PHILIP II AND ALEXANDER THE GREAT
This page intentionally left blank
Philip II and Alexander the Great

Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives

Edited by
ELIZABETH CARNEY and DANIEL OGDEN

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
2010
to William Aarnes and Eriko Ogden
This page intentionally left blank
In July of 1997, A. B. Bosworth and E. B. Baynham convened an international symposium on Alexander the Great at the University of Newcastle (NSW, Australia). The conveners then edited a selection of papers from the conference, *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, published by Oxford University Press in 2000. This conference and publication became a model for what has become a continuing series of symposia focusing on the world and impact of Alexander and involving junior and senior scholars from a variety of academic disciplines, undergraduates and graduates, and the general public. Each symposium has produced a publication. In January 2002, Waldemar Heckel convened a symposium at University of Calgary; he and Lawrence Tritle then edited a collection derived from that meeting, *Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander*, published in 2003. In January of 2005, Professor Heckel again generously sponsored a symposium; he, Lawrence Tritle, and Pat Wheatley edited a collection derived from the second Calgary symposium, *Alexander’s Empire: Formulation to Decay*, published in 2007. In that same year, Pat Wheatley hosted a conference at the University of Otago, New Zealand. He and Robert Hannah coedited a collection of papers related to that meeting; *Alexander and His Successors: Essays from the Antipodes* that Regina Books published in May of 2009. So too the present collection of articles has its origin in an international symposium, “Philip II and Alexander III: Father, Son and *Dunasteia*,” held April 3–5, 2008, at Clemson University in South Carolina. The current manuscript constitutes a selection from the papers delivered at the symposium, though many of these papers now differ markedly from their earlier oral versions. As we write, another Alexander Symposium, convened by Victor Alonso Troncoso, is planned for September 2010 at Universidad de La Coruña, Spain.

Each symposium has differed a bit from the others in focus, or composition, or organization but all have provided invaluable experience for those interested in the world of Alexander and ancient Macedonia, the rare opportunity for specialists ordinarily scattered around the world to talk at length, to bounce ideas off each other, and
for those newly involved in the field to meet and speak to those who have worked in it for many years. The varying venues have added a piquant element to an already rich experience. We remember a lovely afternoon spent wandering the wine country of New South Wales with a somewhat directionally challenged but charming bus driver, a group of Alexander scholars huddled together for warmth as they watched a demonstration of the use of a *sarissa* while Calgary citizens passing by on a Saturday morning gawked and threatened to cause accidents, and an evening of barbecue and blue grass music (but, unfortunately, no strong drink) in a South Carolina restaurant decorated with somewhat obscure football memorabilia.

The symposium could not have happened without generous financial support from four different Clemson University entities: the Department of History and Geography; the College of Art, Architecture, and Humanities; the Office of Research and Economic Development; and the Vending Machine Fund. The staff of the University Madren conference Center/Martin Inn offered invaluable help. Jeannie Davis, Communications Director for the college, designed wonderful posters for the conference. Sheri Stanley, history department administrative assistant, patiently led me through the wilds of state financing, and our administrative specialist, Trish Nigro, worked tirelessly to make sure the minutiae of arrangements worked. Graduate and undergraduate history students helped in many ways, particularly with transport. My department chair, Thomas Kuehn, and my colleagues in the history department did a great deal of work behind the scenes. My husband, William Aarnes, was a wonderful host to thirty-five Alexander scholars and provided back-up service as a designated driver.

I would like to thank our contributors for their hard work and willingness to make deadlines. I am grateful to Stefan Vranka and Oxford University Press for the speed with which this project has proceeded. Above all, I am in debt to my experienced and amazingly efficient coeditor, Daniel Ogden.

Elizabeth Carney
Contents

Contributors, xi
Abbreviations, xv
Introduction, xix

Part I   Father, Son, and Court

1  The “Pixodarus Affair” Reconsidered Again, 3
   Stephen Ruzicka
2  The Bearded King and the Beardless Hero: From Philip II
to Alexander the Great, 13
   Víctor Alonso Troncoso
3  In the Shadow of His Father: Alexander, Hermolaus, and
   the Legend of Philip, 25
   Sabine Müller
4  Philip’s Eurydice in the Philippeum at Olympia, 33
   Olga Palagia
5  Putting Women in Their Place: Women in Public under Philip II
   and Alexander III and the Last Argeads, 43
   Elizabeth Carney
6  The Symposia of Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon: The
   View from Greece, 55
   Frances Pownall

Part II   Philip and Alexander at War

7  Consensus Strategies under Philip and Alexander:
   The Revenge Theme, 69
   Giuseppe Squillace
8  The Asthetairoi: Macedonia’s Hoplites, 81
   Edward M. Anson
9  The Argeads and the Phalanx, 91
   A. B. Bosworth
10 Scythed Chariots at Gaugamela: A Case Study, 103
   Waldemar Heckel, Carolyn Willekes, Graham Wrightson

Part III   After Philip and Alexander: Legacy and Legitimation

11 Cassander and the Legacy of Philip II and Alexander III
   in Diodorus’ Library, 113
   Franca Landucci Gattinoni
12 The Role of the Argeadai in the Legitimation of the Ptolemaic
   Dynasty: Rhetoric and Practice, 123
   Margarita Lianou
13 Hieronymus of Cardia: Causation and Bias from Alexander
   to His Successors, 135
   Joseph Roisman

Part IV   Reception of Father and Son

14 Argead Dunasteia during the Reigns of Philip II and
   Alexander III: Aristotle Reconsidered, 151
   William S. Greenwalt
15 “Worldwide Empire” versus “Glorious Enterprise”: Diodorus
   and Justin on Philip II and Alexander the Great, 165
   Ian Worthington
16 “You Should Never Meet Your Heroes . . .”: Growing Up with
   Alexander, the Valerius Maximus Way, 175
   Diana Spencer
17 His Son’s Father? Philip II in the Second Sophistic, 193
   Sulochana R. Asirvatham
18 Alexander in the Underworld, 205
   Daniel Ogden
19 “And Your Father Sees You”: Paternity in Alexander (2004), 217
   Gideon Nisbet

Notes, 233
Bibliography, 305
Index, 339
Contributors

Edward M. Anson is Professor of History in the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Department of History, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 2801 South University Avenue, Little Rock, AR 72204, USA; emanson@ualr.edu.

Sulochana R. Asirvatham is Associate Professor of Classics and General Humanities at Montclair State University, Montclair State University, 1 Normal Avenue, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA; sulochana.asirvatham@gmail.com.

A. B. Bosworth is Emeritus Professor of Classics and Ancient History at the University of Western Australia and currently Professor of Ancient History at Macquarie University, NSW, and Conjoint Professor of Classics at the University of Newcastle, NSW, Department of Ancient History, W6A 540, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia; brian.bosworth@humn.mq.edu.au.

Elizabeth Carney is Professor of Ancient History and Carol K. Brown Scholar in Humanities at Clemson University, Department of History, Hardin Hall, Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634-0527, USA; elizab@clemson.edu.

Franca Landucci Gattinoni is Associate Professor of Greek History at the Catholic University of Milan, Catholic University of Milan, Largo Gemelli 1, I-20123, Milan, Italy; franca.landucci@unicatt.it.

William S. Greenwalt is Professor of Classics at Santa Clara University, Department of Classics, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA 95053, USA; wgreenwalt@scu.edu.

Waldemar Heckel is Professor of Ancient History at the University of Calgary, Department of Greek and Roman Studies, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive N.W., Calgary, AB, T2N 1N4, Canada.
Margarita Lianou is a PhD candidate in Ancient History at the University of St. Andrews, School of Classics, University of St. Andrews, Swallowgate, Butts Wynd, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, UK; ml47@st-andrews.ac.uk.

Sabine Müller is Lecturer in History at the University of Hannover, Historisches Seminar der Leibniz-Universität Hannover, Im Moore 21, D-30167, Hannover, Germany; sabine.mueller@hist.uni-hannover.de.

Gideon Nisbet is Lecturer in Classics at the University of Birmingham, Institute of Archaeology and Antiquity, Arts Building, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK; g.nisbet@bham.ac.uk.

Daniel Ogden is Professor of Ancient History at the University of Exeter, and Academic Associate in UNISA Classics Department, University of Exeter, EX4 4EF, UK; d.ogden@ex.ac.uk

Olga Palagia is Professor of Classical Archaeology at the University of Athens, Department of Archaeology and Art History, The University of Athens, GR-157 84 Athens, Greece; opalagia@otenet.gr.

Frances Pownall is Professor of Classics at the University of Alberta, Department of History and Classics, Tory Building, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6G 2H4, Canada; frances.pownall@ualberta.ca.

Joseph Roisman is Professor of Classics at Colby College, Classics Department, Colby College, 4160 Mayflower Hill, Waterville, ME 04901, USA; jsroisma@colby.edu.

Stephen Ruzicka is Associate Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of History, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, P.O. Box 26170, Greensboro, NC 27402-6170, USA; sqruzick@uncg.edu.

Diana Spencer is Senior Lecturer in Classics at the University of Birmingham, Institute of Archaeology and Antiquity, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK; D.J.Spencer@bham.ac.uk.

Giuseppe Squillace is a Researcher in Greek History at the University of Calabria, Department of History, Cubo 28D, University of Calabria, 87036, Rende (Cosenza), Italy; giuseppesquillace@libero.it.
Víctor Alonso Troncoso is Professor of Ancient History at the University of La Coruna, Facultad de Humanidades, Campus de Esteiro, 15403 Ferrol, La Coruna, Spain; troncoso@cdf.udc.es.

Carolyn Willekes is a PhD candidate at the University of Calgary, Department of Greek and Roman Studies, University of Calgary, 5th Floor, Social Sciences Building (SS506), 2500 University Drive N.W., Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada.

Ian Worthington is Frederick A. Middlebush Professor of History at the University of Missouri, Department of History, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, USA; worthingtoni@missouri.edu.

Graham Wrightson is a PhD candidate at the University of Calgary, Department of Greek and Roman Studies, University of Calgary, 5th Floor, Social Sciences Building (SS506), 2500 University Drive N.W., Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada; gcwright@ucalgary.ca.
This page intentionally left blank
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Archäologischer Anzeiger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;A</td>
<td>Antike und Abendland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEMTH</td>
<td>Το Αρχαιολογικό Έργο στη Μακεδονία και Θράκη</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHB</td>
<td>Ancient History Bulletin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJA</td>
<td>American Journal of Archaeology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJAH</td>
<td>American Journal of Ancient History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>American Journal of Philology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AncW</td>
<td>Ancient World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AnnPisa</td>
<td>Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Archaeological Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ArchRW</td>
<td>Archiv für Religionswissenschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAtene</td>
<td>Annuario della Scuola archeologica di Atene e delle missioni italiane in Oriente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>Archäologische Zeitung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCH</td>
<td>Bulletin de correspondance hellénique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Annual of the British School at Athens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CahÉtAnc</td>
<td>Cahiers des études anciennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISA</td>
<td>Contributi dell’Istituto di Storia Antica dell’Università del Sacro Cuore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ</td>
<td>Classical Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Classical Philology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Classical Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCA</td>
<td>California Studies in Classical Antiquity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>Classical World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Dialogues d’histoire ancienne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRBS</td>
<td>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G&amp;R</td>
<td>Greece and Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JdI</td>
<td>Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHS</td>
<td>Journal of Hellenic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIES</td>
<td>Journal of Indo-European Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JÖAI</td>
<td>Jahreshefte des österreichischen archäologischen Instituts in Wien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Journal of Roman Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MedArch</td>
<td>Mediterranean Archaeology: Australian and New Zealand journal for the archaeology of the Mediterranean world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGR</td>
<td>Miscellanea greca e romana: studi pubblicati dall’Istituto italiano per la storia antica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Madrider Mitteilungen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCPS</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Parola del Passato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCCM</td>
<td>Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RÉA</td>
<td>Revue des études anciennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RÉG</td>
<td>Revue des études grecques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RÉL</td>
<td>Revue des études latines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RendIstLomb</td>
<td>Rendiconti. Istituto Lombardo, Accademia di scienze e lettere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFIC</td>
<td>Rivista di filologia e d’istruzione classica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RivStorIt</td>
<td>Rivista storica italiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Rivista storica dell’antichità</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SB  Preisigke, F., et al. (eds.) 1915–. *Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Aegypten.* 21+ vols. Strassburg, etc.

SEG  Hondius, J. J. E., et al. (eds.) 1923–. *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.* Amsterdam and Leiden.

SHA  Scriptores Historiae Augustae


TAPA  *Transactions of the American Philological Association*


Introduction

The careers of Philip II and his son Alexander the Great (III) were interlocked in innumerable ways in their own lifetimes: Philip II centralized ancient Macedonia, created an army of unprecedented skill and flexibility, came to dominate the Greek peninsula, and planned the invasion of the Persian Empire with a combined Graeco-Macedonian force, but it was his son Alexander who actually led the invading forces, defeated the great Persian Empire, took his army to the borders of modern India, and created a monarchy and empire that, despite its fragmentation, shaped the political, cultural, and religious world of the Hellenistic era. Alexander drove the engine his father had built, but had he not done so, Philip’s achievements might have proved as ephemeral as had those of so many earlier Macedonian rulers. On the other hand, some scholars believe that Alexander played a role, direct or indirect, in the murder of his father, so that he could lead the expedition to Asia that his father had organized.

In short, it is difficult to understand or assess one man without considering the other. This seems to have been so from the start. Alexander himself tended both to imitate his father and react against his policies, to define himself as both another Philip and as an anti-Philip. Certainly their contemporaries seemed unable to think of the accomplishments of one without thinking of the other and making comparisons. Hellenic culture generally was intensely and fundamentally competitive. This was particularly true for the Macedonian elite whose culture and values were self-consciously Homeric. The aretē ethic, which defined excellence only comparatively—one needed to be not simply good but better than anyone else—inevitably led to a kind of contest in the minds of the contemporaries of the two kings about which was better, as a king, as a general, as a person. Succeeding generations were heirs to this contest, as our extant sources demonstrate. This collection, therefore, looks at the careers and impact of both father and son. Some of the articles consider only one of the Macedonian rulers although most deal with both, and with the relationship, actual or imagined, between the two. Whatever the focus
of individual articles, the collected group forces the reader to look at the two men together.

In addition to providing the reader with a dual assessment of two historical figures whose actions and impact were vast, this collection intentionally casts a wider net than Alexander history and Macedonian history have often done. There are certainly articles on military and political history, the areas that have been the bread and butter of the field for many years, but there are also articles that look at the self-generated public images of Philip and Alexander, the counter images created by their enemies, and a number that look at how later periods understood them. All of our surviving sources date from the Roman era and many of them are the product of or were influenced by the Second Sophistic. The Alexander Romance, in its many forms, is a kind of repository of all the different traditions from the ancient world about Alexander and Philip transmuted by subsequent eras’ perceptions. The collection concludes with a look at the relationship of father and son as depicted in another sort of romance, that of Oliver Stone.

We have divided the collection into four parts. The first is “Father, Son, and Court.” Stephen Ruzicka, in “The ‘Pixodarus Affair’ Reconsidered Again,” turns analysis of an episode usually considered in terms of internal Macedonian domestic politics, placed after Alexander’s return from self-imposed exile, and seen as proof of continued tension between father and son, on its head. He examines it in an international context, as part of Philip’s preliminary diplomatic efforts for his expedition, puts the incident during Alexander’s absence from Macedonia, and argues that it in fact caused the formal reconciliation between father and son. Víctor Alonso Troncoso, in “The Bearded King and the Beardless Hero: From Philip to Alexander,” reflects on how the clean-shaven, long-haired image of Alexander was a self-conscious rejection of the bearded image of his father and earlier kings and on how subsequent rulers chose between or sometimes combined these two images of kingship, images with sexual, dynastic, and ethnic reverberations. Sabine Müller’s “In the Shadow of His Father: Alexander, Hermolaus, and the Legend of Philip” explores the way in which the legend of Philip II (rather than the historical Philip), originally a source of strength for his son, became a threat to his continued rule and the acceptance of his policies. She observes that whereas Philip himself had begun Alexander’s move to a more absolute and even Persian monarchy, a move that limited the power of the elite, many of his former officers chose to remember Philip as the ideal traditional king and to use that ahistorical iconic image against his own son. Olga Palagia, in “Philip’s Eurydice in the Philippeum at Olympia,” rejects the usual identification of the woman called “Eurydice” that
was once one of the five that stood in the Philippeum, as the mother of Philip II, and argues instead that it was that of Philip’s last wife, commonly called Cleopatra but also referred to as Eurydice. This, she concludes, means that the Philippeum was both a monument to polygamy (since both Olympias and Cleopatra were depicted) and to a compromise Philip was attempting to maintain between the forces of Olympias and Alexander on one hand and those of Cleopatra and her guardian Attalus on the other. Elizabeth Carney, in “Putting Women in Their Place: Women in Public under Philip II, Alexander III and the Last Argeads,” attempts to determine to what degree royal women, as well as their avatars (like their images in the Philippeum), were part of the staging of monarchy for both father and son and actually interacted with the rest of the court. The last chapter in this section is Frances Pownall’s “The Symposia of Philip II and Alexander III: The View from Greece.” It examines the ways in which Greeks made rhetorical use of Macedonian court symposia to demonstrate Greek virtue and Macedonian vice.

The next section, “Philip and Alexander at War,” covers the most traditional area of scholarship but includes papers that do not necessarily take a traditional approach. The section begins with a piece on the war rhetoric of Philip and Alexander, Giuseppe Squillace’s “Consensus Strategies under Philip and Alexander: The Revenge Theme.” He points out the ways in which both kings used myth and mythic revenge to unite Greek and Macedonian forces in combined operations. Edward M. Anson, in “The Astheteroi: Macedonia’s Hoplites,” focuses on the origin of this term and the nature of the troops who bore this title, but also uses this particular problem to consider the overall makeup and armament of the army and how it changed over time. The theme of change is central to A. B. Bosworth’s, “The Argeads and the Phalanx.” He traces the evolving nature of the phalanx in terms of its relationship to the kings but suggests that the critical moment, both militarily and politically, was the role of the phalanx in the victory of 358 against the Illyrians under Bardylis, a force that had threatened the continued existence of the Macedonian kingdom. Waldemar Heckel, Carolyn Willekes, and Graham Wrightson take a specific issue, “Scythed Chariots at Gaugamela: A Case Study,” as an exemplum of their new approach to the study of infantry warfare, one which employs experimentation to understand the practicalities of maneuvers by infantry units.

The third part of the book, “After Philip and Alexander: Legacy and Legitimation,” looks at the immediate fate of the kings’ legacies in the hands of the Successors, and the Successors’ attempts to derive their own legitimacy from the pair. In “Cassander and the Legacy of
Philip II and Alexander III in Diodorus’ *Library,*” Franca Landucci Gattinoni reconstructs the circumstances surrounding the demise of the last of the Argeads and the claims made by the Successors keen to supplant them. She exposes the attempts of Cassander on the one hand to legitimate his position by projecting himself as a successor to Philip II, whilst Demetrius Poliorcetes strove rather to project himself as successor to Alexander the Great. In “The Role of the Argeadai in the Legitimation of the Ptolemaic Dynasty: Rhetoric and Practice,” Margarita Lianou evaluates the impact of the Argead legacy on the foundation, formation, self-presentation, and above all self-legitimation of the Ptolemaic dynasty. While Ptolemy’s appropriation of the imagery and indeed the very person of Alexander in the promotion of his kingdom, his city, and his self-projection as a ruler are widely recognized, Lianou draws attention also to his rather distinct exploitation of the figure of Philip in this regard. In “Hieronymus of Cardia: Causation and Bias from Alexander to His Successors,” Joseph Roisman looks at Hieronymus’ presentation (as reflected in Diodorus, again) of the least typical of the Successors, his friend and compatriot Eumenes of Cardia. As a non-Macedonian, Eumenes could make little direct claim on the Argead legacy. But Hieronymus found other means to enhance Eumenes’ claim to rule: first an elitist differentiation of Eumenes and the Macedonian Successors on the one hand from the common soldiery on the other, and secondly the repeated imputation of insincerity to his rival Successors.

The fourth part of the book, “Reception of Father and Son” looks at the intellectual and literary responses, immediate and remote, of the reigns and achievements of Philip and Alexander, responses that directly and indirectly govern the way we think about them still today. Many of the texts concerned take a particular interest in the relationship between the two men. In “Argead Dunasteia during the Reigns of Philip II and Alexander III,” William S. Greenwalt returns to the curiosity that, despite his intimacy with the Macedonian courts of Philip and Alexander, Aristotle did not incorporate any explicit discussion of the Macedonian constitution into his *Politics.* Greenwalt contends that Aristotle declined to speak openly about these matters because of personal risk, but that he did nonetheless offer a discreet treatment of the Macedonian constitution under the head of his fifth variety of kingship, absolute kingship of the *oikos* (“house”) sort, a variety to which no concrete examples, surprisingly, are attached. In “‘Worldwide Empire’ versus ‘Glorious Enterprise’: Diodorus and Justin on Philip II and Alexander the Great,” Ian Worthington looks at these authors’ comparative evaluations of the achievements of Philip and Alexander, both of which are entangled in complex traditions. It is
Worthington’s contention that the imports of the two evaluations have been misread by scholars, and that in both cases the authors actually judged the achievements and personality of the father to be superior to those of the son. In “‘You Should Never Meet Your Heroes’: Growing Up with Alexander, the Valerius Maximus Way,” Diana Spencer examines Valerius’ nuanced reception of the figure and imagery of Alexander. The fact that Alexander had left no dynasty of his own to follow after him facilitated Valerius’ pliable appropriation of him both as a quasi ancestor for the Romans and at the same time as a quasi ancestor for the enemies of their state, such as Hannibal. It is particularly in the context of his relationship with his father Philip that Valerius makes Alexander tack between positive and negative poles in his role as exemplar, between the more pius (“respectful”) and the less, between the more Roman and the less Roman. In “His Son’s Father? Philip II in the Second Sophistic,” Sulochana R. Asirvatham offers a calibrated critique of the reception of the Philip-Alexander pair as father and son in three Greek authors of the period: Dio, Plutarch, and Arrian. Hellenistic writers had tended to lionize Philip at the expense of Alexander, but that changed with the arrival of the Second Sophistic. For these authors Alexander constituted a readily exploitable figure of mediation and negotiation between their own Greek culture, values, education, and philosophy, on the one hand, and the militaristic monarchy under which they found themselves living, on the other. As such, the paradigmatic figure of Alexander, which the figure of Philip often helped to define by way of foil, could be used as a means of urging emperors towards the adoption and promotion of civilized values. In “Alexander in the Underworld,” Daniel Ogden asks whether, given the emphatic heroization and mythologization of Alexander in much of the tradition, that staple of heroic narrative, the katabasis, the visit to the underworld in life, was ever bestowed upon Alexander. He finds traces of katabasis imagery behind a pair of potentially related narratives that also exploit father-son motifs: the Alexander Romance’s account of Alexander’s journey to the Land of the Blessed, and the account, found in Diodorus and Curtius, of Alexander’s capture of the rock of Aornus. Finally, Gideon Nisbet brings the story of the reception of the Philip-Alexander relationship right up to date with a study of Oliver Stone’s film Alexander in “‘And Your Father Sees You’: Paternity in Alexander (2004).” Nisbet reads the portrayal of the tortured, love-hate relationship between the father and the son who denies him in Stone’s film as a reflexive commentary upon the film’s tortured relationship with its own, similarly denied, cinematic parent, Robert Rossen’s Alexander the Great of 1956.
PART I

Father, Son, and Court
The “Pixodarus Affair” Reconsidered Again

Stephen Ruzicka

Plutarch presents the so-called “Pixodarus affair” as an illustration of the disorders in the Macedonian royal household involving tensions between Philip and Alexander which Alexander’s mother Olympias made worse (Alex. 9.3, 10.1–3).

After Pixodarus, the satrap of Caria, trying to slip into a military alliance [symmachia] with Philip by means of a marriage relationship, wished to give his eldest daughter in marriage to Arrhidaeus the son of Philip, and sent Aristocritus to Macedonia on this errand, once more slanderous stories kept coming to Alexander from his friends and his mother, who said that Philip, by means of a brilliant marriage and great to-do, was trying to settle the kingdom upon Arrhidaeus. Greatly disturbed by these stories, Alexander sent Thessalus, the tragic actor, to Caria, to argue with Pixodarus that since [Arrhidaeus] was baseborn and also not of sound mind, he should switch his marriage connection to Alexander. And this plan was vastly more pleasing to Pixodarus than the former. But Philip, becoming aware of this, went to Alexander’s chamber, taking with him one of Alexander’s friends and companions, Philotas the son of Parmenio, and upbraided his son severely, and bitterly reviled him as ignoble and unworthy of his high estate, in that he desired to become the son-in-law of a man who was a Carian and a slave to a barbarian king. And as for Thessalus, Philip wrote to the Corinthians that they should send him back to Macedonia in chains. Moreover, of the other companions [hetairoi] of Alexander, he banished from Macedonia Harpalus and Nearchus, as well as Erigyius and Ptolemy, men whom Alexander afterwards recalled and had in the highest honors.¹

Following Plutarch, modern scholars have typically investigated and used this story to shed light on Philip’s domestic situation.² If, however, we look beyond the court politics aspect of the affair, we can see that the story is also about diplomacy—about an attempt by
Philip and Pixodarus to establish a political relationship of some kind. I want to reexamine the Pixodarus affair in terms of this Philip-Pixodarus relationship, rather than the Philip-Alexander relationship—though I will deal with that as well.

It is helpful to bring Pixodarus a little more clearly and carefully into focus. Plutarch’s report of Philip’s characterization of Pixodarus as a mere Carian and “slave to a barbarian king” has colored modern characterizations, both in the attitude of dismissive disparagement and in the particular terms—“petty ruler,” “minor official,” “princeling”—often chosen to describe Pixodarus. Given our retrospective perspective, this is not surprising. Unprecedented achievement and glory lay with Philip and his offspring Alexander. Pixodarus was the dead end of his dynasty, the Hecatomnids, whose political and military achievements left no lasting legacy and whose memory was preserved largely because of the dynastic tomb monument built by Pixodarus’ siblings Mausolus and Artemisia.

But if we want to recapture something of Philip’s likely view of things, we need to understand his own experience of the Hecatomnids and Pixodarus in particular. First, the Hecatomnids were, at the time of Philip’s early monarchy, the grandest of dynastic families in the Aegean/eastern Mediterranean worlds. As hellenizers, especially to Mausolus, Pixodarus’ older brother, the Hecatomnids far outstripped such contemporary philhellenes as the Evagorids of Cypriot Salamis or Strato of Sidon. But even more, the Hecatomnids outstripped the others in terms of military strength and political clout. From Mausolus’ time onward, they maintained a standing mercenary army in Caria and a ready fleet, comprising scores of ships, based at Mausolus’ splendid capital Halicarnassus (Xen. Ages. 2.26; Diod. 16.7.3, 43.7). Numerous Greek cities came within their orbit, including sites as distant from Halicarnassus as Byzantium. Mausolus, joining with cities such as Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium during the Social War, had effectively pushed the Athenian war fleet out of the Aegean in the mid-350s (Dem. 15.3; Diod. 16.21.1–4). In the mid-340s Isocrates, in his letter to Philip, had depicted Idrieus, Mausolus’ successor and another of Pixodarus’ older brothers, as “the most prosperous of those in Asia” (Phil. 5.102), a description that could undoubtedly be applied as well to Pixodarus (and in fact seems reflected in the characterization of the proposed Hecatomnid marriage as “brilliant”).

Philip himself had a history with Pixodarus. Attacking Perinthus in 340, Philip had been repelled by Persian support for the city. This was, Diodorus reports, the result of Artaxerxes III’s order that his “satraps on the coast” use all their resources to aid Perinthus (Diod. 16.74.2–75.2; Paus. 1.29.7; Arr. Anab. 2.14.5). Pixodarus was surely
one of the “satraps on the coast”; possibly, given his ready fleet and military force, the leading such satrap, and he (meaning his troops, not necessarily Pixodarus personally) certainly participated in the successful defense of Perinthus which denied Philip a base at the threshold of northwestern Anatolia. When Philip then turned to Byzantium, he faced maritime opposition from (in addition to Athens) Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, all of which might be seen as “Hecatomnid states” (as a result of the alliances established by Mausolus at the time of the Social War) behind whose engagement lay Pixodarus’ hand. Once again, such support compelled Philip to break off operations (Diod. 16.75.2–77.3). In other words, Philip had been effectively pushed away from the Hellespont and potential crossing points to Asia very recently, and in both cases Pixodarus may have been the figure most responsible for Philip’s failure (Diod. 16.77.3).

Philip was thorough and unhurried in his preparations for his great Persian War, and we may be sure that he considered and tried to deal with all foreseeable obstacles, political and military, domestic and foreign. As Philip developed his plans for his Persian War during 337 and looked eastward, he saw four officials in western Anatolia who might singly or jointly oppose any Macedonian advance. Two were Persian—Arsites at Dascyleion and Spithridates at Sardis (Arr. Anab. 1.12.8; cf. Diod. 17.19.4). Two were non-Persian—the Rhodian Memnon, who took over an archê (dominion) in the Troad after his brother Mentor’s death, and Pixodarus, dynast and satrap of Caria. Artaxerxes III’s recent murder, probably in November of 338, and ensuing instability at the Persian court made it unlikely either Arsites or Spithridates would raise great forces on their own, for fear of inciting suspicions about their political aims and allegiances. Among the satraps and officials in western Anatolia, Memnon was perhaps best positioned to block Philip’s entry into Anatolia across the Hellespont. But along with his brother-in-law, the former Persian satrap Artabazus, Memnon had lived in Macedonia for more than a decade after the collapse of Artabazus’ revolt in 352 (before being granted amnesty by Artaxerxes III as favor to Mentor in gratitude for Mentor’s role in reconquest of Egypt (Diod. 16.52.3)). Philip could likely expect that Memnon would not move to oppose him.

That left Pixodarus, Philip’s putative nemesis in 340. With his standing army and fleet he had ready resources. As a non-Persian he need not worry that his military strength would be seen as a political problem, so he could deploy army and fleet if he chose. He had previously shown himself a dutiful Persian official when Philip approached imperial territory in 340. What would he do in the present situation? Most likely, Philip could not be sure. Some eight or nine years earlier,
at a time of apparent Persian weakness with both Phoenician and Cypriot cities (as well as Egypt) in revolt, Isocrates had predicted to Philip that Idrieus, Pixodarus’ brother and predecessor, chafing under tribute demands, would break with Artaxerxes at the first signal from Philip (Phil. 5.102). Idrieus, however, ultimately proved himself loyal, even in these circumstances, and sent troops and ships to Artaxerxes to quell the revolts on Cyprus (Diod. 16.42.3).

It is improbable that Philip would decide simply to take his chances with Pixodarus. Despite Plutarch’s seeming evidence that it was Pixodarus who approached Philip with a marriage proposal, we may plausibly suspect that as part of his planning and preparation for his Persian war, Philip initiated contact with Pixodarus. Plutarch, interested in ensuing events only insofar as they involved disorders in the royal household, had no need to include in his account of Philip’s and Pixodarus’ dealings any information about strategic or diplomatic considerations on Philip’s part. He simply begins with the notice of Pixodarus sending Aristocritus to Philip in Macedon to try “by means of a marriage relationship to slip into a military alliance with Philip” and to that end offering his daughter as marriage partner for Arrhidaeus. In fact, Plutarch’s notice of Aristocritus’ involvement may be the best indication that Philip started things. The name Aristocritus appears again, tantalizingly alongside that of Thessalus, as one of the actors performing during the great celebration at Susa in 324 (Athen. 12.538–39 = Chares FGrH 125 F4). It does not strain credulity to identify the Aristocritus and Thessalus who functioned as envoys in the Pixodarus affair and the Aristocritus and Thessalus of 324 as the same figures and to see them as originally part of the Macedonian court entertainment staff under Philip, inherited, and used also by Alexander (Thessalus at Tyre and in Egypt: Plut. Alex. 29.4; Arr. Anab. 3.1.4). This would then make it likely that Aristocritus was originally Philip’s envoy and that before Aristocritus was sent by Pixodarus to Philip he had been sent by Philip to Pixodarus. That is, before the story, as it starts in Plutarch with Pixodarus’ dispatch of Aristocritus to Pella, is a story of Philip’s earlier approach and preliminary diplomacy. The critical significance of Pixodarus’ stance for Philip’s campaign plans makes it likely that Philip attended to this matter early in his planning, most probably during 337.

If we may plausibly conclude that Philip initiated contact with Pixodarus through Aristocritus, can we also conclude that it was Philip rather than Pixodarus who proposed the marriage between Pixodarus’ daughter (Ada) and Arrhidaeus? That is, did Aristocritus travel to Caria armed with a marriage offer involving Arrhidaeus or did Pixodarus introduce the idea of a marriage to cement an alliance
proposed by Philip? Given Philip’s longstanding practice of fighting war through marriage (Satyrus *ap. Ath. 13.557*), political marriages clearly formed part of Philip’s diplomatic arsenal. Moreover, the story of Olympias and Alexander’s friends spurring Alexander on by insisting that Philip was trying to bring Arrhidæa to the kingship by means of a brilliant marriage seems to rest on the assumption that Philip was promoting the marriage. Before starting his campaign, Philip actually had little to offer Pixodarus, except perhaps promises of immunity. Pixodarus likely needed more than that to take the great risk of breaking with Persia. Pixodarus might have been a “slave to a barbarian king” but such slavery had been very rewarding for the Hecatomnids and for Pixodarus himself, whose realm included not only Caria but now also Lycia, thanks to Persian favor. Isocrates had naively (but very much in Greek fashion) claimed in his letter to Philip in 346 that Philip would induce many satraps to throw off the king’s power “if you promise them ‘freedom’ and broadcast over Asia that word which, when sown among Hellenes, has broken up both our [Athenian] empire and that of the Lacedaemonians” (*Phil. 5.104*). Philip certainly knew better. More than words were necessary.

It seems highly probable, then, that Philip himself made the offer of marriage which would link the two realms. Philip undoubtedly knew something of Pixodarus’ particular circumstances. As dynast/satrap Pixodarus had usurped the position of his sister Ada, the widow of his brother Idries, who was now ensconced in quasi-royal state at Alinda in Caria (*Arr. Anab. 1.23.8*). Pixodarus had no sons and was himself probably beyond middle age (he would in fact die a year or so after this, seemingly of natural causes: *Diod. 16.74.1–2*). Philip may have anticipated that Pixodarus would see a marriage which linked Philip’s and Pixodarus’ families and made a son of Philip the consort of Pixodarus’ daughter Ada as the best means of guaranteeing the long term interests of his immediate family against the claims of his sister Ada. And, indeed, once we see the episode with which Plutarch begins his account of the Pixodarus affair—Pixodarus’ sending of Aristocritus to Macedonia with an offer of marriage to Pixodarus’ daughter—as properly an indication of Pixodarus’ response to Philip’s original marriage offer, we can see (unsurprisingly) that Philip calculated well: Pixodarus welcomed and accepted the proposed marriage alliance.

Now we can turn to the bearing of the Pixodarus affair on the question of Philip and Alexander’s relationship. Plutarch presents the Pixodarus affair as the second of the royal domestic disorders involving quarrels between Philip and Alexander. The first was the confrontation at the wedding of Philip to Cleopatra when Cleopatra’s
uncle and guardian Attalus drunkenly proposed that the Macedonians pray that Philip and Cleopatra would produce a legitimate successor. Philip had tried to attack Alexander after his outraged son had cursed and thrown his cup at Attalus. Alexander then fled Macedonia along with Olympias, leaving her in her native Epirus and himself continuing to Illyria (Plut. Alex. 9.4–5; cf. Ath. 557d–e; Just. 9.7.2–5). Plutarch does not say how long Alexander’s Illyrian sojourn lasted, writing only that Alexander “passed time there.” According to Plutarch, ultimately Philip was persuaded to bring Alexander back to Macedonia after Demaratus, the Corinthian xenos (guest-friend) of the Argead house (Artax. 37.3), admonished Philip for having filled his house with such great stasis and troubles. Demaratus himself seems to have journeyed to Illyria to accomplish Alexander’s return (Plut. Alex. 9.6).

Having reported Alexander’s return from Illyria, Plutarch turns next to the Pixodarus affair, starting with the notice of Pixodarus’ (supposed) marriage proposal (Artax. 10.1–3). Plutarch presents the arrival of Aristocrates, the troubling reports to Alexander by his friends and mother, Alexander’s offer of himself as bridegroom, Philip’s discovery of this, and Philip’s angry and punitive response as a quickly unfolding sequence of events. The culminating scene—Philip’s confrontation with Alexander in Alexander’s chamber—clearly took place at Pella, and at first glance it seems natural to infer that the whole sequence of events took place at Pella and thus only after Alexander returned from Illyria. Closer consideration, however, suggests that this was not the case. The proposed marriage might indeed have been a splendid one, but if there had been reconciliation between Philip and Alexander, it certainly included affirmation of Alexander’s status as heir apparent, so it is impossible to understand in these circumstances Olympias’, Alexander’s friends’, and ultimately Alexander’s belief that Arrhidaeus’ and Ada’s proposed marriage meant that Philip planned to settle the kingdom on Arrhidaeus. Beyond this, if Alexander was at Pella, it is hard to understand why he depended on reports from his friends and his mother to alert him to developments at court.

However, on the assumption that the Pixodarus affair (meaning both Philip’s and Alexander’s dealings with Pixodarus) unfolded while Alexander was alienated from Philip and in residence in Illyria, Alexander’s reaction and his actions are perfectly plausible. If the wedding which precipitated Alexander’s (and Olympias’) flight occurred in late summer or early autumn of 337, Alexander may have been in Illyria for many months. Philip was concerned with preparations for his Persian War during this time. This was planned
to begin in spring of 336 with the dispatch of an advance force to Anatolia commanded by Parmenio and Attalus (Diod. 16.91.2). Given the bitter enmity between Alexander and Attalus, Philip may have been satisfied with Alexander’s extended absence during this period. Philip’s agenda in 337 included clarifying Pixodarus’ stance and, if possible, entering into an alliance with him (cemented by a marriage). This was a critical matter, and from Philip’s perspective Alexander’s whereabouts had no particular bearing on it. We may easily believe that Philip proceeded with preparation tasks and dispatched Aristo- critus to Caria late in 337 or early in 336 to negotiate with Pixodarus while Alexander “passed time” in Illyria.

If indeed Alexander was outside Macedonia at the time he sent Thessalus as envoy to Pixodarus in reaction to Philip’s move, then Alexander’s offer of himself as groom constituted something more than an effort to replace Arrhidæus in the arrangement negotiated by Philip. Macedonian kings arranged marriages for themselves and their offspring. Alexander’s marriage diplomacy thus represented a usurpation of Philip’s royal prerogative and an assertion of Alexander’s independent status. Plutarch says that Pixodarus was much more pleased by this proposal than by the previous one (Alex. 10.2), but this is certainly Plutarch’s own inference based on the subsequent stature of Alexander. At the moment Alexander was actually an out of favor, possibly rival, member of the royal household, making personal approaches which, without Philip’s approval, meant nothing. Pixodarus can only have been troubled by the evidence of court problems that Alexander’s independent diplomacy indicated. In fact, he may have concluded that the evident division boded ill for Philip’s campaign plans since Alexander’s challenge might keep Philip from leaving Macedonia with a large army for some time. It is entirely likely that Pixodarus did not jump to accept Alexander’s proposal.

We may see then that Alexander’s Illyrian sojourn was more than just a self-imposed absence from court. He certainly could have stayed with Olympias in Epirus after fleeing Macedonia. Instead he took himself to Illyria—into perennially anti-Macedonian territory—where he could likely gain immediate backing for an effort against Philip. In Epirus, Olympias was reportedly urging her brother (Alexander) to make war on Philip (Just. 9.7.7), certainly to install her son Alexander as king. Alexander would add Illyrians to such an enterprise.

In other words, the Macedonian royal house had fractured into two parts. Whether or not Alexander would actually have invaded Macedonia, we cannot know. But he was evidently perfectly willing to imperil Philip’s Persian campaign plans by stirring up troubles on Philip’s western and northwestern frontiers and by disrupting Philip’s
efforts to ally with Pixodarus to clear the way for uncontested entry into Anatolia. There may have been more. Philip’s response to Alexander’s actions (after Alexander returned to Pella) included sending orders to Corinth to have Thessalus, Alexander’s diplomatic agent, arrested and sent to Macedonia in chains). Two questions arise. What was Thessalus doing in Corinth and how did Philip know where he was? To answer the latter first, we may note that, according to Plutarch (Alex. 9.6), Alexander’s and Philip’s reconciliation was initiated by Demaratus of Corinth, who warned Philip about stasis in the royal house.

Meanwhile, Demaratus the Corinthian, who was a guest-friend of the [Argead] house and a man of frank speech, came to Philip. After the first greetings and welcomes were over, Philip asked him how the Greeks were agreeing with one another, and Demaratus replied: “It is surely very fitting, Philip, that you should be concerned about Greece, when you have filled your own house with such great stasis and evils.” Thus brought to his senses, Philip sent and fetched Alexander home, having persuaded him to come through the agency of Demaratus.23

Plutarch places this after his report of Alexander’s flight following the fracas at Philip and Cleopatra’s wedding and before his narrative of the Pixodarus affair, seeming to indicate that Demaratus’ intervention and Alexander’s return occurred before Philip or at least Alexander got involved with Pixodarus. However, if we are correct in placing Philip and Alexander’s dealings with Pixodarus during Alexander’s self-exile or, to put it another way, before Alexander’s return to Pella, then Demaratus’ meeting with Philip and his subsequent accomplishment of Alexander’s return must come after Alexander, via Thessalus, proposed himself as bridegroom for Pixodarus’ daughter. Knowing that Thessalus was in Corinth following his visit to Caria, we may plausibly conjecture that Demaratus, coming from Corinth to Pella, brought Philip the news of Thessalus’ whereabouts. We may further conjecture that Demaratus had learned of Alexander’s and Thessalus’ activities from Thessalus himself at Corinth. Returning from Caria, Thessalus may have stopped at Corinth and then waited there for a response by Pixodarus, who, given his confusion, had probably not responded immediately to Alexander. With Alexander in Illyria, there was no reason for Thessalus to travel to Macedonia. Conceivably, Demaratus learned or suspected that Thessalus had additional diplomatic tasks in Greece aimed at gaining Greek support for Alexander. While Thessalus tarried at Corinth, Demaratus may have hastened to
Pella to alert Philip to Alexander’s independent and treasonous activities.²⁴

Philip’s only option in these circumstances was to put a swift halt to Thessalus’ activities by ordering his arrest and to try to bring Alexander (and probably Olympias²⁵) back to Pella as quickly as possible to restore the unity of the royal household.²⁶ Demaratus evidently performed a further great service in managing this, at least in the case of Alexander. Although Justin (9.7.6) does not mention Demaratus, his report that the reconciliation was achieved only with great difficulty and that Alexander was “barely persuaded to return by the entreaties of his relatives” attests not only Demaratus’ effectiveness but also Alexander’s nearly insurmountable alienation. Undoubtedly an interview between Philip and Alexander took place on Alexander’s return. It was quite probably an angry one, but it is hardly plausible that in their confrontation Philip made the remarks Plutarch attributes to him deprecating marriage to a Carian and a slave to a “barbarian king” as unworthy of Alexander’s high estate (Alex. 9.3). (This seems, rather, to be Plutarch’s way of making a contrasting pair out of the two quarrels between Philip and Alexander that he describes by having the issue be differing assessments of Alexander’s lineage.)²⁷ If Philip discussed Alexander’s lineage at all on his return, it was in connection with Philip’s insistence on Alexander’s high and unchallengeable standing as his successor. Philip, however, dismantled Alexander’s entourage, exiling the hetairoi who constituted in effect Alexander’s own court elite.²⁸

The Pixodarus affair did not produce a marriage. But if we see the affair as following and growing out of the rupture at Philip’s wedding celebration, the affair produced—compelled, we might say—the reunification of the royal household. For Alexander, the affair led to renewed confirmation of his status as heir apparent. But it may have been too late. Alexander had seen in recent months that Philip could proceed entirely without him. At the same time, Alexander had asserted his own kingship (albeit briefly and outside Macedonia). For Alexander, the lesson of all this may have been that neither he nor Philip truly needed each other. Consequently, despite his return to Pella, there may have been for Alexander no real rapprochement with Philip, but rather a shift in tactics in his effort to secure the kingship of Macedon, leading in a matter of months to Philip’s murder by Pausanias.²⁹
This page intentionally left blank
The Bearded King and the Beardless Hero

From Philip II to Alexander the Great

Víctor Alonso Troncoso

Having the beard came into fashion under Alexander the Great, who introduced it, and the royal portraiture of the Hellenistic age clearly illustrates this novelty. Oddly enough, the overwhelming majority of ancient authors omit this important change in the image of the king, in spite of the fact that the same sources do not forget to mention the distinctive features of Alexander’s physical appearance. Diodorus, Curtius, and Arrian refer to the bodily stature of the Macedonian, while Plutarch speaks at length about his physiognomy: crooked neck, melting eyes, fair color, sweet-smelling skin, virile demeanor, and leonine mane with anastolē, and so on. Plutarch’s comments on Alexander’s appearance reflect, in a way, the physiognomic consciousness that permeated the Greco-Roman thought world and they would probably have been very interesting for the speculations of a Lavater, but for our research this kind of information turns out to be as useful as it is puzzling. Only Athenaeus (13.565a), who relies on the Hellenistic philosopher Chrysippus, notices the innovation in royal faces from Alexander onwards: “The custom of shaving the beard increased under Alexander, although the foremost men did not follow it.” Athenaeus might have quoted the stoic thinker because the latter’s remark fitted his own iconographic memories of the great Macedonian well, since he was portrayed by sculptors and painters as a beardless figure. In any event, the comment about the shaving habits of the Argead does not come from any of the Alexander historians, but from an Athenian philosophical school that was not very well disposed to the king’s political personality. No doubt the prótoi of Chrysippus were meant to be above all Greek politicians and intellectuals, not the Diadochi or the philosopher’s contemporary Hellenistic kings. Furthermore, if classical authors correctly pointed out two characteristics of Alexander’s hairstyle as given by many artists, the leonine mane and the cowlick over the forehead, they nonetheless failed to appreciate the peculiarity of his long hair, which had no precedent in the person of his father, nor real appeal for the Successors. In other words, although
the iconographic repertoire available to them was considerably richer than the one extant today, ancient critics and historians do not seem to have understood the uniqueness of Alexander’s image within the dynastic sequence of Hellenistic times.8

But let us start at the beginning of this story, when Alexander still lived under the shadow of his father. I have argued elsewhere that the heir presumptive did not receive a distinctive treatment in the fine arts.9 Contrary to the practice of modern European monarchies, the figure of the crown prince was not institutionalized in Macedonian and Hellenistic history, and therefore, corresponding iconography did not develop either. The son of Philip was not an exception to that rule and his two youthful portraits, sculptures dated by most scholars around or shortly after 340, confirm this.10 In the Acropolis-Erbach type,11 whose model might have been a bronze statue commissioned by the Athenians after Chaeronea,12 Alexander is portrayed as a Greek ephebe and, of course, he is beardless. This Athenian exemplar follows the polis tradition: it is a role portrait, as Pollitt has defined the category,13 one inspired by the contemporary Attic gravestones and statues in the round, with Alexander cast in the role of a youthful Athenian citizen, politically acceptable and void of inner complexity. The second type, known as the Dresden Alexander,14 has almost universally been ascribed to Lysippus or at least to his circle. This head with a virile and leonine look is far from the inoffensive and soft Athenian Alexander or, say, from the idealized pupil of Aristotle at Mieza, who so well fitted Peripatetic correctness. The Alexander portrayed seems to be, rather, the most capable cavalry commander at Chaeronea, if not yet the prince ready to sit on the Macedonian throne and to undertake the Asiatic campaign.

Then, if the “Alcibiades” type is in reality a mature version of the Acropolis-Erbach Alexander, representing his father Philip,15 and if this “Alcibiades”/Philip is also a copy of the other bronze statue made in about 338,16 the beard here can only express the natural difference of age and status between a mature man and a young man, between a father and his son, and perhaps implicitly between the king and his successor. It is more than tempting to suppose that the chryselephantine (or marble) group by Leochares in the Philippeum (Paus. 5.20.10), a work perhaps completed at the time of Philip’s murder, repeated the same contrast, with the mature monarch wearing a beard and the heir apparent portrayed as younger, smaller, and beardless.17 Philip, no doubt, had moustache and beard, thus continuing a royal tradition that went back to the ancestral times of the dynasty. For that reason his father, Amyntas III, must have been represented exhibiting an unshaven face in the Philippeum.18 A similar iconographic pattern is
supposed to have been displayed in the marble group of nine statues offered by Daochus II at Delphi (c. 337–32). The donor is likely to have been featured sporting a beard, whereas his son and successor, Sisyphus II, would have appeared clean shaven. This difference in the treatment of the face based on age may also be seen in objects from Tomb II of Vergina: the ivory head of the bearded man has generally been identified as Philip II, whereas the younger and beardless man has been recognized as Alexander. I would dare to say that the pairing of bearded father with beardless son might have soon become a conventional but meaningful theme for subsequent artists: Antiphilus, for instance, painted not only an Alexander puer (the boy), clearly beardless, but also an Alexandrum ac Philippum cum Minerva (Plin. HN 35.114), a work probably executed in Alexandria after 323. Berve, however, thought this work might have been produced after the victory at Chaeronea, an interpretation that might be acceptable if we suppose that the Alexandrian painter celebrated the great event in retrospect, under Ptolemy I. No wonder that Chaeronea should have constituted a military achievement capable of reconciling father and son, past and future, maturity and youth, in Macedonian and early Ptolemaic memories.

Things should have changed when Alexander became king. One would have expected that his image would have been redefined in accordance with his new royal position, imitating the bearded look of his father and predecessor. In this regard, interpretations from outsiders are most telling. A volute krater and an amphora from Ruvo, as well as a third vase now lost, are attributed to the Darius Painter and dated around 330. They most probably present Alexander charging on horseback against Darius, who stands in his chariot, and they reproduce the same general theme as the Alexander Mosaic. The most striking anomaly in these Apulian vases is surely the fact that Alexander wears both moustache and beard uncut: our historical sensibility can accept, perhaps, an Alexander who uses wholly conventional Greek armor, including an anachronistic Corinthian helmet, as he does in these paintings, but never an Alexander whose beard is like that of his Persian enemy. As Stewart has remarked, the artist did not know how Alexander looked, and, in his ignorance, simply assumed that a king would be unshaven. Or, to refine Stewart’s argument, the painter might have taken it for granted that the son would look like his father, whose portraiture was certainly well known all over the Greek world. The sculptural group exhibited in Olympia bore witness to the traditional hirsute image of the Macedonian kings, and many western Greeks must have seen it. Conceptually and artistically the Italian images might perhaps be better interpreted
from the viewpoint of counter-factual history: what if Philip had not died at Aegae? The bearded man attacking the Persian monarch would, then, not be Alexander, but his father, the king who had survived the assassination attempt of Pausanias and who had already planned to cross the Hellespont, the experienced commander who finally managed to pass into Asia and, joining his generals Attalus and Parmenion, fought Darius at Issus. Even after Granicus, Alexander owed his victories to the army trained by his predecessor, not to speak of his own life, saved in battle by an officer of the old guard. For most Greeks, and for many Macedonians too, Alexander was not yet Alexander the Great, but the son of a conqueror hitherto unparalleled in Europe, whose plans he was carrying out and whose image overshadowed his successor's.

Given that facial hair had belonged to the artistic vocabulary of royal majesty, a break with this canonical image could entail some risks. After all, Alexander had already attained the majority when he became king: He was twenty years old in 336 and he did not need a tutor. So he was expected to look and to act as a young man (neos), but still a man, not a stripling (meirakion), a status that included the growing of a “shaveable” beard. If men under thirty could be characterized in classical cities by the lack of a beard, the reason was that they had not yet assumed the status of married people, chiefs of the oikos and full citizens, with facial hair reflecting their social position, rather than their biological age. 27 This is why the Apulian painter took for granted Alexander’s hirsute face in his encounter with Darius: an adult king had to be depicted unshaven, no matter his actual appearance at a given moment, his capacity to develop a beard more or less thick (Alexander was between 23/25 years old at Issus/Gaugamela), or even his position as an unmarried man. Consequently, the challenge for court artists like Lysippus, Apelles, and Pyrgoteles, lay in suppressing beardedness as a traditional symbol of patriarchy and paternalism without diminishing the very ideal of the Argead warrior monarchy. The image of Zeus wearing the beard uncut, featured, for example, on the obverse of Philip’s tetradrachms, established a cosmological archetype for every Greek and Macedonian ruler. Needless to say, the Spartan basileis (kings) sported moustaches and beards (Plut. Cleom. 9.2), as did Asiatic dynasts like Mausolus, not to mention the Great King. 28 Moreover, men with true axiōma (reputation) had the incentive to let their facial hair grow to look more worthy of respect, because in classical antiquity, as in many other civilizations, age meant prestige and wisdom, i.e., full maturity as a person. 29

Beardlessness was not the only change in royal image Alexander introduced. At the same time, the monarch wore his hair long, making
a style combination the peculiarity of which Hölscher has duly brought
to our notice.\textsuperscript{30} Long and thick hair had been a characteristic of Greek
heroic beauty: the formulaic expression in Homer “long-haired
Achaians” bears witness to it and Achilles, Theseus, and Perseus were
represented in this manner; the same look had long since character-
ized gods like Apollo, Helios, or Dionysus.\textsuperscript{31} Now, the iconographic
recreation of Achilles that, instead of featuring him fully bearded
(as on the amphora by Exekias), preferred to imagine him having
both long, even shoulder-length hair, and a face perfectly beardless
must have been especially appealing to Alexander. It is reasonable
to think that the Macedonian Achilles looked not very different
from Theseus and Phorbas in the Pella mosaic showing Helen’s
abduction (c. 325–00); this assumption is thoroughly in keeping
with the hero’s appearance in the early Hellenistic paintings known
through the Italian frescos.\textsuperscript{32}

Of course, an unbearded face animated by abundant and flowing
hair conveyed the ideal of eternal youth, which dominated Hellenistic
kingship from the beginning. However, in classical cities like Athens,
this aesthetic ideal came to be considered akin to softness or even to
voluptuousness. To this ambiguity, political considerations might also
have contributed: a long-haired image had aristocratic connotations,
could be indicative of laconism (Ar. Arv. 1281–82), and could possibly
be evocative of royalty, as the cases of Empedocles (Diog. Laert. 8.73)
and Aristides (Plut. Arist. 5.6) suggest. Furthermore, the Athenians
knew an even more dangerous precedent: Alcibiades. Unlike his vir-
tuous great-uncle, Pericles, represented correctly as bearded and with
short haircut in the famous bust of Cresilas, Alcibiades had been one
of the first to shave (Pl., Prt. 309a) and also wore his hair in long locks
for much of his life (Ath. 12.534c).\textsuperscript{33} In any event, this hairstyle was
normally balanced by a bushy beard, as the iconography of Zeus and
Poseidon proves and the hero of Riace illustrates.\textsuperscript{34}

Moreover, shaving the beard could be easily identified with luxury
and effeminacy, if not with passive homosexuality (Ath. 13.565a–d),
and literary sources reflect this negative association when they talk,
for example, about Menander’s softness.\textsuperscript{35} This prejudice, however,
may not necessarily have had force at the Macedonian court, judging
by the comments of Theopompus, nor perhaps in some other areas of
the Hellenic world.\textsuperscript{36} It has been suggested that Macedonian society
was probably still too “naïve” in a Homeric sense, both in terms of
cultural conservatism and intentional revival of the Bronze Age tradi-
tions, to adopt an Athenian reading of shaving habits and hairstyles.
Heracles, for instance, was depicted beardless on Argead coins as
early as Amyntas III.\textsuperscript{37} The crucial point, at any rate, is that in the
classical polis adult males did not shave, as the Theban Pindar took for granted: in his “homosexualization” of Pelops’ myth, the beloved of Poseidon returns to earth to get married just when his “beard grows.”

Once the facial hair appeared, a young man was generally supposed to be passing out of the eromenos stage, whereas a male who persisted in shaving, so they believed, might run the risk of projecting a soft and unmanly appearance.

For all these reasons the so-called athletic type in classical sculpture constituted a convenient canon of virility for the neoi (men under thirty): the athletic type exhibited a cleanly-shaven face, but had his hair cut. It remained perfectly valid when Alexander ascended the throne. Even Achilles could be represented in accordance with this model, subjected to the civic discipline of the polis: the Attic amphora from Vulci and the mosaic from the Villa of Good Fortune in Olynthus, the neighboring rival polis, illustrate this way of imagining Homer. Kings had to be very careful, therefore, if they did not want to be associated with symbols and qualities that were readily evocative of a lack of manliness and a womanish appearance, the very antithesis of royal charisma in any age.

Now, Alexander did not like the athletic ideal, as Plutarch records (Alex. 4.9–11). Instead, he made here a revolutionary change, which must, of course, have been based on his own physical appearance. Combining the shaving of the beard with the long hair (or at least with leonine and abundant mane), he produced an iconographic effect unknown to previous royal portraiture. In Greece the anti-Macedonians took advantage of the age and outlook of Philip’s successor to deride him, to such an extent that he launched the campaign against Thebes “declaring that since Demosthenes had called him a boy (paida) while he was among the Illyrians and Triballians, and a stripling (meirakion) when he had reached Thessaly, he wished to show him that before the walls of Athens he was a man (anēr).”

In this connection, the Alexander Mosaic, depicting the king in battle, teaches us some important things. The Macedonian king is shown with quite long hair and looks clean-shaven, but the big sideburns and the general expression of the face, not to speak of his courage in combat, neutralize any notion of delicacy or effeminacy. Although unbearded, this Alexander is neither the Margites of Demosthenes (Aeschin. In Ctes. 160) nor the harmless ephebe from the Acropolis; though long-haired, his lionlike mane with the anastolē and his huge eyes defy any ambivalent reading. He is fearsome (deinōs), without losing his majesty (semnotēs), two essential components in the iconographic and literary representation of Hellenistic kingship. In contrast, the Persian enemies are represented in a more
ambiguous and contradictory fashion, according to which full beardedness might have conjured up a sort of respectable impotence.43

Yet the painting is a masterpiece and as such eludes simplistic readings, just as historical reality often does. Note, for instance, that at least four Persian combatants seem to have smooth chins or, at most, a shadow of a beard; did the painter want to avoid a perfect asymmetry between Macedonian and Asiatic people on facial hair? At the same time, Greek ethnicity as depicted here does not reinforce a dualistic cliché. It is not by chance that the helmeted soldier in the background sports a moustache: he is a Greek, not a Macedonian; but not one of Alexander’s men. His frightened eyes point to the group of Greek mercenaries fighting for Darius.

The victors themselves do not escape these nuances. Alexander charges at the head of an apparently small group of Companions, perhaps the Royal Squadron. The Macedonian in a gold-wreathed helmet just behind him must be a high commander—Philotas or Iolaus? His face appears partially covered, but he clearly belongs to the same age-group as Alexander and, if I am not mistaken, he is shaven, or at least the artist has avoided suggesting a beard. This is not surprising in a man so close to a king whose known preferences in facial hair he must have accepted without complaining (Plut. Mor. 180a–b). Almost the same could be said of the other Macedonian soldier, this one on foot, who shows his smooth-faced profile behind Alexander’s elbow. In his case, however, the black shades around the lips, on the upper and lower lip area, may be suggesting a sort of one-day beard or simply the shadow of a beard, not unlike the facial impression given by some of the Persian enemies. More significantly, a closer look at Alexander’s face reveals a new message: his long and bushy side-whiskers constitute a clear reminder that the young king could have had facial hair if he so had wished. His majority and manhood could not be open to question. So this is no departure from the prevailing iconography of the Macedonian monarch, except for the historical orientation of the picture and the earthly depiction of its characters, not to mention the peculiarities and possibilities of pictorial language, mastered by an artist in a state of grace.44

The Mosaic is generally held to be a copy of either a painting by Apelles or a lost late fourth-century fresco by Philoxenus, commissioned by Cassander.45 Be that as it may, the original was probably directed towards a Macedonian audience familiar with the traditional official image of the monarch. This public could be expected to know how their king looked, which explains the styling of Alexander’s face on the Mosaic, a blend of realism (e.g., his facial hair, his nose) and expressionism (e.g., his eyes, his eyebrows). Bieber was right to
observe that this is a character portrait, and Goukowsky has pointed out that the spectators could recognize in this Alexander a genius of war and a conqueror, but never more than a man: he does not have divine attributes, nor does he exhibit the oriental symbols of kingship, not even the diadem, and, although he no longer sports the traditional beard of a king, his eyes, his countenance, and his courage suggest the charismatic aura of a hero. Here, therefore, is the icon of a politically acceptable Alexander in Macedonia, and it was surely attractive also to the neighboring dynasty of the Aecids: Pyrrhus, emulous of the Argead (Plut. Pyrrh. 8.1), would exhibit the same ardor in combat and the same long whiskers on a shaven face.

Oral memories of Alexander, no doubt, lived on during the Successors’ generation, at the new Hellenistic courts, like Alexandria, where the Molossian apprentice spent some time (Plut. Pyrrh. 4.3–4). His early mentors, Antigonus I and Ptolemy I, remembered many things about Alexander’s outward appearance, which maybe also explains the length of the sideburns on the octadrachm busts of Philadelphus. They all were kings and they all knew better than later sources that were a bit obsessed with physiognomic and metaphysical readings. Even the Iranian and peripheral Mithridates Eupator correctly interpreted the iconographic traditions, and there we have his splendid Louvre head as well as his portraits on his first coin issues, matching the image of Alexander as hero in pose, gestures, and facial hair.

Now, when Chrysippus reports that beardlessness came into fashion under Alexander, he surely refers, in the first instance, to the Diadochi, yet even among them the royal image proved to be more complex than is normally assumed. As far as the extant portraiture allows us to conclude, the Diadochi did not faithfully imitate the long hairstyle of Alexander. Although they have smooth chins, their hair is shorter and not swept up in a cowlick. They definitely do not have a mane, and still less a leonine mane. Their choice means that the new Hellenistic kings reached a kind of compromise between Alexander’s heroic or divine style and the sober athletic type. The revolutionary iconography of Alexander with flowing and nearly shoulder-length hair is very seldom attested in the art of the High Hellenistic Age: “for Alexander the Diadochs developed a longer-haired, more Apollo/Dionysos-style of image, and for themselves a shorter-haired, more Herakles-based figure image.” I agree also with Smith that for Alexander and his Successors, shaving the beard represented an important way of setting their image apart from both the Greeks of the cities and the Persians and other Iranians, many of whom wore full beards. In my opinion, however, Alexander’s innovation did not have continuators everywhere (not, for instance, among Greek
and Hellenized Iranian dynasties), and royal portraiture that features facial hair is not as exceptional in the Hellenistic world as is often implied.\textsuperscript{50}

We can imagine Ptolemy and Seleucus choosing to be clean-shaven in the royal fashion, to please Alexander and to assert themselves as part of the emerging generation. Their known portraiture, in effect, confirms this choice of image. It is also possible, and indeed plausible, that other \textit{hetairoi} and \textit{diadochoi} of the same age group, like Hephaestion or Craterus, whose iconographic identification however is less clear, had a similar look. Likewise, the banquet frieze on the tomb of Agios Athanasios bears witness to the fact that in Macedonia both the elites and the army exhibited the newly fashionable clean-shaven chin.\textsuperscript{51} The nucleus of the younger Companions might not have behaved very differently from Craterus: according to Arrian (\textit{FGrH} 156 F19), he dressed and behaved like a king and imitated Alexander in all but the royal diadem. However, we should not assume the same outlook for Cleitus the Black nor for Antigonus, and still less for Parmenion or Antipater. The old guard probably followed the model of their former king, Philip II, who after all had been the founder of Macedonian greatness. Fortunately, an anecdote picked up by Plutarch (\textit{Mor}. 180a–b) turns out to be very telling in this context: when all preparations had been made for a battle, Alexander’s generals asked him whether there was anything else to do in addition to what they had done. “Nothing, said he, except to shave the Macedonians’ beards.” And as Parmenion expressed his surprise, the king replied: “Don’t you know that in battles there is nothing handier to grasp than a beard?”\textsuperscript{52} No doubt, Parmenion had a beard, as Philip had had.

But discord did not end with the older generation. To start with, Alexander’s step-brother and successor, Arrhidaeus, seems not to have adhered to the new fashion: the portraits attributed to him present a bearded man, as if the new king had chosen consciously to imitate his father, rather than his famous brother, inaugurating in this way the earliest \textit{imitatio Philippi}. In the Alexander Sarcophagus, the murder scene in one pediment refers probably to the death of Perdiccas in 320. On the right side of the group an unshaven person in a muscle cuirass is about to eliminate one of the two guards. His purple \textit{chiton} and the cutting for a fillet in his hair point to a diademed royal figure. Arrhidaeus would seem to be the obvious candidate for the identity of this bearded figure and the most recent study on Perdiccas insists on this reading.\textsuperscript{53} There is another sculpture that has been identified by von Graepe as a portrait of Arrhidaeus: it is the diademed bust from the Naples Museum, the outstanding
features of which are the beard and a hairstyle which fits the time of the Diadochi.54

To this piece of evidence we have to add the hunting fresco on Tomb II at Vergina. Although not many today defend Andronicos’ interpretation, full consensus is far from being reached.55 Let us make just a few remarks in terms of the different hypotheses that have been formulated. If the man on horseback is Philip II and the tomb is his, no surprise: the king has been cast in the traditional role of a bearded ruler, and his successor, Alexander, has of course respected the official look of the Argead monarchs. If, on the contrary, the man on horseback is Arrhidaeus and the tomb is his, the commissioner of the tomb would be Cassander and the unshaven face of the king would convey a certain idea of Macedonian traditional identity and Argead legitimism, evoking Philip’s kingship more than Alexander’s. Perhaps we should not rule out a third possible reading: if the older rider is Philip II, but the tomb is Arrhidaeus’ and he is painted as the beardless ephebe in the centre of the composition in accordance with his status as honorand, things would not change a lot. The royal paradigm would be the father, not the unbearded half brother. And so on.

Philip II’s image, therefore, did not fade with the dazzling reign of his son, at least not in Macedonia. There can be little doubt that in this country the ascendancy of Philip and his non-Alexander family “remained the most potent traditionalist political influence in Macedonian affairs.”56 Arrhidaeus seems to have been the first but not the last of Philip’s Macedonian followers and admirers. I have already suggested that the old guard probably still felt attached to Philip’s memory and to Philip’s image: it was a question of age and education. Leaving aside Parmenion, the discordant voice, the first one to be considered is Antipater. Can anyone imagine a man of his age and temper, so far away from Alexander’s court, accepting the fashionable hairstyle and adapting his look to the new canon suggested by the young king? I rather imagine him bearded and having his portrait so painted or sculpted, like his compatriot and friend Aristotle, who is portrayed as a respectable, mature man in the Roman copy of a statue from the late fourth century in Vienna.57 It has been noted that a philosophical beard reflected the pathos of knowledge and calm, as opposed to the pathos of action embodied in the clean-shaven faces of the Hellenistic kings, but this distinction might not necessarily have applied everywhere. A bushy-bearded Antipater must have been a politically acceptable icon for the Macedonians and also for the Greeks, evoking both established practice and Argead legitimacy. We should suppose that Antigonus had the same appearance, since he is
THE BEARDED KING AND THE BEARDLESS HERO

said to have belittled Ptolemy’s victory over his son Demetrius in 312 with the argument that the Lagid “had conquered beardless youths (ageneious nenikēkota), but must now fight with men (andras).”

Even the Macedonian banquet scene on the tomb of Agios Athanasios, from the early third century, includes a bearded banqueter, while the Tomb of the Philosophers in Pella, dating from roughly the same period, shows a pair of men with the same bearded appearance.

Alexander the Great did not have the kind of auctoritas that a Roman emperor enjoyed to help him impose the new royal image. He died too young and no Successor emerged with power enough to inherit his empire. Neither among his senior collaborators nor even within his own dynasty did he find a full understanding, let alone in the Greek cities, the elites of which did not feel compelled to comply with Macedonian and Hellenistic manners. After all, the new world remained politically disunited or, to put it another way, the essentially polycentric character of Greek civilization prevailed, a quality contrary to that of Rome, where emperors managed to generalize the Zeitgesicht. This should prevent us from making over-generalizations when speaking about the portraiture of kings and of men after Alexander.

Even without leaving Macedonia, we encounter no few experiments and oscillations in royal portraiture among the Antigonids. It is a fact that Poliorcetes let himself be represented unbearded, unlike his father, while avoiding a complete identification with Alexander’s iconography. Gonatas may have also adopted the fashionable hairstyle, at least judging by his known coin types, but the possibility that he had made the other choice cannot be ruled out; even a change from one look to another remains perfectly possible. Furthermore, a bearded bust found in Delos has been attributed to Antigonus Doson, and Philip V tells us the old story: on the obverse of his coins the monarch sports the traditional beard, and this personal choice was to be assumed by his son Perseus. No doubt, the unshaven face meant a return to Philip II and implied, as Polybius (5.10.10) confirms, a claim to kinship with the Argeads.

All in all, these iconographic choices and strategies tended to reaffirm or to nuance the cultural identity of the dominant group, embodied in the exemplary person of the king, and in so doing they suggest the validity, to a certain extent, of ethnicity for our analysis. Ethnicity underpins our contention that the royal images are important signs of identity and self-assertion: if ethnic identity was a social construct, perpetually renewed and renegotiated through discourse and social praxis, then the leading dynasties were the mirrors in which the different peoples could look at themselves. Bearded Macedonians
and bearded Iranians (Antigonids and Arsacids) contrast in the same age with unbearded Macedonians and unbearded Iranians (Ptolemies and Ariarathids) or even with other Iranian local rulers, like Kamnaskires I/II from the Elymais; Iranian Mithridatids wore a beard, it is true, but a Greek beard, not the Persian nor the Parthian one. Facial hair could be, therefore, a marker of ethnicity. To some degree, we surmise, these ethnic identities and cultural constructions may have waged their battles also on the level of iconography, being veritable iconomachiae. But, at the same time, powerful personalities, like Alexander the Great or Mithridates Eupator, could defy the past and portray themselves against family tradition and the country’s identity, whereas weakened figures (or peculiar characters), like Seleucus II and Demetrius II, could be subject to the influence of their neighbors, the Arsacids. Personal reading and careful combination of cultural codes made by the ego explain Nemrud Dagh, the creation of Antiochus I of Commagene. He did not construct the codes but rather made a reading of preexisting traditions, Greek and Iranian, and produced with them a combination, the result of which are the architectural designs and iconographic program of Nemrud Dagh, in the same way that Hadrian’s outlook reflects the decisive influence of the imperial persona in redefining fashion. Alexander’s reinvention of the royal image reminds us of the efforts of Louis XIV, the Roi Soleil, beardless like a young Apollo (and like a new Alexander too), in order to detach himself from his Habsburg predecessors, models, and rivals, who were cast rather in the form of sober and unshaven princes, more in keeping with their favorite hero, the virtuous Heracles. Needless to say, a beard could be much more than a beard.
In the Shadow of His Father
Alexander, Hermolaus, and the Legend of Philip

Sabine Müller

In the second century A.D., the satirist Lucian depicts a posthumous conversation between Alexander and his father Philip in the underworld in his *Dialogues of the Dead*. Philip's reproaches against his son and successor mirror the traditional accusations against Alexander. Alexander is characterized as a megalomaniac tyrant who fell victim to *hybris* and rode roughshod over Macedonian *nomoi* (customs). The list of reproaches can be summarized in one image highlighting the negative portrait: Philip ironically calls Alexander “the son of Ammon.” This is a literary code for the degenerated Macedonian ruler and had become a standard topic of literary reference among ancient writers using Alexander as an exemplum of vice. The counterpart and exemplum of virtue is the brave and modest ruler who respects the Macedonian tradition and scoffs at Persian luxury. Lucian mirrors a tradition that describes Philip as the ideal Macedonian ruler as compared to his son.

This paper’s objective is to analyze the political background of the aforementioned ideal. It will consider who might have defined what characterizes a good Macedonian ruler and what could have defined him as a tyrant. The paper also attempts to offer insight into how the legend of Philip as an ideal Macedonian ruler developed into a threat to Alexander’s policy, and how he came to terms with the memory of his father when it was turned into a weapon of propaganda for the opposition. To this end, the conspiracy of Hermolaus in 327 B.C. is used as an instructive exemplum of the conflict between Alexander and the Macedonian nobles after Issus.

As usual with the Alexander sources, we have to strip away layers of accretion before we can expose historical events and trends. In our sources, criteria for an ideal Macedonian ruler are primarily mentioned when criticism or resistance to Alexander’s policy emerged. Consequently, the image of the good Macedonian ruler was created as a reaction to characteristics of a ruler who was not accepted by all segments of the Macedonian population. So it is a kind of counter-image
to Alexander’s political style. First of all, conspiracies express political dissent and changes in the way a ruler’s person or actions were perceived, as Waldemar Heckel has pointed out. The conspiracy of Hermolaus may underline this.

Hermolaus, son of the general Sopolis, was one of the basilikoi paides, the royal youths. These sons of the leading Macedonian noble families were trained at court to serve and guard the ruler. In addition, they were hostages meant to guarantee the loyalty of their families.

Supported by between five and seven other paides according to the different accounts, Hermolaus and his lover Sostratus took advantage of their night watch in Alexander’s tent together to plot against Alexander’s life. The attempt failed; the youths were tried by the army assembly and put to death. It seems helpful first to examine the speech of Hermolaus given in front of the Macedonian army assembly quoted by Curtius and Arrian and then to try to analyze the political motifs displayed in the accounts of the boar hunt that preceded the attempted assassination.

According to Curtius, Hermolaus justified the conspiracy with pithy words: “It is the Persians’ garb and habits that delight you; you have come to loathe the customs of your native land. Therefore it was the king of the Persians, not of the Macedonians, that we wished to kill.” Arrian confirms that Hermolaus spoke frankly, accusing Alexander of having adopted a regal style unbearable to a free Macedonian and of having become estranged from his Macedonian roots. It is telling that, at this point, Arrian is not drawing on his usual main sources, Ptolemy und Aristobulus, who only gave a very short account of the conspiracy and mainly blamed the Greek philosopher Callisthenes, who had allegedly encouraged Hermolaus and his friends to plot against Alexander. Probably the omission of the motives of the paides is the result of the apologetic tendency of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, who also felt a need to justify the death of Callisthenes. Arrian relies upon other sources he unfortunately does not name. He just writes that “tines,” some people, reported that Hermolaus criticized the unjust executions of influential Macedonian nobles, the Median garb of Alexander, his attempt to introduce the ritual of proskynesis, his drinking parties and comatose slumbers.

In regard to the historicity of the speech it is, of course, necessary to note that Curtius seems to have employed his rhetorical skills to make his moral point about Alexander’s degeneration clear. Hermolaus’ complaints, which Arrian draws from his anonymous sources, sound suspiciously like a catalogue of all the criticisms made of Alexander’s alleged orientalizing, modeled on the Greek negative image of the tyrant. Therefore, Arrian’s silence over his sources for Hermolaus’
grievances makes it difficult to know whether he relies on a noncontemporary tradition of Alexander as a stereotypical tyrant corrupted by fortune, or on the reports of an eyewitness. However, keeping in mind that Alexander’s multiethnic policy had strong effects on the political influence of the nobility, it is probable that the main features of the speech are authentic.

This being so, it is the *communis opinio* that Hermolaus’ speech mirrors the thoughts and resentments of the Macedonian opposition at this time quite well. Many Macedonians had become aware of the differences between Alexander’s and Philip’s reign, drew a comparison, and judged Alexander by their idealized memories of Philip’s political style. Even though these memories were faulty, they could well justify the representation of Alexander as a degenerate ruler. The event leading to Hermolaus’ conspiracy may underline this. This prologue to the main event was uncontroversial and probably reported in similar terms by all sources. The royal youths usually accompanied the Macedonian ruler on the hunt and took part in this privileged aristocratic activity. During a boar hunt, Hermolaus killed a wild boar Alexander was about to dispatch. The ruler flew in a great rage and ordered that Hermolaus be flogged and even deprived of his horse. Feeling humiliated, Hermolaus wanted to take revenge.

According to the *communis opinio*, this feeling of humiliation caused by the punishment of public flogging combined with Hermolaus’ wish to regain his personal honor or the honor of the royal youths in general is to be seen as the main motive for the conspiracy. However, there is evidence that the royal youths were accustomed to severe punishments for misconduct and negligence. According to Curtius, the flogging of *basilikoi paides* was consistent with Macedonian *nomoi*, and traditionally administered only by the ruler. More importantly, there is evidence that even Philip II, who at this time already had become the glorified counter-image of his son in the eyes of the aristocratic opposition, punished disobedient royal youths severely. So Alexander’s order to flog the youth could not be perceived as a new feature of his orientalizing policy exposing him as un-Macedonian or as an extraordinarily degrading punishment. Arrian reports that Hermolaus was angry because of Alexander’s *hybris*. In Greek political thought, *hybris* is traditionally attributed to tyrants. Therefore again, it is unlikely that Hermolaus referred to the traditional flogging. It might rather have been the removal of the horse that raised his anger and became the principal motivation for the conspiracy.

To ascertain that Hermolaus’ horse was the key symbol of the conflict described between ruler and royal youth, we must first consider the role of the horse in Macedonian aristocratic society and its cultural
and symbolic significance, and we must consider also the setting for 
the conflict, the hunting scene.

It seems to be important first of all to emphasize that hunting on 
horseback was an aristocratic and royal activity and constituted a 
mark of excellence for a noble Macedonian as it was closely con-

nected to military skill and bravery.28 The royal hunt symbolically 
displayed royal prowess and the skills of the ruler as warrior and 
guardian of his people, the ultimate archetypes of which were to be 
found in the empires of the Ancient Near East.29

In scholarship, it is suggested that Persian court practice in hunting 
reserved the first strike for the great king. This custom is supposed to 
mirror his autocratic position.30 Unfortunately, this practice is only 
attested by Greek sources.31 In general, Greek writers tend to exag-
gerate the unlimited power of the Persian king. Their images of Persia 
are influenced by Greek prejudices against the Persians as flaccid slave 
natures spoilt by luxury and as subjects of a cruel tyrant king.32 This 
stereotypical image was produced as a contrast to the image of Greek 
democratic freedom and is a product of political ideology. So, a 
hunting prerogative of the Great Kings fits excellently into the cliché 
of Persian political hierarchies in Greek eyes. Bearing this in mind, the 
custom of the first strike for the Persian king attested by Greek writers 
sounds suspicious. In addition, it is not Herodotus, with his mostly 
neutral perspective on Asia and his Persian sources, who mentions 
the custom but Ctesias (as well as Plutarch and Xenophon in his Cyro-

paedia). Ctesias did live at the Persian court of Artaxerxes II. However, 
he tended to tell rather incredible stories in a determined attempt to 
contradict Herodotus, while Xenophon’s Cyropaedia is a Greek philo-
sophical treatise revealing much about Greek culture and his own 
ideas on education, military tactics, and principles of government, but 
scarcely anything about Achaemenid Persia.33 In consequence, there is 
no certainty that such a law or court etiquette reserving the first blow 
for the king existed in Achaemenid Persia at all.

This is only one problem. Another one seems to be the suggestion 
that there was a Macedonian counterpart of this practice, a custom or 
even a law reserving the first strike for the Macedonian ruler.34 Accord-
ing to Martin Seyer, this law was of Persian origin and Hermolaus 
expressed his opposition to Alexander’s orientalizing policy by delib-
erately ignoring it.35 Some objections can be raised. First of all, there 
were no laws but unwritten nomoi in Macedonia36 and we have no 
evidence for a custom like that. The informal code of conduct for the 
royal hunt probably depended on the power of the individual ruler 
and his concept of rulership. A privilege like this does not seem to 
have room in Argead Macedonia where, as Elizabeth Carney has made
clear, the ruler traditionally was not absolute but dressed, drank, fought, and hunted in a manner only slightly different from the rest of the aristocracy. To make a comparison with Achaemenid images of the royal hunter, it is also telling that the Great King fights the beasts on his own whereas the Macedonian royal hunter in the hunting frieze from Vergina (tomb II) is accompanied by companions or royal youths. So, one may well doubt that Hermolaus violated a Macedonian tradition. In addition, Arrian states that the royal youths were the ruler’s companions “in the rivalry of the chase.”

On the other hand, Alexander was trying his best to get rid of the traditional concept of the Macedonian ruler as a primus inter pares. Things and times had changed. In the beginning, the Persian campaign was in fact led by Parmenion and his faction who held the key positions in the Macedonian army. The official court historiography, however, tells a different story, casting Alexander in the role of the young military genius imitating his progenitor Achilles. The political influence of the Macedonian nobility was played down in the official reports. The nobles seem to have tolerated it as long as it was fiction and not reality.

But the balance of power began to shift when Alexander continued warfare after the battle of Issus. Extending his personal power by military conquests, he forced back the political influence of the nobility and tried to free himself from the corset of the Macedonian royal conception of the primus inter pares. After the decisive battle of Gaugamela and the execution of the pretender Bessus, Alexander eliminated the leading men of the “old guard.” Hermolaus’ conspiracy was clearly linked to the politically motivated deaths of these Macedonian nobles. This power struggle between the Macedonian ruler and the nobles sets the scene for tensions revealed at the boar hunt.

It is possible that Hermolaus’ killing of the boar was indeed a political statement. He probably relied on traditional Macedonian codes of conduct between nobles and ruler and, as a result, ignored Alexander’s newly acquired privileged position. He symbolically pushed Alexander off his autocratic throne by demonstrating that the king had no prerogative to strike the hunted boar first. Therefore, his action illustrated where the nobles aspired to rank themselves in the Macedonian social hierarchy or which position they wanted to occupy.

If Hermolaus attempted to remind Alexander of his position as a primus inter pares, Alexander’s reaction might have been a demonstration that he was not in this position anymore. This was necessary because the paides were intended to be generals and governors who had to be loyal to the ruler and to back his policy. Therefore, Alexander sent Hermolaus back—where he belonged in his new
model of rule and even demoted him one step further. He did so by depriving him of his horse, using demotion as a disciplinary tool. 46

The horse was a Macedonian noble’s status symbol signifying membership of the political elite. 47 Horses were valuable; breeding, acquiring, and maintaining a horse meant lots of expenses. 48 This was especially true for warhorses that were trained and regularly checked for their condition. 49 Coins of Alexander I showed a rider on the obverse, and thereafter the horse continued to play an important iconographic role in Macedonian coinage. 50 Unfortunately, because of the scarcity of sources on early Argead Macedonia, these are the earliest documents indicating the importance of the image of the rider for Macedonia.

To sum up, Alexander deprived Hermolaus of his symbol of social and political rank. Without his horse Hermolaus resembled the foot soldiers. Even if this removal was not permanent, the gesture was important. It was a demonstration aimed not only at him and his fellows, but also at their families. The punishment of Hermolaus must have raised fears within the Macedonian nobility of an even greater loss of influence. The message was clear: opposition against the new paradigm of rule leads to the loss of status. 51

Hence, the images of the ideal and of the bad Macedonian ruler were developed in the circles of the Macedonian aristocracy in opposition to Alexander’s new positioning of himself after the conquest of the Persian Empire. According to Curtius, Hermolaus mentioned Philip in his speech, accusing Alexander of rejecting him as his father. This was an element of his non-Macedonian behavior and *hybris*. 52

The Philip myth derived from the memories of the control the leading Macedonian families exercised during Philip’s reign. It was referred to in situations of crisis when the political opposition voiced their resentments. At his last banquet at Maracanda in 328 B.C., Cleitus had complained in comparable terms about the loss of *parrhēsia* at Alexander’s court. According to Plutarch, he accused Alexander of being surrounded by Asian “barbarians and slaves” and of refusing free admission to the Macedonians in contrast to tradition. 53 This evidence is anecdotal but seems to be consistent. Cleitus’ praise of “the good old days” stresses the contrast between Alexander’s and Philip’s reigns. 54 The Macedonian nobility proclaimed the degree of influence it felt an Argead ruler should or should not exercise by appealing to the memory of Philip. 55

During the tumults in the Macedonian army at Opis 324 B.C., when the troops objected to Alexander’s decision to send the veterans back to Macedonia, the accusation that the ruler denied his father Philip was voiced again. 56 Alexander was portrayed as a “bad Macedonian
ruler” according to the traditional imagery of Greek literature, with its stereotype of the Persian tyrant as master of Asian “slaves by nature.” The contemporary propaganda of the Macedonian opposition was probably patterned upon this stereotype precisely because the comparison seemed to be so appropriate in the case of a conqueror of the Persian Empire. In contrast, Philip was projected as the ideal ruler and Alexander’s counterpart. Styled as *primus inter pares par excellence*, he was said always to have treated the Macedonian nobility as equal to his rank. This *topos* is patterned upon the model of the good ruler and the degenerate son popular in Greek literary tradition. 57

This idealized Philip of whom the Macedonians in Persia dreamt was a fiction and had little in common with the historical person. The historical Philip had turned Macedonia into a united empire and created a centralized monarchy. 58 He had deprived the upper Macedonian territories of their autonomy and tried to keep the aristocracy under control. 59 He had also adopted some features of the Achaemenid court and enforced a new paradigm of Argead rule as an institution of sacral character. 60 Of course, he had been cautious and respected the limits of power marked by the noble factions. Nevertheless, he had prepared the way for Alexander to transform the royal style still further. 61 However, all of this was excluded from the legend of Philip in the circles of the Macedonian opposition. 62

The moment the memory of Philip developed into a myth, Alexander lost control over it. At this point, the shadow of his dead father turned into a political obstacle for him. After his accession it had been necessary for him to show his devotion to Philip and to guarantee the continuity of his politics to secure his position. 63 He had been in need of his father to legitimize his rule. The situation changed with the conquests and his new royal style. To this reduction of their influence the nobles reacted by transforming the memory of Philip into a *logos* of an ideal Macedonian ruler, who could then be compared to Alexander, who was in turn depicted as degenerating from a new Achilles into a new Xerxes and as neglecting Macedonian tradition. His policy was propagated as an insult to this special memory of Philip. 64 Alexander was forced to react.

We do not know much about the relationship between Alexander and his father during Philip’s lifetime. Philip seems to have supported him and tried to secure his succession until his death. The conflicts during his last years reflect the conflicts between ruler and noble factions rather than between father and son. Philip was forced to grant the nobility concessions against the interests of Alexander and his supporters. 65 The contemporary rumors about the murder of Philip and the propaganda of the Successors probably created the
impression of an enmity between father and son. Olympias was portrayed negatively as the key figure inciting her young and susceptible son against Philip. The notion that Alexander tried to surpass his father throughout his career, spurred on by a traumatic kind of rivalry, seems to derive from this image and should be regarded with caution. Obviously, the conflict between Alexander, Olympias, and Philip was a popular theme and became topical. As far as we can tell, Alexander probably had fewer problems with the living Philip than he did with the dead Philip and his legend. Certainly he did not intend to renounce Philip as a part of his policy, but he was forced to reduce the references to his father in his public presentation at the point when his father’s memory was transformed into a counterimage of his own rule. The watershed seems to have been the victory at Issus. After Issus, Alexander referred to his father only occasionally. In short, the different phases in Alexander’s treatment of Philip’s memory were dependent upon the perception of Philip within the Macedonian aristocracy and were shaped by political conflicts within the Macedonian hierarchy. Confronted with Philip as hero of the Macedonian opposition, Alexander necessarily had to keep his distance. The reason was not a kind of megalomaniac desire for divine paternity or a personal change of heart. As soon as the Macedonian opposition had taken possession of Philip, Alexander let go of him. But this step caused new problems. His distance from Philip was criticized by the Macedonians as a deceitful act of renunciation of Philip’s paternity.

For this reason, it is no wonder that Alexander preferred to refer to his divine and heroic forefathers, Achilles and Heracles, and to stress these family bonds. Among his mortal relatives, he was far better off projecting his mother in the role of Thetis than in tussling with the shadow of Philip.

While in his lifetime Philip had enough trouble with the nobles, even though he seems to have been much more popular than his son, the difference between him and Alexander is first of all marked by his death. He died before he could invade Persia and increase his authority and so enable himself to take steps similar to those subsequently taken by Alexander to stabilize his position. Thus, only after Philip’s death could he become the ideal Macedonian ruler for the Macedonian nobles and soldiers, a weapon of propaganda and the model Alexander was constantly judged by. As the political motives of Hermolaus’ conspiracy also reveal, the legend of Philip primarily consisted of idealized memories of the influence Macedonian noble factions had been able to exercise during his reign. After Issus, Alexander could by no means measure up to this.
After the battle of Chaeronea in summer 338, Philip II spent several months in the Peloponnese, where he took particular care to increase his influence in Elis, the city that administered the sanctuary of Olympia and the Olympic Games (Dem. Philippics 3.27; Paus. 4.28.4). Philip had won an equestrian Olympic victory in 356 (Plut. Alex. 3) and one or two more victories in the chariot races at Olympia (Plut. Alex. 4). Plutarch says that Philip commemorated his Olympic victories on his coinage, and this is borne out by the horse and jockey on the reverses of Philip’s tetradrachms minted after 356, and by the two-horse chariot on the reverses of his staters from 348/7 on. In 338 he returned to Olympia not as an athletic victor but as the conqueror of Greece. He gave visual manifestation to his new status by erecting a tholos (figure 4.1) to house a group of dynastic portraits that reflected his view of the Argead succession and its prospects (Paus. 5.20.9–10). The function of the Philippeum has been much discussed: it has been compared to a treasury, a victory monument, or a heroon. That the dynastic portraits were not cult statues is made clear by the fact that Pausanias described them as eikones (portraits), not agalmata (cult statues). There is no doubt, at any rate, about Philip’s intention to advertise his position within the Argead dynasty and his plans for the future of that dynasty.

After commissioning the Philippeum, Philip returned to Macedonia in summer 337 to marry his seventh and last wife, Cleopatra, niece and ward of the Macedonian noble Attalus. Both Satyrus (ap. Ath. 13.557d) and Plutarch (Alex. 9.6) say that she was very young and Philip married her for love, but it may well be that his decision was also influenced by other considerations. It has been argued that in anticipation of his expedition to Persia, his nobles intended him to produce an heir of pure Macedonian blood in contrast to Alexander who was half-Epirote (not to mention Arrhidaeus, who was half-Thessalian). During the wedding banquet Attalus expressed the wish that Philip and Cleopatra would produce a legitimate successor to the kingdom of Macedon (Plut. Alex. 9.7; Ath. 13.557d–e). This was clearly an insult to Olympias’ Epirote origin, and the intention is corroborated...
by Arrian’s statement (3.6.5) that with his marriage Philip disgraced Olympia. Alexander’s prospects as heir apparent were threatened; his and Olympia’s position at court became untenable and they both fled, she to her brother, Alexander, king of Epirus, he to the Illyrians, thus posing a potential combined threat to Philip’s kingdom from the west (Plut. Alex. 9.11; Ath. 13.557e). Philip had to solve the problem before his departure for Asia. He managed to bring back his son through the good services of the Corinthian Demaratus (Plut. Alex. 9.12–14), and to placate Alexander of Epirus by offering him the hand of his daughter by Olympia, Cleopatra. And it was the marriage of this other Cleopatra that was the occasion of Philip’s downfall, for he was murdered at Aegae during the wedding celebrations in summer 336 (Diod. 16.93–94; Plut. Alex. 10.6–8). 6

Despite the fact that his marriage to Cleopatra disrupted the balance of power at court by threatening the status quo of the succession and creating an explosive situation, Philip’s loyalty to his new bride is not in question. Had he lived, and had Cleopatra given birth to a son, there is every possibility that she would have eventually acquired power and influence as mother of a potential heir. In retrospect her
glory was brief, for not only did she give birth to a daughter (Europa) not a son, she was also murdered by Olympias, along with her child, not long after her husband’s violent death (Ath. 13. 557e; Plut. Alex. 10.8; Paus. 8.7.7; Just. 9.7.12). She is now a mere footnote in Macedonian history but her position at court (and in Philip’s life) from the day of her marriage in summer 337 to the day of his assassination a year later must have been both very prominent and very promising. It was during that year that construction of the Philippeum at Olympia was going on in full swing. And yet modern scholarship has convinced itself that she was absent from the dynastic portrait gallery designed by Philip to be viewed at the heart of the Panhellenic sanctuary as an advertisement of his past and future plans. His message was aimed at the domestic front as well as at the Greeks at large. We will attempt to decipher that message by looking closely at Pausanias’ text.

Pausanias states (5.20.10) that the Philippeum was a round building made of mud brick, no doubt because he was misled by the reddish brown color of its limestone walls. He states that it was made by Philip after the fall of Greece at Chaeronea, and it housed statues of Philip and Alexander, alongside a statue of Amyntas, Philip’s father. These statues, he says, were made by Leochares in ivory and gold, just like the portraits of Olympias and Eurydice. In his description of the temple of Hera, which lies adjacent to the Philippeum, Pausanias (5.17.4) had already remarked that the chryselephantine statues of Philip’s Eurydice and . . . had been brought in from the Philippeum. The text is lacunose but we assume that the other statue was that of Olympias. There are enough blocks surviving from the semicircular pedestal of the statuary group in the Philippeum (figure 4.2) to suggest that it originally held five statues even though Pausanias only saw three in place.

Attempts to fill the gaps in Pausanias’ text have concentrated on two Macedonian queens named Eurydice, first, Philip’s mother, wife of Amyntas III, and second, Philip’s grand-daughter, Adea, who, according to Arrian (FGrH 156 F 1.23), took the name Eurydice upon marriage to her uncle Arrhidaeus, Alexander’s half-brother. It is assumed that Adea chose the name Eurydice in order to honor Philip’s mother but we must bear in mind that Adea’s own grandmother, Audata, Philip’s Illyrian wife, had probably also been renamed Eurydice (Arr. FGrH 156 F 1.22). Arrhidaeus in his turn assumed his father’s name, Philip, upon his accession in 323 (Diod. 18.2.4; Curt. 10.7.7). Further name changes are known in the Macedonian court. According to Plutarch (Mor. 401B), Olympias had three other names, Polyxena, Myrtale, and Stratonice. We do not know at which stages in her
life she assumed different names, but the name Olympias is sometimes associated with Philip’s first Olympic victory in 356, the year of Alexander’s birth. Ernst Badian has made the cautionary remark that despite all her name changes, Olympias did not assume the name Eurydice, and therefore it could not have functioned as a regnal name in Macedonia. In addition, Antipater named one of his daughters Eurydice without arousing suspicion that she aspired to royalty.

If we look at the various emendations to the text of Pausanias proposed since the nineteenth century, we observe that Corais’ noncommittal Ἕρυδικὴ τε Ἡ Φιλίππου <καὶ Ὀλυμπιάς> (“Philip’s Eurydice and Olympias”) is unhelpful because it implies that Philip had a daughter named Eurydice, which we know to be untrue. Buttmann’s emendation Ἕρυδικὴ τε Ἡ Ἀριδαίου γυνὴ καὶ Ὀλυμπιάς ἡ; Φιλίππου (“Eurydice, Arrhidaeus’ wife and Olympias, Philip’s wife”) adding Adea Eurydice to the family group is impossible if we recall that Adea was born around the time of the construction of the Philippeum and that Philip had no room for her in his dynastic plans. The last two emendations by Rocha Pereira (Εὐρυδίκη τε Ἡ Φιλίππου <μήτηρ καὶ Ὀλυμπιάς ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ>: “Eurydice, Philip’s mother and Olympias, his wife”) and Cassevitz (Εὐρυδίκη τε Ἡ <μήτηρ καὶ Ὀλυμπιάς ἡ> Φιλίππου <γυνὴ>: “Eurydice, the mother, and Olympias, the wife of Philip”) advocate the inclusion of Philip’s mother Eurydice as a companion to his father Amyntas, forming a pendant to Philip’s wife Olympias. And yet this reconstruction of the Philippeum statuary group does not reflect the realities of the final years of Philip’s life. It is a construct of modern scholarship blinkered by hindsight. The great historical significance of Alexander and Olympias has colored modern perception of the monument.

Philip’s father, Amyntas III, reigned from 393 to 370/69, and was succeeded by his son, Alexander II, who sat on the throne until 367,
followed, after two years of instability, by Amyntas’ second son, Perdiccas III (r. 365 to 360/59). Philip II was the youngest brother and only became king because Perdiccas was killed in a disastrous campaign against the Illyrians in 359. We will not go into the question of whether Philip usurped the throne from his nephew Amyntas, also known as Amyntas IV, who was a minor at Perdiccas’ death. It is enough to say that Philip did not succeed his father directly yet he did not commission portraits of those who ruled between his father’s death and his own accession, thus conveying the impression that power passed from father to son. The inclusion of Alexander and his mother Olympias was a gesture of reconciliation aimed at reassuring his alienated son and estranged wife and repairing the rift in relations caused by his marriage to Cleopatra.

It has often been suggested that Olympias’ appearance in the dynastic portrait group betrays the hand of Alexander, and that the Philippeum was therefore begun by Philip and completed by Alexander, after his father’s death. The brief interval of two years between the battle of Chaeronea and Philip’s assassination was also thought to be insufficient time for the completion of the structure. In addition, Pausanias’ ambiguous phrase Φιλίππωι δε ἐποίηθη could of course mean that he commissioned it but could equally well be taken to indicate that the Philippeum was created in his honor.

The reason for the removal of the two royal women to the Heraeum has also been a challenge to the ingenuity of scholars. Jan Huwendiek tried to solve both problems at a blow by suggesting that Philip had originally included a statue of his last wife, Cleopatra, which was removed by Alexander after his death and replaced by a statue of Olympias. Konrad Hitzl attributed the removal of the female statues to Nero, who would have hypothetically replaced them with portraits of himself and his wife.

Careful examination of the materials and techniques of the statues’ pedestal and the fabric of the tholos by Peter Schultz, however, has established that the entire monument was built in one phase and must have been completed in Philip’s lifetime. If the fourth-century temple of Asklepios at Epidaurus and its architectural sculptures were completed in less than five years, then the much more modest Philippeum could easily have been constructed in two. The pedestal was designed from the start to carry five statues (fig. 4.2), not four; the idea that Cleopatra was replaced by Olympias is therefore untenable. In addition, Peter Schultz has shown that the cavities on top of the bases were designed to hold plinths of marble statues, not pegs for ivory feet. Pausanias was therefore misinformed about the material of the portrait group, just as he was mistaken about the fabric of the
building. The statues were not made of ivory and gold, but of marble, presumably polished and gilded to give an impression of chryselephantine technique.\textsuperscript{21} An alternative view was offered by Giorgos Despinis, who suggested that the bottoms of the statues were in marble, with marble plinths, whereas the upper parts were completed in ivory and gold.\textsuperscript{22} As there are no other examples of this technique from the classical period, however, this suggestion remains sub judice.

We now come to the crux of the matter, Philip’s Eurydice. Philip was obviously very selective in his choice of family members for the dynastic monument, considering that he had left out several of his wives and children, not to mention his brothers. Would the inclusion of his mother have served his purposes in 338–336? There is no evidence that she was still alive in 338, and despite her eventful career earlier in life, she seems to have had no impact on the reign of Philip II. Her last recorded action fell in 368/7: during his embassy to Philip in 346 Aeschines (2.27–29) recalled Eurydice’s plea to the Athenian general Iphicrates to save the dynasty in 368/7, implying that she was no longer alive as he spoke.\textsuperscript{23} Besides, Philip’s claim to the throne rested almost entirely on the fact that he was Amyntas III’s son. He was not his brother’s obvious successor since Perdiccas III had an infant son, Amyntas ‘IV’, who was pushed aside to make way for Philip. After Philip’s death, Amyntas ‘IV’ constituted a potential threat to Alexander, who had him eliminated by 335.\textsuperscript{24}

Eurydice in the Philippeum has been almost unanimously identified by modern scholars with Philip’s mother.\textsuperscript{25} There is, however, a more obvious candidate, who seems more appropriate in the context of 337. Philip’s last wife Cleopatra is named Eurydice by Arrian (3.6.5). Given her prominence in Philip’s life at the time the Philippeum was built, it would have been surprising had she not been represented in the dynastic portrait gallery. Her absence, especially considering the inclusion of Olympias, would have constituted an affront to the faction of Attalus that was so powerful at court on the eve of Philip’s Asian campaign. Arrian (3.6.5) says that Philip became suspicious of Alexander after he married Eurydice and disgraced Alexander’s mother, Olympias. Because all other sources name Philip’s last wife Cleopatra,\textsuperscript{26} the name Eurydice was considered a mistake on the part of Arrian, notably by Ernst Badian, who published a polemical article on the issue.\textsuperscript{27} Badian, as we saw earlier, succeeded in establishing that Eurydice was not a regnal name. On the other hand, there is no reason to reject Cleopatra’s name change in the face of all other name changes attested for Macedonian royalty. Far from doubting Arrian’s testimony, Helmut Berve had proposed the reverse scenario,
that Cleopatra was originally named Eurydice but changed her name after her marriage to Philip.28

Cleopatra/Eurydice’s greatest champion was Waldemar Heckel.29 He defended the name Eurydice given to her by Arrian and went so far as to suggest that the name change was significant to the point of being offensive to Olympias. It is a pity that his impressive battery of arguments did not take into consideration Pausanias’ corrupt text with regard to the Philippeum. There is no reason why we could not restore Pausanias’ lacuna as Εὐρυδίκη τε ἡ Φιλίππου <γυνὴ καὶ Ὀλυμπιάς> (“Eurydice, Philip’s wife and Olympias”). Pausanias’ account of the monuments in the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia is heavily indebted to the inscriptions written on or alongside these monuments.30 It is therefore reasonable to suppose that his identification of the portraits in Philip’s family group was based on accompanying inscriptions. As the pedestal carries no lettering (figure 4.2), we assume that the names of the figures were either painted on the blocks or written on a separate stele. Bearing in mind that women’s names were normally followed by a patronymic or, in the case of married women, by the husband’s name in the genitive followed by γυνὴ (wife), we would expect the inscription identifying Philip’s mother to have conformed to this formula and to read Εὐρυδίκη τε ἡ Ἀμύντου γυνή (“Eurydice, wife of Amyntas”). If Pausanias’ incomplete phrase Εὐρυδίκη τε ἡ Φιλίππου actually echoes the words on the statue base, then the inevitable restoration is Εὐρυδίκη τε ἡ Φιλίππου γυνή (“Eurydice, wife of Philip”).

An additional point to be made here is the fact that the three extant inscriptions actually naming Philip’s mother Eurydice, only give her patronymic. Εὐρυδίκα Σίρρα (“Eurydice, Sirras’ daughter”) seems to be the way she chose to describe herself after her husband’s death in 370. If her statue had been included in the Philippeum, it is likely that the accompanying inscription would have named her as Eurydice, daughter of Sirras, and that Pausanias would have read it that way. A statue base that once carried Eurydice’s portrait, perhaps forming part of a dynastic group, and reused in a Christian basilica at Palatitsia near Vergina, preserves the inscription Εὐρυδίκα Σίρρα.31 Two statue bases dedicated by Eurydice to Eukleia that came to light between 1980 and 1990 in Eukleia’s sanctuary at Vergina carry the identical inscriptions Εὐρυδίκα Σίρρα Εὐκλείαιa (“Eurydice, Sirras’ daughter, to Eukleia”).32 The statue that stood on the second base represents a peplos figure with separately attached head, covered by a cloak falling over her shoulders.33 This statue has been identified as a portrait of Eurydice. Extant portrait statues of the fourth century, however, are not peplos figures but wear a chiton and himation, for example the so-called Artemisia from the Mausoleum of Halicarnassus.34
The peplos is reserved for goddesses, e.g., Cephisodotus’ Eirene. The formulaic inscription, moreover, giving the name of the dedicant in the nominative, not the accusative, indicates that the statue on the Eukleia base is not a portrait but a divine image. Portrait statues were usually dedicated by a third party, often by family members. A good example from the fourth century is offered by a statue base from Athens, datable around 360 and signed by the sculptor Praxiteles that carried the portrait statue of a priestess, dedicated by her brothers. The names of the donors are in the nominative, whereas that of the person portrayed is in the accusative.

In conclusion, the identification of Philip’s Eurydice in the Philippeum with his last wife, commonly known as Cleopatra, is, I think, a viable possibility. The shape and size of the surviving four cavities for the insertion of the statues’ plinths on the pedestal tell us two things. The trapezoidal shape of the first cavity on the right suggests that it must have held the plinth of a draped female figure, whereas the comparatively small cavity in the second block from the left indicates the statue of a youthful male figure, namely Alexander, who was only in his teens at the time. Even though most scholars have argued that Alexander stood at the center of the composition because Pausanias mentions him second after Philip, the reduced size of the plinth places him here. Olympias’ place is clearly beside him, on the now missing first block on the left (figure 4.2). The two royal women were thus standing on the edges of the composition; it was therefore possible to remove them to the Heraeum without damaging the overall composition. But who stood at the center? This position was assigned to Philip by Treu, followed by Schultz, who assumed that the donor dominated the composition, and that Amyntas III should stand next to his wife, Eurydice. If, however, Eurydice was not Philip’s mother but his last wife, she belonged to his side, which left the center open for Amyntas, who was thus identified as head of the family. We should bear in mind that in statuary groups of the classical period the donor did not necessarily stand in the middle. Examples are offered by two groups at Delphi. First, Lysander’s naval commanders, dedicated after the battle at Aegospotami in 405, where Lysander was portrayed near the edge of the pedestal (Paus. 10.9.7), and second, by the Daochos dedication, dedicated after 338, where Daochos II’s portrait is again placed close to the edge.

Cleopatra/Eurydice’s inclusion modifies the message conveyed by the dynastic group. In addition to Amyntas III, on whom depended Philip’s right to the throne, Philip portrayed himself; Alexander, his heir; Olympias, the heir’s mother; and the potential mother to a new heir, Cleopatra/Eurydice. This would have amounted to a public
gesture of reconciliation toward Alexander, also establishing the new wife’s position in the dynasty. What the Greeks made of this manifestation of Philip’s polygamy in a Panhellenic sanctuary we do not know. The fact that the two female portraits were seen by Pausanias inside the Heraeum shows that the arrangement was short-lived. It is very likely that after Philip’s death Alexander removed Cleopatra/Eurydice’s portrait to the Heraeum, perhaps on the occasion of the exiles’ decree that was announced at Olympia during the Games of 324 (Diod. 18.8.3–5). Olympias’ portrait could have been removed by Cassander during his campaign in the Peloponnese in 317. The juxtaposition in the Heraeum of the portraits of the two rivals, Olympias and Cleopatra/Eurydice, both exiled from Philip’s side for eternity would have been fate’s final irony.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Beth Carney for inviting me to this conference, and to Brian Bosworth for his advice and suggestions.
This page intentionally left blank
Putting Women in Their Place
Women in Public under Philip II and Alexander III and the Last Argeads

Elizabeth Carney

Philip II and Alexander III used the women of their dynasty to shape the presentation of Argead monarchy. While father and son frequently employed the images of royal women for their own purposes, it is not clear how often royal women themselves actually appeared in any public setting and even less clear, when they did, whether they interacted with individuals or simply played nonspeaking roles in ceremonies and spectacles. Indeed it is difficult to locate royal women in any specific physical context, an actual place, public or private. In the light of this absence of direct evidence, we historians, myself included, have tended to temporize and not “put” these women anywhere, but filmmakers like Oliver Stone have no such luxury. In his Alexander, the character of Olympias had to appear in some sort of physical context. Stone chose, in one scene, to locate her, face unveiled, in a theater audience, but during much of the rest of the film she lurks on the edge of male public space. Indeed, in the sections of the film that depict her actions after Alexander’s departure for Asia, Olympias seems always to be in her own quarters. While not in general sympathy with the characterization of Olympias in Alexander, I do admire Stone’s commitment to picturing the material world that Olympias and her son inhabited. What I would like to do in this paper is “place” Argead women. This is a topic that cannot justifiably be avoided on the grounds of lack of evidence; these women were, of course, somewhere, and wherever that somewhere was makes a difference in how one interprets the dynamics of the Argead court.

Two strands in current scholarship on the ancient world inform my discussion of the place of women in Argead monarchy. A body of recent work has dealt with the staging of monarchy, the ways in which monarchs employed images, rituals, costume, and processions to legitimize, stabilize, and empower royal dynasties. Most of this work has focused on the Hellenistic or Roman periods. Though there has been recognition that the Argeads also employed these methods,
comparatively little has been said about them, despite the fact that
Philip II played a seminal role in the development of royal stagecraft.
Spawforth rightly called him an “impressario of monarchy.” Theaters
were often used for assemblies as well as dramatic performances, thus
obscuring the distinction between political and theatrical events. As
we shall see, Philip II seems purposefully to have linked palace and
theater at Aegae. Whereas scholarship on Greek women of this period
written in the 1970s and 1980s tended to stress difference between
women and men and to assume that “woman” as a category was
nearly synonymous with “private” and that “man” had a similar rel-
ationship with “public,” more recent work nuances these categories.

Now we recognize that in the area of religion many women played
very public roles indeed. Work on domestic space and on veiling
practices has altered our understanding of women’s physical place
in the Hellenic world. Observations once taken as literal are now
often understood as prescriptive. Class, place, and period now receive
more attention. There is even some realization that not all Greek
women were fifth century Athenians.

Let me begin my discussion of women’s place in Argead monarchy
with the public appearances of their various avatars. The personal
names of royal women appeared in public speech and spaces. These
names themselves sometimes had a public aspect. Philip II gave two
of his daughters—Thessalonice and Europe—names that celebrated
his victories. Olympias had at least three other names (Plut. Mor.
401), apparently selected to commemorate moments in her life or that
of her husband. The name “Eurydice” apparently acquired dynastic
significance. When Adea, the granddaughter of Philip II, married
Philip Arrhidaeus, she took the name Eurydice (Arr. FGrH 156 F
9.23). Her new name alluded to public memory of Philip II’s mother.
Inscriptions and monuments from the Vergina/Aegae area demon-
strate the preservation of such of a memory. During the reign of
Alexander, Olympias and her daughter Cleopatra appeared on lists of
grain recipients with only their personal names and no patronymic, a
formulation that duplicated the inscriptive usage for male heads of
state.

While the names many Argead women bore functioned as quasi-
titles, they had a power that the actual title, basilissa, a development of
the early Hellenistic period, lacked. The names recognized public
identity for these women without reference to office or male kin, as the
title did not. In an era when respectable Athenian women’s names
were not mentioned in public and appeared only on funerary inscriptions,
Athenian speechmakers referred to Macedonian royal
women by personal name alone. Hypereides first mentions Olympias,
without any other identifier, as the dedicator of a *phialē* (cup) to Hygieia and, in the next sentence, argues that the name (*onoma*) of Olympias and of Alexander should not be used to harm citizens (Hyp. 4.19). This passage closely associates Olympias’ name and her public reputation and treats Olympias and Alexander in a parallel manner. Eurydice’s and Olympias’ names stood naked in the Athenian assembly, like the names of men, particularly famous men. In terms of names, at least, they were functionally male.\(^{18}\)

Many of the inscriptions that named these royal women also commemorated their patronage and euergetism. The patronage itself was a public act (and in the case of Olympias’ offering to Hygieia, a controversial one), but so were the inscriptions commemorating that action. Inscriptions recalled Eurydice’s patronage of the Eucleia sanctuary,\(^{19}\) Olympias’ and her daughter’s reception of grain in time of scarcity (and the wealth their reception of the grain implied\(^{20}\)), and Eurydice’s dedication of something related to citizen women and the Muses.\(^{21}\)

The images of royal women appeared in public, largely sacred places. Their appearances mirrored the pattern of elite women elsewhere in the Hellenic world, though on a somewhat grander scale, earlier than the majority of such examples, and in circumstances sometimes at least as much political as religious.\(^{22}\) In Greece, honorific statues for priestesses first appeared in the late fifth or early fourth century, almost exclusively in sanctuaries.\(^{23}\) Priestesses, typically members of elite families, enjoyed social and legal privileges that more ordinary women did not.\(^{24}\) Thus priestesses honored with statues resembled royal women so honored in the sense that they were exceptional women who frequently moved between public and private roles.\(^{25}\)

Philip II’s mother Eurydice (who may well have been a priestess of Eucleia; see below) dedicated two statues (one of which has survived) in the sanctuary to Eucleia at Aegae, on the edge of the agora. The surviving statue may represent Eurydice herself rather than Eucleia.\(^{26}\) Granted the problem of distinguishing images of mortal women from goddesses in Greek portraiture, it is difficult to say.\(^{27}\) Difficulty in making this distinction may derive from the Greek sense that this was a peculiarly permeable barrier, just as more women (mostly royal) began to be assimilated to divinities (frequently Aphrodite) in the early Hellenistic period.\(^{28}\) Another image, more certainly intended to be that of Eurydice herself, once stood in a monument somewhere near Vergina, as a surviving inscription demonstrates.\(^{29}\) (The idealizing nature of female portraiture and the similarity of female portraits to divine images meant that a female image was,
therefore, recognized as a portrait primarily through the inscription of a woman’s name on statue base.) Famously, Eurydice’s image and that of Olympias stood at either end of the dynastic statue group within the Philippeum (Paus. 5.17.4, 20.9–10), in sacred space at Olympia. Their statues, like those of the male Argeads in the center of the group, appeared to be chryselephantine, a fabrication previously employed, possibly exclusively, for divinities. Greeks often referred to statues of individuals as though they were the people themselves (Paus. 5.17.4, 20.10). Chrysoula Saatsoglou-Paliadeli rightly titled her discussion of the inscriptions and statues to which I have just referred, “Queenly Appearances.”

Not only the avatars of royal Argead women but the women themselves appeared in public. Many of these appearances of royal women would have related to religion. Throughout the Greek world women participated in public processions and sacrifices. A late Archaic burial at Vergina, apparently that of a royal woman, contained a scepter, possibly signifying that this woman functioned as a priestess, perhaps for dynastic ritual. Eurydice may well have served as a priestess of Eucleia. It is likely that Olympias was a priestess of Dionysus. A letter from Olympias to Alexander preserved in Athenaeus (659f–660a) indicates that she also had some involvement in Argead ritual: Olympias offered to her son a slave skilled in sacrifice according to Alexander’s ancestral rites, both Argead and Bacchic. Plutarch (Alex. 2.5) describes her as a patron and apparently leader of a public female Dionysiac celebration. Duris (ap. Ath. 560f) claimed that in 317 she appeared in front of the Macedonian army dressed as Baccant, and that, so guised, won the home army over to her side. As a young woman, Olympias, accompanied by her uncle, made the long trip to the Samothrace shrine to the Great Gods, in order to become an initiate and, almost certainly, to be betrothed to Philip (Plut. Alex. 2.1). As we have seen, Eurydice made dedications at Aegae and possibly at Dion and elsewhere, as did Olympias, in Athens to Hygieia and at Delphi to Apollo. She may also have placed an inquiry at an oracle of Apollo in Asia Minor (Anth. Lyr. Graec. 14.114). Her proprietary attitude toward the oracle of Zeus at Dodona (Hyp. 4.24–26), quite apart from its political significance, suggests a role in the shrine itself. All these dedications may not have been made in person, but other elite women certainly made such dedicatory trips. The presence or absence of women from theatrical performances is an old problem, but I am inclined to the view that considers their presence likely because women generally participated in public religion. Oliver Stone might actually have been right in placing Olympias and her rival Cleopatra in the theater audience. Philip’s wives and daughters
could have been present in the theater when Philip was murdered, attending the panegyris (festal assembly in honor of a god) celebrated in the theater that was part of the palace/theater complex he himself had created (see below). Royal female piety involved public appearance.

Greek women generally played prominent roles in death ritual. We have no evidence that royal Argead women took part in royal funerals—unless one takes seriously Justin’s reports of Olympias’ cavorting around the tomb of Philip—but it seems likely that they did. The women interred in the antechamber of Tomb II and in the so-called Tomb of Eurydice at Vergina, almost certainly royal, received splendid burials, as did earlier Argead women.

Today in the United States, commercial vendors participate in “wedding festivals” in hopes of attracting spendthrift brides, but the Argeads put on actual wedding festivals. Olympias’ wedding and those of other royal wives may have been tied to a festival at Dion. Philip and Alexander used royal weddings to stage their monarchy, advertising its wealth and glamour. Philip transformed his daughter Cleopatra’s wedding into an international panegyris with public processions, sacrifices, and theatrical performances. His murder itself occurred in the midst of this extravaganza, at the entrance to the theater at Aegae (Diod. 16.91.4–93.3). Alexander placed his wedding to the Persian princess(es) in the context of an outrageously splendid display, his own royal wedding echoed by those of many of the Macedonian elite to Persians. These wedding festivals were not simply, however, advertisements for the dynasty. They did more than embody Argead wealth and power. In keeping with W. R. Connor’s analysis of the functions of festivals organized by leaders, these wedding festivals were interactive events in which the crowds, by their attendance, indicated approval of leaders and, sometimes, disapproval.

Were the brides visible at these wedding festivals? None of the accounts of Argead weddings in Macedonia mention the brides’ location. The general public would probably have glimpsed them and their conspicuous jewelry in a wedding procession. If Argead weddings resembled even comparatively modest Athenian ones, then the bride was present at the wedding feast and so were other women, though they probably sat apart. Moreover, at a critical moment in the affair, Athenian brides were unveiled in front of the wedding guests before being taken off to the wedding chamber. Of course, in Athens, there was an entire female world of celebration associated with weddings and that was likely the case in Macedonia as well. In other words, royal women may more often have appeared to the female public world of Macedonia than to the male. Arrian (7.4.4–8),
reporting that the mass weddings at Susa were held according to Persian fashion, says that the brides, including the royal brides, were present, sat beside their husbands, and were kissed by them. We know that in the Hellenistic period, following the example of Philip II, royal weddings became dynastic and religious festivals with long processions, sometimes by sea.\textsuperscript{52}

What about other court banquets? Were royal women present there? In the Greek world in general, respectable women did not attend symposia, but at family feasts both men and women were present, though they may have sat separately. Herodotus (5.17–21) tells a story about a banquet at the Macedonian court in the time of Amyntas I. Whatever the literal historicity of this Herodotean tale,\textsuperscript{53} although it has usually been understood to say that elite women did not participate in court symposia, Herodotus actually has Amyntas assert only that their custom (\textit{nomos}) was to separate women and men whereas the Persians expected their wives and mistresses to sit beside them (5.18). (The rest of the story, however, seems to imply that the women may have been in another room since Amyntas had to send for them.) Indeed, Hoepfner pictured royal women banqueting separately but equally from men, in parallel banqueting rooms.\textsuperscript{54} Some court events may have been understood as family occasions of the sort that both men and women attended. The view that royal women occasionally participated in royal banquets and symposia\textsuperscript{55} remains attractive, if currently unprovable.

Whether seen in the distance or in closer proximity at a banquet, the trappings of royal women would have publicized their presence but, at the same time, partially concealed it. Kings employed costume to demonstrate their power and distinction, as well as their wealth: Philip’s white cloak worn in the procession on the day of his murder (Diod. 16.93.1); Alexander’s double plumed helmet (Plut. \textit{Alex}. 16.4); his use of mixed eastern and western attire (Plut. \textit{Alex}. 45.1–3) and Demetrius Poliorcetes’ famous cloak showing the heavenly bodies (Plut. \textit{Demetr}. 41.4–5). As with Macedonian disapproval of Alexander’s eclectic dress (Plut. \textit{Alex}. 45.3) or negative reaction to Demetrius’ over-the-top royal wardrobe (Plut. \textit{Demetr}. 41.5), a king could miscalculate the effect of costume choices.\textsuperscript{56} Nonetheless, to be king, one had to dress the part. The same generalization certainly applies to royal women.

Passages about the Hellenistic period associate royal women with luxurious royal garments and litters (Plut. \textit{Arat}. 17.2–5; Polyaeon. 8.57).\textsuperscript{57} For the Argead period, of garments, we have only the gorgeous purple and gold fabric used to wrap the woman’s bones in the antechamber of Tomb II at Vergina, though traces of purple dye
from now vanished fabric have been found in both male and female burials, including the tomb at Vergina attributed to Philip II’s mother Eurydice. Throughout the Hellenic world, luxurious dress was a vital aspect of an elite woman’s self-presentation. What has survived is golden jewelry: the beautiful diadem and lovely myrtle wreath from Tomb II, and the quantities of gold jewelry and decorations from the presumably royal female archaic burials. Granted the amount of gold jewelry regularly found in elite Macedonian burials, surely those of royal women would have been even more impressive.

Whether the story that Arsinoë, widow of Lysimachus, escaped her enemies by omitting her royal attire and royal litter and by persuading someone else to wear her robes and occupy the litter (Polyaen. 8.57) is literally true, it implies that, at a slightly later period, a royal woman’s face may not have been visible, but the outward signs of her identity, the fabric of her clothing and litter, were. Llewellyn-Jones has demonstrated that veiling customs may mean that women were at once in public, but at the same time privatized by their veiling. He argues that veils were the Hellenic norm for women, that they got more common and more concealing in the Hellenistic period, and that they may be connected to the greater mobility of women in that period. In effect, he suggests that the veil was a portable house that a woman brought with her into public areas.

We should picture these royal women, faces shadowed by a veil or perhaps partially visible through translucent fabric, gleaming with gold and purple, perfumed, and sometimes riding in a litter equally luxuriously decorated. Their dress, their jewels, and even the vehicles that carried them showed the wealth and glamour of the monarchy. Sumptuary legislation in Athens from an earlier period reminds us that elite families had long employed their female members to display/stage their wealth and power. Argead women performed a similar role. As Llwellyn-Jones observes, a woman could be “covered and conspicuous at the same time. . .” At weddings and funerals royal women costumed themselves for their roles; one could understand their own funerals and sometimes splendid tombs as costume of another sort. In death as in life royal females displayed Argead power and wealth.

Better evidence for female royal dress exists for the last days of the Argead dynasty. After the deaths of Philip and Alexander, no fully competent royal males being present, some royal women certainly used their attire to shape their image and stage their own power, as kings did. According to Duris (ap. Ath. 13.560f), when the armies associated with Olympias and Adea Eurydice confronted each other in fall of 317, Olympias appeared dressed as a Bacchant,
as we have seen, and Adea Eurydice armed in Macedonian fashion. Each woman defined her public role, what each apparently hoped would generate support, by distinctive dress. Olympias’ axiôma (reputation, rank) won the day (Diod. 19.11.2); apparently she had dressed for success. Even at the moment of death, royal dress was important. Justin (14.6.9–12) says that when Olympias saw the men sent to kill her coming, she went out to meet them, chaperoned by two serving women, dressed royally (“veste regali”), and that, even as she died, she was careful to arrange her hair and garments so that there would be nothing indecorous. In effect, she staged her own death. To some degree, Adea Eurydice, though lacking access to an appropriate wardrobe, did much the same, apparently imitating the manner and means of death of that of royal women on the stage, employing part of her dress to bring it about (Diod. 19.11.7). Both woman followed a script and chose a wardrobe and accoutrements to suit.

Let me turn to the problem of the place of women at court, apart from public banquets and processions. Were women physically accessible to males? Royal housing and the use of royal domestic space are suggestive. Palaces functioned as stages for monarchy. Recent scholarship suggests that Philip II was responsible for the construction of buildings 1 and 2 at Pella as well as the palace at Aegae. The palace and theater at Aegae were apparently part of the same unit, planned and built together, presumably by Philip II. He may have envisioned the palace/theater complex as the setting for the very kind of royal procession and spectacle at which he was murdered. At Aegae, and to a lesser degree at Pella, the palace is both near and far from the rest of the town, much like the king. The Vergina palace reflects the ambiguous relationship between king and people. Public and private were blurred in Macedonian palaces. Many of the rooms on the first floor of the Vergina palace were constructed for banqueting, though usable for other purposes. Instead of the ordinary blank wall with a closed door, Macedonian palaces presented a grand entrance façade, theatrical in aspect. The Vergina palace had a veranda, or balcony, that looked out on the valley below, particularly on the nearby theater. Verandas in Hellenic dwelling places were unusual; typically, domestic structures were closed off from the outside, the line between public and private firmly drawn. The Vergina veranda may have functioned something like the window at Buckingham palace or the Amarna “window of appearances.” The women of the royal family might have appeared there or used the veranda in order to view events in the theater.
Were royal women visible and accessible inside the palace, in either public space or private quarters? Physical evidence offers little help here; the palace at Aegae had, at least, a partial second story, but we know nothing about how space was allotted there. Hatzopoulos has recently pointed out that a passage in Livy (40.6.1–16.3) indicates that in the era of Philip V, his grown sons had houses of their own (with banquetting rooms and upper stories of their own) at Pella and did not live at the palace.\textsuperscript{75} In Philip II’s time, not all his wives and their offspring may have lived in the palace. His children by his various wives, judging by what we know about Cynnane and Alexander, had comparatively individualized upbringings,\textsuperscript{76} though this could have been accomplished without architecturally separate quarters. Nor is much gained if we assume all the royal women lived in the palace. Now that we know that many Greek houses did not have a separate physical place for women but rather a mental category for women’s space, one defined in good part by the movements of men and women, it is difficult, on the basis of physical evidence, to surmise where they might have been and with whom they might have met.\textsuperscript{77} Alexander, following Persian custom in Asia, may have maintained a “harem”—at least a “designated space for royal women”\textsuperscript{78}—and Roxane and certainly Barsine traveled with him.\textsuperscript{79} Presumably they had tents or sections of tents of their own, visible to the army and the rest of the court.

The most difficult problem about royal women’s place—and unfortunately the most important—is the degree to which Argead women had personal dealings with elite males other than their husbands, brothers, and sons, particularly before the death of Alexander. A number of passages in written sources provide information, directly and indirectly.

Aeschines (2.26–29) appears to picture Eurydice in a place where other people are present when she asks Iphicrates to help her sons. Clearly, he understands her to deal with Iphicrates in person, whether in her own quarters or a more public setting, with a number of witnesses present (Aeschin. 2.28–29).\textsuperscript{80}

When Olympias and Alexander’s friends convince him that the planned marriage of Arrhidæus to Pixodarus’ daughter is a political threat (Plut. Alex. 10.1), do they do it independently of each other or do they meet together to confer with him? Plutarch’s diction allows for both interpretations. Plutarch (Alex. 10.4) pictures Olympias encouraging Pausanias, the assassin of Philip, to kill her husband. The scenario Plutarch describes can hardly have taken place in a public setting but does seem to involve personal conversation between Olympias and Pausanias. It is hard to imagine her trusting to a letter
an exhortation to kill the king. Olympias quarreled with Antipater before her departure from Macedonia. We know that they both wrote Alexander about the dispute and may certainly have written each other, but some of the initial argument surely developed as a personal confrontation. If there were not an aspect of personal confrontation to the dispute, it is difficult to see why Olympias felt it necessary to remove herself physically from Macedonia. Olympias must have seen and met the young men Amyntas, son of Andromenes, accused her of sheltering from the Macedonian draft in her home (Curt. 7.1.37).

Cynnane, Philip’s daughter by the Illyrian Audata, actually fought in battle against the Illyrians during Philip’s reign (Polyaen. 8.60). Unless we reject this story out of hand, she must have had dealings with men in the army.

Alexander’s sister Cleopatra had employees of her own (Paus. 1.44.6), apparently ran Molossia by herself for some time, served as a thearadoch (an official who receives envoys sent to consult oracles or present offerings), was well enough known to receive requests for assistance in influencing her brother (Memnon FGrH 434, F 4.37), and supposedly took a lover (Plut. Mor. 818b–c; the anecdote presupposes that Cleopatra could know men at court). One must conclude, granted the amount of conspiratorial and political activity going on, either that royal women were unusually trusting about committing their activities to paper and equally confident in the loyalty of those who carried their notes or voiced their views, or that some considerable amount of their dealings happened in person.

After Alexander’s death, royal women did not simply play a part in scenes intended to be observed or deal privately with male courtiers. Some regularly appeared in public and dealt in public with men: Cynnane escaped Antipater in company with and perhaps in command of a small military force, appeared in the vicinity of the Macedonian army, and was killed in public (Arrian FGrH 156, F 9.22–23); Adea Eurydice addressed the troops, negotiated with Cassander, and appeared with an army; Cleopatra argued with Antipater in person and apparently talked to Eumenes in person (Arrian FGrH 156, F 11.40); Olympias also appeared with an army, managed a siege, asked to address the Macedonians, and was killed in public.

The appropriate model for the place of Argead women is to be found in Homer, not in the lives of fifth-century Athenian housewives. The functioning norm of Argead women’s public presentation seems to lie somewhere between the apparently regular public appearance at court of Helen or Arete and Penelope’s occasional ones. Doubtless, as with Homeric royal women, they were always accompanied
by attendants and they may well have been veiled, but they were sometimes present at court.

As adult male Argeads grew scarce, Argead women appeared more often in public. When the Successors began to employ a royal title as did the women associated with them, the formal public role of royal women may have expanded. The growing tendency to stage monarchy as a spectacle required that. Whether royal women were more often physically present at court is another matter. Mothers would always have been more visible than wives, widows more visible than those with living husbands. Apart, however, from the great processions and ceremonies of the period, royal women may have continued to conduct themselves like Homeric royal women, but with their costumes more visible than themselves.
The court symposia of both Philip and Alexander of Macedon are unanimously portrayed in the extant Greek sources as riotous gatherings in which large quantities of wine were consumed, usually to excess, leading to unrestrained, licentious, or even violent behavior. This perception appears to be confirmed by the prevalence of drinking vessels in the royal tombs at Vergina. As I shall argue, however, the dismissal by the Greek sources of Macedonian symposia as mere drinking parties is based upon a misunderstanding of the integrative social function of the symposium in the courts of both Philip and Alexander. The Greek misunderstanding arises because the Macedonian monarchs did not model their own symposia upon those of their neighbours to the south, but turned rather to Homer, where communal feasting and drinking served to strengthen the ties between Achilles and his Myrmidon Hetairoi. In her recent examination of Macedonian royal symposia, Elizabeth Carney demonstrates that the Macedonians were not ignorant of Greek sympotic customs:

Granted the increasing Hellenization of the court and the dramatic increase in the number of courtiers of Greek origin, the distinctive nature of the Macedonian symposium was hardly the consequence of ignorance of southern Greek practice. It represented, rather, a willful refusal to abandon practices that defined both the style and the substance of Macedonian monarchy and, at the same time, by their excess, confirmed their wealth and power.²

I intend to demonstrate that it is actually the Greek sources who were ignorant, and willfully so, of the important role the distinctive Macedonian symposium played in the integration of the elite for both Philip and Alexander. Failing to perceive the deliberate Homeric allusions of the Macedonian symposium, they transferred the ritual drinking customs of Philip and Alexander and their court into further evidence of their barbarism.
I shall begin with a *caveat*, that I am in no way trying to suggest that the Macedonian rulers were not hard drinkers, but rather that there was a ritual and integrative function to their symposia, which was deliberately overlooked by the Greek sources. There are scores of anecdotes on the drunken behavior of both Philip and Alexander. One has only to think, for example, of Philip’s drink-fueled attempt (prevented only by an opportune stumble) to draw his sword against Alexander in response to the latter’s hurling of a drinking-cup at Attaeus. The most obvious, perhaps, example of Alexander’s drunkenness did not end so well, for it culminated in the murder of his childhood friend Cleitus, who had saved his life at the battle of the Granicus River. These, of course, are extreme examples, memorable for the violent acts fuelled by the overconsumption of alcohol perpetrated (or nearly perpetrated) against family members and close friends.

Even when the royal symposia of both Philip and Alexander occur under less emotionally charged circumstances, however, the Greek sources portray them as drunken revelries, notable for their excess. To take but one example, Philip’s (alleged) drunken reveling after his defeat of the Greeks at Chaeronea appears to have become a *topos*. Its earliest extant appearance occurs in the contemporary *Philippica* of Theopompus of Chios (apud Ath. 10.435b–c = FGrH 115 F 236):

> When they [the Athenian ambassadors] had departed, he summoned some of his companions, and told them to call in the pipes-playing girls and Aristonicus the cithara-player and Dorion the pipes-player and the others who customarily drank with him. Philip used to associate everywhere with people of this sort, and he was well-furnished with much equipment for symposia and parties. Because he was fond of drinking and unrestrained in his character, he kept around him many buffoons, both musicians and joke-tellers. And after drinking all night and becoming very drunk and violent, he dismissed all the others and, when it was already near daybreak, he went on a revel (*kōmos*) to the Athenian ambassadors.

Theopompus’ portrayal of Philip in this episode as a drunken lout, adding insult to injury to his defeated opponents, is in keeping with his characterization of him throughout the *Philippica* as a habitual drinker and host of intemperate parties. The tendentiousness of Theopompus’ portrayal of Philip was noted even in antiquity, for Polybius severely chastises him for his excessive virulence toward Philip, not least because he depicted Philip as “so passionate in the drinking of unmixed wine, that even in the day he often appeared in front of his friends manifestly drunk.”
Diodorus gives a very similar account of Philip’s behavior after Chaeronea, but transfers the scene of his insulting and drunken kōmos to the Athenian captives, rather than the ambassadors (16.87.1):

Some say that during the drinking, after he had consumed large quantities of unmixed wine and had led a kōmos with his friends, he strolled though the midst of the captives, exulting at the misfortune of the luckless men.

There are two things to note in the Diodorus passage, however. First of all, Diodorus explictly disclaims authority for Philip’s drunken kōmos, attributing it to unnamed authorities (it is tempting to suggest that Theopompus was one of them). Second, its sequel in Diodorus is the rebuke of Philip made by the Athenian orator Demades (who was one of the captives) for his inappropiate exultation in his victory, which is followed by Philip’s complete change of attitude, resulting in his immediate cessation from reveling and entrance into diplomatic negotiations with the Athenians. In Diodorus’ account, when all is told, Philip stands at least somewhat redeemed (in strict contrast to his inebriated lack of diplomacy in Theopompus’ version).

Plutarch offers a similar portrayal of Philip’s drunken kōmos after Chaeronea, although he too transfers it to a different venue (Dem. 20.3):

Immediately afterwards Philp was hubristic in the joy arising from his victory, and after going on a drunken kōmos to the corpses, recited the beginning of the decree made by Demosthenes, putting it into metre and marking off the rhythm.

Interestingly, however, in the sequel, the hero of the episode who forces Philip to change his hubristic attitude is Demosthenes himself (through the power of his oratory, at least), rather than Demades (hence also the change to Philip’s reveling in the presence of the corpses, rather than the captives). Plutarch tells us that when Philip became sober after his mocking of Demosthenes, he understood the magnitude of the agon in which he had been involved and shuddered to think of the power and skill of the orator who had forced him to risk both his hegemony and his life in the space of a single day. Clearly, the anecdote of Philip’s drunken kōmos had become a topos by the time of Diodorus and Plutarch, the precise details of which could be changed to suit the purpose at hand.

The formulaic nature of this episode by Plutarch’s day is shown by his discussion of the question of whether or not intoxication clouds
one’s judgement in his *Table Talk* (*Mor.* 715c), where no one plays an explicit role as the hero of the episode. In this context, while there is an apparent allusion to Philip’s drunken behavior after Chaeronea,\(^9\) the emphasis of the anecdote is on his ability to recover his sobriety in response to a delegation from the Athenians offering him a peace treaty.

We should note that there was clearly an alternate version of the episode in circulation, which exculpated Philip from drunken hubris entirely. Justin (9.4.1–3) claims that Philip’s behavior was restrained after his victory, but attributes his motives to political calculation, “so as not to appear exultant before his own soldiers or insulting before the defeated.” Similarly, Aelian (*VH* 8.15) claims that Philip exercised restraint and did not behave in an arrogant way (οὐχ ὕπερμελέτησε), although this statement is somewhat at odds with his earlier implication that Philip’s treatment of his captives was in fact excessive (6.1).\(^10\) As this example reveals, the Greek sources were more than willing to tailor their accounts of the drinking habits of the Macedonian royalty to fit the narrative context, and the contradictions within the tradition (and sometimes, as we have seen, even within the same author) render the details of any of the extant versions suspect at best.\(^11\)

The drunken hubris of Philip and his companions in this episode is given credibility in its earliest extant rendition, that of Theopompus, by the specific mention of the names of Philip’s musicians. This kind of circumstantial detail not only adds color to the narrative, but also an air of veracity, for it creates the impression of eyewitness testimony. Theopompus himself was a contemporary of Philip of Macedon, and was an eyewitness to Macedonian symposia (although probably not the one in question), for he spent time at Philip’s court in the late 340s (*Speusippus, Letter to Philip* 12=*FGrH* 115 T 7),\(^12\) and is reported even to have enjoyed the king’s patronage.\(^13\)

Demosthenes, who also spent time at the Macedonian court when he participated in the Athenian embassy to Philip which resulted in the infamous Peace of Philocrates, offers another, very similar, account of the court symposia of Philip II, also based on eyewitness testimony (2.18–19):

> If there was anyone among them [Philip’s mercenaries and *pezhetairoi*] who was experienced in military matters, all of these men he sent away through ambition [my informant] said, wishing to take all the credit himself, for in addition to his other vices he was also not to be surpassed in ambition. But if there was anyone who exhibited good judgment and justice in other respects, who could not abide the daily dissolute style of life...
and drinking and lascivious dancing, he rejected this sort of man and did not include him as a member of his retinue. Indeed, the remainder of his associates are robbers and flatterers and the sort of men who participate in drunken dancing of such a kind as I hesitate now to describe to you. It is clear that these things are true, for those whom everyone has driven away as being more licentious than street performers, such as that common slave Callias and men of his sort, mimics of bad jokes and poets of shameful verses, which they perform to get a laugh out of their audiences, these people he treats with affection and keeps around him.

Demosthenes’ testimony is particularly interesting in this connection because it appears to corroborate Theopompus’ depictions of Philip’s court symposia both in his description of Philip’s drunken kōmos after Chaeronea (discussed above) and in his extended denunciation of Philip and his entourage (F 224 and 225). Like Theopompus, Demosthenes attempts to bolster the credibility of his narrative with the addition of circumstantial details such as the mention of Callias, the mime, by name, and even goes further in his attribution of the details of the symposia of Philip’s court to an unnamed informant, whom he describes (2.17) as “a man utterly incapable of lying” who had spent time in Macedonia.

While it is impossible to determine with any certainty on chronological grounds whether either Theopompus or Demosthenes served as a source for the other, because both spent time at Pella themselves and also had access to sources with firsthand information, it is more likely that each composed his (remarkably similar) description of Macedonian court symposia entirely independently of the other. Nevertheless, both are unrelentingly hostile toward Philip, portraying his drinking companions as lowlifes and degenerates, whereas in actual fact the king’s fellow drinkers were members of the elite, as Theopompus (presumably unintentionally) reveals through his specific mention of Aristonicus, who became a close associate of Alexander. The purposes of their hostile portrayals of Philip, however, are quite different. By portraying Philip as the leader of a gang of drunken louts, Demosthenes’ aim is to persuade the Athenians to lose their fears of Philip’s military power, stop prevaricating, and take the offensive against him. Theopompus’ interests, however, were more theoretical, in that Philip served as the epitome of a successful tyrant, who took advantage of the luxury and extravagance of others for his own political and military advancement. While the corrupting effects of luxury and decadence had been a topos of the Greek historiographical tradition
from its beginnings, the careers of Philip and Alexander (as the heirs to Persia in both luxury and “otherness”) appear to have given it new life in the late fourth century. 

Duris of Samos offers near-contemporary and probable eyewitness commentary on Macedonian royal symposia as well, when he informs us that Philip customarily slept with a gold wine cup under his pillow (FGrH 76 F 37a and b). Duris’ motives in including this detail in his Macedonian History are equally suspect, however, because he was interested in emphasizing the enervating moral effects of excessive drinking, particularly among the Successors (FGrH 76 F 12 and 15; cf. F 27), and the themes of luxury and extravagance serve for him, like Theopompus, as explanatory factors for political and military decline.

Similarly, the Greek sources emphasize the heavy drinking and extravagance of Alexander’s symposia. Eyewitness accounts of Alexander’s (allegedly) excessive drinking can be found in the poison pen of a certain Ephippus of Olynthus, who served with Alexander on his expedition and wrote a pamphlet on the deaths of Alexander and Hephaestion. It is clearly a hostile work (and indeed it is not surprising that any contemporary Olynthian would have no love lost for the Macedonian monarchy), and the few fragments which are extant from this work emphasize the luxury, extravagance, and generally un-Hellenic nature of Alexander’s court in general, and his symposia in particular (FGrH 126 F 1–5). Ephippus is the source of the observation (FGrH 126 F 1) that the Macedonians were unable to drink in an orderly fashion, but immediately made large toasts, so that they became drunk as the appetizers were being served and were not able to enjoy their meal. He also is the earliest extant authority to attribute the onset of Alexander’s fatal illness to his draining of a twelve-pint drinking cup (FGrH 126 F 3). Another hostile pamphlet that was probably published soon after Alexander’s death and emphasized his heavy drinking is attributed to a certain Niobule. It provides the additional details that Alexander exchanged toasts individually with all twenty of his fellow symposiasts at his final drinking party (FGrH 127 F 1), and that after declaiming a scene from Euripides’ Andromeda, he proposed a toast of unmixed wine and forced the other guests to do the same (FGrH 127 F 2). Another eyewitness, Chares of Mytilene, the king’s Royal Usher, emphasizes the luxury of Alexander’s symposia (FGrH 125 F 4) and is our earliest surviving source for the drinking contests of unmixed wine that Alexander held in honor of the Indian Sage Calanus, which led to the deaths of forty-one of his men. Chares also hints that Alexander was known for drinking large cups of unmixed wine in his anecdote of Callisthenes’
refusal to drink at one of Alexander’s symposia with the quip that he
did not wish to be in need of Asclepius’ cup after quaffing one of
Alexander’s (FGrH 125 F 13). Chares also appears to be the earliest
extant source for the animus that arose between Alexander and Cal-
listhenes when the latter refused to perform proskynēsis (FGrH 125
F 14a and b). It is likely, therefore, that his Histories of Alexander
highlighted the luxury and excessive drinking of Alexander’s sym-
posia in order to discredit the king and his un-Hellenic behavior.

An alternate tradition exculpating Alexander from heavy drinking
can also be traced back to contemporary eyewitness accounts. Arrian
(7.29.4), on the authority of Alexander’s officer Aristobulus, who
wrote a eulogistic history of Alexander’s reign, asserts that Alex-
ander had long drinking parties not in order to consume large quan-
tities of wine, but out of friendliness toward his Companions (FGrH
139 F 62). Similarly, Plutarch claims that Alexander was less prone
to excessive consumption of wine than he was thought to be, explain-
ing that this perception arose because of the amount of time he spent
in conversation over wine (Alex. 23.1; cf. Mor. 337f). Elsewhere in
his Life, however, Plutarch characterizes Alexander as “prone to
drinking” (ποτικός), an assessment which he mitigates by attributing
it to physical causes (Alex. 4.7). Furthermore, in his Table Talk, he
explicitly disavows the apologetic tradition, citing the Ephemerides
for the observation that Alexander was known to sleep all that day
(and sometimes the next as well) after drinking (Mor. 623e=FGrH 117
F 2c; cf. Ael. VH 3.23 and Ath. 10.434b). These purported diaries of
Alexander, with their “tedious emphasis on Alexander’s days of
drunk stupor,” are generally agreed not to be authentic and to
have been written with an expressly tendentious intent, whether that
was to rebut pervasive rumours that Alexander had been poisoned by
attributing his death to over-drinking or to damage his reputation in
the same way as Ephippus by portraying him as a drunk.

This portrayal of Philip and Alexander as excessive drinkers and
hosts of drunken, riotous, and sometimes violent symposia was per-
vasive in the extant contemporary Greek sources, who tailored it as
needed for the immediate purposes of their narrative context. (Even
in rather more panegyric accounts of Alexander’s life and career, it
was a factor that had to be explained away.) By contrast, Greek sym-
posia were highly ritualized events, governed by clear rules. Participants reclined on couches (a custom imported from the east), usually
numbering between seven and fifteen, with two people per couch.
After the removal of the dinner, which did not include wine, the
guests cleansed their hands, put on garlands, and anointed them-
selves with perfumed oils. Then a libation was made with undiluted
wine (the only time when the Greeks did not mix their wine with water), accompanied by a hymn to the gods. One participant was selected to lead the proceedings (the symposiarch) and he determined the ratio of water to wine (usually between three and four parts of wine to one part water), the size of cups to be used, and the number of draughts. The entertainment then commenced, and consisted of conversation (facilitated by the square arrangement of couches in the andron), the singing of poetry (to the accompaniment of pipes-playing girls), the playing of drinking games, and the performance (sometimes overtly erotic) of dancing girls. The symposium concluded when the allotted number of draughts had been consumed. Greek symposia were intended to be comparatively restrained affairs, at least by Macedonian standards, and exceptions serve to prove the rule—one has only to think of the proverbially shocking behavior of Hippocleides with his indecorous and perhaps even lewd dance in Herodotus (6.129), or Alcibiades’ drunken entrance into Plato’s Symposium (212c6–213b3).

In a series of influential articles, Oswyn Murray has identified the function of the Greek symposium as an aristocratic male bonding ritual, designed to maintain the loyalty and cohesion of the group. During the Archaic Period, the symposium served as an important nexus for the transmission of aristocratic values, through both the performance of poetry (the poetry of Theognis is particularly illustrative of this aspect) and male bonding. The homoerotic element of the symposium is intertwined with its initiatory function during this period, for young aristocrats served as wine-pourers and sometimes lovers to their older mentors. By the Classical Period in Athens and many other cities, aristocracies had lost their dominant role in politics and society to democracies, and the symposium became marginalized, offering a private (elite) alternative to the public fora of the democracy, sometimes with a subversive political focus, although this view has recently been challenged. Accordingly, the earlier initiatory function was no longer relevant and the participants were now all adult male citizens.

I contend that both Philip and Alexander also conceived of the symposium as an aristocratic male bonding ritual, but in a particularly Macedonian context as a mechanism to secure the loyalty of the elite to the Argead monarchy. Eugene Borza has observed that Alexander employed the symposium as a means of reinforcing his relationship with his closest associates while on the march. I suggest that the symposium served a particularly important role also for Philip in his military reorganization and consolidation of the Macedonian elite, in that it served to bind them both to himself and the Argead royal
house in lieu of their former regional loyalties (as one can see, perhaps, by reading between the lines of Theopompus and Demosthenes). But because the Macedonians did not model their symposia upon those of their contemporary Greek neighbors to the south, the Greeks, as always when faced with societies different from their own, dismissed them as barbarian, although many of these very customs originated from practices of the Greeks of earlier times, befitting the archaic and semi-Homeric nature of fourth-century Macedonian society. It is surely no coincidence that both the Macedonian elite cavalry and Achilles’ Myrmidons (Il. 1.179) are called Companions, Hetairoi, bound by strong ties of personal allegiance to their respective monarchs.43

Unlike contemporary Greek symposia, the Macedonian symposium did retain much of its original function of an initiatory rite of passage. The symposia of Philip and Alexander employed the services of young boys as wine-pourers, and it appears that the Royal Pages also served this function. The Pages were an innovation of Philip designed to secure the loyalty of the Macedonian elite more firmly by training their sons to be future officers in his army, while at the same time retaining these youths as hostages for their families’ continued loyalty.44 At the same time, the institution served an educative function,45 to which the Pages’ participation in the symposia presumably contributed.

Another peculiarly Macedonian rite of passage was the custom, probably derived from earlier Greek practice,46 that youths were not permitted to recline at symposia until they had slain a boar without the use of a net.47 As for the question of reclining itself, Duris states that the Homeric heroes banqueted sitting up, and so sometimes (ἐν ἱοτε) did Alexander, and cites as an example a banquet at which he seated six thousand of his commanders upon silver seats and couches (FGrH 76 F 49). This fragment is problematic as evidence for usual Macedonian practice because the large number of participants in the occasion in question, which is usually identified with the mass marriages at Susa following Alexander’s return from the east,48 would likely have determined the posture of the guests, as Duris hints with his qualification of “sometimes.”49 In any case, his point in the passage is to highlight the “otherness” of the Macedonian court by emphasizing the archaic nature as well as the luxury of its symposia. Nevertheless, although it is uncertain at what date the Macedonians began to recline at symposia, it is certain that they did so at a later date than the Greeks, and the custom of sitting remained more pervasive at Macedonian symposia, probably because this was the practice of the heroes in Homer.50
I further suggest that the famous cup from which Alexander was drinking at his final, fatal symposium, which Ephippus says (FGrH 126 F 3) was about twelve pints (two choes) in capacity, was historical.\textsuperscript{51} In Menander’s \textit{Flatterer}, written only a few years after Alexander’s death, the braggart soldier boasts that he drained a cup containing ten kotylai (equivalent to about five pints) three times over. That’s even more than Alexander, replies the Flatterer (F2 Körte=Ath. 10.434bc).\textsuperscript{52} This exchange indicates that Alexander’s use of an overly large cup was well known to his contemporaries. Alexander, whose education was shaped by the study of Homer and who is said to have kept Aristotle’s recension of the \textit{Iliad} under his pillow,\textsuperscript{53} may well have deliberately modeled his own cup on the famous drinking cup of Nestor, which Homer describes as being so large that it was difficult for others to lift (\textit{Il}. 11.632–37). Because the Macedonians customarily drank out of small cups,\textsuperscript{54} Alexander’s use of so unusually large a cup not only invoked Homeric precedents but served to distinguish his special status, for the cup was associated with Heracles, the supposed ancestor of the Argead royal house (Hdt. 8.137–39).\textsuperscript{55} In the competitive society of fourth-century Macedonia, the king’s ability to drink more than his fellow symposiasts demonstrated his worthiness to hold his position and was a quality worthy of admiration.\textsuperscript{56} How better to illustrate the king’s superior capacity than by the use of an extravagantly large drinking cup? Furthermore, the cup offered a visible symbol of the king’s special favor to those members of the elite whom he permitted to drink from it.\textsuperscript{57}

Perhaps the most contentious putative Macedonian sympotic custom is the pervasive modern assumption that the Macedonians habitually drank their wine unmixed. While there are many references in the sources to the excessive drinking of Philip and Alexander, there are very few to the drinking of wine unmixed.\textsuperscript{58} Diodorus claims that Philip drank unmixed wine before his kȜmos after Chaeronea (16.87.1), while Chares of Mytilene says that the drinking contests that Alexander held in honor of Calanus were of unmixed wine (\textit{FGrH} 125 F 19a and b). Certain authorities also state that the cup that Callisthenes refused also contained unmixed wine,\textsuperscript{59} as did the large cup that led to Alexander’s final, fatal illness (\textit{FGrH} 127 F 2; cf. Diod. 17.117.1). These incidents, however, took place on particularly special occasions, and do not necessarily suggest the habitual consumption of unmixed wine.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, the dearth of mixing bowls in the archaeological material also does not necessarily mean that the Macedonians did not mix their wine, but that they did not mix it in \textit{kraters}. It is possible, as has been suggested recently, that the participants at royal Macedonian symposia did not receive premixed wine
but instead were provided with both unmixed wine and water, so that they could mix their own wine in individual cups; this largesse was typical of the lavish Macedonian court and allowed the guests the freedom to determine both how much wine they would consume, and in what proportion they would consume it. Such a custom readily explains the dearth of \textit{kraters} and the prevalence of small cups in the archaeological material. The Greek sources, however, transfer this peculiarly Macedonian custom into the drinking of unmixed wine, the hallmark of a barbarian.

To conclude, most of our evidence for the unrestrained and riotous nature of the symposia of Philip and Alexander comes from hostile Greek sources, anxious to damage the reputation of their Macedonian overlords. As such, they deliberately fail to perceive the integrative social function of the symposium in the courts of both Philip and Alexander. Instead, they transfer the largesse necessary to secure the allegiance of the elite of their courts into luxury and overindulgence, explanatory factors for political and military decline in the Greek historiographical tradition. Similarly, the Greek sources portray the deliberate Homeric allusions of the Macedonian royal symposia as evidence of their archaic “otherness.” In general, the ritual drinking customs of the Macedonians are turned into further evidence of their barbarism, without consideration of the specific role they played in Macedonian society. In the final count, then, Theopompus, Demosthenes, and their successors did indeed get their revenge upon Philip and Alexander.
This page intentionally left blank
PART II

Philip and Alexander at War
This page intentionally left blank
Consensus Strategies under Philip and Alexander
The Revenge Theme

Giuseppe Squillace

It is not easy to study the propaganda themes during the reigns of Philip and Alexander because there are few sources available and many of them are late. Having said that, research in this area is easier for the reign of Philip than it is for that of Alexander. For Philip we can use, along with later sources such as Diodorus, Justin, and Polyaeanus, contemporary authors such as Demosthenes, Isocrates, Ephorus, Theopompos, and Speusippus who understand the political meaning of the Macedonian king’s actions and give favorable or hostile interpretations. For Alexander, only a few sources, such as Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, Arrian, and Justin, are available and all of them are much later. Along with information taken from contemporary authors (such as Callisthenes, Ptolemy, and Aristobulus), they also express their personal impressions and opinions, drawing on the culture and political debates of their own time.

Since it is impossible to deal thoroughly with all aspects of Macedonian propaganda under Philip and Alexander here, I will simply shed light on the theme of revenge, constantly used during the reign of the two kings, in order to clarify who created it, for what events, and with what political aims.

1. Revenge against the Phocians

In 354 B.C., Philip was called to arms by the Aleuadas of Larissa against the tyrant Lycophron of Pherae. Answering this call, he actually got involved in the Third Sacred War. The conflict opposed the Phocians (accused by the Amphictyons of having unduly cultivated the Cirrhaean plain, thus committing sacrilege) to the Thebans and Thessalians. The Phocians had on their side the same Lycophron but also the Spartans and Athenians. In 352 B.C., Philip, after two unsuccessful attempts, defeated the terrible troops lead by Onomarchus in the battle of Crocus Field. Six years later, intervening again in support
of the Thebans, he won the war definitively and inflicted a severe punishment on the Phocians, taking their place in the Amphictyonic Council.¹

Traditions vary about the different stages of the war. In 346 B.C., in his speech On Peace delivered just after the events, Demosthenes accused Philip of participating in the Third Sacred War with the aim of gaining control over the Thermopylae, acquiring fame (doxa), and appearing as the one who had personally solved the conflict, celebrating under his presidency the Pythian Games.² Only a few years later, in the speech On the False Embassy, Demosthenes accused Philip of deceiving the Phocians at the end of the war.³ A similar hostile attitude is to be found in some late sources like Justin and Pausanias. Justin first recalls how, after the victory of 352 B.C., Philip razed to the ground the towns that had chosen him as a leader; sold women and children as slaves, and shattered their temples and their houses, thereby disowning his role as “avenger of the sacrilege” and taking the liberty of committing sacrilege himself (sacrilegorum licentiam).⁴ Then, with regard to the conclusion of the war, Justin reports that Philip did not maintain his promise of granting life to the Phocians in return for their surrender, but instead attacked them by surprise, robbed all their possessions, plundered all their temples, and deported entire populations, driven only by his own reckless yearning (libido).⁵ Pausanias’ version of the facts is similarly negative. In 346 B.C., Pausanias comments, after his victory, Philip did not spare the Phocians severe retaliation. He put his enemies to flight, forced them to live in villages, and forced them to pay to the god an annual amount of sixty talents, full compensation for what they had taken from the sanctuary during the time of their occupation.⁶

Demosthenes’ bias and the tendentiousness of the traditions used by Justin and Pausanias are clear when we analyze some of Philip’s actions, especially those susceptible to a quite different presentation and interpretation. Justin, following a pro-Macedonian source, connects the idea of a religious conflict to the identification of Philip as “avenger of the sacrilege” (ultor sacrilegii). Just before the clash—he reports—the Macedonian King, “acting as the avenger of the sacrilege rather than of the Thebans” (quasi sacrilegii, non Thebanorum ultor esset), ordered the soldiers to crown their brows with laurel and gave battle “as if he was under the god’s guidance” (veluti deo duce).⁷

This view became evident after Philip’s success against Onomarchus at Crocus Field. After their victory, the soldiers could actually see how Apollo, through Philip, had led them to overcome and punish those who had committed sacrilege. The blood and the carnage were a just consequence of the irreverence of Onomarchus and
of the Phocians who, according to Justin, terrified by the emblem of the god, left their arms and ran away. This success, the historian concludes, gave glory to Philip, “avenger of the sacrilege” (vindex sacrilegii) and “avenger of the god” (ultor religionis). It also made him very close to the gods (a diis proximus), since he had avenged their majesty.

We can find a similar version in Diodorus who interprets the whole Third Sacred War in terms of vengeance and adopts a pro-Macedonian point of view. In his opinion, the god’s vengeance against the sacrilege is manifest at many different moments of the conflict: the earthquake that struck the temple of Delphi while the Phocians were plundering it; the fire in Apollo’s sanctuary at Abae (where the Phocians had sought refuge from the Boeotians’ attack), a just punishment for those sacrilegious men; and the final destiny of all Phocian's leaders. Philomenus killed himself jumping from a rock; Onomarchus was crucified; Phayllus died after a long and painful illness; and Phalaecus went wandering for the rest of his life. Diodorus also recalls how Philip joined the Delphic Anphictyony taking the Phocians’ place, and not just because of his military victory, but also because of his piety and his respect for the gods who had given him the power to make his realm the biggest in Europe.

Such different interpretations show a clear ideologization of the war: one part of the tradition is manifestly anti-Macedonian, but another is evidently pro-Macedonian. The anti-Macedonian tradition clearly follows Demosthenes who, since 351 B.C., has never lost any chance to attack Philip. It is more difficult to determine the origin of the pro-Macedonian tradition.

It is significant that, right at the end of the Third Sacred War, a group of intellectuals started to write in support of Philip. Cephisodorus, Anaximenes of Lampsacus, and Leon of Byzantium composed a series of works with the intent of celebrating Philip’s victory; Aristotle and Callisthenes drew up a List of the Winners of the Pythian Games taking, perhaps, the opportunity of the new beginning of the competition, after the end of the Third Sacred War; Ephorus and Theopompus collected in their works the main facts regarding the conflict, the former in the 30th book of his Universal History (left unfinished and completed by his son Demophilus), the latter in his Philippic History and also in his monograph On the resources stolen from Delphi. Most of these works have been lost and we cannot, therefore, know exactly the terms they used to celebrate Philips’ victory. Nevertheless, analysis of Diodorus’ and Justin’s reports allows us to deduce the main themes used on this occasion by some of these authors.
Diodorus’ version seems to be based on Ephorus, while Justin’s story summarizes Pompeius Trogus and is based on Theopompus. Even if they were later rearranged, Ephorus and Theopompus’ works, in terms of the Sacred War, advanced the vengeance theme, making Philip the instrument used by the god Apollo to punish the Phocians for their sacrilege. One aspect of Diodorus’ narrative demonstrates this ideologization: his account of the death of Onomarchus. Pausanias ascribed the killing of Onomarchus to his own men, while Philo of Alexandria presented it as an accident. Ephorus, instead, emphasized Philip’s decision to have Onomarchus hanged or crucified after the victory at Crocus Field, but also to let the Phocians drown (katapontismos), thus giving Philip the credit for executing Onomarchus by means of a punishment traditionally reserved for impious men. By these details, the historian reinforced his interpretation of the conflict as a sacred, religious war, of vengeance, and corroborated the image of Philip as the “avenger of the god” and “punisher of the sacrilege.”

By emphasizing this idea of a sacred war, Ephorus and Theopompus were not only celebrating Philip’s figure and his achievements, but also responding to Demosthenes’ repeated attacks on the king. The orator’s critics should be seen as part of the background in the general clash of interests between Philip and Athens which would lead to the battle of Chaeronea. In particular, in 349 B.C., with regard to the war against Olynthus, the orator accused the king of dismissing the best men and surrounding himself with sycophants and thieves, reducing Olynthus to slavery, establishing tyrannical regimes, being an enemy of Athens and a barbarian, and selling as slaves the citizens of the Greek towns. Furthermore, in his speech to the Athenians against the Macedonian king, Demosthenes recalled the glorious past of Athens, quoting Aristides, Nicias, Demosthenes, and Pericles and recalling its hegemony over the Greek world and over Macedonia, a barbarian country, in the fifth century. Picking up and reconfirming Herodotus’ tradition, Demosthenes also referred to Alexander I, Philip’s ancestor, as a traitor to the Greeks during the Persian Wars and underlined the hatred of the people of Athens against those, like Arthemios of Zeleia, who betrayed the Greek cause in favor of the Persians.

Against these accusations, not only did Ephorus and Theopompus excuse the king’s actions by means of the vengeance theme, but they also, as a riposte to the orator, attacked Athens and its traditions. They both based their accusations on a fact which was deliberately omitted by Demosthenes: Athens’ involvement in the Sacred War on the side of the impious Phocians. Ephorus argued that, on this occasion, both
Athenians and Spartans betrayed Apollo. The Athenians did so by forgetting that Apollo had been their forefather and the Spartans did so by disowning the god after receiving their constitution from his hands. Theopompus’ statement was sharper and more articulated. He had lived for a while at Macedonian court and felt that he had to respond directly to respond to Demosthenes’ description of the sycophants and thieves who surrounded Philip. According to the historian, the Athenians, once the heralds of freedom, had gone over to the other side, defending the sacrilegious against those who wanted to punish the sacrilege; in the past Apollo had helped them to face many wars, to found towns, and to establish their dominion over land and sea, but now they had shamefully become the enemy of the god and left to others the task of avenging his honor. Theopompus’ reinterpretation of events included the whole history of Athens. In his Philippic History, he accused the Athenian leaders Chares and Charedimus, sent to help the town of Olynthus, of being corrupt. His description of their mission deprived it of the anti-tyrannical aim that Demosthenes had attributed to it in the Olynthiac Speeches. Above all, Theopompus tried to destroy the image of the glorious Athenian past, undermining the credibility of its role in the Marathon battle, remembering how Athens cheated its allies in the Second Athenian Alliance, and describing the city as a place full of liars and corrupt people.

We can ascribe to Theopompus and Ephorus in particular the creation of the vengeance theme with regard to the Third Sacred War to favor Philip, but their entire school had offered its services to the king since 346 B.C. In the same year Isocrates, master of the school, wrote a speech for the king and two years later sent him a letter, while the orator Python of Byzantium was given leadership of the Macedonian embassy to Athens in 344 B.C. and to Thebes in 339 B.C. Needing to find an excuse for the terrible conditions imposed on the Phocians after their defeat and to provide an answer to Demosthenes’ accusations, Ephorus and Theopompus based their defense not only on a religious interpretation of Philip’s actions as vengeance in the name of Apollo, but also on an attempt to deride the supposed glorious past of the Athenians, accusing them of forgetting their progenitor Apollo, supporting the sacrilegious Phocians, and acting like the barbarians. To which barbarians do they refer? Even if Diodorus’ and Justin’s brief narratives do not say so specifically, the barbarian who was most famous for his impiety in Greek history was Xerxes. Herodotus mentions him as the one responsible for the destruction of the Greek sanctuaries, including the Delphi temple, the same temple that was targeted by the sacrilegious Phocians.
This celebration of Philip and of his achievements reflected not only the image that the king planned to convey but also the aspiration of Isocrates and his school to strengthen their bond with the Macedonian sovereign. This is made clear by the similar attempts of the Platonic school that, in the years following the end of the war, also tried to celebrate and flatter the victorious king. In his letter to Philip, in 343 B.C., the philosopher Speusippus, head of the Academy after Plato’s death, showed how the vengeance theme was one of the main ideological issues used to build consensus in favor of the king. Speusippus wanted to facilitate the access of his disciple Antipater of Magnesia to the Macedonian court. In order to achieve this, he tried to shed a bad light on Isocrates, who had written a speech addressed to Philip in 346 B.C., but also on Theopompus who didn’t deserve, in his opinion, to be at the Macedonian court. The philosopher, drawing on Antipater’s work, coupled the vengeance motif in the Third Sacred War to Athens’ mythical past and to the First Sacred War when, according to him, Apollo, Heracles, and the other Amphictyons had defeated the Phlegyans, Driopians, and Crisaeans and had determined their exclusion from the Amphictyony. He stressed Apollo’s action and those of his allies, but omitted the theft of Apollo’s tripod by Heracles, the forefather of the Argead dynasty. That was the only way to glorify Philip’s punishment of the Phocians as being like that of Heracles and also to promote Antipater’s position in the Macedonian court. It was, however, a distortion of the facts, a device he used in other passages of his writing. Like Demosthenes, Speusippus mentioned Alexander I of Macedonia but, against the orator’s version and the Herodotean tradition, he portrayed Alexander I as a defender of the Greeks during the Persian Wars. Speusippus ascribed to Heracles, forefather of the Argead dynasty, possession of the towns of Amphipolis and Olynthus, thereby implying that Philip had legitimately regained possession of these towns. He also made Heracles a citizen of Athens because of his adoption by Pilius, using an obscure and scarcely verifiable tradition to establish a connection between the king and the Athenians.

The propaganda about the Third Sacred War wasn’t only orchestrated by the intellectuals. Philip himself initially made his contribution and supported it with some of his actions. In 352 B.C., he ordered his soldiers to crown their brows with laurel and on two other occasions he defended his image as advocate of divine justice. In 352 B.C., as Justin notes, after punishing the Greek towns of Thessaly, who had supported the Phocians, he tried to cancel out the bad reputation (ad abolendam invidiae famam) that his actions had produced. Consequently, he sent messengers to announce his intention (qui opinionem sererent) to rebuild the walls and the temples of these towns. But
once he obtained the consensus he was looking for and had restored his reputation, he did not honor his promise. His initiative definitely had a propaganda aspect whose force came from common religious feeling. It was meant to spread enthusiasm, to cancel his bad reputation (invidia), and to restore the good image (opinio) of the king. Once he had achieved this aim, Philip could just forget about it. He showed a similar attitude in 348 B.C. After destroying Olynthus and selling women and children as slaves, he wanted to recover his reputation, stained by his recent actions. He used the traditional Dion festival, celebrated in the same year, as an opportunity, inviting as many people as possible. Philip then showcased his benevolence by making generous promises to his guests; in return, he achieved not only their support but also the renovation of his image. At this location, he could demonstrate the righteousness of his action against Olynthus: in the temple of Zeus Olympus at Dion, anyone could read the agreement signed by him and by the Olynthians in 357 B.C. in front of the gods, an agreement which they had violated in 349 B.C., deserving, in so doing, Macedonian retaliation.

This propaganda was, therefore, supported by very well thought out choices made by Philip himself and by the careful rearrangement of the facts by the intellectuals near to him. In the Third Sacred War, Philip himself had appealed to “Apollo’s justice,” inviting his soldiers to crown their brows with laurel and representing himself as the “avenger of the god against the sacrilegious men”; his intellectuals then rearranged and amplified this message, reinforcing it with details taken from history and from mythological traditions and using it in political confrontations against the anti-Macedonian orators.

The effect of these actions, based on the combination of slogans (logoi) and deeds (praxeis), can be gathered from what Demosthenes noted with regard to the Fourth Sacred War. In 339 B.C., according to the orator, the Amphictyons accused the citizens of Amphissa of illegally taking possession of the sacred land and of cultivating and using it as pasture land for their cattle. Before embarking on a war, they decided to ask for Philip’s support and appointed their general Cotyphus to go and ask Philip to come in aid of Apollo and of the Amphictyons and not to tolerate the offense against the sanctuary by the impious Amphissians. In this case, as well, Philip did not lose the chance to join, legitimately, a war, after an explicit request for aid. It is significant that he was again called “avenger of the god,” confirming him in the role he had already played in the previous conflict, a role repeatedly asserted by the pro-Macedonian intellectuals. Even Demosthenes had to recognize it, despite his many attempts to discredit the king.
2. Revenge against the Persians

The vengeance theme reappears with the Asian expedition, initiated by Philip and completed by Alexander. In some late sources we can find traces of the themes used to justify the new undertaking. With regard to the treaty of Corinth, Diodorus remembers the slogan (logos) used to persuade the Greeks to subscribe it. It presented the conflict with the Persians as a vengeance and Philip as the avenger of the Greeks from the injustice (paranomia) perpetrated, a century before, by the Persians against Greek temples. The king, Diodorus says, adopted a friendly attitude privately and in public, showing to the towns that he wanted to defend their common interests and not simply his own. In this way he gained consensus from the Greeks, boosted expectations among their delegates in Corinth, persuaded them to enter the war, and persuaded them to elect him as their leader. 53 Polybius stressed the propagandistic nature of the vengeance slogan, one often linked to the theme of freedom. Polybius observed that Philip, having ascertained the weakness of the Persians and their military inferiority, and thinking of the immense riches he would gain in case of victory, decided to make war on the Persians. So he started to prepare the expedition, but he had to secure, first, the consensus of the Greeks and put forward—but just as an excuse (prophasis)—the vengeance argument against the injustice (paranomia) of the Persians toward the Greeks. 54

Even though the sources of both Diodorus and Polybius are not certain, 55 these passages confirm a point of view which is very close to that of the school of Isocrates, in so much as they stress the role of Philip as avenger of the Greeks. Isocrates himself, in his speech to the king in 346 B.C., associated the Asian expedition with the idea of freedom, encouraging Philip to use the “flag” of freedom to get the satraps to revolt and recalling how, in the past, this slogan had been used to get rid of the power of the Athenians and Spartans. 56 The rhetorician was the first to use the theme of freedom with regard to the Asian expedition, but for the idea of vengeance we have to go back to his disciple Theopompus, who had used it for the Third Sacred War. In a moment when he needed to create enthusiasm and to get consensus for his undertaking, Philip relied on Isocrates’ school and, when the situation in Greece was ripe, he followed his suggestions, especially that of raising the standard of freedom in his Asian expedition. His orders to his generals to liberate (eleutheroun) the Greeks in Asia seem to confirm this. 57

During his expedition to Asia, Alexander used the vengeance motif as well. Diodorus highlights this continuity between the father and
the son. He remembers that after Philip’s death, Alexander was given the title of general (*strategos autocrator*) by the Greeks and the goal of his mission was presented as a vengeance against the Persians, to punish their offenses against the Greeks. Alexander repeatedly used this slogan during the war, reinforcing it with some of his gestures. Before the Issus battle, in his speech to the troops, he prompted them, calling to mind the Persian wars and the insolence (*insolentia*) of Darius and Xerxes, which they were called to counteract. After the battle of Issus, in Alexander’s letter to Darius in Marato, in 332 B.C., he justified the continuation of the war by using the vengeance motive (*timoria*) against Darius. When he set fire to the royal palace of Persepolis, Alexander justified it as a vengeance (*timoria*) for the fire of Athens and its temples and for all the wrongs done by the Persians against the Greeks. Just like his father Philip, Alexander accompanied and justified some of his actions (*praxeis*) with the theme of the vengeance, directly or indirectly, through the words of his intellectuals. This theme is evident with regard to various incidents in the conflict, but the propagandistic staging of some of the king’s actions is to be seen very clearly in the episode of his arrival in the Troad, as it is reported by Diodorus, Arrian, Plutarch, and Justin.

According to Diodorus, Alexander, who was about to disembark into the Troad, hurled his spear from his ship to the land, to show that it was a land he was given by the gods. Once he was on land, he paid homage to the tombs of the Greek heroes who died at Troy and took offerings to the tombs of Achilles and Ajax. He also visited Athena’s sanctuary and got a good omen from the sacrifice offered by the priest Aristander, who forecast Alexander’s victory in the next battle, and granted him the favor of the gods, especially Athena. Reassured about the outcome of his battle, Alexander entered Athena’s temple, dedicated his shield to her, and took the best among past offerings to the goddess to use in the battle. According to Arrian, who gives the most detailed account, Alexander, before getting to the Asian shores, stopped in Sestus to sacrifice to Protesilaus in order to obtain a better destiny than that of the Homeric hero. During his journey by sea, Alexander offered a bull to Poseidon and made sacrifice to the Nereids. Once he was ashore in Asia, he made sacrifices to Zeus, Athena, Heracles, and to Athena Ilias from the rock of Ilium. He also exchanged his arms with those that had been kept in the goddess’ temple since the time of the Trojan War. Arrian mentions that Alexander made sacrifice to Priam, on Zeus’ altar, in order to calm Priam’s fury against a descendant of Neoptolemus (the man who had cruelly killed Priam); left a wreath on Achilles’ tomb (Hephaestion put his own on Patroclus’ tomb); and declared that the hero was lucky because he was
celebrated by Homer and so made immortal.\textsuperscript{64} Plutarch briefly mentions Alexander’s crossing of the Hellespont, but he agrees with Arrian in describing the king who makes sacrifice to Athena Ilias and to the Greek heroes on the Ilium rock. He also adds that the offering at Achilles’ tomb was preceded by the ceremony of the bare-breasted king running around the hero’s stone.\textsuperscript{65} In his even briefer account, Justin\textsuperscript{66} relates that Alexander, before sailing to Asia, offered sacrifices to the gods, asking from them success in his war to avenge the Greeks for the offenses suffered at the hands of the Persians (\textit{petens victoriam bello, quo totiens a Persis petita Graeciae ultor electus sit}). From the ship, before going ashore, Alexander launched his spear and, as soon as he arrived, he went to Troy to pay homage to the tombs of the heroes.\textsuperscript{67}

All the sources mentioned so far seem to make reference—directly or indirectly—to the work of Callisthenes,\textsuperscript{68} who accompanied the king to Asia in order to celebrate his deeds.\textsuperscript{69} With regard to Alexander’s arrival in Asia, the historian used two themes taken from mythology and from the historical tradition: the Homeric one of the comparison between Alexander and Achilles\textsuperscript{70} and the contrast between Alexander and Xerxes. Both of these themes had been widely used by the intellectuals in terms of the figure of Philip. While Isocrates, in 346 B.C., suggested a comparison between the king’s expedition to Asia and that of his ancestor Heracles to Troy\textsuperscript{71} and, in 339 B.C., he also compared the Macedonian king to Agamemnon,\textsuperscript{72} Demosthenes and Speusippus, respectively, had attacked and defended Philip by recalling the Persian Wars through the persona of Alexander I of Macedonia.\textsuperscript{73}

In this case, Callisthenes linked the theme of vengeance against the Persians to the Herodotean tradition. According to Herodotus, in fact, Xerxes had offered libations during the crossing of the Hellespont,\textsuperscript{74} outraged the gods and Poseidion in particular because, driven by his pride, he dared to fetter the Hellespont, linking Sestus to Abydus, with a bridge made of ships;\textsuperscript{75} he profaned and plundered Protesilaus’ tomb in Elaeus;\textsuperscript{76} he made sacrifice to Athena Ilias and to the heroes to gain their favor in his crossing of the Hellespont and in his expedition against Europe and Athens;\textsuperscript{77} and he was responsible, with the other Greeks in Asia, for the destruction of the temple of Sardis.\textsuperscript{78} Quite the opposite were Alexander’s aims: he made sacrifice to the gods in Europe, before crossing the Hellespont, and in Asia, as soon as he arrived, he honored Zeus \textit{Apobaterios}, Athena, and Heracles and, on the Ilium rock, Athena Ilias and Troy’s heroes.\textsuperscript{79}

Callisthenes described the episode of Alexander’s arrival in Asia in such a way as to make evident the difference between Alexander’s and Xerxes’ intentions: the Macedonian conquest is seen under the
### Table 7.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wars</th>
<th>War Aims</th>
<th>Enemies</th>
<th>Presentation of the Enemy</th>
<th>Presentation of the Macedonian Kings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philip</td>
<td>354–346 B.C.: Third Sacred War</td>
<td>Revenge</td>
<td>Phocians and their leaders</td>
<td>Phocians and their leaders were impious because they plundered the Delphic temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>339 B.C.: Fourth Sacred War</td>
<td>Revenge</td>
<td>Amphissaeans</td>
<td>Amphissaeans were impious because they plundered the Delphic temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>337–336 B.C.: War against the Persians (preparation)</td>
<td>Revenge and freedom of the Greeks</td>
<td>Persians and their king, Darius III</td>
<td>Persians and their earlier kings, Darius I and Xerxes, were impious because they had devastated the Greek temples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander</td>
<td>335–331 B.C.: War against Darius III and the Persians</td>
<td>Revenge and freedom of the Greeks</td>
<td>Persians and their king, Darius III</td>
<td>Persians and their earlier kings, Darius I and Xerxes, were impious because they had devastated the Greek temples</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
flag of vengeance and of the fight for Greek freedom, while the expe-
dition of the Persian king is described as intended to reduce the
Greeks to slavery. This was an ideological view which was not new
and that had been proposed, in the recent past, by Athenian intel-
lectuals. Following their examples, Callisthenes, who was a Peripa-
tetic, nurtured by Athenian culture and already involved in the
propaganda in favor of Philip, picked up again, as he had in the past, Herodotus’ tradition on the Persian Wars and adapted the ideolog-
ical theme of vengeance to Alexander and his undertakings.

Conclusions

The theme of vengeance was, therefore, created with regard to the war
against the Phocians, and successfully employed during the Third
and Fourth Sacred War, but was also used for the Persian expedition,
with similar ideological devices. We can quickly see the trajectory of
this theme in the following table 7.1:

Using this theme, Isocrates, Ephorus, Theopompus, Speusippus,
and Callisthenes were able to justify first the Sacred War and then the
expedition to Asia. The two conflicts concealed specific interests—
control of the Amphictyony for Philip and the conquest of the Persian
Empire for Alexander—which had to be covered up by great ideals
and presented in a light that would attract consensus among the
Greeks. The vengeance theme linked to the mythical and historical
past of the Greeks, moved the focus from the conquest strategies of
the Macedonian kings to the world of the Hellenic towns, called upon
the Greeks to join forces with the two kings, and to give full support
to their initiatives.
Since Brian Bosworth established that the references in Arrian’s *Anabasis* to *asthetairoi* were not scribal errors for *pezhetairoi* (foot companions), the discussion has centered on the origin of the name and the nature of these troops. Clearly they were heavily armed Macedonians and infantry “companions,” but little broader agreement has emerged. This paper contends that the name derives from a difference in armament.

While the core of the Macedonian infantry was composed of those bearing pikes, *sarisai,* modified hoplite armament was an important component of both Philip’s and Alexander’s Macedonian infantry. This was the conclusion drawn by Minor Markle in a series of articles. As Markle points out, hoplite shields are often depicted in tomb paintings and on monumental works. Hoplite shields and spears are seen on a frieze from the Agios Athanasios tomb and a hoplite shield is found on the facade of the Tomb of Judgment. The so-called Alexander sarcophagus depicts Macedonians, wearing Macedonian helmets and carrying hoplite shields, as does the Monument of Aemilius Paullus at Delphi. In these last two examples the underside of a shield is exposed, revealing a central ring and a hand grip near the rim. Numerous coins from the period also depict hoplite shields, identified by their offset rims. Highly suggestive are a couple of Macedonian tetradrachmas dated 325–300 B.C. and 323 B.C.–315 B.C., respectively, showing on the first a hoplite shield with an $\Lambda \Sigma$ on its face, and on the second, a small rimless *sarisa* shield with the letter $\Pi$ in the center. These depictions have led at least one commentator to suggest that the typical Macedonian *sarisa* shield was larger than generally thought. However, the Shield Monument at Beroea, whose importance was highlighted by Markle, and dated by that scholar to the reign of Pyrrhus, presents both types of shields—the standard hoplite and the smaller shield traditionally associated with *sarisa* bearers (Asclep. 5.1). While the marble blocks are now part of the remains of a tower from the old city wall, they were originally the base for a monument. Even though the reconstruction of the
original edifice suggested by Markle, showing two rows of *peltai* (light shields) enclosed by two flanking *aspides* (round shields).\(^{14}\) may be a bit optimistic, the presence of both shields in a common monument demonstrates, as Markle remarks, that both types of shields were used in the Macedonian phalanx.\(^{15}\) The Macedonian heavy infantry, then, would appear from this visual evidence not to consist solely of *sarisa* bearers, but of a combination of heavy infantry types.

The hypaspists were more mobile than the “typical” Macedonian phalangetic,\(^{16}\) and regularly “equipped for hand-to-hand warfare” (Arr. *Anab*. 2.20.6).\(^{17}\) This unit is frequently described by modern commentators as equipped with the hoplite panoply.\(^{18}\) It is apparent from Arrian that these troops, at least, were more lightly armed than most of their heavy infantry counterparts. In Hyrcania, Alexander advanced with the hypaspists and the “lightest-armed and more nimble of the Macedonian phalanx” (Arr. *Anab*. 3.23.3; cf. 1.27.8).\(^{19}\) Before the Cilician Gates, Alexander divided the army, with Parmenio being given the “more heavily armed foot battalions.”\(^{20}\) Alexander proceeded with the hypaspists, archers, and the Agrianes (Arr. *Anab*. 2.4.3).

The identification of the *asthetairoi* as also outfitted with hoplite equipment, while based on circumstantial evidence, is convincing nonetheless. It is unfortunate that Arrian often refers to all heavy infantrymen as hoplites (Arr. *Anab*. 1.13.1, 28.6, 7; 2.8. 2, 3; 6.18.3),\(^{21}\) and frequently to shields in general as *aspides*, even in those circumstances where this is clearly not technically correct (that is, Arr. *Anab*. 1.6.4; cf. Diod. 17.57.6, 58.3).\(^{22}\) *πέλται* (*peltai*) is the correct term to apply to the shields carried by the Macedonian pikemen (Polyaen. 4.2.10; Plut. *Aem*. 19.1–2, 5; *Flam*. 14.1). However, *ἀσπίς* (*aspis*) is also used by Arrian in contexts where it is appropriate. During the assault on Mount Haemus the Macedonians covered themselves with their shields to permit wagons rolled down upon them by the Thracians to pass over them harmlessly (Arr. *Anab*. 1.1.9; cf. Polyaen. 4.3.11). As Markle has remarked, the smaller shield would not have provided sufficient protection and, consequently, the hoplite shield is here indicated.\(^{23}\)

More importantly, Alexander used heavy infantrymen in situations where the use of pikemen would be hard to imagine because of their inflexibility. In instances where roads were difficult or where speed was essential “lighter-armed” heavy infantry would be used. Most often, as seen previously, among such troops would be the hypaspists, but they were in many cases associated with the *asthetairoi*. In India, Alexander divided his army giving to Hephaestion and Perdicas command of the *taxeis* (regiments) of Gorgias, Cleitus, and Meleager.
(Arr. Anab. 4.22.7), while Alexander took the hypaspists, the archers, the Agrianes, the mounted javelin men, half of the Companion cavalry, and “the brigades of the asthetairoi” (Arr. Anab. 4.23.1). The association of the asthetairoi with these more mobile units suggests that these were not pikemen. In his attack on the Rock of Aornos, Alexander selected Coenus’s brigade and the “lightest from the rest of the phalanx, but at the same time the best armed” (Arr. Anab. 4.28.8).

Those termed more heavily armed by Arrian were then the sarisa bearers. While sarisa bearers are generally regarded as lightly armored, Markle is correct that the term “baruteron” (heavier) refers to offensive weaponry, that is, to the spears. Polybius (18.18.3) comments that “carrying the sarisai on the march caused the troops to become fatigued.” Pikemen were also equipped with javelins, swords (Diod. 17.100.6–7; Curt. 9.7.19–21), small shields, and possibly linen corselets (Dio Cass. 78.7.1–2) and greaves (Polyaen. 4.2.10). If, as some believe, the hoplite’s heavy metal breastplate had been replaced with one of linen and/or leather, reinforced with iron plates, then the only true differences in defensive armor between hoplites and pikemen would have been the smaller shield possessed by the latter.

Most importantly the sarisa phalanx was not very flexible. It required level and clear ground with no obstacles (Polyb. 18.31.5–6) and was ineffective in small units or with single soldiers (Polyb. 18.32.9). With respect to the latter, the combat between Coragus and Dioxiippus clearly showed the insufficiency of the pike in a one-on-one struggle (Diod. 17.100.2–101.2; Curt. 9.7.16–23), and even though Ptolemy during Perdiccas’ invasion is depicted repelling besiegers with a sarisa (Diod. 18.34.2), sarisai were weapons designed exclusively for the battlefield. As Hammond states, “[the sarisa] was unsuitable for skirmishing, besieging, street-fighting, ambushing, [and] mountaineering.” Crossing broken terrain was also difficult for a pike phalanx. At the battle of Mantinea in 207 B.C., a small ditch was sufficient to result in the defeat of the Spartan phalanx of pikemen (Polyb. 11.15.7–16.3). Hoplites, however, while most effective in, and designed for, warfare in the compact phalanx, were capable of individual combat especially against opposing troops in disarray, when the cohesion of the infantry collapsed, or in general, against Asiatic heavy infantry forces.

These hoplites, even with their limitations, presented a commander with far more flexible infantrymen than those carrying sarisai. In the “Ten Thousand’s” assault on the stronghold of the Drilians, after the walls had been cleared by the slingers, archers, and javelin
men (Xen. *Anab.* 5.2.14–15), the hoplites captured the ramparts and the palisades (Xen. *Anab.* 5.2.15).³²

Markle maintains that Macedonian forces were typically cross-trained to fight with both hoplite armament and with *sarisa* and *peltai*.³³ I would argue that this sort of broad training was at first found only in the hypaspist corps. Initially, the cost of the weaponry would have been prohibitive. In all likelihood, Philip adopted the *sarisa*, in part, because this form of warfare was inexpensive. Also, training in both weapon panoplies would have required more time than was typically available to the nonprofessional soldier. This would be especially true with regard to *sarisa* training.

Later, in Asia, as the army became increasingly professional with each passing year, cross training became more common. Over time Alexander switched more of his forces from the ranks of the *sarisa* bearers into that of hoplites. This was made necessary by Alexander’s dismissal of his League forces, amounting to several thousand hoplites (Arr. *Anab.* 3.19.6; cf. Diod. 17.17.3); by his need for speed; and by the collapse of the Persian grand army after Gaugamela. Diodorus (17.65.4) speaks of Alexander making improvements in the army after this third victory. The *taxeis* of Attalus, Amyntas, and Polyperchon, now appear on expeditions requiring mobility and flexibility (Arr. *Anab.* 4.25.1, 5; 3.18.5).

After Alexander’s death, when war was waged by the armies of his Successors, the trend reversed itself with increasing use of *sarisa* bearers. Polybius describes the two opposing phalanxes at Sellasia in 222 B.C. (2.69.7) and again at Mantinea in 207 B.C. (11.15.6, 16.1) as armed with pikes, with no clear evidence of the presence of hoplites. The lessons of Philip and Alexander regarding the advantage of the coordination of differently armed units were lost. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the decline in the importance of cavalry. At Sellasia, the Macedonian army consisted of ten thousand pikemen, three thousand peltasts, and three hundred cavalry (Polyb. 2.65.2). The proportion of infantry to cavalry had changed from approximately 6:1 in the time of Alexander to 25:1.³⁴

Initially only one of Alexander’s brigades was specifically designated as *astheteroi* the one led by Coenus. The first reference to this brigade occurs during the siege of Tyre (Arr. *Anab.* 2.23.2).³⁵ Arrian states, “One of the ships was manned by the hypaspists, . . . the other by Coenus’s brigade, the so-called *asthetairoi*.³⁶ From the ships these forces exited by gangplank and launched an attack by climbing through a breach in the wall (Arr. *Anab.* 2.23.2.4). It is unlikely that these troops were armed with pikes. Moreover, Coenus’s brigade is often found in circumstances requiring great mobility
and diversity. His *taxis* accompanied Alexander on his rapid return to Areia after that region’s satrap revolted, covering approximately seventy-five miles in two days (Arr. *Anab.* 3.25.6). While this brigade is definitely identified as *asthetairoi*, others would appear to be so also. In Alexander’s campaign against the Illyrians in 335, Perdiccas’ unit is associated with that of Coenus along with the hypaspists and the Agrianes (Arr. *Anab.* 1.6.9), and Perdiccas’ troops are again linked with those of Coenus on the Granicus (Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.2), where they were also in close proximity to the hypaspists. Moreover, the association of these two phalanx brigades occurs additionally at Issus (Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.3; Curt. 3.9.7) and Gaugamela (Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.9), and, perhaps, on the Hydaspes (Arr. *Anab.* 4.24.1). At the Persian Gates, it is Perdiccas’ brigade alone of the territorial regiments that accompanies the hypaspists, squadrons of cavalry, and the “lightest [or nimblest] armed archers” (Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.5).

Both Bosworth and Griffith argue that the *asthetairoi* represented half of the phalanx brigades. This, indeed, may have been the case later in the expedition, when Alexander faced more mobile forces and engaged in numbers of sieges. Polyperchon’s unit later appears in contexts that suggest strongly that these troops had become *asthetairoi*. Against the Assacienians, Craterus remained with the “heavier armed” infantry (Arr. *Anab.* 4.25.5), while Alexander proceeded with the Companion cavalry, the mounted javelin men, the Agrianes, and the brigades of Coenus and Polyperchon (Arr. *Anab.* 4.25.6). It is furthermore very likely that Amyntas’ brigade changed its equipment as well. At Issus (Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.4) and at Gaugamela (Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.9), this unit was clearly part of the pike-phalanx, being located in the center of the infantry phalanx in the former (Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.4) and on its left wing in the latter (Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.9). Yet, later, after the revolt of Satibarzanes, Amyntas’ brigade joins with Coenus’ on Alexander’s rapid return to Areia (Arr. *Anab.* 3.25.6). After Amyntas’ death in 329 (Arr. *Anab.* 3.27.3), his unit may have been put under the command of Attalus. It is also possible that the latter replaced Perdiccas on that officer’s promotion. In any case, in 327, Attalus’ brigade is associated with that of Coenus and with the hypaspists (Arr. *Anab.* 4.24.1).

In addition to providing greater flexibility in situations other than fixed infantry battles, the combination of hoplites and pikemen had tactical advantages. While “nothing could withstand the frontal assault of these pikemen,” it was vulnerable to attack, especially on the flanks (Polyb. 18.29.1). As with the later Swiss pikemen, the German *Landsnechts*, and the Spanish *tercios*, other units protected the men carrying the long lances. At Magnesia, the *sarisa* phalanx of Antiochus, even though it was drawn up in a square formation,
became vulnerable when its supporting troops were stripped away (App. Syr. 6.35). Antiochus had only cavalry and light-armed infantry to protect his pikemen. The Swiss, in support of their pikemen, employed troops equipped with halberds and soldiers armed with a two-handed sword. Later, these halberdiers were replaced in large part by troops carrying arquebuses, and still later muskets, and the German Landsnechts and the Spanish tercios from their beginning used men carrying primitive firearms to protect the pikemen, and also to attack the enemy’s flanks, the latter a duty also carried out by the Swiss halberdiers. Additionally, these other infantry units came into play when the phalanx of pikes had broken the integrity of the opposing infantry formation. In the case of the Swiss, those soldiers equipped with halberds and two-handed swords would then enter the fray most effectively. Yet, the pikemen anchored the line and were critical to victory in any set battle well into the seventeenth century.

On defense these pikemen were practically invulnerable to assault by cavalry or infantry, and on offense, as the result of regular practice and a well-cultivated esprit de corps, they could maintain formation while “steam-rolling” their opponents. All commentators marveled at the speed of the onslaught of the Swiss pikemen. By establishing a strong training regimen, they became masters of handling the long pike on maneuvers and in combat. Such training is also apparent in the new Macedonian infantry created by Philip II (Diod. 16.3.1–2: Polyæn. 4.2. 10, 19). Alexander, in his Balkan campaign of 335, had the Macedonian phalanx execute a number of complicated moves, demonstrating that these Macedonians had developed an expertise equal to that of their later Swiss equivalents (Arr. Anab. 1.6.2–3).

The combined use of hoplites and pikemen can be seen in an analysis of the Battle at Paraetacene between the forces of Antigonus and Eumenes. For this battle, Diodorus (19.27.1–30.10), probably following the account of an eyewitness, Hieronymus of Cardia, is very explicit in his description of the opposing phalanxes, with the exception of light-armed infantry, which he has omitted. Eumenes’ heavy infantry is described as from left to right, six thousand mercenaries, five thousand men of all races “armed in the Macedonian manner,” the “argyraspids” (Silver shields), and the three thousand hypaspists (Diod. 19.27.6–19.28.1). The infantry of Antigonus, from left to right, consisted of nine thousand mercenaries, three thousand Lycians and Pamphylians, eight thousand “men of all races equipped as Macedonian phalangites,” and finally eight thousand Macedonians presumably armed with the sarisa (Diod. 19.29.3). Since each force has “men of all races” armed in the Macedonian manner, it is to be assumed that the mercenaries and Antigonus’ Lycians and Pamphylians were
not so armed and were likely equipped as hoplites. It is even possible that Eumenes’ own hypaspists, to be distinguished from Alexander’s old corps of that name (now called the argyraspids), were equipped as hoplites. However, with the change after Alexander’s death to fixed heavy infantry battles, there was a return to a preponderance of pikemen. Markle has shown that representations of shields on coins dated after 300 B.C. are commonly rimless, that is *peltai*.52

There are parallels between the arrangement of forces at Paraetacene and Alexander’s organization in the Battles at Issus and Gaugamela. At Gaugamela, in particular, Alexander had no natural obstacles on which to anchor his flanks, and formed his army in what Devine describes as a “tactical square.”53 Both flanks were composed of cavalry, light-armed troops (Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.8, 10; 12.1–4), and mercenary infantry. On the right were found Cleander’s “Old Guard” mercenaries (Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.2), and on the left the Achaean mercenaries (Diod. 17.57.4). In both cases these were hoplites, since they are distinguished from the light-infantry and from the Macedonians. Alexander’s “Macedonian” phalanx was from right to left, the hypaspists, the divisions of Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Polyperchon, Simmias, and Craterus.

The *asthetairoi*, then, were hoplites, differing from the hypaspists in that the latter were proficient in either array, hoplite or *sarisa*, and possessed of the special status of infantry guards. While the term *asthetairoi* designated Macedonian infantry armed with hoplite equipment, these troops, as Bosworth has shown,54 apparently are to be associated with Upper Macedonia. Why this would be the case is unclear. Those from Lower Macedonia may have been early on introduced to the *sarisa* by Philip and over the years of campaigning had become expert in its use.55 It is also remotely possible that these hoplites came from Philip II’s new city foundations in Upper Macedonia.56 The more likely explanation, however, is that the pike became the traditional weapon of Philip’s forces beginning with his defeat of the Illyrians in the first year of his reign, and in subsequent years these were supplemented with his increasingly adaptable hypaspists, Greek mercenaries, and, perhaps, some of the new infantry recruited from Upper Macedonia. That Philip was responsible for the introduction of the *sarisa* appears conclusive.57 Diodorus (16.3.1–2) and Poly- aenus (4.2.10) make direct attributions. The only question then becomes the date of the introduction. It is likely that Philip, early in his career, created a variation on the traditional hoplite phalanx, in part attracted by the low cost of the necessary equipment.58 Machiavelli comments that the Swiss pikemen of his day came into existence because of the poverty of the Swiss cantons.59
As to the name *asthetairoi*, many suggestions have been offered for its origin. Bosworth argues that the “*asth*” comes from “*asista/assista,*” the superlative of “*ason/asson.*” Originally, then, the term would have been “*asisthetairoi.*” With this derivation, the term means “closest in kin companions.” This designation has a number of problems. As Hammond notes, “For Philip to have called the men of Upper Macedonia “closest-in-kin-companions” would have seemed entirely untrue to them, and I cannot see any reason for Philip to stress so fictitious a facet of their relationship.” Griffith, while finding Bosworth’s suggestion “attractive,” does not believe that the term refers to those units recruited and brigaded together from Upper Macedonia. This scholar asserts that the term in origin was “*aristoi hetairoi*” or “*aristhetairoi.*” As evidence, Griffith shows that Thessalian proper names often began with a contracted form of *aristos, a sto.* Griffith believes that the “best companions” would be those who received this title as a direct result of their performance. Griffith argues that the first such designation went to Coenus’s brigade and that subsequently based on their performance this distinction was extended to that of Polyperchon, and to others as well. Of course, the implication then is that the other brigades were inferior to these. Bosworth had considered Griffith’s suggestion, but rightly rejected it. Moreover, this argument would appear to be refuted by Arrian (*Anab. 7.11.3*). At Opis in 324, Alexander inaugurated a Persian mirror-image force replete with “Persian *pezetairoi, asthetairoi, argyraspids,* and cavalry companions, . . . .” Clearly, the references are to specific Macedonian units. The title *asthetairoi* must then have become permanently affixed to these units. Since those brigades identified as *asthetairoi* may have originated in Upper Macedonia, this designation would have been “provocative” to Alexander’s other Macedonian infantrymen.

Hammond proposes that the term *asthetairoi* derives from *astoi hetairoi,* “townsmen-companions, i.e. companions recruited from the towns of Upper Macedonia.” However, as Milns points out, Philip II was trying to build national allegiances, not parochial ones. It is also to be objected that it is more likely that the more urbanized Lower Macedonia produced far more recruits from towns than did the less urbanized Upper Macedonia. The Upper Macedonian brigades are described as from specific cantons of Upper Macedonia (*Diod. 17.57.2*).

A more likely origin of the term is that, like that of the later argyraspids, it derived from the shields of these troops. It is commonly asserted that the usual decoration of the *pel té* was segmented concentric circles. This emblem is found associated with a *sarisa* on
a belt-plate from a late third or second century B.C. tomb at Vele Ledine in Montenegro. Liampi connects the description of the plunder carried in Aemilius Paullus’ triumph with a Roman Republican coin commemorating this victory with a depiction of a Macedonian shield with the concentric motif. In Plutarch’s *Life of Aemilius Paullus* (32.6), the Macedonian shields are associated with “long Macedonian spears,” an obvious reference to the sarisai. While the concentric circle motif is generally regarded as the common shield decoration, it is clear that over the years Macedonian shields could be painted with various designs, including the Macedonian star or sunburst. Liampi, however, does not regard the star as a usual shield emblem for any element in the Macedonian army, even though the star or sunburst motif with varying rays appears with some frequency. It is found on a number of shield depictions: one of the frescoes in the tomb of Lyson and Kallikles, the miniature shield from the tomb at Katerini, a shield fragment from Florina, the Shield of Pharnaces, the Diadem of Amphipolis, and on the Boscoreale mosaic.

It is, therefore, very possible that the “asth” is short for “aste¯r,” star, and was initially a nickname, asteresetairoi, which when contracted became asthetairoi. That it was in some fashion a nickname seems apparent from Arrian’s frequently used phrase “the καλούμενοι (kaloumenoi) asthetairoi” (Arr. *Anab*. 4.23.1; 6.6.1; 7.11.3). A similar situation occurred with the change in name of Alexander’s hypaspists to the argyraspids. While Hammond interprets kaloumenoi as meaning “renowned,” and Milns suggests that the term meant “out of the ordinary knowledge of the writer and experience of the writer himself, or . . . his readers,” Arrian uses the word typically to mean very basically “called.” As with the asthetairoi, the word in Arrian on occasion would be appropriately translated “so-called,” implying that the term was either of recent or an initially unofficial origin. With respect to the latter, in 335, Alexander invaded the territory of the “so-called” (kaloumenoi) independent Thracians (*Anab*. 1.1.5), and at Gaugamela, there are Persian units described as the “so-called (kaloumenoi) transplanted Carians” (*Anab*. 3.2.5) and the “so-called (kaloumenoi) mountaineer Indians” (*Anab*. 3.8.4), and one of Alexander’s brigades in the same battle was designated the “‘so-called’ (kaloumenoi) old mercenaries” (*Anab*. 3.12.2). As with the other interpretations of the origin and meaning of asthetairoi, this one also has problems. Etymologically astêr, asteros, in various combinations apparently conforms to the pattern of Greek syncopated nouns and never loses the rho. It is possible that the absence of the rho in asthetairoi is a dialectical aspect of Greek in Macedonia. But to this date there is no
such evidence. However, nicknames do not always follow grammatical rules.

Philip’s, and later Alexander’s, army, was successful in part owing to its mixed armament. This force consisted of heavy and light cavalry, peltasts, archers, slingers, hoplites, and *sarisa* bearers. This was an army designed to meet every contingency.
The Macedonian phalanx was the backbone of Alexander’s army. As such, it received special attention, to ensure that it was effective to the highest degree. What mattered most was its flexibility. Tactics changed with changing circumstances, as Alexander responded to the many challenges, military and political, that he encountered. Under his leadership the phalanx became more than a superb military tool. It developed what might be seen as political involvement. Intensely loyal to the monarchy, it was at the same time deeply conscious of its traditional rights and could challenge the king himself. The tension between autocratic king and politically conscious phalanx culminated in a period of turmoil in the summer of 324. Then, at the Assyrian city of Opis, Alexander faced down his men and threatened to replace them with Iranian troops specially trained in Macedonian techniques. He was able to assert his authority (in dramatic fashion), and at the time of his death he was creating a new mixed phalanx which combined Macedonian and Iranian troops, each with their own national weapons. This was custom made for his projected western expedition, and proof that he had decisively overridden the regionalism that had been the curse of the Macedonian state from time immemorial.

In this paper I examine the gradual transition of the phalanx from a collection of highly trained regional levies to a blended unity and focus on the military nomenclature, which reflected the political development of Macedonia. During the fourth century, the infantry evolved from a heterogeneous rabble to an expert body of pikemen schooled in the techniques of mass fighting. Simultaneously there emerged strong ties of loyalty to the Argead house, which were symbolized in their title of Foot Companions (πεζέταιροι).

Chiliarchs and Pentakosiarchs: The Emergence of Mixed Commands

Alexander, of course, was not the first to stamp his political will upon the Macedonian infantry. Earlier in the century Philip II and Philip’s
older brother Alexander had given the Macedonian infantry a wholly new structure. Instead of a rabble, disorganized and ineffective, there emerged a disciplined army that fought *en masse* in defined military units. The new organization brought military success, which in turn engendered an *esprit de corps* that was indispensable for the victories of Alexander. The system was not static. Philip and Alexander did not rest on their laurels, but used their armies to break down the ties of regional loyalty between the nobility and their retainers. It was a problem addressed by both monarchs, and for Alexander we have an explicit, if much contested, passage of Curtius Rufus (5.2.6): “in the interest of military discipline he made several advantageous changes from ancestral practice.” He then gives an example, set in the context of Alexander’s stay in Sittacene, late in the Julian year 331. The cavalry, recently reinforced, were to be given commanders chosen for their excellence irrespective of their ethnic origins.2 That is precisely what Arrian (3.16.11) states in exactly the same context,3 and there is certainly a common source. That common source also deals with the infantry. According to Arrian the six thousand infantry reinforcements4 were allotted to the existing battalions on the basis of their ethnic origins. Curtius agrees in principle, but gives a vivid picture of a competition for high command. In particular, he states that a new formation of one thousand troops was created, the so-called chiliarchy; and he adds that there had previously been units of five hundred (*quingenariae cohortes*). He states that nine chiliarchs were appointed and gives their names.5 The eighth is missing, and almost certainly it has fallen out through manuscript corruption. Apart from this omission the text seems sound. It is lucid, and there is nothing in the context that is suspicious. Nonetheless, there has been persistent and perverse reluctance to accept Curtius’ plain statement.6 There is no evidence, it is said, for the existence of pentakosiarchs before the competition in Sittacene. This is true, but there is no evidence after the competition until we reach Alexander’s last days, when pentakosiarchs and chiliarchs share the vigil before the royal bedchamber. The source for this is the royal *Ephemerides* (Arr. 7.25.6; Plut. Alex. 76.6), and however suspect the document may be as propaganda,7 it cannot be wrong about a detail witnessed by so many contemporary observers. Another criticism focuses on the men honored by election as chiliarchs, who seem to be too obscure for such a high command. True enough—up to a point. However, it could be argued that the men elected were meant to be obscure. Their election excluded the general staff from some of the most prestigious commands in the army.8 And there is no doubt that they were competent leaders. Atarrhias the one-eyed and Hellanicus had distinguished themselves at the siege of
Halicarnassus,\(^9\) and were likely to have enjoyed the confidence of their men. It is no wonder that they were the choice of the troops in Sittacene.

Another more serious criticism concerns the figures. Nine chiliarchs were appointed, implying a total of nine thousand men under their command, too many for the hypaspists, the elite guard of the king, and too few for the entire phalanx infantry.\(^{10}\) But once again we are jumping to conclusions. Curtius does not state that only nine chiliarchs were appointed. The names he gives are those of the men whom the troops elected to office.\(^{11}\) It is quite possible that Alexander reserved a number of chiliarchies for himself, so that he could counteract any populist movement in the ranks. If the king’s chiliarchs balanced the elective officers it would give a paper strength of eighteen thousand, a figure that is consistent with most estimates of army numbers at this period. It would seem, then, that there was a reorganization that resulted in the creation of a new step in the hierarchy: the old pentakosiarchs continued with their old names and their current commands, but they were subordinate to newly formed chiliarchs who were elected by the commons. Though Arrian does not explicitly say so, it seems clear that it was Alexander who decided which pentakosiarchies should be combined as chiliarchies. The scheme would be reminiscent of Cleisthenes’ trittyes in Athens and presumably had similar motives, to separate senior commanders from their regional power base and bring together units of different origins under officers of lower social status.

The one difficult objection to Curtius’ account comes from Arrian’s description of the siege of Halicarnassus (1.22.7). This deals with a certain Adaeus, who died repelling a sortie by the defenders. Arrian explicitly terms him chiliarch,\(^{12}\) and so contradicts Curtius’ statement that chiliarchies were first introduced at the competition in Sittacene. How, then, can Adaeus have been a chiliarch if the command did not as yet exist? One possibility is that Adaeus did in fact command a chiliarchy, but it was not a unit of Macedonians. That is unlikely, as Arrian repeatedly states that the contingent in which Adaeus served was Macedonian. I think it more likely that Arrian is inadvertently misleading. His focus, as always, is the achievement of Alexander, who effortlessly disposes of the sortie that threatens his siege engines.\(^{13}\) However, it is clear that the source for the episode wrote up Adaeus’ exploit in some detail, for it is represented as a brilliant Macedonian victory, disastrous for the Halicarnassians.\(^{14}\) This battle account could well have given details of Adaeus’ command. It may have been a temporary measure, combining two pentakosiarchies
for the action around the Tripylon Gate. Arrian, more interested in Alexander and less disposed to give credit to others, has reduced the action to the bare minimum. Adaeus is given his honorable death, but that is all. There is no indication how he died. The two pentakosiarchies are conflated for a single engagement, and the commander of this combined unit is loosely termed chiliarch. It is an easy transition, made easier by the fact that in the Roman military hierarchy chiliarch was synonymous with tribune, a military office that Arrian himself may have held under Trajan. It was certainly natural for him to think of a commanding officer as a chiliarch, no matter what the paper strength of his division. 

The Hekatostys (Group of One Hundred) and Its Role in the Infantry

We must now turn to Arrian’s account of Alexander’s last days. Shortly before his death he had received a sacred embassy from Siwah that gave the god’s formal endorsement of Hephaestion’s hero cult. On receiving the news, Alexander celebrated on a grand scale and performed a number of sacrifices; some were the thank offerings customary after favorable events and others too that had been sanctioned by the oracle. Consequently he and his friends drank well into the night. Up to this point Arrian uses direct speech, which should mean that his principal sources were in agreement. There were sacrifices, prescribed by Ammon and conducted with all the lavishness one would expect when the new cult was established. Next Arrian reverts to indirect speech (δοῦναι δὲ λέγεται), and moves from the customary sacrifices of the high command to the largesse bestowed on the troops. The source here is almost certainly Ptolemy; the qualification suggests that Arrian was choosing between differing authorities, and Aristobulus was unlikely to have dwelt on the repeated carousing of these last days. Now, what Ptolemy recorded is highly instructive. He reveals that the troops received wine and sacrificial meat, a regular source of protein, which would supplement the usual cereal diet. It is no wonder that there were daily sacrifices performed by the king (Arr. 7.25.2–5). It was a duty that he discharged religiously, even when he was burning with fever, and the troops would expect to receive the residue. On this occasion, according to Arrian, the meat and wine was distributed by lochoi and by hekatostyes. These divisions are difficult to explain. They comprised a substantial number of troops, but not too large a number. Otherwise the individual soldier would end up with a very meager helping of sacrificial
meat. It looks too as though both cavalry and infantry received the largesse. The *lochoi* were clearly the cavalry units that had been established in Sittacene late in 331. That means that the *hekatostyes* were infantry units, and they were probably one hundred strong, in paper strength at least.

There is a parallel passage earlier in Arrian’s narrative, dealing with the distribution of pack animals after the passage of the Gedrosian desert, where there had been a huge wastage. Alexander’s satraps, Phrataphernes and Stasanor, joined forces with the main army, and as they did so Alexander assigned them to the various army divisions. He made allocations to the commanders individually, then to others by *ilai* and *hekatostyes*, and to others again by *lochoi*. There are three categories of recipients. For Tarn (following Berve) the *lochoi* were “the well-known infantry *lochoi.*” That assumption was fatal. It led him to the conclusion that the *ilai* and *hekatostyes* were both cavalry units, the *hekatostys* being the regular term for the cavalry *lochos*, which had come into existence in Sittacene. This will not do. On Tarn’s interpretation Alexander allocated pack animals to two cavalry units: the well-known cavalry *ile* and another that he identifies with the *hekatostys*. In other words a cavalryman might receive shares in the column of baggage animals twice over—one as a member of an *ile* and again by virtue of his belonging to a *hekatostys*. Two bites at the cherry are surely excessive, and we must find a more acceptable solution.

In my opinion, the sentence should be interpreted as follows. First we have the allocation to commanders. Then we move to the Macedonian troops, both infantry (*hekatostyes*) and cavalry (*ilai*), and finally to non-Macedonian forces (*lochoi*). These non-Macedonians had been heavily engaged in the fighting in Sind and experienced the hardships of the Gedrosian desert. They will have lost pack animals and presumably had some claim to compensation. If so, they were given replacement beasts, which were distributed to their individual companies. Arrian gives them the generic title of *lochoi*, which he uses elsewhere to refer to troops in an undifferentiated mass, including non-Macedonians. In contrast, the Macedonians are divided between cavalry and infantry. The horsemen receive an allocation by *ilai*, the standard unit of cavalry, whereas, it seems, the infantry were grouped in *hekatostyes*. Interestingly, they seem to have had the lion’s share of the distribution. The cavalry may already have had replacements before the reinforcements arrived in Carmania. The troops had a rest period in Pura (Arr. 6.27.1), and during that time any pack animals discovered in the area would have been requisitioned. Consequently, there was less of a need to supply them with more, and the new teams
could be spread more thinly. On the other hand, the infantry was in desperate need of transport animals after its appalling time in the desert. They were in no shape for foot-slogging, encumbered by any sarisai that had survived the march; there would have been a collective sigh of relief as the weapons were dismantled and loaded on the backs of mules and camels.26

The Mixed Phalanx of 323 and Its Structure

The infantry was divided into hekatostyes for the distribution of the pack animals, as was the case with the sacrificial meat. Etymologically this should mean that the basic command unit comprised one hundred men. By the time of Alexander’s death this may have been simply a notional paper strength division, but of course at some juncture the hierarchy needed to be fixed. In its developed form under Alexander the phalanx operated on a base of sixteen. In the classic description of the battle order, when Alexander deployed his forces at Issus, he started with his line thirty-two deep and extended it first to sixteen and finally to eight.27 Similarly, when he was displaying the expertise of his phalanx to Glaucias and his Illyrians, he began with his forces 120 deep.28 Here the basic unit, the file, might be either eight or ten deep, but what clinches the argument is the structure of what I have termed the mixed phalanx. This was formed out of Persians and Macedonians shortly before Alexander’s death, and I would argue that it was designed for service in the west when the king finally embarked on his scheme of conquest.29

This new phalanx was sixteen files deep. In each file there were twelve Persians armed with bows and light javelins. The first three ranks consisted of Macedonians with Macedonian weaponry, and finally there was a Macedonian to bring up the rear.30 This formation was intended to be highly flexible; the sarisa men of the phalanx would deal with any direct attack by cavalry or massed infantry and the Iranians in the center would repel any sorties by light armed mercenaries, such as were favored by the Carthaginians.31 This phalanx was carefully designed to combine two types of fighting and, as far as we can see it was a new development. It comes as a surprise when we look at the nomenclature as it is represented by Arrian. The hierarchy is based on a decimal system. The individual file is termed dekas (tens), its leader dekadarches. The hekatostys (group of one hundred), fits nicely into this command structure: it can be seen as
a group of ten files (dekades), each comprising ten soldiers. It seems clear that the files of the phalanx were originally ten deep and named dekades. At some time later tactics changed, and it was felt desirable to increase the phalanx depth, perhaps to increase its weight of impact and to improve mobility. Even when a brand new phalanx was created out of nothing the anachronistic nomenclature remained and the files which were in fact sixteen deep retained a title that implied that they were ten deep. Is it possible to make sense out of all this?

Anaximenes and the *Pezhetairoi* (Foot Companions)

It is clear that the Macedonian army was restructured in the course of the fourth century. During the Peloponnesian War there is little mention of Macedonian infantry, and what there is, is frankly disparaging.\(^{32}\) It would seem that there was no systematic organization and the techniques of fighting in files had not emerged. That must have been an innovation of the fourth century. There is a famous fragment from the work of Anaximenes of Lampsacus,\(^ {33}\) who wrote a *Philippika* during the reign of Alexander.\(^ {34}\) In his first book he described a reorganization of the Macedonian army, which he attributed to a certain Alexander. This, among other things, described the division of the foot soldiers into “lochoi, dekades and the other commands.” These units were collectively termed “Foot Companions,” and Anaximenes claimed that the purpose of the nomenclature was to give both cavalry and infantry a share in the friendship of the king. In future years they would retain their enthusiasm for the royal house. According to Anaximenes, the lynch pin of the military organization was the phalanx, and it was divided into subgroups that had their counterpart in the last year of Alexander III.\(^ {35}\) The dekades of the mixed phalanx we have seen already, and at Opis in 324 Alexander broke the spirit of his men when he drafted Persian infantry into lochoi, and, we may note, gave them the traditional names of the Macedonians.\(^ {36}\) So far so good, but can we go further? There is other testimony to the content of Book I of Anaximenes. It comes from a fragmentary papyrus commentary on Demosthenes’ speech *against Aristocrates,* and deals with events in Thrace. In Book II\(^ {37}\) it seems that Anaximenes retailed the story of the treachery of Smicythion, an event that took place shortly after the assassination of King Cotys in early 359, and it becomes almost certain that Book II began with the events surrounding the Thracian king’s death. Book I therefore would have covered the events
of the 360s B.C., including the account of the army organization. It would not have gone beyond 360–59.

There is, however, a major objection. According to Anaximenes, the author of the army organization, as the text supposedly reads, “accustomed the most illustrious to serve as cavalry and termed them Companions” (τοὺς μὲν ἐνδοξοτάτους ἱππεύειν συνεθίσας ἑταίρους προσηγόρευσε). This has evoked a chorus of derision. It is ridiculous, so it is alleged, to suggest that the Macedonians, who had a long-standing reputation as expert cavalry, needed to be trained to fight on horseback. According to G. T. Griffith, “A writer of stuff like this perhaps was capable of a rather unusual silliness.”38 This is an excellent example of sawing off the branch one is sitting on. We can hardly dismiss our principal source as an idiot and then use him as primary evidence. On Griffith’s view, Anaximenes held that it was Alexander the Great who widened the application of the term “Companions” to all the cavalry and infantry, and then “embellished these facts with cliché nonsense.” In my opinion it would be preferable to accept that Anaximenes did know what he was writing about and is correctly reported by Harpocration and other lexicographers. What, then, is Anaximenes saying? For Griffith, the passage should be construed “having trained the upper class as cavalry, he called them Companions.”39 But there is no allusion in the text to training or even to an “upper class.” My translation would be “having accustomed those of highest repute to serve as cavalry, he termed them Companions (hetairoi).” On this interpretation, there is no suggestion that the Macedonian cavalry are to be taught to fight. They are already expert horsemen, but they are not as yet steeped in battle experience. Now they are to be accustomed to service around the king’s person as a permanent corps d’élite, to be constantly open to call in the face of a military emergency and as a standing bodyguard in time of peace. It would be an earlier version of the ἱλὲ basilikē, the Royal Squadron, which was the spearhead of Alexander’s cavalry in the major battles. As the king’s horsemen, they were permanently in his entourage, not simply a reserve to be called upon in time of crisis; and it would take some time for them to become accustomed to their role at court. It is no surprise that they were singled out to be the Royal Companions. The rest of the cavalry would, as before, serve when they were called upon.

There is a similar dichotomy with the Foot Companions. As we have seen, at some stage the phalanx infantry was organized on a basis of files ten deep and was collectively given the title of pezhetairoi. There was, however, a smaller group. According to Theopompus of Chios40 the largest and strongest of all the Macedonians were selected
as the king’s bodyguard and were called “Foot Companions.” Here there is a contradiction, but only an apparent one. It looks as though the royal footguards were originally a small, select group, which was vastly expanded at some stage. The wider body of infantry now had the title which had previously been the preserve of the elite guard, and the entire infantry was, in effect, a huge bodyguard for the king. But which king? According to Harpocration, Anaximenes mentioned the army organization in Book I of his *Philippika* with reference to an Alexander. This has sparked unending debate with practically every Macedonian monarch canvassed except the most obvious. Brunt opted for Alexander I (the Philhellene), who, he suggests, was elevated into a culture hero, the spiritual founder of the Macedonian state. More adventurously, Griffith thought that a case could be made for Alexander the Great, based on the passage of Anaximenes that he roundly condemns. Others have suggested Philip, who is seen as the ruler most capable of revolutionizing the Macedonian army, even though Anaximenes explicitly ascribed the restructuring to an Alexander. In my opinion, the most likely candidate is Alexander II, the eldest son of Amyntas III and brother of Philip, who reigned briefly from the death of his father in 370 until his assassination in 368/7. For many commentators this has ruled out Alexander II. In their view, he was too young to carry out such a radical reform and he shows no sign of military brilliance. None of this is conclusive. Alexander had probably been accepted as crown prince during the lifetime of his father. The two are named together in an Athenian decree of the late 370s, and by that time Alexander would have reached maturity. On his accession he was active militarily, intervening in Thessaly in support of the Aleuad clan of Larisa and provoking retaliation from Thebes. At this stage, he was challenged for the throne by his relative, Ptolemy of Alorus, and a second pretender, Pausanias, was able to occupy a few cities to the east of the kingdom which he turned into a small principality where he is said to have enjoyed the favor of the local populace. The year of troubles culminated in Alexander’s assassination in 368. This is clearly relevant to the military organization. Alexander was hard pressed by domestic and foreign enemies and had every reason to win and sustain his popularity with the troops. What is more, he had observed the Theban army at close quarters in 369, when Pelopidas entered Macedon and struck up a friendship with the young king. He could well have been influenced by their tactics in action and organized his own men in files of ten. Given the threat from Ptolemy and Pausanias, it would have been a clever populist move to extend the title of Foot Companion to the entire infantry.
The Kings and the Phalanx: Defeat and Recovery

It is unlikely that the new formation was dramatically effective. The ructions in the royal house continued, with Ptolemy struggling against yet another Argead usurper and facing humiliation at the hands of the dominant power. Finally disaster struck. Perdiccas, the younger son of Amyntas, had killed Ptolemy and taken over the Macedonian kingdom. By this time the vultures were gathering and Macedon was faced with invasion from the north. Perdiccas fought a major battle against the Illyrian king Bardylis and lost four thousand men. The army had not performed with distinction, and for a time it looked as though Macedon would be dismembered, as there were a series of challenges to the royal authority, invasions from Paeonia, two more pretenders backed by Athens and Olynthus, and worst of all, the Illyrians were planning a resumption of hostilities. In the face of these threats Philip, the successor to the Argead throne, could only play for time and put his army through an arduous training routine. According to Diodorus (16.3.1–2) he concentrated on maneuvers under arms, and above all, imitated the close formation πυκνότης described by Homer. Diodorus actually states that he was the first to compact the Macedonian phalanx (πρῶτος συνεστήσατο τὴν Μακεδονικὴν φάλαγγα). This is something different from the original formation of the phalanx, when the Foot Companions were established under Alexander II. Philip focused on the συνασπισμός the tightest concentration of the phalanx infantry. The battle line would remain ten deep, but it was literally packed together with shields overlapping. Maneuvering under such conditions required enormous skill. The great sarisai needed to be handled with absolute precision if they were not to collide and throw the whole line into confusion. It is hardly surprising that Philip trained his men for a lengthy period before resuming hostilities against the Illyrians.

Around 358, Philip settled accounts with Bardylis. He took the offensive, demanding that the Illyrians withdraw from Macedonian territory, and rejected Bardylis’ offer of an armistice. A decisive battle ensued, and in its course the phalanx distinguished itself. The Illyrians had adopted a square formation in an attempt to neutralize the superb Macedonian cavalry. Their intention was to counter any cavalry attack by the Macedonians from any direction. The tactic proved a failure. If Frontinus may be believed, the front of the Illyrian square consisted of picked men, and their formation was vulnerable on the flanks where the weaker troops were stationed. In reply, Philip deployed his forces in a strategy that foreshadowed Gaugamela. His
cavalry began the engagement by an attack from his right, to create the worst possible disruption, while Philip himself pressed frontally “with the best of the Macedonians.” Philip had concentrated his attack on the Illyrian left, firstly with cavalry forays to create confusion in the left of the Illyrian square and then using the infantry to crush the enemy line. Now, according to Diodorus, Philip was at the head of the fighting along with the best of the Macedonians. Unfortunately, he fails to tell us who this elite were, but quite certainly they included the soldiers who had been painfully trained and toughened throughout the previous year and had developed into the prime fighting unit of the Macedonian army. As such, they were primarily responsible for the defeat of the Illyrians. They caused massive loss of life (according to Diodorus seven thousand out of ten were left dead on the field), and in the aftermath Bardylis withdrew his forces from Macedonian settlements, as Philip had demanded before the battle.

The heroes of the hour were the Macedonian phalanx. They had disposed of the Illyrian threat and secured their borders for a generation, and it is more than likely that they helped annex the principalities of Upper Macedon and began the long process of absorbing them into the Argead kingdom. Philip had stood alone, but his army compensated for the lack of allies and secured him on the throne. It is reminiscent of the Athenians at Marathon. Faced with an invasion by supposedly superior foreign forces, they held out without allies (except for the Plataeans), and finally won because of the effectiveness of their heavy infantry. They became legends in their lifetime and had little hesitation in using the prestige of their victory to gain political leverage. Philip’s infantry, it could be argued, were the Marathon men of Macedon. They had preserved and expanded the kingdom, and they could capitalize on their achievement. The legendary plain speaking of the Macedonian commons may derive from their actions in 358. They could impose their will on the king, who owed his throne and very existence to them.

### Conclusion

**What’s In a Name?**

We can now turn back to the army as it was in Alexander’s day. The anomaly of the decimal basis of nomenclature is easily explained. It goes back to the early days of the phalanx, as it was first formed by Alexander II. This “Urphalanx” was comparatively primitive. It saw the introduction of an infantry based on the file ten deep. There is, however, no indication as yet that the characteristic sarisa was in use.
The troops may have originally operated with the familiar hoplite spear and had it progressively lengthened as their expertise increased. The fundamental development came with Philip’s campaign against the Illyrians, when he introduced the close formation of the *sunaspismos*. From that time the army divisions retained their nomenclature, no doubt because there was a superstitious objection to changing the names of units that had been so spectacularly successful in 358. If such a superstition existed, it would have been reinforced by Alexander’s career of victory. It would be best to leave well alone and not tempt providence by interfering with the names which were associated with success.

Under Alexander, as we have seen, there was some reorganization of the army but it tended not to extend to the nomenclature. There is, however, an important passage of Arrian, which describes the climax of the Opis mutiny. There Alexander turns to his Iranian troops and gives them Macedonian names—phalanx names, to make it worse. At this, the Macedonians lose control of themselves and surrender unconditionally. Alexander’s awesome paroxysm of wrath was no doubt enough to intimidate his men, but the transfer of the names to the Iranians was the last straw. The names that had brought them victory were being transferred to their former enemies, and, if there were to be open conflict, fortune would be unlikely to favor them over her legendary favorite. There is a similar phenomenon in the imperial Roman army, where the legionary names along with the legionary eagles were transmitted from generation to generation, and it was a mark of utter disgrace to lose them. Similarly, in Alexander’s army, the *Argyraspides* (“Silver Shields”) were its most effective and ferocious component. Under Eumenes they were invincible and enjoyed a legendary reputation. The unit was broken up and largely dispersed by Antigonus, but the name had its attractions. It was adopted by the shock troops of the Seleucid armies, who served as the royal infantry, recruited as the elite of the army. They will have been set on justifying the expectations inherent in the name. Regimental pride was (and is) a powerful motive force, and the *Argyraspides* will have ensured that their nomenclature was instantly familiar.
Much has been written about Alexander’s victory over Darius III at Gaugamela. One episode, however, has not received sufficient attention: the attack of the Persian scythed chariots. This lack of attention is not surprising, since the attack formed only a small part of the battle and had virtually no impact on its outcome. Nevertheless, this brief and confused episode is instructive and sheds some light on both the strengths and the limitations of the Macedonian phalanx. Hence, a closer look at the deployment of the chariots and the Macedonian countermeasures is in order, making use of our recent experiments with the Macedonian sarissa used in formation.¹

When Darius deployed his troops at Gaugamela, he placed the fearsome scythed chariots in three different positions in front of his battle line. According to Arrian, one hundred scythed chariots were positioned in front of the Persian left, facing Alexander’s right, where the main force of Alexander’s cavalry was preparing to strike the Persian army (3.11.6). Fifty more chariots were placed in front of Darius himself in the center of the line—although it is not clear whether these were scythed—and an additional fifty scythed chariots were stationed on the Persian right (3.11.7). Arrian says little, however, about Alexander’s strategy for dealing with this threat, except that he placed half the Agrianians and the javelin-men, along with the javelin-men of Balacrus, opposite the chariots on the Persian left (3.12.3), and that, at one point, some of these (almost certainly light infantry) parted ranks to let some chariots pass between them, “as they had been instructed to do” (ὡσπερ παρήγγελτο αὐτοῖς). As the Macedonians began to slant to the right, to counter the attempted encirclement by the Bactrians and the Dahae, Darius launched the scythed chariot attack in the hope of catching his enemy before he moved away from the level ground (Arr. 3.13.2). Arrian (3.13.5–6) says:

At this point, the Persians launched their scythe-carrying chariots directly against Alexander, to throw his line out of formation; but in this they were signally disappointed. For first, as they approached, the Agrianians and the javelin-men under
Balacrus, who had been stationed in front of the Companion cavalry, met them with volleys; and then they snatched hold of the reins, pulled down the drivers, and crowding round the horses, cut them down. Some did pass right through the Greek lines, which, as they had been ordered, parted where the chariots attacked; this was the main reason why the chariots passed through unscathed and the troops against which they were launched were unharmed. These chariots too were overpowered by the grooms and by the royal hypaspists.

Thus P. A. Brunt’s translation (or, at least, Brunt’s reworking of Robson’s translation). But the Greek phrase he translates as “to throw his line out of formation” is ὡς ἀναταράξοντες αὐτῷ τὴν φάλαγγα (literally: “in order to throw his phalanx into confusion”). There is, of course, no phalanx, at this point of the Macedonian line, unless we take into account the hypaspists stationed to the left of the Companions, which acted as the articulating force between the cavalry and the sarissa-bearing infantry. But this is clearly not the case, since the hypaspistai basilikoi—literally “royal hypaspists,” a term which must refer to the aristocratic infantrymen, i.e., the aristocratic youths who had by now graduated from the ranks of the paides basilikoi (royal youths, sometimes called “pages”) and were fighting primarily as hamippoi (infantry mixed with cavalry) in conjunction with the king and the Companions—were positioned behind the Agrianians and javelin-men. Hence, if they were responsible for “mopping up” the stray scythed chariots, it was the light armed troops who, in places, allowed the chariots to pass between their lines. This is precisely what we should expect to find, since such a parting of ranks is most easily accomplished by mobile troops.

It is, of course, well known that Xenophon (Anab. 1.8.20) describes a similar tactic by the Greeks at Cunaxa, but even here we cannot say whether the infantrymen who parted to avoid the chariots were hoplites or light infantry. They were, most likely, of the latter sort. But the maneuver can be executed, with somewhat more difficulty, by hoplites. What is important to note is that it is far more difficult for sarissa-bearing phalangites to do the same thing. There are several reasons for this:

1. The phalangite, encumbered by his eighteen-foot sarissa, is hardly a nimble infantryman.
2. The sarissa-wielding phalanx, by the time it has entered this stage of the battle, has begun to press closely together, since gaps in the formation can easily be exploited by the enemy (as Roman maniples would later demonstrate with deadly results).
3. Densely packed formations have little room and cannot react quickly enough to make wide lanes for the chariots to pass through.

4. The leveling of the sarissas by the men in the first five rows greatly impedes the lateral mobility of the phalangites.

5. Phalangites cannot strike out at their enemy with the sarissa unless that enemy is directly in front of them; for, once they are in formation, the angle of the leveled sarissa cannot be changed by more than about five or ten degrees, if that.

This brings us to the main point. Why would Macedonian phalangites, armed with the perfect weapon for warding off cavalry formations and charioteers, wish to, or be ordered to, part ranks in order to create a lane for the enemy, who could now take them in the flank, where they are most vulnerable? Yet, this is exactly what many modern scholars think they did. For example, Burn observes that “[o]nly a few [sc. chariots] reached the main battle-line, where the Macedonians, with parade-ground precision, opened their ranks and let them through. The horses, swerving from the spear-points, tore harmlessly down the lanes opened, and were rounded up in rear.” Fuller is, at least, aware that such a maneuver requires training, although he assumes that the Macedonian phalanx pulled it off: “One would like to know what the drill was which enabled broad lanes to be rapidly formed; it must have been very simple, and discipline must have been of the highest.” Marsden, to his credit, stops short of describing a parting of the phalanx: “Darius launched his chariots against the foe, no less than a hundred of them being directed toward the Companions. Alexander’s arrangements for their reception proved satisfactory, little or no damage was done, and this episode is of no importance except insofar as it shows the good results obtained by Alexander’s attention to detail.”

Before we examine this in closer detail, it is necessary to consider the accounts of Diodorus and Curtius Rufus, which appear to support the view that the sarissa-bearing phalanx parted to let the chariots through. Curtius (4.15.3–5), in the first of two passages, writes:

Before him Darius kept his scythed chariots which, on a signal, he released en masse against the enemy. The charioteers charged at full speed in order to increase the Macedonian casualties by taking them by surprise, and as a result some were killed by the spears that projected well beyond the chariot poles and others dismembered by the scythes set on either side. It was no gradual withdrawal that the Macedonians made but a disordered flight, breaking their ranks. Mazaeus struck further panic into them in
their consternation by ordering 1,000 cavalry to ride around and plunder the enemy’s baggage camp . . . .

The exact timing and the position of the scythed chariots on the battlefield is not clear, but the reference to Mazaeus implies that this action occurred on the Persian right and was thus not identical with the action on the Persian center-left described by Arrian. Curtius (4.15.14–17) picks up the account of the chariots’ progress:

Meanwhile, after causing havoc in Alexander’s front lines, the chariots now charged the phalanx, and the Macedonians received the charge with a firm resolve, permitting them to penetrate to the middle of the column. Their formation resembled a rampart; after creating an unbroken line of spears, they stabbed the flanks of the horses from both sides as they charged recklessly ahead. Then they began to surround the chariots and to throw the fighters out of them. Horses and charioteers fell in huge numbers, covering the battlefield. The charioteers could not control the terrified animals which, frequently tossing their necks, had not only thrown off their yokes but also overturned the chariots, and wounded horses were trying to drag along dead ones, unable to stay in one place in their panic and yet too weak to go forward. Even so a few chariots escaped to the back line, inflicting a pitiful death on those they encountered. The ground was littered with the severed limbs of soldiers and, as there was no pain while the wounds were still warm, the men did not in fact drop their weapons, despite the mutilation and their weakness, until they dropped dead from loss of blood.

Curtius’ account of the parting of the phalanx is not without its problems. It paints a picture of the foremost ranks of the phalanx parting to form a lane, while those farther back do not part but level their sarissas to face the chariots head-on. The sides of the ranks that have parted make a left and right turn respectively and lower their sarissas, which they use to stab the horses in the flank, as the chariots are now hemmed in on three sides. This would be a highly difficult maneuver, and would take time and special training to execute. But, even if there were time for so intricate a maneuver, one wonders how the phalanx could create a gap so wide that there was room for the onrushing chariots and twelve feet of projecting sarissas to their left and right. Because the ends of the sarissas (with their buttspikes) project six feet to the rear, it is virtually impossible to deploy the phalanx in such a way that some of the troops were placed at right angles to the others—unless the phalangites in the front held their sarissas upright,
in which case they would be helpless to defend themselves against the troops opposite them. But, most important, it is entirely unnecessary, since it would have been far more effective not to have created an opening (or a number of openings) in the phalanx in the first place.\textsuperscript{10}

A similar description of events is found in Diodorus (17.58.2–5):

First the scythed chariots swung into action at full gallop and created great alarm and terror among the Macedonians, especially since Mazaeus in command of the cavalry made their attack more frightening by supporting it with his dense squadrons of horse. As the phalanx joined shields, however, all beat upon their shields with their sarissas, as the king had commanded, and a great din arose. As the horses shied off, most of the chariots were turned about and bore hard with irresistible impact against their own ranks. Others continued on against the Macedonian lines, but as the soldiers opened wide gaps in their ranks the chariots were channelled through these. In some instances the horses were killed by javelin casts and in others they rode through and escaped, but some of them, using the full force of their momentum and applying their steel blades actively, wrought death among the Macedonians in many and various forms. Such was the keenness and the force of the scythes ingeniously contrived to do harm that they severed the arms of many, shields and all, and in no small number of cases they cut through necks and sent heads tumbling to the ground with the eyes still open and the expression of the countenance unchanged, and in other cases they sliced through ribs with mortal gashes and inflicted a quick death.\textsuperscript{11}

Diodorus’ account confirms that the common primary source—Cleitarchus or an intermediary—was describing action on the Macedonian left, that is, the Persian right, where Mazaeus led the charge against the forces under the command of Parmenion.\textsuperscript{12} Hence, whatever is going on in Diodorus and Curtius, it has nothing to do with the action at the beginning of the battle described by Arrian 3.13.5–6. It is important to reiterate that we are not dealing with two different descriptions of the same event, but rather two different episodes in the battle of Gaugamela.\textsuperscript{13} The account given in the popular Alexander tradition\textsuperscript{14} actually helps to demonstrate the problems associated with phalanx (\textit{viz.} sarissa) warfare, especially when phalangites are confronted by charioteers.

Arrian speaks of an attack on the Macedonian right, intended to disrupt the mobile troops who are moving toward the broken
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Arrian</th>
<th>Curtius</th>
<th>Diodorus</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack launched against the Macedonian right</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alexander placed the Agrianians and javelin-men in front of the Companion Cavalry to meet the scythed chariots; Arrian specifies only light-armed troops, archers, <em>hypaspistai basilikoi</em> and <em>hippokomoi</em> (grooms).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack launched against the Macedonian left</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Curtius mentions cavalry support by Mazaeus, who is stationed on the Persian right; Atkinson, 1980: 437 <em>ad 4.15.2</em>, thinks that <em>in laevum Alexandri cornu</em> is a “careless mistake” for <em>in dextrum . . . cornu</em>. Diodorus mentions troops with <em>sarissas</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians unscathed by the scythed chariots</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Similar to Xenophon’s account of Cunaxa. Did Arrian model his account on Xenophon? Or did Callisthenes do so?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops make noise to frighten the Persian horses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Similar to Xenophon’s account of Cunaxa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians form alleys for the chariots to pass through</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Also found in Xenophon’s account of Cunaxa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses are attacked from the sides</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>In Arrian’s version they are surrounded by light-armed troops; in Curtius they are confronted by spears from both sides, and apparently from the front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonian infantrymen suffer heavy and gruesome casualties</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>An early account of the perils of scythed chariots appears to have influenced Lucretius; whether this was an Alexander historian, Polybius, or some other source is hard to tell.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ground and attempting to prevent encirclement by the barbarian horsemen. Although Arrian speaks of disrupting the phalanx (3.11.6: ὡς ἀναταράξοντες αὐτῷ τὴν φάλαγγα), there are no phalangites positioned at this point in the line. Diodorus and Curtius are clearly describing events on the Macedonian left, where the chariots are supported by the cavalry of Mazaeus. (Curtius, however, seems to have assigned Bessus to the wrong wing, or his account suffers from conflation of his source material.) The chariot attack on the Macedonian left must have exploited the gap in the phalanx (Diodorus mentions their sarissas, a word that is relatively rare: it occurs only in five other places in Book 17, and once in Book 18) created by the disconnection between the units of Meleager and Simmias [Philip son of Balakros]. In this case, the Macedonians who panicked and were chopped up by the chariot blades were those on the newly created and exposed flanks (on Meleager’s left and Simmias’ right). Since chariots were stationed on the Persian right (fifty scythe-bearing), in the center (fifty more not scythe-bearing), and on the Persian left (one hundred scythe-bearing), it is conceivable—in fact, highly likely—that the two traditions describe separate engagements, but that the forming of “lanes” occurred accidentally on the Macedonian left and deliberately on the Macedonian right (where the maneuver was executed by light armed troops). Diodorus and Curtius followed the account of a historian who was familiar with Xenophon’s description of the parting of the infantry at Cunaxa (even though Xenophon does not specify the nature of the troops involved) and ignorant of the difficulties that sarissophoroi (sarissa bearers) would have encountered when attempting such a procedure. On the other hand, the action on the Macedonian left, and Mazaeus’ skilful use of the scythed chariots to exploit the gap created in the surging phalanx, demonstrate that the war chariot (which by now had become a splendid anachronism in ancient warfare) could still have its uses.
This page intentionally left blank
PART III

After Philip and Alexander

Legacy and Legitimation
Cassander and the Legacy of Philip II and Alexander III in Diodorus’ *Library*

Franca Landucci Gattinoni

In Books 18 and 19 of his *Library*, Diodorus devotes considerable space to the so-called Second War of the Diadochoi fought by Polyperchon and Eumenes against the broad coalition of Cassander, Antigonus, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Seleucus. The war also involved Alexander the Great’s heirs against their will: in effect, both Alexander’s half-brother, Philip III Arrhidaeus, and his own posthumous son, Alexander IV, were crushed by the events, as was Olympias, Alexander’s mother, who, having survived her son and Antipater, her most hated enemy, allied with Polyperchon against Cassander. As known, in October 317 Olympias, who wished to safeguard the kingdom for her young grandson, Alexander IV, killed king Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Adea Eurydice a few months later. Albeit reaching Macedonia too late to save the Argead rulers, Cassander defeated and killed Olympias, becoming de facto the master of the territory.

At 19.52.1–6, Diodorus describes the measures Cassander took to sanction his definitive seizure of Macedonia after his three-year exile. The narration of events aside, he lays particular emphasis upon Cassander’s wish to appropriate Macedonian sovereignty and conveys the point at linguistic level by the frequent and repetitive use of terms connected with the semantic field of “sovereignty.”

More specifically, as early as 19.52.1, we read not only that “Cassander’s ambitions included the kingdom of Macedonia” (τὴν Ἱππεαὶς), but also that he decided to marry Thessalonice, daughter of Philip II, because he was “eager to appear as a relative to the royal house” (οἰκεῖον τῆς βασιλικῆς συγγενείας). Later, at 19.52.4, speaking of the young Alexander IV and of his mother, the Persian princess Roxane, Diodorus tries to prove that Cassander’s conduct aimed at “preventing the existence of successors in the kingdom” (διάδοχος τῆς βασιλείας): to this purpose, he had decreed that the young Argead was to be given “no royal education (τὴν ἀγωγὴν οὐκέτι βασιλικήν) but a common man’s.” Finally, at 19.52.5 the historian reports that Cassander “behaving as a king (βασιλικῶς) had had
Eurydice and Philip, the sovereign couple (βασιλεῖς), buried in Aigai according to the royal custom (καθάπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς βασιλεῖσι).”

Thus, according to Diodorus, Cassander’s “hunt” for power in Macedonia, previously exercised by Alexander, follows three steps, which are closely intertwined in the text under examination: (a) the marriage with Thessalonice, daughter of Philip II; (b) the marginalization of Alexander IV; and (c) the royal obsequies granted to Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Eurydice.

More specifically, Diodorus expressly underlines that Cassander’s choice of Thessalonice as a wife was due to the fact that she was related to Philip II. As is well known, Thessalonice was born from the marriage of Philip to the Thessalian Nicesipolis,7 who had herself been tied by kinship to the powerful family of the tyrants of Pherae. (Nicesipolis died twenty days after giving birth.)8 The key role played by this marriage in Cassander’s plan is also proved a fortiori by his decision to turn his wife into the eponym of the city of Thessalonica.9 Her descent from Philip II could in effect help channel toward Cassander those persistent feelings of nostalgia, devotion, and respect for the man all Macedonians considered the founder of their powerful kingdom.10

The fact that the relationship between Cassander and Thessalonice revolved around the figure of Philip II is also confirmed by their first-born son’s name: in effect, he had not his paternal grandfather’s name, Antipater (as in genuine Greek-Macedonian tradition), but his maternal grandfather’s name, Philip, almost as if to prove that Antipater’s clan wanted to reestablish, in an ideal continuum, the genuine Argead lineage whose “Macedonian-ness” had been temporarily marred by Alexander’s Persian marriage. From this same perspective, Cassander’s direct continuity with Philip II was emphasized also by the funeral ceremonies he held to honor Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Eurydice, which were characterized by “funeral games,” typical of royal obsequies in Macedonian tradition. According to Diodorus,11 even Alexander himself on the point of dying had prefigured the “funeral games,” or epitaphios agōn, that his heirs were to hold at his own funeral.12

The funerals for Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Eurydice are mentioned also by Diyllus,13 who confirms Diodorus’ notion of the “royal” nature of the burial ceremony for the sovereigns. This, in turn, brings us back to the long-standing debate on the identification of those buried in the three royal tombs under the so-called Great Tumulus of Vergina-Aigai unearthed by Manolis Andronicos14 in the 1970s.15

As observed by Carney16 ten years ago, “no consensus on the individual identities of those buried under the Great Tumulus has developed,
although most scholars would now identify the occupant of Tomb III as Alexander IV. Enduring controversy, however, surrounds the identity of the man and woman buried in Tomb II. Within a few weeks of the discovery of the tomb, Andronicos asserted that the male was Philip II. Many scholars have accepted his assertion, but many others have rejected it, convinced that the man in Tomb II was his obscure and mentally limited son, Philip Arrhidaeus.” Most recently, Borza and Palagia have maintained that “the burial in Tomb III is that of Alexander IV: the forensic evidence is clear about that burial. The evidence for the double burial in Tomb II strongly suggests a date in the last quarter of the fourth century: the deceased are Philip III Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice. Thus, if we accept that this is the royal Macedonian necropolis of the last Argeadai, the process of elimination—plus the evidence of the human remains found therein—dictates that the small cist tomb is the resting place of Philip II, his wife Cleopatra, and their infant. In the nearly three decades that have elapsed since the commencement of the excavations of the royal necropolis at Vergina no credible new argument has been offered to support the identification of Philip II as the occupant of Tomb II at Vergina.”

Yet, the hypothesis that identifies the dead in Tomb II as Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Eurydice has been challenged by an objection that, as I have already said elsewhere, is not without foundation, and thus deserves careful investigation. More specifically, some scholars think that, if Tomb II preserved the two sovereigns eliminated by Olympias in 317 and buried therein by Cassander, it should also preserve the remains of Cynna, daughter of Philip II and mother of Eurydice, previously killed in Asia by Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas, in order to prevent her daughter’s marriage with Philip III Arrhidaeus. They are of this opinion because in the description of the funeral of the two sovereigns Diodorus explicitly states that Cassander “buried (ἐθάψεν) also Cynna with them, according to the royal custom (καθάπερ ἦν ἔθος τοῖς βασιλεῦσι).”

However, since in Tomb II only two gold funerary larnakes were found (and there was no trace of a third cinerary urn), the lack of Cynna’s ashes seems to preclude the possibility of identifying this tomb as Philip III Arrhidaeus’, so much so that those still siding with this theory either ignore or underestimate the issue, generally merely commenting (rather disingenuously) that Cynna must have been buried elsewhere.

As a matter of fact, it is true, as maintained by Adams, that Diodorus’s passage must not be interpreted as a sure indication of a joint burial for these three historical figures honored by Cassander; however, it is also true that the same passage at least implies the
existence of a nearby burial site for Eurydice’s mother, whose status, as Philip II’s daughter, made her worthy of resting in the area of the Great Tumulus, that is, in a burial area reserved for the last representatives of the Temenid dynasty.

In my view, a possible solution to this debate lies in a brief note drafted by Andronicos along with the description of the excavation campaigns carried out at the Great Tumulus of Vergina from 1976 to 1980. In effect, Andronicos writes that in the summer of 1980, about thirty meters to the east of Tomb II, another “Macedonian tomb” was excavated, which, unlike similar tombs, had freestanding columns on its façade, the sole remains of the original monument (the rest having been dismantled and transferred, perhaps to be used elsewhere, in circumstances to us unknown). This tomb, then, about chamber and antechamber of which no further details are available, could be the resting site for Cynna’s mortal remains, buried with all honors near the richer and more important tomb of her son-in-law Philip III Arrhidaeus and of her daughter Eurydice. Cynna was indeed part of the royal family, although hierarchically subordinate to Philip III Arrhidaeus and Eurydice, who had officially been the king and queen (βασιλεῖς) of Macedonia and were therefore worthy of royal burial as prescribed by tradition.

In the light of these observations, it is clear that for Cassander both his marriage with Thessalonice and the celebration of royal funerals for Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Eurydice were part of a strategy aimed at presenting himself as Philip II’s spiritual heir, as conveyed by Diodorus at 19.52.1–6. Furthermore, in the same passage, the historian also mentions Cassander’s marginalization of the young Alexander IV, whose mother, the Persian princess Roxane, was the living symbol of the “betrayal” of Macedonian customs on the part of Alexander. In Cassander’s view, the banishment of the boy and of his mother to Amphipolis was intended to reaffirm his stand against that process of “orientalization” of the monarchy initiated by Alexander in the last years of his reign and opposed by the more traditionalist Macedonians. Most interestingly, according to Diodorus, Cassander, despite wishing to eliminate Alexander IV, initially limited his action against mother and son to removing their royal trappings, fearing the reaction of the people, whose feelings of loyalty to the monarchic tradition had already been strained by the elimination of Olympias.

Soon the Macedonian world would, however, change significantly, reaching a turning point in the 311 peace, whose signatories, Antigonus on the one hand, and Lysimachus, Cassander, and Ptolemy on the other, officially, and for the first time, asserted their total political autonomy. Until then, in effect, internal struggles to gain control of Alexander’s
legacy had been “conspiracies” (κοινοπραγίαι), designed to eliminate, even physically, dangerous opponents. In 311, the joint signing of the treaty legitimized de facto all counterparts.³⁰

According to Diodorus, in the clauses of the peace treaty “it was provided that Cassander be general of Europe until Alexander, Roxane’s son, would come of age; that Lysimachus rule Thrace, and that Ptolemy rule Egypt and the cities adjacent thereto in Libya and Arabia; that Antigonus have first place in all Asia, and that the Greeks be autonomous.”³¹ To Cassander, as “general of Europe” (στρατηγὸς τῆς ᾿Εὐρώπης), was granted the right to intervene politically and militarily not only in Macedonia but also in Greece, as his father had done while Alexander was away (in absentia Alexandri),³² however, the tacit removal of that “guardianship” (ἐπιέλεια) of the kingdom that Eurydice, wife of Philip III Arrhidaeus, hadentrusted to Cassander just before falling prey to the fury of Olympias,³³ ruled out any right of intervention (for Cassander himself) in the spheres of influence of the other signatories to the peace (a right which he never even claimed anyway). As a matter of fact, the territories assigned to the Diadochoi still belonged, at least formally, to a sole “kingdom” (βασιλεία) and still belonged in theory to the young Alexander IV, who was quickly approaching adulthood, a fact that, as suggested by Diodorus, could endanger the position of the Diadochoi.³⁴

On this subject, I think Goukowsky³⁵ is right in underlining that Cassander was in a more delicate position than the others: Alexander’s quest to reappropriate power would be easy in Macedonia, where the young king could count on longtime loyalty to the Argead dynasty. By contrast, merely nominal sovereignty would be more than sufficient to him in the other, distant territories of his father’s empire.

According to Diodorus,³⁶ Cassander was so afraid of losing his power, a fear fomented by anonymous rumors that spread in Macedonia in support of the dynastic rights of Alexander IV, that he was led to eliminate the young sovereign and his mother Roxane, who had long been confined to Amphipolis. In the literary tradition, the murder of Alexander IV is intertwined with the killing of Heracles, the self-proclaimed son of Alexander the Great and Barsine, and the two events are considered almost contemporary by the sources.³⁷ Heracles is mentioned by Diodorus in two chapters (20.20 and 28). After recounting the signing of the peace treaty and the elimination of Alexander IV, and “returning” to Greek matters, he reports at 20.20.1–2 that Polyperchon, after long isolation in the Peloponnese and harboring persistent resentment against Cassander, sent for the seventeen-year-old Heracles from Pergamum in order to promote him as a pretender to the throne of his Macedonian ancestors.³⁸
Later, at 20.28.1–3, Diodorus suggests that, fearing Macedonian loyalty toward the Argeads, Cassander induced Polyperchon to put Heracles to death by reassuring the old general that, should he eliminate the young prince, he would not only remain “general” (στρατηγός) of the Peloponnese, but also regain all the “grants” (δωρεαί) that he had received in Macedonia from Philip II and Antipater, which Cassander had confiscated as he had assumed control over his native land.

The fact that Diodorus dates Alexander IV’s death to the Attic year 311/10 (archon: Simonides) and sets the story of Heracles in the years 310/09 and 309/08 (archons: Hieromnemon and Demetrius of Phalerum, respectively), and the fact that the Parian Marble sets the death of Alexander’s two sons in the Attic year 310/09 (archon: Hieromnemon) confirms not only substantial chronological proximity between the two homicides, but also the fact that the news of Alexander IV’s death rapidly spread across the Greek world, this being the sole circumstance that might justify the sudden rise to prominence of Barsine’s son.

This notion of such a rapid spreading of the news of Alexander IV’s death appears, however, to contradict an explicit assertion by Diodorus, reechoed in Justin, according to which Cassander, perhaps fearing possible hostile popular reactions, tried to hide the news of the elimination of the young prince and of his mother, and to this end had them buried secretly. In my view, the aporia may be solved assuming that even though Cassander managed to avoid announcing the deaths of Alexander IV and his mother by ordering a secret burial, he did not succeed in suppressing the rumors that quickly propagated all across the Greek world from Amphipolis, where mother and son had been murdered, and which in turn prompted Polyperchon to “invent” Heracles as another son of Alexander the Great.

In turn, the historiographical indication of a secret burial for Alexander the Great’s legitimate son sharply clashes with the modern hypothesis that identifies Cassander as the man behind the construction of Tomb III at the Great Tumulus of Vergina. In this respect, it must be acknowledged from the first that Tomb III is, in effect, unanimously considered to be Alexander IV’s funeral monument, because it contained a silver hydria with the remains of a fourteen-year-old male compatible with Roxane’s child. Moreover, further indication that the purpose of Tomb III was in effect to proclaim Alexander IV’s death may be found in the majesty of its vault, which preserved not only a corpse but also rich funeral outfits; in the application of seals to its door; in the tumulus mound raised above the tomb; and in the fact that it was built beside other
two imposing royal tombs at Aigai, the traditional Argead burial site.

In a recent examination of the issues connected with Tomb III of the Great Tumulus, Adams takes the following three points for granted:

1. Tomb III is Alexander IV’s burial site.
2. Cassander was the man behind Alexander’s burial ceremony.
3. Alexander IV’s burial neither was, nor can be considered, secret.

Accordingly, Adams also acknowledges that Tomb III contradicts those passages in Diodorus and Justin that allude to Cassander’s secrecy in hiding the young prince’s corpse and that of his mother. From these premises, and despite finding no confirmation in the sources, Adams further suggests that Alexander IV was secretly buried shortly after his murder, as in this way Cassander hoped to succeed in covering up the action he himself had ordered. Moreover, he maintains that some years later, in any case before 306/5 (considered the first year of Seleucus I’s rule, after the end of Alexander IV’s reign, in the fragmentary Babylonian Chronicle), Cassander had to declare the death of the young prince officially, perhaps also under the pressure of public opinion already unofficially informed on the event. In Adams’ opinion, Cassander arranged a full-honor burial ceremony for Alexander IV’s remains for that occasion and so constructed Tomb III.

Although archaeologically plausible (Tomb III is slightly more recent than Tomb II and can be dated about the end of the fourth century), Adams’s reconstruction seems to me to be not only completely bereft of historiographic evidence, but also scarcely supported by convincing historical arguments. In effect, in the last years of the fourth century, Cassander had to confront massive political and military aggression carried out by Demetrius Poliorcetes, whose maneuvers culminated in the refoundation of the League of Corinth in accordance with which all Greek cities were to ally against Cassander in a Panhellenic crusade. In this context, any official act regarding Alexander IV’s death would have proven counterproductive, as it would have given a massive fillip to the impressive Antigonid propaganda machine. In all probability this was already disseminating anti-Cassander rumors and it was undoubtedly intent on denying legitimacy to his rule in Macedonia along the lines sponsored by Monophthalmus in the so-called Tyre proclamation in 315. In the light of this, I believe that the identification of Cassander as the man behind the building of Tomb III becomes highly questionable, as
in that case he would appear to have taken no heed of those minimum conditions of appropriateness and opportunity of which an accomplished politician, as Cassander was, had to be aware after a twenty-year struggle for power.

This, however, brings us back to the issue of the identity of the “maker” of Tomb III. As has been said, archaeological evidence dates the tomb about the end of the fourth century, thus limiting the spectrum of search to those historical figures that were (by law or de facto) in a position to arrange official burial ceremonies for the last representative of the Argeads in Macedonia between 310 and 290.

To shed further light on the issue, it must be remembered that in cases of murder, such as that of Alexander IV, the Macedonian ethos, still Homeric in nature, obliged the legitimate heir of the dead to satisfy two obligations, namely to take revenge on the murderers and to arrange full-honor funerals for the victim. \[^{50}\] To mention a few pertinent examples, Achilles avenged Patroclus and celebrated his obsequies; \[^{51}\] at his accession to the throne in 336, the twenty-year-old Alexander killed his father’s murderers and celebrated his funeral; \[^{52}\] on his part, at his accession to power in Macedonia, Cassander laid accusations against Olympias and executed her as the murderer of Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Eurydice, \[^{53}\] arranging solemn funerals for the two sovereigns.

From these premises, then, in my opinion, the man behind the construction of the tomb for Alexander IV ought to have been the same person that, in the first decade of the third century, (successfully) asked the Macedonian army assembly to proclaim him king of Macedonia, listing among his merits the fact that he had avenged the disappearance of Alexander the Great’s family by murdering Cassander’s sons, who thus expiated their father’s guilt. This is Demetrius Poliorcetes who, taking advantage of the fratricidal struggles that overwhelmed Cassander’s family after his death in 297, seized the Macedonian throne while emphasizing the illegitimacy of Cassander’s sons’ claims, not because of their personal faults, but because of their father’s misdeeds. \[^{54}\]

From this perspective, it can be assumed that by performing solemn obsequies to honor Alexander IV, the last representative of the age-old dynasty of the Argeads, Poliorcetes, once stably in power, aimed at further legitimizing his actions against the Antipatrids: the impressive vaulted tomb built for Alexander IV in close proximity to those of his ancestors, the rich outfit it preserved as sign and seal of his royal lineage, as well as the mound perpetually preserving the tomb and its precious contents, are all elements that not only marked, per differentiam, Cassander’s unworthy denial of honors to the young
prince, but also conveyed Poliorcetes’ wish to draw ideal continuity between himself and the Temenids, whose memory was one of the founding factors of Macedonian national identity.

Thus, by a twist of fate, Cassander and Demetrius Poliorcetes, despite being harsh enemies, both wished to present themselves to the Macedonians as the heirs of the Argeads. Through his marriage with Thessalonice and the funeral honors granted to Philip III Arrhidaeus, Cassander privileged his ties with Philip II, the “architect” of Macedonian power in the Aegean; Demetrius, instead, by assuming the role of the “avenger” against the Antipatrids, i.e., against those who, in the figure of Cassander, had succeeded in eliminating Alexander IV, Alexander the Great’s only legitimate son, drew continuity between himself and the ecumenical legacy of the latter, the king who had extended the boundaries of the Macedonian kingdom well beyond the Greek borders to encompass the entirety of the Persian Empire.
The Role of the Argeadai in the Legitimation of the Ptolemaic Dynasty
Rhetoric and Practice

Margarita Lianou

The dynasty of the Ptolemies proved the most enduring of all the royal houses that emerged after the death of Alexander the Great. In this respect, it was the most successful. However, the enduring presence of Ptolemaic Egypt as a political unit in the power map of the Hellenistic world was the result of factors that went beyond the cohesion of its dynastic organization. As a matter of fact, the very weaknesses of that organization contributed to the destabilization of the broader system of the Hellenistic world and allowed the Romans to intervene in it as early as the close of the third century B.C. The struggle for power and succession among competing dynastic groups endemic to all monarchic states was exacerbated by the self-serving practices of the Romans, which played potential candidates for succession off against their rivals. The kingdom was eventually weakened to such an extent that it was finally incorporated into the provinces of the Roman Empire.

In spite of the fact that similar instability had already characterized succession in the hereditary dynastic monarchy of Argead Macedonia, this still constituted the most recognizable paradigm of government for the generals who partitioned the Empire after the death of Alexander. Every single one from this new generation of state-builders ventured to establish their own dynastic monarchy with varying degrees of success. The urgent circumstances, though, that brought about their assumption of satrapal power, followed by the endorsement of a royal title, entailed a radical break from the established royal Macedonian tradition. None of these military men, who became kings over portions of Alexander’s former empire, were rightful members of the Argead dynasty. The monarchy was a central institution in Macedonia and the dynasty was the center of that monarchy. In almost four hundred years of recorded Macedonian history, up
until the reign of Alexander IV, the king had belonged to the Argead royal house. It was very seldom that outsiders contended for the throne and even then, their dissociation from the Argead dynasty cannot be unequivocally proven. As usurpers, the newly-established Hellenistic rulers were obliged to construct their dynastic legitimacy ex nihilo before an audience of disparate groups whose support was critical. Ptolemaic rulers in particular had to approach not only the Hellenic-Macedonian immigrants that made up the king’s household, his court, the highest ranks of the army, and the majority of the population in Alexandria, but also the Egyptian population, accessible mainly through its priestly class. In addition, the recognition and acceptance of Ptolemaic dynastic rule over Egypt as legitimate by the peer-kingdoms was indispensable for maintaining the status quo in the wider international community.

Legitimacy can generally be described as a formula by which individuals accept a power and view their obedience to it as a just commitment. Rather than being an abstract quality that a state either possesses or not, legitimacy (or rather the process of legitimation) is an observable activity in which empowered groups make claims regarding their right to rule. The strategies employed in early Ptolemaic Egypt for legitimating rule and securing the support of subjects and peers were varied, but modern scholars tend to view some as more influential than others. On the one hand, Gruen believes that legitimacy rested with the personal achievements of the individual kings. Austin, on the other hand, argues that the consolidation of kingship and its legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects depended on military success and the associated economic rewards. It was the parading of booty and the promise of more that attracted soldiers to the sides of the Hellenistic monarchs. Bosworth voices another view: legitimacy and support were essentially maintained by the constant practice of euergesiai. Failure to reward the loyalty of subjects would ultimately have a detrimental effect on the ruler’s popularity. Notwithstanding the importance of immediate benefits in a ruler-ruled relationship and the favorable or unfavorable reputation individual rulers could accrue as a result of their personal charisma, military success, or benefactions, legitimation is also the outcome of more deeply-seated processes that relate to what the audience (domestic and international) perceive as constituting the right of a king to rule. Adherence to traditional norms as a legitimating claim is in line with Weber’s theory of the bases of legitimate authority, whereby the person occupying a traditionally sanctioned position commands the obedience of subjects who believe in the validity of age-old rules. In the Hellenistic context, students of the literature
and art of the period have recognized a conscious effort on the part of the rulers to manipulate those media in order to project a self-constructed persona that would help cement the acceptance of their subjects.\textsuperscript{16} This rhetoric aimed not only at legitimating the current king but extended the honors to his family, successors, and ancestors.\textsuperscript{17} The representation of a strong dynasty, rooted in both Egyptian and Hellenic-Macedonian tradition, was a recurring theme in royal propaganda. As suggested by their titulature and the Pharaonic visual vocabulary in their portraits, the Ptolemies aspired to be accepted by their Egyptian subjects as the legitimate successors of the Pharaohs.\textsuperscript{18} For their Hellenic-Macedonian subjects and the rival Hellenistic kingdoms, links with the Hellenic and Argead past appear to have mattered in claims for legitimation.

This paper aims to explore the use and importance of Argead references in early Ptolemaic claims for dynastic legitimation. Particularly relevant in this context are the associations with Alexander and the construction of genealogies. Both involve the making of dynastic claims through the exploitation of recognizable symbols. Further, this article will examine the practical role of the Argead dynasty as a model for early Ptolemaic dynastic organization. By dynastic organization we will refer to the organization of dynastic marriages and their significance for the legitimation of the ruler’s position. It will be argued that although the figure of Alexander was and has been treated as the catalytic source of inspiration for the dynastic legitimation of Ptolemaic rule, it was not the only one. The early Ptolemies looked further back into their Argead past, not only for bolstering their own dynastic significance vis-à-vis their antagonists but also for drawing paradigms for their dynastic organization.

\textbf{Alexander}

It is the \textit{communis opinio} of ancient and modern scholarship that the dynastic legitimacy of the Diadochs stemmed from the manipulation of their association with Alexander. Such claims were made on the basis of their personal closeness to the King during his lifetime or by their imitation of his behavior and regalia posthumously.\textsuperscript{19} The strength of Alexander’s legitimating power in non-Macedonian territory, like Egypt, rested primarily on two grounds: Alexander provided the new foreign ruling elite with a link to its Hellenic-Macedonian past, but most importantly he furnished ties with the land itself. As the territory was won by Alexander’s spear, Ptolemy I had to devise ways according to which he could claim to be Alexander’s legitimate
Successor. Additionally, as the Hellenic-Macedonian immigrants of Alexandria, most of whom had either served under him as soldiers, or were familiar with his career, constituted the primary audience for Ptolemy’s legitimating claims, he could not afford to disregard their expectations regarding his right to rule.20

Alexander penetrated the everyday lives of the ordinary citizens of Alexandria from early on. To begin with, a founder cult in honor of Alexander as Κτίστης (the Founder) was inaugurated in Alexandria possibly even during Alexander’s lifetime and persisted until well into the Christian era.21 Distinct from the state cult instituted by Ptolemy I around the turn of the fourth century B.C.,22 the founder cult in Alexandria seems to have echoed the traditions of founder worship that were a typical feature of Hellenic colonial foundations. The founder cult was very closely integrated with the formation of the civic identity of new settlements. It provided a common “past” for the new city of which Alexander, as the founder, was to hold center place.23 If one accepts Pseudo-Callisthenes, Alexander was worshipped as Κτίστης in especially dedicated sanctuaries but also in a household environment.24 The cult legend of the foundation of Alexandria is important in this context as it provides the setting through which Alexander’s presence penetrated the domestic cultic life of the Alexandrians. According to the legend, after the slaying of the great serpent Agathos Daimon (“Good Fortune/Spirit”) that appeared during the foundation of the city, Alexander built a shrine to commemorate his feat. Out of the shrine doors, however, there emerged myriads of other serpents which each found their way into the newly-built houses of the Alexandrians. The soothsayers present decreed that these should be worshipped as good spirits (ἀγαθοὶ δαίμονες).25 Through this association with Agathos Daimon, the figure of Alexander became intertwined with the good fortune and spirit of the city and as such assumed duties of protection. According to the description of Ammianus Marcellinus, the temple to the Agathos Daimon in Alexandria was still standing at the crossroads of the two main avenues of the city in the fourth century A.D. This same account testifies that even at this late date the Alexandrians were very protective toward it.26 In addition, the large number of statuettes representing Alexander wearing the aegis (the so-called Alexander Aigiochos type) recovered from Alexandria, Ptolemais, and elsewhere in the Egyptian chora, and which date from throughout the Hellenic-Roman period, seem to support the possibility that a domestic cult of Alexander as the founder of Alexandria was prominent.27 Although this view has been challenged by Stewart, who favors a dynastic cult context for these statuettes as opposed to a domestic one, their small
size and the snake-fringed aegis that covers the torso of Alexander, as well as other serpentine details, cannot preclude a more generalized domestic worship of Alexander associated with good fortune.\(^{28}\)

Ptolemy I was quick to realize the dynamics of Alexander’s potential for legitimating his rule and equally keen to exploit the attraction he held for the Hellenic-Macedonian public. Alexander’s posthumous presence in Egypt was not limited to the abstract memory of his achievements and to his worship in domestic or state cults, all-pervasive as they might have been.\(^{29}\) The early Ptolemies made sure that visual prompts of their association as rulers with the conqueror of Egypt were in constant supply. A study of the extant portraits of Alexander from the early Ptolemaic period reveals that his image was institutionalized to an unprecedented degree in comparison to the rest of the Successor Kingdoms.\(^{30}\) It also figured on early Ptolemaic coinage, the primary function of which “is to record the messages which the [ruler] and his advisers desired to commend to the populations [under their control].”\(^{31}\) Although the minting of particular coin types can be attributed to commemorative and honorific purposes alongside propagandistic ones, a conscious thought process is invariably involved in the choice of symbols to be portrayed on the coinage of a political unit.\(^{32}\) Ptolemy I was the first of the Successors to mint coins bearing the portrait of Alexander and the first to tweak the iconography of the standard Alexander-type tetradrachms into a uniquely Ptolemaic variety.\(^{33}\) Although remarkably similar to the idealized head of the youthful Heracles with the lion-skin on Alexander’s lifetime issues, the young man depicted on the new Ptolemaic Alexanders wore an elephant headdress: a distinct historical allusion to Alexander’s conquest of India. The Alexanders remained in circulation until the need to pay for mercenary armies in recognizable, hence legitimate, currency subsided and Ptolemy felt secure enough in his newly-proclaimed royal position to mint coins bearing his portrait.\(^{34}\)

Once more, he was the first to supplant the image and legend of Alexander with his own. However, certain of the symbols Ptolemy chose to emphasize as significant (e.g., the Ptolemaic eagle) are encountered in earlier Argead issues, indicating a continuity in dynastic semiology that will be further elucidated below.

As far as visual prompts go, however, the most dramatic in providing a concrete reminder of the Ptolemies’ rightful claim to the throne was Alexander’s own body. Diverted from its funeral cortège, which was probably escorting it back to Aigai, it was finally put on prominent display in Alexandria where it stayed until at least the reign of Caracalla in the early third century A.D.\(^{35}\) Although not an absolute prerequisite for succession, it appears to have been the
custom in Macedonia, as well as in Pharaonic Egypt, for the legitimate successor to provide for the burial of his predecessor. In a magisterial act of propaganda Ptolemy thus singled himself out from the rest of the Successors of Alexander, as the guardian of the king’s body; an idea he further elaborated upon by instituting a cult with an eponymous priesthood in Alexander’s honor.

By the time of Philadelphus’ accession to the throne in 283 B.C. Alexander’s carefully constructed role as the predecessor of the Ptolemaic dynasty permeated public and domestic life in Alexandria, the center of the Hellenic-Macedonian experience in Egypt. The Ptolemies’ attempt to establish continuity as the legitimate heirs to Alexander’s Egypt, however, was not exhausted by Ptolemy I’s pioneering and persistent manipulation of the former’s image and cultic presence.

Argead Genealogies

Even if, as Diodorus mentions, a collective sigh of relief escaped the Successors when the last of the Argeadai was eliminated by Cassander, the old Macedonian dynasty still mattered as a legitimating vehicle. This section will examine the creation of dynastic links with the Argead dynasty as a whole by looking at the genealogical traditions put forward in the early Ptolemaic period.

If we accept the premise that power can stem from the control of ideological resources and that the rulers in a monarchic environment have the capacity to monopolize the choice of myths and symbols that they associate with themselves, then we can deduce that the royal genealogies that circulated in early Ptolemaic Egypt, especially within court literary circles, served the precise aim of advertising the legitimating agenda of the rulers to their subjects.

Walbank has argued that the Ptolemies did not press their Argead connections very far. In fact, however, the genealogical strands preserved in a number of accounts paint a different picture. In all of them, Ptolemy I is presented as having direct blood relations with the Argead kings. In what seems to be the most widely iterated version, Ptolemy I inherited this connection through his mother, Arsinoe. Satyrus, evidently a contemporary of Ptolemy IV, traced the patrilinear descent of Arsinoe directly through the various Macedonian Kings, all the way back to Heracles, the mythical founder of the Argeadai, and Dionysus. The Adulis inscription, dating to the reign of Ptolemy III, suggests that this link was first promulgated long before Satyrus.

Connections with the Argeadai were not only drawn in order to establish a common mythical ancestry. Another story, which was
invented most probably in the court circles of Ptolemy I, attempted to anchor Ptolemaic lineage directly on the mortal line of Argead kings by presenting him as the illegitimate son of Philip II. According to Pausanias and Curtius, our sources for the story, Ptolemy’s mother was a concubine of Philip II. Having become pregnant by him, she was married off to the obscure Lagus who bore the responsibility of raising the bastard son of the Macedonian king. The historicity of this claim has been discredited, but veracity is not what matters in this context. Instead, it is the illusion that the two houses, Argead and Ptolemaic, were tightly linked through blood that was promoted by the Ptolemies. Against this background, one can interpret the close association of Alexander and Ptolemy I’s statues in dynastic celebrations and central public buildings as promoting this fictional half-brother relationship. Examples of this association can be found in the no-doubt massively attended procession of the Ptolemaia, as well as in the dynastic sculptural group situated at the now lost Tychaion, which housed the inscribed plaques of the laws of Alexandria.

Without naming Philip as the father, Aelian preserves another relevant snippet of gossip, whereby Arsinoe gave birth to an illegitimate Ptolemy while she was married to Lagus. In this version, the latter did not bear his responsibility with dignity. Instead, he exposed the infant on a bronze shield to die. The child survived through the intervention of a male eagle, which sheltered it from the elements and fed it with his own blood. The currency of the eagle myth could find a possible parallel in the choice of the Ptolemaic eagle as a symbol for the Ptolemaic dynasty. It is interesting to note how both stories about the illegitimate birth (with Philip as the only named father candidate) and the descent from Heracles (as the son of Zeus) can be seen as coming together in the Ptolemaic eagle; arguably the most recognizable symbol of the Ptolemaic dynasty.

As hinted at above, Ptolemy I’s choice of coin iconography was not wholly innovative. He made use of traditional themes that already existed on Argead coinage, and which communicated the earthly power and divine connections of the kings. The staple of Ptolemaic coin iconography, the eagle, first appeared on the coinage of Archelaus. Closer to the “Ptolemaic eagle” type with its closed wings, standing on Zeus’ thunderbolt, was the “eagle” coinage of Amyntas III, Perdikkas III, and, later on, Alexander III. Although the eagle does not figure on coins of Philip II, Zeus’ iconic symbol, the thunderbolt, occurs frequently. The laureate head of the king of the gods was another very common image on Ptolemaic coins, while the portrait of the Ptolemaic king frequently depicted him wearing Zeus’ aegis. Zeus was introduced on Macedonian coinage on Philip’s silver tetradrachms
around the middle of the fourth century B.C. Since he was the father of Makedon, the eponymous ancestor of the Macedonians, the cult of Zeus carried special significance for the Macedonians. The genealogical rhetoric of the Ptolemies, as revealed by Theocritus’ encomium to Ptolemy II, implies that behind the popularity of Zeus and his attributes on Ptolemaic coinage lay a Ptolemaic claim of descent from the same god who had fathered Alexander: “From Zeus let us begin and, Muses, cease with Zeus.” Although we will never know with certainty the references behind the choice of any of the symbols examined, it is worth considering that the Ptolemaic adoption of the Zeus-type had a more concrete political dimension. His image was originally adopted at a time when an expanding Macedonia was looking for a patron of Panhellenic appeal to accommodate the sensitivities of the Hellenic states falling rapidly under its sphere of influence. It is possible that, like Alexander before him, who continued to mint Philip’s Zeus-types upon his accession, Ptolemy I recognized that he had also become the leader of disparate groups of non-Macedonians. The image of Zeus on the coinage provided a more than respectable mythical ancestry for the new dynasty, and more importantly, a familiar and common frame of reference with the Hellenic-Macedonian population of Alexandria.

 Dynastic Organization

Quite apart from the legitimation provided by the promotion of exaggerated, fictitious, symbolic, and mythical links with Alexander and the Argead dynasty, the latter also provided a practical model of dynastic organization for the early Ptolemies. This type of organization is particularly relevant when it comes to the passing on of the acquired power base of a first generation ruler to their successor. In pragmatic terms, it is the construction of a legitimate line of succession that facilitates and normalizes the transition of power and preserves the political strength of the ruler. If successful, this type of transmitted legitimacy ensures the social stability and territorial unity of the kingdom. The main structures that framed the organization of the immediate family of the ruler (consorts and progeny) were the conduct of dynastic marriages and the pattern of succession. In terms of the latter, Ptolemy I substituted the less than formalized system of succession of the Argeadai with a system of co-regency, which, at least in theory, facilitated the transition of power between reigns by publicizing the choice of successor. The manner of the organization of Ptolemaic dynastic marriages, on the other hand, presents stronger Argead influences.
One of the recurring features of the dynastic organization of the Macedonian monarchy was the formal association of its kings with more than one wife. Plutarch informs us that making “many marriages” was “customary for the Kings of Macedon from Philip and Alexander.” In fact, the “custom,” as Plutarch calls it, extended backward well beyond the reign of Philip II. The practice of concurrent marriages to more than one wife, commonly referred to as Macedonian royal polygamy, featured also in early Ptolemaic Egypt. Ptolemy I is associated with no less than four wives, while Ptolemy II is known to have had two.

Marriage in Argead Macedonia was used as a way of concluding political alliances. Satyrus the Peripatetic is explicit in his account of Philip II’s list of marriages that these took place with a view to strengthening the Kingdom. Philip II, with his seven known marriages, may represent an anomaly with regard to the number of women a Macedonian monarch would normally marry, but his situation must be seen as reflecting a kingdom under expansion. Alliances through marriage did not necessarily involve the king as the groom. Female members of the Argead royal family were frequently wed to prominent individuals of other political units. In the same vein, Ptolemy I is known to have married no less than four of his daughters to other rulers. Seibert argued that the bulk of Macedonian dynastic marriages took place in order to satisfy the political and military exigencies of the period, as rulers expected to have more control of their diplomatic counterparts through their wives and daughters than through a peace treaty. This becomes evident when one considers the frequency of dynastic marriages in conjunction with the shifting balance of power. When Antipater was appointed regent for Philip Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV in 321 B.C., his daughters became the most popular brides, alongside Alexander’s sisters. Ptolemy himself chose to marry the daughter of Antipater, Eurydice, in order to cement the decision at Triparadeisos to join forces against Perdiccas. Similarly, in the years following the battle of Ipsus, in 301 B.C., when the territorial claims of the various Successors were largely crystallized into recognized political units, the Successors exhibited an interest in reinforcing their standing in the international community by conducting dynastic intermarriages. Accordingly, when Seleucus reaffirmed his claims over Koile Syria, which was already occupied by Ptolemy in 301 B.C., the latter sought the support of the new ruler of Asia Minor, Lysimachus of Thrace. He married one of his daughters to Lysimachus and another to his heir. The alliance between Egypt and Thrace was further bolstered in Lysimachus’ lifetime by the marriage between Ptolemy I’s successor and Lysimachus’ daughter Arsinoe I.
Apart from demonstrating the precariousness of the balance of power of the period, the almost frantic rate at which the Successors were intermarrying serves also to direct our attention toward the importance of royal women as guarantors of dynastic stability. Even if pragmatically the stability was more often than not short-lived, their being offered in, and sought out for, marriage was a token of their equation with their dynastic line, the legitimacy of which was carried over to the family they were being married into. Nowhere is the prospect of legitimation through marriage more apparent than in the later life of Cleopatra, the only full sister of Alexander. Diodorus informs us that all of the Successors, including Ptolemy I, entertained the idea of marrying themselves to her on account of the illustriousness of her descent: “διὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν οὖν τοῦ γένους.” In what is presented by Diodorus as a contest, the prize of an alliance with the Argead royal house through Cleopatra was the loyalty of the Macedonians and the prospect of universal rule over Alexander’s Empire. In this, Ptolemy I would have emerged the victor, had Cleopatra not been murdered by Antigonus Monophthalmus on her way to the Alexandrian court. Craftily enough, Ptolemaic propaganda appears to have promoted this union post hoc as the expressed wish of Alexander.

Even in the case of the marriage of Ptolemy II to his full sister, which represents an anomaly, both by Egyptian and Hellenic/Macedonian standards, one can discern the gravitas of Arsinoe’s lineage weighing against any other probable bride. The real motives behind this union are beyond the reach of modern scholarship. However, in a foreign environment like Egypt, where the most probable course of action would have been native intermarriage (Alexander certainly provided a template for that) or inter-dynastic marriage, Philadelphus chose to lay the foundations of an introverted dynasty the roots of which ran deeper into the Argead past than any other; especially if one assumes that he took heed of his father’s Argive propaganda.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that in addition to the situational legitimation born out of personal charisma, military victories, or benefactions, and the methodical exploitation of Alexander’s image and name, aimed at smoothing out in popular imagination the creases of an irregular transition of power between the conqueror and the nascent Ptolemaic dynasty, the early Ptolemies systematically made
the effort to present themselves to the Alexandrian population as the scions of the Argead dynasty. Alexander became the cornerstone of the Alexandrian cult the Ptolemies developed to celebrate their dynastic line. Ptolemaic genealogies reverberated with Argead allusions, which were propagandized in their coinage, statuary, and court literary production, while in practice, the organization of the Argead dynasty with its emphasis on polygamy and the importance of royal females as the carriers of dynastic legitimation provided a template for the Ptolemaic dynastic organization.

Interestingly, the essential claims of the legitimating rhetoric of the early Ptolemies are encapsulated in just a few lines of a recently discovered epigram by the Macedonian poet Posidippus of Pella, active in the courts of the first two Ptolemies: the eagle and lightning of Zeus, both considered good omens for military victories, appeared to the Ptolemies in the same way as they had to Alexander before conquering the Persian Empire. What is most striking to notice here is that instead of calling them Ptolemies, the poet addresses them as “Argead kings.”
This page intentionally left blank
Scholars of ancient historiography have long recognized Hieronymus of Cardia’s lost history of Alexander’s successors as the main source for the best extant ancient histories of the period, especially Diodorus’ books 18–20. Although the idea that Diodorus relied heavily in these three books on additional sources, especially on Duris of Samos, has been recently revived, the majority opinion, to which I subscribe, still views Hieronymus as Diodorus’ chief informant. Hieronymus is also identified as the direct or ultimate source of other accounts of the period, such as Arrian’s history of events after Alexander, Plutarch’s, and Nepos’ biographies of the diadoch Eumenes, and even of Justin’s epitome of Pompeius Trogus. Yet rather than regard these later authors, and especially Diodorus, as mere copiers of Hieronymus, it is important to recognize their contribution to the narrative while trying to tease out of it Hieronymus’ share.¹

In this paper, my approach will be more thematic than chronological. I will focus on events involving the Greek general Eumenes, because as Eumenes’ fellow countryman and companion, Hieronymus is most likely to be the chief source about him. My goal is to draw attention to two characteristics of Hieronymus’ history that have been either ignored or insufficiently recognized. The first is Hieronymus’ tendency to look for, and to explain actions through, the actor’s ulterior motive, even when such explanation is unwarranted. The second is his elitist approach, which often privileges the perspectives and interests of leaders while downgrading those of their followers. I will illustrate these characteristics and especially their impact on his history.

A. Ulterior Motives and Hidden Agenda in Hieronymus

Jane Hornblower, the author of the most detailed study to date of Hieronymus, has noted that most of the generals who vied for power
after Alexander are depicted in Diodorus’ narrative as acting or thinking in their own interests, except for Hieronymus’ patron, the general Eumenes (Hornblower 1981, 159). Indeed, it is surely significant that the verb \textit{idiopragein} (“to pursue one’s own interests”) and its verbal family appear only in book 18, which is largely based on Hieronymus (Hornblower 1981, 168–69). The following example illustrates Hieronymus’ partiality for explaining actions in terms of self-interest or utility.

In 324 Alexander issued a decree that allowed Greek exiles to return home and instructed their native \textit{poleis} to accept them. My interest is not in assessing his motives but in how they are reported in the sources. In addition to epigraphic and other evidence, the four major historical accounts of this decree come from Diodorus book 17 on Alexander’s campaign (17.109.1–2), Curtius Rufus’ history of Alexander (10.2.4–7), Justin’s summary of Pompeius Trogus on Alexander (13.5.2–5), and Diodorus book 18 on Alexander’s successors (18.8.2–5). Diodorus 17, Curtius, and Justin all report on the decree and the reactions to it, but say nothing about Alexander’s reasons for issuing it (cf. also Orosius 3.23.14). Only Diodorus 18 explains that Alexander ordered the return of the exiles not only in order to gain fame (\textit{doxa}) but also because he wished to have in each polis many people who would entertain good will (\textit{eunoia}) toward him and so allow him to check revolutions and stases among the Greeks. In response to the proclamation of this decree at the Olympic Games, the crowd shouted their approval, welcomed Alexander’s favor, and praised his benefaction (\textit{euergesia}).

The wording of the last report is probably Diodorus’ own, and so is the reference to the reciprocal power of doing good unto others. Yet our interest is not in Diodorus’ style or motifs but in his explanation of the decree. The reasons given for Alexander’s actions, regardless of their accuracy, are absent in the other sources, and, most importantly, in Diodorus book 17. Because book 17 was based mostly on Cleitarchus, and because it is highly unlikely that Diodorus, after reporting on the decree in book 17, decided to add his own explanation of it in book 18, it is right to recognize here the contribution of his source, Hieronymus, who detected utilitarian motives and self-interest behind the royal decree.

While the explanation of Alexander’s decree in terms of its utility is not improbable, the attribution elsewhere of utilitarian reasons to the actions of the satrap of Persis, Peucetas, is hardly adequate. In 318/7 the diadoch Antigonus Monophthalmus campaigned against a coalition army representing the kings of Macedonia, led by Eumenes. According to our sources, Eumenes faced frequent challenges to his
command from fellow generals, especially Peucetias. The following incident took place after Eumenes’ victory in the competition with this satrap over who would be the supreme commander. We are told that Eumenes and the commander of the Macedonian elite unit of the Silver Shields, Antigenes, planned to stop Antigonus’ advance at the Pasitigris River in Iran, and therefore asked Peucetias to draft and bring there ten thousand Persian archers. At first Peucetias ignored their request because he felt wronged in not having been awarded the supreme command himself. But then he realized that if Antigonus won he would lose both his satrapy and his life. Agonizing about his own situation, and thinking that he would probably get the command if he had a large number of troops, he brought the requested ten thousand men.¹⁵

This is hardly the only time in which Peucetias is portrayed negatively in the sources, thanks most probably to Hieronymus, Eumenes’ friend.⁶ In the case of the plan to meet Antigonus on the river, however, this bias puts Peucetias’ significant contribution to the coalition’s war efforts in the worst possible light. If we look at what the satrap actually did, as opposed to his purported motives and thought process, to which Hieronymus could have hardly been privy, we see that Peucetias honored in full Eumenes’ request for troops. Rather than showing an ambition for supreme command, he obeyed the instructions he was given and helped Eumenes and Antigenes. Moreover, what is described here as a period of delay and hesitation on his part was probably the time needed for the mobilization of such a large force. The source also never mentions that Peucetias could easily have eliminated his alleged fear of Antigonus by changing to his side, but that he chose not to. By ascribing to Peucetias ulterior, selfish motives, the source distorted his cooperative conduct and, to judge by the scholarship that has followed his version, quite successfully.⁷

Akin to attributing unworthy and selfish motives to individuals is Hieronymus’ search for a hidden agenda, an offense that he often attributes to Antigonus.⁸ A man’s hidden agenda, however, did not always reflect negatively on him, and especially not when he was favored by the source. Even Alexander’s ulterior motives for the Exile Decree did not make him appear villainous. In Hieronymus, it seems, a hidden agenda was deplorable when it targeted other generals, but not when directed against the troops, who, it should be said, very rarely had hidden agendas of their own. Two stories involving trickeries may illustrate the point.

Following Eumenes’ victory over Craterus in 321 or 320 (depending on the so-called “high” or “low” chronology), Eumenes surrounded Craterus’ defeated Macedonians and got from them a pledge
to join him. At night, however, they fled to Antipater, Craterus’ colleague. Diodorus describes them as faithless men who broke their oath to Eumenes (Diod. 18.32.2–3). He spared Eumenes, however, a similar reproach when the Cardian later broke his oath to Antigonus. He also failed to commend the fleeing Macedonians for sticking with their original leader and cause in spite of their defeat, which was rather remarkable in the time of the Diadochs. It was not just Diodorus’ or his sources’ pro-Eumenes bias that informed his negative depiction of the Macedonians. Equally influential was the notion that it was fine for generals to deceive the troops but not vice versa. For example, Photius’ summary of Arrian’s history of events after Alexander, which most likely relied on Hieronymus and some additional sources, relates that before Antipater crossed back to Europe from Asia in the winter of 320/19, his army mutinied and demanded money. Antipater promised the troops that he would pay them in three days at Abydus, which allowed him to get there in peace, but then he sneaked away under the cover of night to Thrace. The empty-handed troops followed him the day after. Clearly, it was justified, even admirable, for a general to get out of trouble by a stratagem, even if it meant cheating the troops out of their wages.9

The legitimization and deligitimization of actions and agendas described above was based on a more broadly elitist approach toward actors and history. According to this view, individual leaders were the makers of history, with little credit given to their followers. It regarded the leaders’ concerns and interests as more worthy than those of their subordinates and sided with the former whenever their respective interests were in conflict. It condoned conformity to well established values of the elite including the competitive pursuit of good repute, self-control, and such, and held the military elite to higher standards of conduct than the masses, but also ranked Macedonians (and Greeks) above Asians, who were portrayed as their inferiors and their natural victims in war and plunder. This was hardly a novel approach, because it was anchored in traditional Greek or conquerors’ mentalities, and in the political, social, and economic hierarchies of the Argead state. In Macedonia, the king and his elite used the masses to sustain and enhance their positions and policies, and as much as kings like Philip or Alexander deemed themselves their subjects’ benefactors, they were primarily their exploiters, as some Macedonians told Alexander in tears or in resentment (Curt. 9.3.1–3; Arr. 7.8.1–10.7). For men like Hieronymus, who made his career rubbing shoulders with dynasts such as Eumenes, Antigonus, Demetrius Poliorcetes, and Antigonus Gonatas, privileging the elite’s role and perspective came naturally. In the following I wish to examine how Hieronymus’ elitist approach impacted his history.
B. Elitist Approach in Hieronymus

Hieronymus’ elitist perspective comes through clearly in our sources’ description of generals’ relationships with their troops. Plutarch’s biography of Eumenes, describing Antigonus’ siege of Eumenes in Nora in 319–18, provides one example. Since Hieronymus was involved in the negotiations between these two generals as well as with Antipater, he is most likely to have been Plutarch’s direct or indirect source.  

We are told that after Eumenes had fled to Nora, Antigonus went there with the intention of putting him under siege, but offered first to meet him. After preliminary negotiations between the two, in which the author lets Eumenes come out on top both morally and rhetorically, Eumenes left his shelter to meet Antigonus at his camp. Plutarch says that the two commanders embraced and greeted each other like old, intimate friends. As the conference and the negotiations went on, many Macedonians rushed to see what kind of a man Eumenes was, because he was the most talked about leader in the army since the death of the highly respected Macedonian general Craterus, who had died in an earlier battle with Eumenes. Antigonus was afraid that Eumenes would suffer some violence, and shouted at the soldiers not to come closer, threw stones at them, and finally embraced Eumenes and kept the crowd (okhlos) away with his bodyguards, until he could take him to a safer place.

Even if only the gist of the story comes from Hieronymus, it still shows his elitist perspective. Clearly, the Macedonian troops were hostile to Eumenes, who was outlawed in Egypt two years earlier and was charged with responsibility for Craterus’ death and a Macedonian civil war (Plut. Eum. 8.1–3; Arr. Succ. 1.30). In short, they did not yearn to gaze upon and admire him, but to lynch him. Antigonus’ staunch defense of Eumenes had likely less to do with his friendship with the Cardian and more with the presence in Nora of Ptolemy, his nephew, who had gone there before the negotiations to serve as a hostage and ensure Eumenes’ safety (Plut. Eum. 10.5). All this is ignored in the episode that centers instead on the noble and collegial manner in which the generals conducted themselves. The Macedonian troops, on the other hand, are relegated to the role of providing these leaders with an opportunity to display their friendship, code of honor, and superior rank and character. The author largely disregards the encamped soldiers’ feelings or motives and emphasizes instead their mob behavior, which obstructs and threatens the dealings of the generals.

Conversely, when the sources depict the troops positively, it is mostly to show how they liked and appreciated their generals.
Diodorus’ account of the eve of the battle of Gaza in 312 between Demetrius, son of Antigonus, and Ptolemy and Seleucus takes this view of commander-troops relations, but with a twist. The author draws a portrait of Demetrius which is rare for its rich details about a commander’s personality and the troops’ attitudes toward him (Diod. 19.81.1–6). Jane Hornblower has convincingly identified Diodorus’ source here as Hieronymus, who appears to have accompanied Demetrius during this period and to have focused his narrative on him. I am more interested in the way the author presents leader-troops relations than in the accuracy of his statements. Hence Diodorus’ anachronistic references to Antigonus and Demetrius as kings (a title they held officially only from 306) have little bearing on my analysis.

Diodorus’ report begins with subdued criticism of Demetrius for confidently going into a major battle against his advisors’ recommendations and in spite of his youth and the absence of his father. Demetrius convened an army assembly and was ill at ease when facing it, but the audience unanimously called upon him to take courage and then fell silent of its own accord. The author opines that because Demetrius was a new commander, he was free from the troubles that characterized longstanding generalship, such as the cumulative burden of past minor resentments that soldiers feel toward a veteran general, and the increasing difficulty of pleasing them. He was also liked by those who felt that their previous general had deprived them of something and were looking for a change. As heir to the kingship of Antigonus, who was now elderly, Demetrius enjoyed the good will (eunoia) of the people and became the focus of their hopes. The fact that he was a handsome and imposing figure, especially in his royal armor, induced men to respect and expect much of him. His youthful mildness gained him universal enthusiasm and sympathy in his intimidating task of fighting experienced and apparently invincible generals such as Ptolemy and Seleucus.

The soldiers’ conduct and attitudes serve to highlight the attributes of their leader. Indeed, forgoing reciprocity, the author tells only how the soldiers regarded their commander and says nothing of Demetrius’ view or expectations of them. The author’s sensitive psychological description of the troops’ state of mind shows them reacting to this general with a mixture of hope, empathy, and even patronizing attitudes. Such sentiments explain why, instead of having doubts about the ability of their new commander to lead them into battle against such formidable enemies, they wished to help this young, handsome, and promising general and were anxious to hear what he had to say. The historian’s extensive treatment of the soldiers’ hopes and mood brings the reader to anticipate an equally detailed description of how
Demetrius took advantage of the favorable atmosphere. Instead we get a disappointing general statement about his emboldening the troops and promising them the usual rewards of gifts and booty.

Perhaps Diodorus epitomized a longer speech by Demetrius in the original. But it is no less likely that he was loyal to his source, for there is an inescapable irony in the entire episode. Demetrius did not have a single quality that justified his rank and command in a decisive battle, except for his being Antigonus’ son. Yet he owed the soldiers’ *eunoia* (“good will”) to their hope that Antigonus would die and that Demetrius would be different from him. The rest of his popular appeal consisted of his good looks, his striking a royal figure, and the troops’ wish to protect such a vulnerable young man. These were not credentials that could justify Demetrius’ self-confidence prior to the battle or the soldiers’ trust in him. In reality, many troops must have felt relieved to know that the experienced general Pithon, son of Agenor, was Demetrius’ co-commander and that there were other veteran commanders in the camp. Yet this factor is not mentioned among the considerations that moved the soldiers to follow Demetrius into battle. Instead, we are shown troops who centered their false hopes on an unqualified commander, and who, in spite of their good feelings toward him, would desert him in droves following his defeat in battle. One wonders how many soldiers were still longing for a change in command and a milder leader than Antigonus after Demetrius’ defeat in Gaza. Neither the general nor the troops acquit themselves well here, but when one reads how at the end of the battle Demetrius was left standing with only few cavalrymen, and that he unsuccessfully begged his soldiers not to flee (Diod. 19.84.5), sympathy goes to him rather than to the troops.

A different kind of emotional relationship between troops and their general is presented in the episode of Eumenes’ illness and its effect on the troops during their march through Iran in 317. Both Diodorus (19.24.5–6) and Plutarch (Eum. 14.5–14.3) report on this incident, and although it is no surprise that Plutarch is the better storyteller, Diodorus’ account appears more sober. Once again, their most likely source is Hieronymus, who was an eyewitness to the events.

Eumenes and his opponent Antigonus were marching with their armies not far distant from each other, and were looking for a suitable battlefield. Eumenes became seriously ill following a drinking bout (so Diodorus) or some illness (Plutarch). According to Diodorus, the march halted for some days and the army lost its spirit because their most competent general was incapacitated (cf. Plut. Eum. 14.3). When Eumenes was somewhat recovered, he was carried in a litter at the
rear, out of sight and away from the tumult of the marching army, which was being led by Peucæstas, the satrap of Persis, and Antigenes, the commander of the Silver Shields.

Plutarch relates that while Eumenes’ army was on the move it suddenly saw Antigonus’ army descending onto the plain in all its might and splendor. The troops at the front of Eumenes’ column stopped and shouted their refusal to go on and risk battle without Eumenes in command, and they delivered this message to the rest of the army. Eumenes, quite pleased, rushed forward in his litter and stretched out his hand. The soldiers hailed him in Macedonian, raised the battle cry, and challenged the enemy to fight. Plutarch then artfully shifts his narrative to the enemy’s reaction. Antigonus, who knew about Eumenes’ condition, was amazed to see Eumenes’ army ready for battle, and the litter moving from one wing to another. He even joked that his army was facing a litter, and then he withdrew his forces. Plutarch gives the credit for Antigonus’ retreat to Eumenes’ appearance at the front, an explanation consistent with his flattering portrait of this general. According to Diodorus’ more level-headed account, both armies withdrew because they did not like the terrain.

Both descriptions use the soldiers’ reactions to emphasize Eumenes’ prominence and his popular leadership, and thus they indicate the elitist perspective of the source. Let us look at what happened from the soldiers’ rather than their leaders’ point of view. Prior to this scene, Eumenes had made great efforts to ensure that no one but him could hold the supreme command. He demonstrated to the troops that he could reward them with gifts and provisions as richly as his alleged rival to leadership, Peucæstas. He forged letters that reported the victory of his European allies in the fight over Macedonia and their marching to help him with an army. Significantly, these were allies and friends of Eumenes himself, not of the other generals. He also intimidated Peucæstas through a failed attempt to assassinate his friend Sibyrtius, the satrap of Arachosia (Diod. 19.23.1-4). In short, the troops demanded that Eumenes take charge because he succeeded in making the alternatives to his leadership appear weak and unappealing. Scholars have also noticed Eumenes’ efforts to draw similarities between himself and Alexander, and, in this case, his greeting the soldiers from his litter in illness just as Alexander had done in 325 after he was seriously wounded in an attack on Indian town.16 From the soldiers’ perspective, Eumenes’ gesture might have enhanced his stature, but the situation also triggered unpleasant memories and fears. Alexander had made an effort to come and greet his soldiers in order to prove that he was not dead (Arr. Anab. 6.12.1-13.3). Since Eumenes was seriously ill and was being carried in a litter away from
the marching army, fear for his life must have been on the minds of his troops as well. But they feared for more than the fate of a dearly loved commander. Imagine soldiers who faced battle against a strong army in a foreign land, under a general who had presented himself as their caretaker and the sole link to potential allies, who had weakened every other leader in camp, but who was not in sight. I suggest that the Macedonians’ refusal to march on without Eumenes in the lead meant that, before risking their lives in battle, they wanted to know if he was alive, because his death would have required them to reassess their situation or even the rationale for fighting Antigonus. The description of the love fest between Eumenes and the troops surely flatters him, but it is a dubious compliment if it reflects the desperate situation of the soldiers and their dependence on their general.

A similar elitist perspective recurs in Diodorus’ description of the aftermath of the battle of Paraetacene between Eumenes and Antigonus in 317. The battle was indecisive, because although Eumenes’ cavalry and infantry were victorious over their respective enemy counterparts, Antigonus defeated Eumenes’ left wing. The two armies regrouped, but by the time they were ready to offer a second battle it was midnight and the troops were exhausted from the marching, fighting, and lack of food. Each went back to its camp, but Eumenes wanted to return to the battlefield to bury the dead, an act tantamount to a declaration of victory. We are told that his soldiers refused and shouted that they wanted to go back to their own baggage, which was at a distance, and that Eumenes had to comply with their demand. He was unable to punish them when so many leaders disputed his command; nor was this an opportune time to discipline the troops. Antigonus, on the other hand, who had a firm grip on his command and did not have to resort to démagógia (“popular leadership”), forced his army to camp next to the battlefield, and so could declare victory by burying the dead (Diod. 19.31.1–4).

Right after this report, Diodorus records the greater number of losses that Eumenes had inflicted on his opponent, and for a reason (19.31.4). Regardless of the battle’s indecisive outcome, he and his source aim to show that Eumenes was the victor, but that he was robbed of his victory for no fault of his own. The culprits were the disobedient troops and Eumenes’ rivals for command, who prevented him from punishing the soldiers. Yet several aspects of this story show not only a pro-Eumenes bias but also a tendency to privilege the commanders’ distinction and agenda.

Firstly, here and elsewhere the soldiers express themselves by making a commotion, either by shouts or by banging their spears against their shields, while their leaders speak in individual, articulate voices.
Secondly, the contrast between Eumenes’ difficulties in controlling the army and Antigonus’ easier task is problematic, both because it is designed to exculpate Eumenes’ failure to possess the battlefield and because it does not tell the whole story. While Antigonus’ army was made up of relatively fresh recruits, who probably had little baggage, the Macedonians in Eumenes’ army carried baggage that had been accumulated since Alexander’s campaign, and hence had a greater incentive to go back to it. In addition, Eumenes’ army fought the battle after a hurried meal and a quick march. In contrast, Antigonus’ army, except for the cavalry, reached the battlefield at a regular pace (Diod. 19.26.3–10). The claim, then, that both \(\textit{amphoteroi}\) armies were hungry and exhausted (Diod. 19.31.2–3) underestimates the greater distress of Eumenes’ troops. A good general knows when to push his men beyond their capability and level of motivation. It was not his soldiers’ fault, nor to Eumenes’ credit, that he had failed to appraise correctly their low morale and physical condition. Furthermore, the fact that the source ranks the two commanders’ goal of declaring victory above the soldiers’ concerns does not make the former more legitimate or justified. Eumenes’ soldiers wished to recuperate and were anxious about the welfare of their baggage, which included their families and dependents. They would demonstrate the importance of this concern once again after the subsequent battle of Gabene, when they moved to Antigonus’ side following his capture of their baggage. In any case, the ones who needed to assert victory were the generals, not the troops, who had little reason or ambition to make sacrifices and expend extra effort so that Eumenes could win his battle of prestige with Antigonus. In the eyes of the source, however, this was a shortsighted, petty, and selfish attitude. Only an author who focused on the general’s perspective and needs, and who was convinced that the soldiers’ interests should be subjugated to those of their commander, would produce such a biased report.

The belittling and tendentious treatment of the troops’ needs recurs in other accounts of Eumenes’ campaign. Diodorus tells that during the winter of 317/6, Eumenes’ army was widely scattered over unplundered Gabene. According to Plutarch and Nepos, this was not done by Eumenes’ design. Plutarch says that Eumenes’ troops acted once again as if they were led by popular leaders (\textit{edemagogounto}) and, mocking their commanders, they spread themselves wide in their winter quarters. Nepos states that Eumenes distributed his soldiers according to their wishes, not his own. This inspired the Roman biographer to comment on the insubordination of Alexander’s phalanx, their aspiration to rule rather than to obey their commanders, and the possible lessons of this bad example for those commanding Roman veterans. He
adds that Eumenes’ troops were dispersed in search of winter quarters for no military purpose but for their own luxury or pleasure.

Diodorus’ failure to mention any conflict between Eumenes and his troops over their winter camps is probably due to his abbreviating his source, for it appears that Diodorus, Plutarch, and Nepos all relied on a common source. This is suggested by the fact that all three authors follow the episode with similar reports on Antigonus’ failed attempt that winter to catch Eumenes’ forces by surprise, and on Eumenes’ successful countermeasures. Both authors link Antigonus’ stratagem to the dispersion of Eumenes’ army and conclude the account of the two commanders’ maneuvers with the almost identical comments that Eumenes outgeneraled Antigonus. Hieronymus is their most likely direct or indirect source.

The description of Eumenes’ mutinous soldiers is, at best, one-sided. We do not know for sure how many of Eumenes’ 36,700 infantry and six thousand cavalry, who participated in the battle of Gabene shortly afterward (Diod. 19.40.4), actually wintered in that region. Some of them may have gone home to their nearby satrapies for the winter, while others joined him just before the battle (cf. Diod. 19.39.1–2). Yet it is a fair assumption that more than half of that force stayed at Gabene. There was no one camp that could have accommodated and provisioned so many troops and their companions. More important, looking for good winter shelters was necessary for the survival and comfort (both legitimate goals) of the soldiers, some of whom had families with them. Moreover, even if, according to the sources, Eumenes’ army covered 1,000 stades from end to end, its bulk could not have been far removed from Eumenes’ camp, since he himself estimated that it would take (only) three to four days to assemble his and his colleagues’ forces. Indeed, when he needed his troops for battle they all showed up. The adverse outcome of the troops’ insubordination, then, was exaggerated by the sources that adopted Eumenes’ view of it, and their criticism of the soldiers for doing what was good for them was both inaccurate and unfair.

Finally, the Hieronymus’ elitist attitude comes out clearly even in the digression on sati (or suttee), the Indian practice of burning widows along with their dead husbands, in a passage of Diodorus, which most likely relies on him. We are told that, in the past, the Indians had allowed young men and women to marry each other freely and without parental matchmaking. This resulted in many disappointed couples and even in wives poisoning their husbands so they could live with their lovers. To prevent this outcome, the Indians instituted a law ordaining that wives must join their dead husbands on the pyre or else become religious outcasts and lifelong widows.
Recently A. B. Bosworth has analyzed this account and argued with great ingenuity that Hieronymus’ discussion of the Indian custom and its origins was possibly either a reworking of Indian traditions or a criticism of some of Diogenes the Cynic’s followers, who advocated free choice of partners in marriage. I agree with Bosworth’s statement that “there was on occasion an implied message, moral or political, which the reader might detect beneath the plain text of the excursus” in Hieronymus. In the following I wish to show that the excursus gains added significance when viewed as a comment on events in Eumenes’ war against Antigonus.

The digression on the Indian custom and the funeral is placed in the context of the aforementioned contest between Eumenes and Antigonus over who would bury the dead of the battle of Paraetacene and so claim the right to victory. Eumenes, who first wished to possess the battlefield, was denied the privilege by his tired and hungry troops: they shouted that they wanted to go back to their personal baggage, and he was unable to punish them. Antigonus, who commenced the burial, failed to finish the job because he was anxious to retreat and give some relief to his army. This allowed Eumenes to come back and give a splendid burial to the dead (Diod. 19.32.1–3).

The digression comes next. It tells of the Indian general Ceteus, who died in battle, and who was married to two loving wives. After explaining the origins of the custom whereby living widows joined their dead husband on the pyre, the source comments that the introduction of this law reversed the former lawlessness of Indian women, and made them face death willingly, care about their husbands’ safety, and compete with each other to gain a great reputation (megistēs eudoxias). We hear of rivalry between Ceteus’ wives over the right to die with him, as if they were competing for excellence and honor (hōs huper aristioũ sumphilotimounemenai). When the younger wife wished to disqualify the older, pregnant wife because of her condition (the law forbade cremation of pregnant wives), the older woman claimed seniority, which ranked higher in respect (entropē) and honor (timē). The generals in Eumenes’ army decided in favor of the nonpregnant wife, and the other left the scene as if she had suffered a catastrophe. The younger woman, however, went to her death as full of joy in her victory as if she were going to a wedding, with her kin singing her virtue (aretē). She gave away all her precious jewelry (which the source enthusiastically itemizes), climbed the pyre, and ended her life heroically (herōikōs), making no ignoble sound (oudemian phonēn agennē). We are told that some of the spectators were moved to pity, some to extraordinary praise, but that some Greeks viewed the custom as savage and cruel. The next sentence reports on Eumenes’
completing the burial of the dead and leading his army to the well-supplied environs of Gabene (Diod. 19.33.1–34.7).

The description resembles, perhaps by intention, Herodotus’ description of the Thracian wives, who also competed for the honor of joining their dead husbands. It might even have been partly informed by Indian tales. I wish to draw attention here to the Greek rendering of the story. Hieronymus reports Hellenic criticism of the practice, but the descriptors used for the wives’ conduct leave no doubt about his admiration. They behaved piously, courageously, nobly, honorably, heroically, and without a thought for themselves. Could they have been more different from the troops in Eumenes’ army, who a few days earlier had prevented their leader from burying the dead because they wanted to return to their baggage? On the one hand, we are shown enthusiastic conformity and strict obedience to the law, an exemplary self-control, a noble victory over fear and pain, and the highest form of self-sacrifice. On the other, we see lack of discipline and defiance, an inability to overcome bodily wants, and an unwillingness to do something for others. Ceteus’ wife paid her dead husband the ultimate honor and gave away all her very precious belongings. The troops would not even return to give the dead their last honors, because they wished to be reunited with their personal, and presumably far less valuable, belongings. Two Indian women, who in good Greek elitist fashion competed for a good name in deference to societal norms, thus put to shame the selfish, inconsiderate, and lawless troops. That the contrast was not coincidental is indicated first by the context for the story of the Indian funeral, which concerns the burial of the dead of Paraetacene, and also by the two sentences that introduce and conclude the digression with references to Eumenes’ giving a magnificent burial to the dead.

The fact that in both episodes barbarians behave better than the Macedonians does not necessarily contradict the author’s elitist attitudes. In Hieronymus, positive depictions of barbarians show them conforming to traditional Greek ideals. This is true for the Indian wives discussed above; for the Isaurians whom Perdiccas fought in 322 and who were willing to sacrifice themselves, their families, and their possessions for the sake of liberty; for the young Pisidians who in 319 honored Alcetas, Perdiccas’ brother and their benefactor, with a magnificent burial after Antigonus abused his body for three days and then discarded it unburied; and for the Nabatean Arabs in Hieronymus’ famous digression. The latter were resourceful, manly, eager to fight for their freedom, and steadfastly attached to their way of life. Barbarians who validated Greek values thus demonstrated where the Macedonians and their leaders went wrong.
Hieronymus was hardly unique among the ancients in his search for ulterior motives or in framing his history around the stories of prominent individuals. While the motives and causes he ascribes to actions are not in themselves unlikely, they may produce, together with his elitist focus and perspective, distorted and biased accounts. It is unfortunate that many scholars of the Hellenistic age have followed Hieronymus in identifying the military and political history of the period with the careers, ambitions, and points of view of Alexander's great successors. I hope that this paper will illustrate the advantages of taking a different approach.
PART IV

Reception of Father and Son
Alexander’s astonishing reign riveted his contemporaries and has fascinated ever expanding audiences from the moment of his death. The king, clearly understanding the utility of propaganda and extremely covetous of public acclaim, fanned this fascination by engineering chronicles of his conquests. Moreover, very soon after Alexander’s passing, the official account of his _anabasis_ was joined by others, authored initially by lieutenants who had been in his entourage, men who tended to hype their own roles as Alexander’s lieutenants whenever possible. Personal associations with Alexander quickly garnered great popularity among the Macedonians and other sympathizers; they revered his memory seemingly even more than they did his person when he was alive. Magnifications of the trials and tribulations faced by all as the king and hoard moved east proved extremely popular in these posthumous accounts of Alexander’s career. Perhaps even more importantly, amid the rapidly shifting political sands of the immediate post-Alexander world, many established and furthered claims of legitimacy and authority by any association with his memory. So impossible did Alexander’s deeds suddenly appear (especially after he was gone), and so fabulous were the lands that he traversed (especially to those living around or near the eastern Mediterranean), that he spawned a genre of historical fiction that included more than a dollop of fantasy. Over centuries, components of romance literature took on different colorations depending upon the interests of new audiences. Over all that time, Alexander’s reputation grew. Alexander’s father, Philip, in a similar if lesser way, also attracted the attention of many far beyond his native land, because he too accomplished things that no one before him had accomplished. Macedonia itself, however, had generated but little interest among (inevitably, foreign) readers before the rise of its two greatest monarchs: the land, its people, and their ways appeared only sporadically when other interests encroached upon Macedonia proper. The wider world learned of Macedonia and its customs only...
as refracted through the prism of its two monumental kings. The magnitude of the accumulated successes of Philip and Alexander, however, tended from the very start to eclipse any knowledge, or interest in, the resources and institutions upon which both drew to accomplish their deeds. Until the twentieth century, few knew or manifested any care about Macedon the kingdom or its mores.

When modern scholars began to ask questions about ancient Macedonian society, among the first areas to be considered was that of politics. The study of Argead (“Temenid”) kingship has generated a cottage industry over the last century. Learned, if irreconcilable, arguments about Macedonian Staatsrecht have been proffered by Granier, de Francisci, Aymard, Briant, Lock, Errington, Anson, Hammond, Borza, and Hatzopoulos, just to name a few of the more prominent scholars who have worked in the field. A constitutionalist interpretation of the evidence arose in earnest when Granier maintained that Macedonian kingship had Germanic and Homeric parallels, and that Macedon was traditionally a monarchy in which an assembly (most frequently in the form of an army assembly) knew judicial and elective rights which both subjects and kings consciously recognized as constitutional, even if these rights were occasionally violated. Since Granier’s work, Aymard, Briant, Hammond, and now currently Hatzopoulos have argued some version of a constitutional monarchy from the origins of the Macedonian realm. The constitutionalist interpretation of our evidence was vigorously challenged by De Francisci, who argued that the sources simply did not support such a reading, and that they rather suggested that Macedonian kingship came in a personal form without any checks or balances. Although subsequent scholars such as Lock, Errington, Anson, and Borza have tempered this absolutist approach somewhat in deference to the restraints of custom and immediate circumstances, fundamentally they have been inclined to agree with de Francisci’s interpretation of the evidence. Generally speaking, more scholars today (including myself) lean toward the second of these interpretations. With the exception of Borza, however, most do so without giving much attention to the distinct probability that Macedon constitutionally developed from whatever it originally may have been, to what it eventually had become by the time our literary sources began to pay more attention to Macedonian realities. Macedonia moved from a more autocratic to a more constitutional political culture, a transformation wrought in part because of growth and in part because of the Hellenization of Macedonian culture. I approach my topic with an appreciation for this gradual transformation. Space concerns will, however, preclude a point-by-point rebuttal of the extensive arguments proffered by earlier scholars.
Hatzopoulos offers the most comprehensive defense of the constitutionalist Macedon in his important Macedonian Institutions Under the Kings largely because, more than even Hammond, he pays close attention to the emerging epigraphical, as well as the literary, evidence. I will largely disregard the arguments of Hatzopoulos, however, because they mostly deal with evidence gleaned either from regions beyond the extent of the Argead kingdom as it stood throughout most of the fifth and fourth centuries, or because they postdate the Argead period. Hence, his arguments, like all of those that attempt to posit conclusions for the Argead period from Hellenistic evidence, are simply not germane to my concerns. I wield Occam’s razor in this fashion because it is manifest that a clear break in constitutional tradition came with the fall of the Argead house. I support my decision to reject all Hellenistic evidence as being irrelevant to the Classical period here simply by recalling the extraordinary efforts exerted by all of Alexander’s Macedonian Successors in their sometimes successful, sometimes not, attempts to establish new legitimacies. That given, it seems to me obvious that all of the constitutional practices of the Hellenistic period, especially in Macedon proper, bear the imprint of the cultural Hellenization which accelerated rapidly during and after the reign of Archelaus, but which was not complete until after the Argeads were no more.

I begin by observing that Lock and Errington and, to a lesser extent, Anson, have already essentially demolished the arguments of Granier, Aymard, and Briant, and thus, also of Hammond, who (for all of his thoroughness as a scholar) really added little to the constitutionalist arguments offered by previous scholars. That having been noted, let us proceed next to two quotations from Lock, the first being: “Aristotle . . . points strongly to the conclusion that there was no [Macedonian] constitution which either specified that the kingship was absolute or limited its power. All was determined by circumstances, as, for example, the personality of the king, the atmosphere of the times, the mood of the people;” and later, “[t]he Macedonian monarchy was not governed by a constitution which laid down the political rights of the king and subjects. . . . In every case their reactions can be understood simply in terms of the relationship between soldiers and their leader, a relationship unaffected by any ideological influences.” We will return to the allusion to Aristotle in a moment, but first I must point out that not even Lock can mean exactly what he argues in these passages, since he is fully aware that until the death of Alexander IV, Macedon was necessarily ruled by an Argead. This fact qualifies the essential point of what Lock asserts, for by limiting the pool of prospective kings to one family, the whole Macedonian system became bound by ideological influences of a sort. Thus, it cannot be said that
Argead kingship was simply the product of any one moment, although its exercise certainly seems to have been.

Since the extermination of the Argead house created a constitutional crisis among Macedonians everywhere, forcing the redefinition of political legitimacies and making Hellenistic examples irrelevant to any interpretation of the Argead state, the sources which might render some service in understanding what the nature of that earlier state was, are few. I will omit here reconsiderations of the literary exempla (e.g., the accessions of Philip II, Alexander III, and the confusion reigning after the death of the latter) so often covered by the scholars interested in this issue, because they have been so well exploited by especially Lock, Errington, and Anson to demolish the basic constitutionalist premises. As for the epigraphic record, its almost complete absence is itself testimony against the constitutionalist position, since where a political culture with the appropriate checks and balances of its existence does not exist, it tends not to leave behind testimony of its nonexistence. Where a few stones do leave some testimony as to the nature of the Argead state, that testimony exclusively mentions royal prerogatives, without qualification.\(^{19}\) So also does the numismatic evidence.\(^{20}\) In short, my position is that the few stones we have from Macedonia proper during the Argead era do not reveal a constitutionalist mentality, because such a mentality did not exist: the Argead king was the law until the Argeads were no more and other legitimacies had to evolve. Of course, practical considerations tempered too authoritarian a rule, because no matter how relatively small or weak a kingdom might be, or how popular a ruler might be, no kingdom can (or could) be absolutely dominated by its monarch without the collusion of significant others: woe quickly befell Argead kings like Archelaus and Alexander II who moved too quickly for the good of powerful vested interests.\(^{21}\)

But, let us return to Aristotle and Macedonian kingship (references hereafter to the *Politics*). The great polymath of the fourth century, from personal experience intimately acquainted with the status of Macedon in his time, has been cited peripherally by scholars in connection with Argead kingship, especially by Lock and Hammond.\(^{22}\) It has frequently been stated that he has little to say about the nature of the Macedonian monarchy, although the *Politics* cites many Macedonian particulars in passing and addresses kingship (e.g., 3.7 ff.; 3.9.1–11.13; 5.8.2–13). Although we will never be certain as to why there is no overt analysis of royal Macedonian institutions in the extant *Politics*, it is not enough to argue that the philosopher simply did not understand the full implications of Macedon’s rise and its potential impact on the world of the polis.
Plato and his students had a demonstrable desire to put their ideas into practice, a desire that sometimes led to practical experience and knowledge of Greek politics, even Macedonian politics. Plato was intensely interested in bringing the notion of the philosopher prince to reality in Syracuse—a hope that seems to have lingered throughout the writing of his *Laws* and down to his death in 348. Plato and his associates seem also to have had other kings and tyrants in mind for the political influence of philosophy, including Hermias of Atarneus (to whose court two Platonists, Erastus and Coriscus, had traveled to attract that eunuch tyrant to Platonic studies, even before Aristotle befriended him, married his niece, and wrote to his memory a famous paean). Even Macedon had experienced Platonic interest in the 360s, as Plato’s disciple, Euphraeus, was known at the court of Perdiccas III, where he convinced the king to designate some territory to be commanded by the king’s younger brother, Philip (Speusippus, *Epist. Socrat.* 30, 12), from which Philip seems to have mounted his counterattack after Perdiccas’ death. Plato himself was up on Macedonian court gossip, probably through Euphraeus (*Grg*. 471 a–c), so it is very likely that Aristotle knew a great deal more about the north and Macedonia’s institutions than he reveals in his writing.

I think it is quite likely that Aristotle handled Macedon as he did in the *Politics* because no matter what more he might have said openly about the kingdom, his words would have involved personal risk, living where and when he did as it was being composed. The *Politics* are usually dated to the period between 335 and 322 when the mature Aristotle was in Athens and enjoying a subsidy provided by Alexander to undertake his myriad interests. The risks to Aristotle during this period were twofold: first, since he was enjoying Alexander’s favor for at least a significant part of this period but living in democratic Athens when the local attitude to Alexander was lukewarm at best, a favorable discussion of Macedonian kingship would have been indelicate to say the least. But even after a growing rift between Alexander and Aristotle occurred, surely widened by Callisthenes’ fate, an honest appraisal of Macedonian customs (if he felt any needed to voice any) would have been dangerous. As for the Macedonians, any less-than-fulsome praise of their mores would have marked Aristotle as a traitorous enemy at a time when their influence in some way overshadowed the entire Hellenic world.

One does not have to go so far as to think that Aristotle was an important Macedonian political agent throughout his long life, to believe that Aristotle was well informed as to the nature of the
Argead dynasty and its contemporary power. It is remarkable, though, that significant moments in Aristotle’s life, including his initial arrival in Athens in 368 and his return to the city about 335 (after thirteen years of living elsewhere—including Asia Minor—when it was of profound interest to Philip and Macedon itself) coincided with important developments in Macedonian history (the former the murder of Alexander II and the latter the imposing of Alexander the Great’s control over southern Greece after the unsuccessful rebellion of Thebes).

His need for circumspection does not mean, however, that Aristotle had nothing important to say about the Argead kingdom. In the opinion of some who have taken the time to consider Aristotle’s classification of kingships, Macedon falls under the rubric of Homeric kingship. Hammond, however, is of the opinion that “the Macedonian monarchy would fit fairly well into Aristotle’s category of contemporary hereditary monarchies among some of the barbarians. In contrast to the absolute monarchy . . . in which the king was in charge of everything and master, the king in this type of monarchy governed willing subjects, was guarded by citizens in arms and ruled in accordance with law; but he had powers which approached those of a dictator.”

Before proceeding to what exactly Aristotle has to say about monarchy, it should be noted that before he even broached the topic in depth he offered the opinion that (Pol. 3.8.1–2):

If there is any one man so greatly distinguished in outstanding virtue, or more than one but not enough to make up a complete state, so the virtue of all the rest and their political ability is not comparable with that of the men mentioned, if they are several, or if one, with his alone, it is no longer proper to count these exceptional men a part of the state; for they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in virtue and in their political ability: since such a man will naturally be as a god among men. . . . there can be no law dealing with such men as those described, for they are themselves a law.

Clearly, Aristotle had very different standards for evaluating the relationship between human beings and the law than have we in the post-Enlightenment West. Nevertheless, after this passage, Aristotle goes on to distinguish tyranny from kingship, and then define the kingdoms he recognized, characteristically arranging them by discernable qualities. At 3.9.2, Aristotle begins with a form of constitutional monarchy à la Sparta, in which the (sometimes elected) monarch is not sovereign in all respects, but is absolutely so during military
campaigns. He notes that a king of this sort knew absolute military authority for life, and he acknowledges that it was known in the past (e.g., in Homer), as well as in his own day. Aristotle continues by recognizing a “barbarian” type of kingship, hereditary in nature and in some ways resembling tyranny except that such kings were subject to law and protected not by foreign mercenaries but by willing, native warriors. As an aside, Aristotle remarks that such kingdoms were possible among barbarians but not among Greeks because barbarians (and here Asians even more so than Europeans) were more “servile” than Greeks. Aristotle then denotes a third type of kings, known to the Greeks of old, whom he calls the *aisymnétaí*. This kind of monarchy was elective tyranny, and differed from the kingship type known to barbarians only in the fact that such power was not hereditarily obtained. Aristotle notes that some kings of this type ruled for life, while others ruled for fixed terms, or until whatever they had been enthroned to accomplish had been completed. He then states that kings of this type were tyrant-like in their autocracy, but king-like in their selection by willing subjects. Aristotle next distinguishes a fourth type of kingship that he associates with the heroic past. Characteristic of this form was the willing support of subjects, won over by past benefactions. Having established themselves, kings of this ilk passed their authorities to linear successors with the consent of their subjects. These kings had supreme command in war, acted as judges, and were religiously active on behalf of their peoples. They once knew considerable power, but gradually had seen their authorities eroded, so that in his contemporary world, only a vestige of their religious authority remained.

After providing this list, Aristotle takes a moment to summarize what he had just covered about kingship. Then, perhaps unexpectedly, he introduces yet another type of kingship (*Pol*. 3.10.2):

But a fifth kind of kingship is when a single ruler is sovereign over all matters in the way in which each race and each city is sovereign over its common affairs; this monarchy ranges with the rule of a master over a household, for just as the master’s rule is a sort of monarchy in the home, so absolute monarchy is domestic mastership over a city, or over a race or several races. There are therefore, we may say, virtually two kinds of kingship that have been examined, this one and the Spartan. For most of the others lie between these. . . .

After going on for a bit about the dangers of absolute monarchy and the snares to which an absolute monarch might fall prey, Aristotle returns to a point he has already made at 3.8.1 (*Pol*. 3.11.11–13):
Fit subject for royal government is a populace of such a sort as to be naturally capable of producing a family of outstanding excellence for political leadership . . . a republican community, one in which there naturally grows up a military populace capable of being governed and of governing under a law that distributes the offices among the well-to-do in accordance with merit. Where therefore it comes about that there is either a whole family or even some one individual that differs from the other citizens in virtue so greatly that his virtue exceeds that of all the others, then it is just for this family to be the royal family or this individual king, and sovereign over all matters. . . . For it is not seemly to put to death or banish, or yet obviously to ostracize, such a man, nor is it seemly to call upon him to take his turn as a subject; for it is not in the order of nature for the part to overtop the whole, but the man that is so exceptionally outstanding has come to overtop the whole community. Hence it only remains for the community to obey such a man, and for him to be sovereign not in turn but absolutely.

Now, it should be noted that in his list of kingships one through four, Aristotle bases his characterizations not upon philosophical abstractions, but upon historical or contemporary prototypes, both Greek and Barbarian. Did he intend Macedon to be characterized by any of these types? If so, it certainly was neither types one nor three, because the sovereignty of Macedonian kings was not exclusively military in the manner of Sparta, but it was hereditary and not elective. Nor can Macedonian kingship be associated with Aristotle’s fourth type, since he clearly describes this type of kingship as historical, with only feint vestiges lingering in his present day. Finally, contra Hammond, it is impossible that Aristotle would lump the Argeads together with barbarians, thus also eliminating type two as a possibility. Many of Aristotle’s prominent contemporaries might have found it easy to call Philip a barbarian, but they did not know the north as did Aristotle. Nor had most of them seen Pella, post-Archeaus, or schooled the young prince Alexander, or personally known of his familiarity with the Greek classics, or edited for him a personal copy of the Iliad, or from their own families provided the conqueror of Persia with an historian and court tutor (i.e., Callisthenes). Thus, it borders on the perverse to think that Aristotle would lump Argead Macedon among the barbarian states. We may conclude that the master had no intention of associating Macedon with any of his first four types of kingship. But what about Aristotle’s fifth type of kingship, absolute kingship of the oikos sort, so prominently separated from his other kingships and situated nowhere in either time or space? To
what concrete example is Aristotle referring when he introduces this type of rule? Although one might assume that Aristotle would associate Persia with such absolute monarchy, that cannot be so here since Persia is so obviously incorporated in his second type. Could the mention of a kingship that associated the authority of a king to that exercised by the master in his own household be an oblique reference to what Aristotle believed he saw in Macedonia? Since it is self-evident that Aristotle intended the Politics to be a serious analysis of politeieia as they existed in his day and not a work of speculative philosophy, I believe we must answer, that yes, here is where Aristotle meant to place Macedon, while doing so obliquely so as to minimize antagonizing his Athenian hosts. Of course, it does not follow that Aristotle necessarily believed that the Argeads were men of such outstanding virtue as to justify absolutism for long, but the virtue evoked by Aristotle was relative, and I see no reason why the successes of Philip and Alexander could not have been interpreted by Aristotle as giving proofs of their unique superiority. And, of course, there is also the issue which I will not pursue here of how some among Aristotle’s audience, Alexander in particular, interpreted what the master had to say about virtuous men and the law. As every professor knows, what he says and believes is not always what his student takes away from a discussion on any point.

Although I do not expect to have the last word on Macedonian Staatsrecht when I argue that Aristotle imagined the Argead realm to be an absolute one on the oikos model, because it fits the constitutional arguments already put forward very well, I do find it odd that none of the most prominent scholars dealing with the issue makes reference to Aristotle on this point. For the absolutists, it explains why the Macedonian kings could frequently reject the impositions placed upon them at times by their subjects without institutional ramifications. It also fits the lack of independent political activity among the Macedonians, the absence of an official royal titulature, the personal nature of the monarchy with the reckoning of status as a relationship with the reigning king, the absence of any kind of political bureaucracy, royal interaction with foreign powers, royal ownership of natural resources, royal marriages as politics, and the one known prerequisite for Macedonian kingship until the demise of the royal house, being an Argead (if not necessarily the first son of the previous king). On the other hand, if one considers what Aristotle says about the kingdom as household in light of his discussion about the composition of the typical oikos (household) and its various roles and statuses in the first book of the Politics (1.5.1 ff.), it also meshes well with some of the points articulated by the Macedonian constitutionalists.
Although Aristotle believed the master of the *oikos* to be an authority without peer, he also believed that the culture, much enhanced by strong emotional ties, by necessity tempered the exercise of that authority. Aristotle clearly recognized that established roles and statuses brought with them some claims of respect, especially when circumstances affected the well-being of affected parties. Aristotle knew that the *oikos* only functioned well when it did so as a coordinated social unit with the rights of those within it being respected. Without the relative harmony that comes with a mutual respect of station within the household, the common business cannot be accomplished successfully (*Pol*. 1.5.11–12). Without going into greater specifics here, I will assume both that Aristotle understood Argead kingship to be of this household type, and, that he was more or less in step with what contemporary Macedonians thought about their condition. Further, I consider Aristotle, as familiar as he was with Macedonian institutions, to be a better source about their nature than any of the extant historical sources over which scholars to date have wrangled.

In Macedon, down to the reign of Archelaus, the household “help” was most prominently provided by the *hetairoi* (Companions), who provided the early kings with their cavalry (the only part of the Macedonian army worth mentioning) and who probably acted as royal surrogates in the absences of the king. As Thucydides notes, this changed radically with Archelaus, who militarily upgraded his kingdom, financially centralized it, and extensively promoted the cultural Hellenization of his realm.30

But these reforms, intended to exploit the decline of Athenian regional influence before any other than Argead Macedon could be established in the vacuum thus created, not only aimed at greater security from foreign enemies, they also had the effect of strengthening the king’s powers in relationship to the influence of the *hetairoi*. This was so because, in order to enhance the realm’s security, Archelaus attempted to increase the military effectiveness of an infantry; he did this by sowing the seeds for a larger middle class and maximizing revenues which could be used, among other things, to hire mercenaries.31 The rise of a more powerful kingship thus threatened the *hetairoi* by creating a military balance to their influence and rivals for domestic economic resources. This attempt at royal consolidation, so abruptly introduced, led to dissent among Macedon’s aristocracy and the eventual assassination of Archelaus.32 Archelaus’ death led to an interesting but very tumultuous period of Macedonian history which I will not review here. Rather, we pick up the narrative with the death of Perdiccas III and the massacre of the army he was commanding, which ironically can be evaluated as one of the best
things that ever happened to Macedon (Diod. 16.2.4–5). Perdiccas’
death soon led to the elevation of his younger brother Philip, whose
achievements are famous. But one largely overlooked result of the
manner of Perdiccas’ death must be emphasized here. The magni-
tude of the losses suffered by the Macedonians at the hands of their
Illyrian foes both exterminated a critical mass of *hetairoi* and created
mass hysteria throughout the realm. Philip successfully exploited the
hysteria by massively expanding the Macedonian infantry which
soon proved that the faith which his subjects had placed in him was
well founded, at least insofar as domestic security and national pride
was concerned (Diod. 16.3–6). One of the reasons Philip was able to
act so decisively, however, was the decimation of the *hetairoi* that
occurred at the time of Perdiccas’ death. As a result of their losses,
Philip created and used his own corps of elite lieutenants while
simultaneously disregarding whatever qualms anyone might have
had about any failure to observe whatever may have become the
expected prerogatives of the *hetairoi*. Philip may not have had a blank
check to do anything he wanted to do, but he clearly greatly expanded
the powers of the Macedonian king, as the sources attest (Diod. 16.95.1–4),
and, because of his success, he faced very few domestic
obstacles. Philip’s very success, however, created a new environment
and he came increasingly to depend on favorites to extend his effec-
tive reach. He was still king and the ultimate source of justice and
security against threats from both this world and the divine.
Nevertheless, figures like Parmenion, Antipater, and Attalus accrued a
certain amount of prestige thanks to Philip, which in turn led to the
development of their own interests and ambitions, factors that the
king could disregard only at his peril.33 Nothing appears to have been
static as long as success was mounted upon success, so that, by the
end of his life, Philip may even have aspired to be recognized as more
than human, along the lines that Aristotle defined.34 Success, how-
ever, demanded constant effort and vigilance, so that even as the size
of Macedon grew beyond the limits that could be successfully con-
trolled by the primitive household structures of the kingdom Philip
had inherited, there was no time for consolidation, for systematiza-
tion, or for reform. The king may have had the last say, but care
continuously had to be taken so that when he spoke he did not desta-
bilize the balance of his household or its dependents, or threaten their
interests through marriage, political or military appointments, or new
policy initiatives, and so on. This became increasingly difficult, since
success has the effect of reinforcing the illusion of invincibility in the
successful, frequently leading, as it did in Philip’s case, to one indis-
cretion too many: toward the end of his life especially, Philip was
too often unsuccessful in balancing rival domestic interests. Since Philip never fundamentally reformed the structure of his kingdom, the future of Macedon remained in the balance at the time of his assassination.

Whether Philip realized the need for structural political reform cannot be known, but clearly, as Alexander’s own successes mounted in Asia, he did realize that such reforms had to come, and soon, for his conquests to have any hope of long-term stability. Of course, his famous orientalization brought on its equally famous reactions among the Macedonians. One thing that should not be overlooked here is the emotionalism unleashed as Alexander adopted the dress and customs of the east in exchange for stability. Alexander’s fundamental alteration of established mores was viewed as betrayal by most Macedonians, as was the incorporation of outsiders into what they understood as a national “household.” Imagine, for a moment, a head of a household, having obtained meteoric success, deciding to build a huge new house, and then decorating every room of it in a radical new fashion, only thereafter to invite strangers, whose clothes, food, music, and even gods were new to the old family, to reside in the new home alongside the original members, and I think you can appreciate how the Macedonians felt after Alexander embraced Persian norms. Even most of those who would have understood the need to live by very new standards would have felt pangs of nostalgia and realized a sense of loss. “Progress,” alas, always comes at a cost.

Since Errington, much has been written about the importance of a consensus of Macedonian nobles in the running of the state and dynastic affairs, and indeed the influence of those *hetairoi* who were appropriately situated at critical points in the unfolding of Macedon’s history is consistently chronicled in our sources. The influence of the lucky few who happened to be in the right place at the right time, or of those whose established *auctoritas* demanded respect from all lest dire consequences be realized, only grew with the size of the Argead kingdom. This was not so, however, because of some acknowledged constitutional role, but because, in lieu of any formalized political infrastructure, the *hetairoi* continued to give the king greater reach: they allowed the household to grow to a monstrous size and temporarily delayed the need for institutional change. The tragedy of the Argead house is that even though Alexander realized the need for reform, it had not proceeded far enough to save the “house” from collapse before his extraordinary life came to an end. Once Alexander’s Argead heirs were removed, there no longer existed an acknowledged owner of the national “estate.” To make matters worse, Alexander (even though there existed no immediately viable successor to his
power from within his family)\(^3^7\) left no will committing his estate to another house or even to a prominently placed general. Therefore, the “deed of ownership” became hotly disputed, and no ground rules for the rights of usufruct were ever generally respected. This is why all of Alexander’s successors had to scrap to create new legitimacies for their respective futures. Most, of course, failed.
This page intentionally left blank
At the end of his comparison of the good and bad qualities of Philip II and Alexander III (the Great) of Macedonia, Justin has this to say: *Quibus artibus orbis imperii fundamenta pater iecit, operis totius gloriām filius consummāuit* —“with such qualities did the father lay the basis for a worldwide empire and the son bring to completion the glorious enterprise” (9.8.21). At first sight the quotation is an apt summary of the key achievements of their reigns. From disunited chaos, economic ruin, and military weakness, Philip II (r. 359–36) turned Macedonia into the super-power of the fourth century, established an empire, created a first-class army (and an engineering corps that pioneered the torsion catapult), and framed the plans for the invasion of Asia. Alexander built on his father’s legacy and in little over a decade as king (r. 336–23) he brought the planned invasion of Asia to spectacular fruition. On his death in 323, the Macedonian empire, stretching from Greece to India (modern Pakistan), was as close to worldwide as one could get in antiquity.

It is easy to understand why Alexander has come to be the household name he is, in his time and down to the present day, and why he is the subject of far more books than Philip (although the paucity of ancient evidence that we have today for Philip, compared to Alexander, is a factor). Philip lives in the shadow of his famous son, given that he did not wage anything like the spectacular battles and sieges that Alexander did, and while Philip did more for the actual kingdom of Macedonia than any of its other kings, he did not oversee a Macedonian empire that was as expansive as that of Alexander. The difference between the reigns of these two kings is apparently also reflected in how ancient writers saw them. In the case of Philip, we have only two narrative sources for his reign, Diodorus (book 16), of the first century B.C., and Justin (book 7.6–9), himself writing in later imperial times, but who epitomized Pompeius Trogus’ *Historiae Philippicae*, which was also written in the first century B.C. Philip is
praised for such things as his diplomatic and military skills, his achievements in Macedonia, and the reorganization of the army, but our ancient writers seem to wax the more lyrical over Alexander in their narratives of his reign, principally for his spectacular exploits in Asia, as the opening quotation indicates.5

It is the contention of this paper, however, that the impression that Diodorus and Justin favor Alexander is a misleading one. It can be argued that Justin’s lengthy comparison of the two kings (9.8) and Diodorus’ personal comments on Philip (16.95) and Alexander (17.117) actually elevate Philip over Alexander, not the other way around. This view has implications about the standards on which they based their evaluations, especially in light of the Roman perceptions of Alexander at the time when they were writing, and by extension it further distances Diodorus from being merely a summarizer of his sources, especially Ephorus.6 Further, it plays a role in how we today ought to view Philip and Alexander. I begin with Justin 9.8, a comparison of Philip and Alexander made at the end of his narrative of Philip’s reign:

(1) Philip . . . was a king with more enthusiasm for the military than the convivial sphere; (5) in his view his greatest treasures were the tools of warfare. (6) He had a greater talent for acquiring wealth than keeping it, and thus despite his daily pillaging he was always short of funds. (7) His compassion and his duplicity were qualities which he prized equally, and no means of gaining a victory would he consider dishonourable. (8) He was charming and treacherous at the same time, the type to promise more in conversation than he would deliver, and whether the discussion was serious or lighthearted he was an artful performer. (9) He cultivated friendships with a view to expediency rather than from genuine feelings. His usual practice was to feign warm feelings when he hated someone, to sow discord between parties that were in agreement and then try to win the favour of both. (10) Besides this he was possessed of eloquence and a remarkable oratorical talent, full of subtlety and ingenuity, so that his elegant style was not lacking fluency nor his fluency lacking stylistic elegance. (11) Philip was succeeded by his son Alexander, who surpassed his father both in good qualities and bad. (12) Each had his own method of gaining victory, Alexander making war openly and Philip using trickery; the latter took pleasure in duping the enemy, the former in putting them to flight in the open. (13) Philip was the more prudent strategist, Alexander had the greater vision. (14) The father could hide, and sometimes even suppress, his anger; when Alexander’s had flared up, his retaliation could be neither delayed nor kept in
check. (15) Both were excessively fond of drink, but intoxication brought out different shortcomings. It was the father’s habit to rush from the dinner party straight at the enemy, engage him in combat and recklessly expose himself to danger; Alexander’s violence was directed not against the enemy but against his own comrades. (16) As a result Philip was often brought back from his battles wounded while the other often left a dinner with his friends’ blood on his hands. (17) Philip was unwilling to share the royal power with his friends; Alexander wielded it over his. The father preferred to be loved, the son to be feared. (18) They had a comparable interest in literature. The father had greater shrewdness, the son was truer to his word. (19) Philip was more restrained in his language and discourse, Alexander in his actions. (20) When it came to showing mercy to the defeated, the son was temperamentally more amenable and more magnanimous. The father was more disposed to thrift, the son to extravagance. (21) With such qualities did the father lay the basis for a worldwide empire and the son bring to completion the glorious enterprise.

At a first reading the account gives a generally hostile view of Philip’s character. Justin views him as a cruel person, deceitful, and beyond shame in his actions, and, further, says that Philip had no hesitation in plundering and selling into slavery the women and children of allied cities (8.3.1–5). Alexander is also the subject of criticism, and the passage shows that Alexander’s bad qualities outweighed his good qualities.

The relationship of Justin’s work to the original one by Trogus is problematic to say the least. Estimates for the life of Justin span the second to the fourth century A.D., and we cannot say whether he is merely echoing Trogus or giving us his own opinion. However, his criticism of Alexander echoes that of Diodorus (see below), who was writing in first-century B.C. Rome. Diodorus, therefore, could have been roughly contemporary to Trogus. Moreover, the Romans’ attitude to Alexander (and of Greek values) was hostile at this time. Alexander’s reputation was really only elevated in the second century A.D. when philhellenism fell into fashion again. Both Trogus and Diodorus are a product of the Roman world and its values and beliefs, and so must have been influenced by these factors (and perhaps by the depiction of Alexander in Roman writers). Since Justin was writing so much later, when Alexander was viewed more positively, we might expect his account to reflect this reevaluation more widely. While there are positive elements in it, thus reflecting Justin’s times, most of it is critical, and hence reflective of the earlier negative views
A more careful reading of this Justin passage reveals that Philip is presented as the reverse of Alexander. In other words, Philip’s personal good qualities outweigh his bad ones, and hence Trogus/Justin elevates him over Alexander. For example, Justin says that Alexander “surpassed his father both in good qualities and bad [qualities].” The latter would include emotional outbursts, for Philip “could hide, and sometimes even suppress, his anger,” unlike Alexander, whose retaliation (when angered) “could be neither delayed nor kept in check.” Further, Alexander was violent “not against the enemy but against his own comrades”: one thinks of the engineered demises of Philotas and Parmenion in the so-called Philotas conspiracy at Phrada in 330, Callisthenes in the Pages Conspiracy at Bactra in the same year, probably Coenus, who openly voiced discontent at the mutiny at the Hyphasis river in 326, and of course the drunken murder of Cleitus at Maracanda in 328, to which Justin must refer when he says Alexander often left “a dinner with his friends’ blood on his hands.” Nevertheless, he does end with the line that Philip laid “the basis for a worldwide empire and Alexander brought to completion the glorious enterprise.”

The criticisms of Philip’s character in the passage may, however, simply be pragmatic acknowledgments of the measures Philip was forced to take, given the situations in which he so often found himself, and hence which Trogus/Justin’s Roman audience would understand. For much of his reign, Philip was fighting to unite his kingdom, given its history, to protect its borders from invasion, and to defy interference on the part of hostile Greek powers. It is hardly a surprise, then, that Philip (as Justin says) was “charming and treacherous at the same time” and that he had to “cultivate friendships with a view to expediency rather than from genuine feelings” and “to feign warm feelings when he hated someone, to sow discord between parties that were in agreement and then try to win the favor of both.”

Justin puts his comparative passage at the end of Philip’s reign. This is logical, although introducing Alexander into it adds an interesting and arguably unexpected dynamic. Further, it makes one wonder how Justin might deal with Alexander in a summation at the end of his account of Alexander’s reign. This occurs in book 12 chapter 16, in a passage that starts with the news that Alexander died at the age of 33. Yet the majority of that chapter is about the myths associated with Olympias’ impregnation and Alexander’s birth, and his instruction under Aristotle. It ends as follows (12.16.11):
So it was that he did battle with no adversary without defeating him, besieged no city without taking it, and attacked no tribe without crushing it entirely. (12) In the end he was brought down not by the valour of an enemy but by a plot hatched by his own men and the treachery of his fellow countrymen.

There is no question that this is a far briefer treatment of Alexander’s end than Trogus/Justin lavish on Philip. All Alexander did was fight, it seems (albeit always successfully), and in the end his men had enough of him and he was brought down not in battle, as we might imagine he might have wanted his end to be, but as a victim of a conspiracy. It is thus an inglorious death, not a Homeric/heroic one, but then so was that of Philip, cut down by an assassin’s dagger at Aegae in 336 and perhaps also the victim of a conspiracy that may even have involved Alexander.

Next, let us consider Diodorus. Again (as with Trogus/Justin), we have the problem that affects all of the secondary ancient sources on Alexander: to what extent do they accurately use the primary (earlier) source material, existing today only in fragments, and especially do they give us views stemming from the historical and cultural backgrounds in which they wrote or do they simply reiterate those of their sources? It has been convincingly demonstrated that Diodorus was not merely a “scissors and paste historian,” virtually summarizing his sources, when it comes to his use of the sources (as has long been thought), but was his own distinctive writer and with his own opinions. Since I have argued that the judgments of Diodorus and Trogus/Justin are similar, they may well reflect the Roman view of Alexander in the early empire. However, it is the concluding passages in Diodorus that I find particularly telling because before each of these passages Diodorus has given us a straightforward narrative of each king’s reign. In the concluding sections what we read are his own opinions of these kings, with Philip coming off better than Alexander.

Thus, at 17.117.5, Diodorus is of the opinion that “[Alexander] accomplished greater deeds than any, not only of the kings who had lived before him but also of those who were to come later down to our time.” This is high praise, but fitting for someone who within a decade had expanded the Macedonian empire from Greece to what the Greeks called India (modern Pakistan), and could not be matched by any other king of Macedonia. However, in his concluding comments about Philip in 16.95, Diodorus has this to say:

Such was the end of Philip, who had made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time, and because of the extent of
his kingdom had made himself a throned companion of the twelve gods. He had ruled twenty-four years. He is known to fame as one who with but the slenderest resources to support his claim to a throne won for himself the greatest empire in the Greek world, while the growth of his position was not due so much to his prowess in arms as to his adroitness and cordiality in diplomacy. Philip himself is said to have been prouder of his grasp of strategy and his diplomatic successes than of his valor in actual battle. Every member of his army shared in the successes that were won in the field but he alone got credit for victories won through negotiations.

The immediate reaction is that this is far better than the brief conclusion on Alexander. That Philip was the “greatest of the kings in Europe” clearly echoes Theopompus’ famous line in the Proem to his Philippica that Europe had never produced such a man as Philip.19 Theopompus goes on to detail Philip’s various character flaws and ruthlessness, such as his excessive drinking, a voracious sexual appetite for women, men, and boys, his incontinence, his inability to manage money, and his destruction of Greek cities.20 He also states that Philip owed more to luck than anything else, and expounds on the dangers of life at the Macedonian court. There are echoes here of Demosthenes (2.18–19), who says the Macedonian court was dangerous, debauched, and full of indecent dancing and drunken revelry, and he regularly attributes the king’s military successes to his use of bribes.21 Theopompus and Demosthenes were contemporary writers and they did not like Philip (yet Demosthenes would call Philip “the cleverest man under the sun,” Aes. 2.41). Clearly the criticisms of our later writers on Philip are far more limited in extent,22 and in fact they dilute what the earlier sources give us in their presentation of the two kings.

Thus, Diodorus echoes what Theopompus has to say about Philip and Europe, but he decides to modify it and even ignore some of the more telling criticisms. Philip seemingly has done enough to make him a god;23 he came from nowhere and won for himself “the greatest empire in the Greek world.” He did so by a combination of military force and diplomacy, and he thought more of diplomacy than fighting.24 In other words, he used other means to beat his enemies (unlike Alexander) and especially to consolidate his position, again unlike his son.

The similarity in viewpoint and especially in the placement between Diodorus’ longer closing comment on Philip and shorter one on Alexander and Justin’s longer closing comment on Philip and shorter one on Alexander is striking. Moreover, Trogus/Justin turns
his necrology of Philip into a long comparison between Philip and his famous son. In Alexander literature as a whole it is unique, and it extends far beyond the famous speech in 324 that Alexander allegedly delivered to his mutinous men at Opis (as Arrian gives it to us), in which he started off by lauding his father but then went on to praise his own achievements more.25

Justin does not appear to be giving us merely rhetorical flourish, as it has been argued that Arrian does in the Opis speech, nor was he expounding on some literary father-son topos. There is more to his necrology than a literary undertone. Like Diodorus, Trogus/Justin’s view of Philip and Alexander is based not so much on what each king did, but how each king acted in the best interests of his kingdom and especially each king’s legacy. These points now need expansion, beginning with the legacies.

There is a chasm of a difference between the legacy of Alexander and that of Philip.26 Thus, at the end of Alexander’s reign in 323, when the Macedonian empire was at its greatest geographical extent, national pride back home was probably at its lowest and dissatisfaction with its king at its highest. Alexander left no undisputed heir to succeed him, and when news of his death reached the mainland, the Greeks revolted from Macedonia in the Lamian War.27 He also depleted Macedonian manpower with his frequent demands for reinforcements to the extent that Antipater, left behind as guardian of Greece and deputy hēgemōn of the League of Corinth, could have been severely compromised if the Greeks had attempted a widespread insurrection.28 Diodorus 17.16 tells us that Parmenion and Antipater had been urging Alexander from the time of his accession not to become actively involved in Asia until he had produced a son and heir, but he ignored them (admittedly, choosing a bride in his first year as king, given the problems he faced, was problematic, not least because of the relative dearth of suitable candidates). That was perhaps his biggest failing as king. Unlike his father, Alexander failed to grasp the advantages of political marriages to consolidate and maintain power—of Philip’s seven marriages, the first six were kata polemon.29 Alexander’s marriage to Roxane of Bactria in 327 was probably political—an attempt to secure the loyalty of Bactria, as well as to have an heir.30 By then it was a case of too little too late. Roxane did give birth to a child, who died at the Hyphasis river in 326 (Metz Epit. 70). She was pregnant again when Alexander died, and Alexander’s answer of “to the best” when he was asked to whom he was leaving his empire only exacerbated the tensions between his generals.31 Alexander may well have ushered in the cultural greatness of the Hellenistic era,32 but after his death the Macedonian throne
became a bone of contention in the bloody wars waged by those generals for three decades, and the empire that Philip had worked so hard to found and Alexander to extend was no more.

Philip’s legacy, on the other hand, was brilliant, and there is no question that Macedonia benefitted more from his rule than from that of Alexander. We need only compare the kingdom in 359 when he became king to 336 at the time of his death for the very obvious differences. By the time he died, he had doubled Macedonia in size and population, and his empire stretched from southern Greece to the Danube. The systematic reduction of previous enemies within Upper Macedonia and elsewhere on his frontiers, Illyria, Paeonia, Thrace, and the Chalcidice, and a new, centralized government at Pella, created border security and a unified Upper and Lower Macedonian kingdom for the first time in its history. Indeed, the unification of Macedonia and the elevation of Pella as capital of the entire kingdom were arguably Philip’s greatest successes, as everything he was able to do followed from them. His military and economic reforms revolutionized both army and state. He stimulated the economy as never before, and Macedonian coinage became the strongest in Europe. He left Alexander the best army in the Greek world, no external threats, the plan for the invasion of Asia, and no succession problems.33

Diodorus writes of Alexander as he does at the end of his narrative of that king’s reign because of his military successes and the extent of the empire he forged. Alexander did accomplish “greater deeds than anyone, not only of the kings who had lived before him but also of those who were to come later down to our time,” by which he means Alexander created a great empire that no single person could match. Not even the Romans came close to duplicating what Alexander did because no single man forged their empire, but a succession of generals in different areas, and over a far greater time frame than the decade it took Alexander. Pompey was great, but he was one of many who played a role in extending Rome’s empire.

However, let us consider the difference between creating an empire (i.e., winning the battles) and administering it. Alexander did try to administer his vast empire and to reconcile his rule with the conquered peoples, especially the Persian aristocratic families, but his attempts at nation-building ultimately failed.34 Diodorus does not distance Philip from what Alexander achieved, and nor does Trogus/Justin. Yet as Justin significantly says at the end of his necrology, quoted above, Philip “laid the basis” (fundamenta pater iecit) for “a worldwide empire” and Alexander brought to completion “the glorious enterprise.”
The phrase *fundamenta pater iecit* ("Philip laid the basis") is important. I would argue that it shows that these authors did not merely understand that Alexander built on his father's considerable accomplishment, but also that without Philip's original plan to invade Asia, Alexander would not have been able to achieve what he did. Given the distance that Alexander traveled, as far east as present-day Pakistan, it was nothing short of a worldwide empire—even in his own time, some Greek orators depicted Alexander as reaching the end of the world. The comparison between the two kings gives Philip the edge because he formed the plans to invade Asia (a glorious Panhellenic enterprise to liberate the Greek cities of Asia Minor and to punish the Persians for what the Greeks had suffered at their hands during the Persian Wars); Alexander carried the enterprise out, but again, without Philip and the plan to invade Asia, there would have been no Alexander in Asia, and hence no Alexander the Great.

It was the legacy of both kings and the nature of their rules that drove our ancient writers to see them as they did. Hence, to Diodorus, Alexander might have actually done more than any king down to his day, but it was Philip who "won for himself the greatest empire in the Greek world." Philip never forgot what his duties as king were, never lost touch with his people, and worked to ensure the continuation of his dynasty. In his battles and sieges he lost an eye, shattered a collarbone, and suffered a near fatal wound that maimed a leg and made him limp for the rest of his life, but he took all these knocks in the pursuit of his own glory and especially for that of his kingdom—as even his harshest critic Demosthenes admits—and with no reluctance (cf. 11.22, 18.67).

Likewise, Trogus/Justin, who takes the opportunity of rounding off his account of Philip's reign to make this unique, detailed comparison between Philip and Alexander that structurally and dramatically would have been lost at the end of his Alexander narrative. It is not mere rhetoric: Justin wants us to remember the points he makes about Alexander (and about him and his father) as we read on in his account into Alexander's reign. He has set us up beforehand to be critical of Alexander. It has the same effect as Thucydides' description of Cleon as "the most violent of the citizens" the first time he introduces him before the Mytilene debate (3.36.6). Try as we might, it is impossible to get that image out of our minds when we read about Cleon in Thucydides.

Trogus/Justin and Diodorus were preoccupied with that makes a good ruler—as the Romans of their time were. Diodorus we know concerned himself with the relationship of the individual to state, and so it is no surprise that Philip receives the better press from this
writer, given what he did for Macedonia, than Alexander, who was present in his kingdom only for two years of his reign, and whose death marked the disintegration of the Macedonian empire and Macedonia becoming a pawn in the wars of the successors until the Antigonid dynasty established itself in the third century. That Alexander may have been implicated in his father’s assassination did not help either. At the same time, they were writing when the Romans’ view of Alexander was being shaped by important changes in politics and culture that were taking place in republican and early imperial Rome. Thanks to these, Alexander had become a “Roman construct, a product of Roman sensibilities and worldview,” and he was the “archetype for monarchy and charismatic autocracy” because of Roman attitudes to Greek kingship. Although Philip himself had works written about him (Theopompus’ *Philippica* being the obvious example, and of course Trogus’ account of the same title), and hence was known to a Roman audience, he was not subject to the same shift of reinterpretation as his more famous son. This was because Alexander excited the imagination more, given his spectacular military achievements, which put Philip in their shadow. Diodorus and Trogus/Justin, however, rightly shone the spotlight on Philip as being the better ruler for Macedonia. The great conqueror did not make the better king.

Diodorus and Trogus/Justin constructed a deliberately styled juxtaposition of Philip and Alexander in their accounts of their reigns. Both have a higher opinion of Philip than of Alexander, which was based not so much on mere exploits, but on the nature of kingship and what makes a good king. While few people today would eulogize Alexander as the rosy, heroic figure of a Tarn or a Lane Fox, especially when we consider him not as just a general but as a king, our ancient writers were also concerned with presenting and representing as correct an image of Alexander, and of his father, as historically possible—and so should we. To them (and the Roman audience), it would seem, setting up a future worldwide empire was more important than completing that glorious enterprise. Perhaps the norm of referring to the fourth century as the age of Alexander should be adjusted and it would be better to call that century the age of Philip and Alexander.
“You Should Never Meet Your Heroes . . .”
Growing Up with Alexander, the Valerius Maximus Way

Diana Spencer

. . . He loves hype like any child of modern media.

These two opening sound bites encapsulate the lively afterimage that continues to embed Alexander within genealogies of autocratic charisma. In the British TV comedy series Father Ted, naive priest Dougal MacGuire confronts his own disappointment on first meeting an admired TV quiz show host (Henry Sellers), who is also, it transpires, a dramatically-lapsed alcoholic: “It’s true what they say, you should never meet your heroes, you’ll only be disappointed,” runs the full quote addressed to worldly wise and cynical Father Ted when Sellers, who has arrived to Compère the All Priests Stars In Their Eyes Lookalike Competition on remote Craggy Island, goes on a drunken rampage. Chasing Sellers across the island, the local police sergeant comments to Father Ted, “This reminds me of Vietnam.” Ted asks, astonished, “Were you in Vietnam, Sergeant?” “Ah no, no,” replies the Sergeant, “I mean, you know, the films.” This disjunction between “reality” and “myth,” with a dash of propaganda thrown in, pithily sums up a key aspect of how Alexander attained mythic status: very soon after his accession to the throne he was available to most of his subjects only as a legendary figure. No one but those accompanying him got the chance to meet the full-fledged famous “Alexander” unmediated by texts of one kind or another, and no biological successor survived to perpetuate—and thereby dilute—the unique image conjured up by “Alexander the Great.”

Pronouncing that “you should never meet your heroes,” then, retrospectively evokes key issues that faced Alexander himself. It also acknowledges many of the difficulties and opportunities that Alexander’s complex legacy posed for all subsequent autocrats who, unlike the Macedonian, made the transition from glory-hunting commander to elder statesman. Alexander’s famously successful promulgation of his own
legend, and his achievement in making himself a charismatic poster boy for Hellenic resurgence against a vast but corrupt Persian empire, made it very difficult for any subsequent ruler or military campaign operating in the East to escape his shadow. The world after Alexander continued to reference him as a model not only because of his exceptional and world-changing military achievements, but also because of his failure to secure the future politically. In the aftermath of his brief but spectacular career, successive Hellenistic kingdoms, and eventually Rome, needed to face up to the more mundane problems of government in and by *longue durée*—they expected to stay the course, to outlast any one normal lifetime rather than blazing to a spectacular but early end. These are the Successor Kingdoms—political units defined by dynasticism, but still eager to make Alexander their founding and legitimizing figure. This process made comparisons or pseudogenealogies of power inevitable, whether in contemporary or retroactive propaganda.3

These fresh heirs of Alexander, presenting “Alexander” anew, inevitably cross-fertilized, contaminated, and rewrote him in their own image. This iterative process whereby states and rulers proclaimed their legitimacy by instantiating Alexander (that is, by making themselves part of Alexander’s *dunasteia*) made “Alexander” a common ancestor for the emerging political states of the Hellenistic Mediterranean. Of particular significance for this chapter is how the up-and-coming Roman Empire drew Alexander into its developing historiographic mythmaking as it struggled to create a genealogy for itself.4

1. *Dunasteia*

Valerius Maximus “loves hype like any child of modern media.” Whether by accident or design, Shackleton Bailey’s throwaway remark draws Valerius—who is addressing his work to the emperor Tiberius—into Alexander’s *dunasteia*. In one sense at least, it transforms Valerius by implication into yet one more Successor, another Roman Alexander marshaling an exciting and memorable parade of *maiores* (noteworthy ancestors) in a compendium that works toward his own as well as Rome’s interests. Taking such an approach to the relationship between Valerius and his favored characters can have significant implications for reading and for appreciating the cultural weight of his project, both as he defines it and as we understand it.5

There is nothing provocative in suggesting that Alexander is the ultimate self-fashioned hero—this was already a truism in the earliest
surviving sources. Texts describing Alexander show him operating a sophisticated image factory from the start, creating a larger-than-life “Alexander” for public consumption. The reflexive qualities of such a persona make him an ideal point of reference for subsequent power figures, and had a huge impact on how ideologies of power developed in the Hellenistic world. His success in deploying these qualities also made it very difficult for his “successors” to avoid comparisons when Alexander-style, propagandist self-fashioning was key to their power (whether Ptolemy, Antigonid, Seleucid; or eventually, Roman would-be autocrat). They “make like” an Alexander who is already, famously, doing the exact same thing.

The significant role Alexander plays in Valerius Maximus is, then, a fascinating episode in Roman self-fashioning for at least two reasons: in the first place, his prominence in a collection of noteworthy sayings and deeds addressed directly to Tiberius provides us with a glimpse into his Roman afterlife in the years between a gradual abandonment of Alexander as a viable model in the Augustan Principate and Caligula’s emulatory adoption of him. It thereby offers an insight into the changing focalization his image underwent as it morphed between different kinds of users with different Alexander-style needs and desires. We might argue that for Tiberius, Valerius’ Alexander offers a menu of exempla (positive or negative role models) specifically to highlight the Princeps’ modesty and good judgment in choosing not to deploy them. Secondly, his appearance in Valerius is strikingly different to his use by Velleius Paterculus, another “Tiberian” author, but one who composed a fairly condensed and primarily annalistic history. Valerius’ Alexander features in his own right as protagonist, rather than solely as a comparative figure, as in Velleius. Where Velleius’ comparison of (for example) Julius Caesar to Alexander subsumes Alexander into a grand narrative of Roman history (making his story a prequel to Rome’s), Valerius’ array of sayings and deeds worthy of memory makes an explicit division between Roman and foreign, and thereby downplays Alexander’s role in any one Roman’s ancestral self-fashioning. Instead, this scheme locates Alexander, and to an extent all the “foreign” exempla, within a shared, broadly nuanced cultural memory. He is no one’s ancestor and everyone’s ancestor. Less clear, however, is how well Valerius’ stated aim of separating Roman from foreign plays out in practice, and this is an issue to which we shall return.

Rome was key to the growth of Alexander’s legend. Rome enthusiastically adopted “Alexander” into a pervasive anecdotal tradition and developed him into something Greater than the sum of his parts: a key figure in the changing political Zeitgeist of the last centuries B.C.
Romans also “grew up” with Alexander—as a schoolroom staple he was a key figure in hortatory texts. One facet of this shines through—his significance in late Republican prosopopoeia: a practice whereby Romans “met” their (dead) heroes (maiores—ancestors) by imagining and playing out encounters with them. Valerius’ Alexander, very much in the tradition of the Elder Seneca’s, illuminates the whole project of recording facta simul ac dicta memoratu digna as set out in his Preface. Valerius’ opening move is in the clichéd tradition of authorial self-abnegation (mea paruitas, my inconsequentiality, 1, Praef.). This happens to open the door to his (and we might speculate Rome’s) alter ego: Valerius is minor (paruus) where Alexander is Magnus (Great), and this tag Magnus emphasizes the Roman quality of his legend both semiotically and conceptually.11 Alexander the Great is at least as much a child of Rome as he is a son of Philip’s, and he is also one of Rome’s most problematic maiores.

Valerius’ address to Tiberius prioritizes dunasteia as an interpretive model. He positions himself within a compositional tradition—the way that orators (and poets) of old gained their inspiration and authority was through taking Jupiter Optimus Maximus as their starting point. In this scheme, all texts and all performances of Roman identity always operate relationally to a father figure (Jupiter), and to a god (historically, Jupiter again). Yet Valerius’ comments clearly intimate that Jupiter at least is no longer readily available for everyday assistance.

Into this tradition of pietas (respect and reverence) to one’s maiores and gods alike, laid down in ancient practice, Valerius inserts himself, and then gives the topos an explicitly genealogical twist by using it to muse on Tiberius as a manifestation of hereditary divinity. Valerius’ direct address to Tiberius instantiates a relationship between author and emperor that invokes the paternal qualities of imperial power and its translation into divinity, while at the same time, perhaps, nodding to traditional tensions in paternity and
authority between Philip and Alexander. We shall return to this later (in section 3).

Tiberius’ inherited divinity is tackled head-on and explicitly affirmed; Alexander’s, as we see later, is denied. This differentiation may also be significant when assessing how Valerius characterizes Alexander: he shies away from magnification, typically choosing rex (king) rather than magnus. Often “Alexander” is deemed sufficient to specify the correct Alexander—the third, of Macedon. But the basic question remains: why does Valerius frequently reference this “Alexander” in an early first-century A.D. handbook illustrating all that’s most worth memorializing of the city of Rome and elsewhere?

Pinning down the themed compendium produced by Valerius Maximus—and thereby Alexander’s role in it—requires an awareness of how Romans engaged with the past and in particular with the hermeneutics of exemplary history. Turning back from Tiberius’ Principate to that of Augustus, Livy’s famous Alexander “digression” in Book 9 offers one yardstick. Writing broadly annalistic history, but with a strong interest in the role of individuals and their relationship with the state, Livy makes talk of Alexander equal talk of countless Romans. By writing Alexander into Rome’s history as stalking horse, Livy surely echoes and re-frames a preexisting Roman cultural awareness of the Macedonian that almost guarantees him a walk-on part in future attempts to understand the birth, adolescence, and imperial young adulthood of Rome itself. This model and its influence makes Alexander ideal for Valerius, allowing a pleasing economy of scale (saying “Alexander” speaks volumes) for an author who wants us to know right from the start that encyclopedism is not his game. The virtue of Livy’s republican exempla when compared to Alexander is that they appear interchangeable, whereas Alexander is by default unique and therefore disastrous for stability and continuity. By contrast, in the early first century A.D., we find in Valerius’ Alexander a paradigm for reading stability and continuity into even the most anomalous and entropic of figures.

Valerius’ Alexander moves easily through his themed stories: we meet him first in “Religion” (1.1 ext.5), then “Augury” (1.4 ext.1), “Dreams” (1.7 ext.2), and “Wonders” (1.8 ext.10). These lock him into a set of intensely significant themes. Belief is set against superstition: the public necessities of formal religion rub up against the personal and individual experience of unknowability. After a brief absence in Book 2, he returns in a flurry of key imperial values: “Fortitude” (3.3 ext.1, 4); “Resolution” (3.8 ext.10); repeatedly in “Abstinence and Continence” (4.3 ext.3b, 4a); “Friendship” (4.7 ext.2a, b)—where this chapter will linger; “Humanity and Mercy” (5.1 ext.1a, b); and “Pietas
to *Patria*”—duty and respect to one’s fatherland (5.6 ext.5). Valerius’ shift from ethical qualities to the achievements of great men (*res gestae*) keeps Alexander in the picture for “Things Momentously Said or Done” (6.4 ext.3); “Things Wisely Said or Done” (7.2 ext.10, 11a, 13); and “Things Craftily Said or Done” (7.3 ext.1, 4). Here, the significance of Alexander for a Roman rhetorical education, preparing successive generations of politicians for *bon mots* and public duty, is close to the surface. The subsequent headings are archetypes in his characterization in the Roman imagination. His association with artistic propaganda is a *topos* in and of itself, making inevitable his appearance in “How Great Are the Effects of the Arts” (8.11 ext.2). 18 “Of Appetite for Glory” (8.14 ext.2); “Of Anger and Hatred” (9.3 ext.1); “Of Arrogance and Outrageousness” (9.5 ext.1); and finally, “Of Revenge” (9.10 ext.2) present quintessential themes where Alexander comes to Rome’s service again and again in the production and analysis of cultural norms. 19 As Faranda has observed, Alexander is the predominant “external” figure in the text as a whole, 20 but as this chapter suggests, Valerius’ emphasis on him as *alienus* (external, or “other”) is compromised both by context (Valerius’ audience will expect to meet with Alexander because anecdotes about Alexander were common currency in rhetorical handbooks) and by association (the threat to Rome posed by once and future Alexanders makes playing Alexander a Roman game). 21

Valerius Maximus 7.5.2—an amalgam of four generations of Scipio stories—is worth drawing in at this point. Maslakov speculates that Roman rhetorical practice led to a process whereby “details of family history tended gradually to become the property of popular imagination, destined to be manipulated by it at random and disseminated widely without much concern for keeping generations and identities distinct and properly identifiable.” 22 To meet and thereby refashion Rome’s exemplary heroes on a day-to-day basis, then, is also to encounter a kind of entropic process operating on historical memory. Alexander III of Macedon’s inability to continue or found an imperial dynasty is thus ironically implicated in Rome’s successful and enthusiastic claim-staking over the rights to make Alexander “the Great” part of Rome’s backstory. He is constantly available to perform as himself and in the guise of others as part of a panorama of Roman history, and has left no awkward heirs of the body to complicate matters.

In 338 B.C., Rome reached a rapprochement with the Latin states in the wake of the Latin revolt. In the same year, Philip II of Macedon’s victory at Chaeronea brought the Greek states under Macedonian control. The coincidence of this historical parallel further enhances the
dynastic quality of the ties that bind Alexander into the Roman historical imagination. Such a reading models mid-Republican Rome as a parallel for Philip, and makes Alexander at once son of Philip, by transference heir to Rome’s idealized Republic, and an intriguing “what if . . . ?” for testing alternative developments in Roman autocratic ideology. Valerius’ Alexander remains notionally “alien,” placed in the “external” section of each theme’s elaboration, and Valerius’ Preface is intriguingly specific on the framework: he will split his categories by defining each event or noteworthy saying as either from the city of Rome (urbis Romae) or drawn from external peoples (externarumque gentium). Nevertheless, this split is undermined fairly quickly when he reaches his first transition between “us” and “them.” Discussing Masinissa’s refusal to accept ivory plundered from Juno’s temple at Melita causes Valerius to exclaim: “Yet why restrict an assessment of customs by focusing on nationality? One [Masinissa] whose origins were in the midst of barbarity [foreign/uncivilized] undid the sacrilege of another. . . .”

2. Alexander and Hannibal

At Campana luxuria perquam utilis nostrae ciuitati fuit: inuictum enim armis Hanibalem illecebris suis complexa uincendum Romano militia tradidit. Illa uigilantissimum ducem, illa exercitu acerrimum dapibus largis, abundanti uino unguentorum fragrantia, ueneris usu lasciuiores ad somnum et delicias euocauit . . . adeo ut nescias ab hostibusne an ab illis capi perniciosius habendum sit? (9.1 ext.1)

But Campanian luxury was extremely useful to our state: for having embraced Hannibal, unconquered in arms, by means of its blandishments, it handed him over for conquest to the Roman military. It lured the most vigilant commander, the keenest army, with lavish feasts, plentiful wine, the scent of perfumed oils, the most lascivious sexual practice, into slumber and frivolities . . . so that it’s hard to know whether capture by enemies or by these [the temptations of luxury] should be regarded as more pernicious.

This paradox situates Valerius’ use of Alexander in the didactic tradition of ethnographic historiography exemplified by Sallust, nearly two generations before. When the entire world is Rome, how can foreign characteristics be separated effectively from “Roman” qualities? That Valerius recognizes this problem is significant for understanding the role of his two favorite foreign exempla: Alexander and Hannibal.
In Valerius’ handbook, Hannibal features about forty times, and this sense of his omnipresence among the *alieni* is enhanced by the frequent appearance of terms relating to Carthage. Hannibal’s connection with Rome is obvious: in directly menacing the city of Rome he became embedded in Roman consciousness like no other threat-figure before. The ubiquity of Hannibal, of course, offers yet another approach to Alexander. Very often, Roman historiography and cultural memory produce a Hannibal designed to explore the counterfactual: “what if . . . ” Alexander had turned his attention west?

Looked at yet another way, another possible Roman point of view even transforms Valerius’ Hannibal into Alexander’s heir: our passage makes Hannibal’s entrapment by the luxuries of Campania clearly comparable to treatments of Alexander’s “degeneracy” in the fleshpots of the east—Babylon in particular. This reading presents Alexander as a strongly negative exemplum—Rome’s black sheep—and a warning from history of what might happen when a people very like the Romans (the Macedonians), who began to flex their imperial muscles at exactly the same time, come to be led by a larger-than-life but flawed individual. Hannibal, unlike Alexander, posed a real threat to Rome. His last bow in Valerius’ scheme exemplifies and undercuts his persistence as a bogeyman (9.8 ext.1): his mistaken execution of his steersman was given a retrospective gloss by the erection of a statue-topped mound which continues, in Valerius’ account, to confront the eyes of those sailing north or south through the strait between Italy and Sicily. Hannibal’s concluding memorial in Valerius, then, connotes his poor judgment, despite which (as the monument continues to remind passing Romans) he almost triumphed. Alexander, by contrast, is always more useful than Hannibal for exploring the nature of Roman imperialism. Roman use of Alexander is always on Roman terms: Alexander never actually set foot in Italy or tilted at Rome’s sphere of influence, despite the semiotic contortions of so many authors and texts. Romans control how (or if) to remember him and to decide what he means.

Valerius’ anecdotal Alexander weaves through the compendium of sayings and deeds worthy of memorialization in a way that highlights some issues hugely pertinent to this volume’s concerns with dynasty. Valerius focalizes a Roman rhetorical education (that is, the transmission of Roman identity from one generation to the next, and its ongoing performance) through the figure of Alexander (and Alexander/Hannibal); he tells a story of Alexander that configures him specifically in the terms most relevant to all who sign up to a Roman episteme; and as a result of these two processes Valerius is also showing how self-fashioned and genealogically transmitted models of Roman
identity interact through performance and prosopopoeia. Whether in public (the Forum) or “private” (the atrium) one becomes Roman by repeatedly relating oneself to the everyday appearance of “great” father figures—imagines and maiores, the plural comparative of magnus.

The relationship between Philip and Alexander is also a factor here: Alexander comes with key ready-made identities as son and king, plugging into two areas of prime concern for Roman sociopolitical identity and the transmission of cultural memory. Valerius’ Alexander is foreign by taxonomy (“external”) but fully intelligible in Roman terms and Roman by epistemology—his greatest hits feature strongly in the historical performance repertoire of ambitious citizens. This simultaneous flexibility and ambiguity, in tandem with the potential overlap with Hannibal, makes Alexander a richly connotative alter ego ripe for creating Roman innuendo.\(^{29}\) He is at once a child of Rome, a son of Philip, and also one of Rome’s most problematic ancestors.

3. Philip and Alexander

Quae tam pertinax necessitas in patre <in> filio Alexandro consimilis apparauit (1.8 ext.10)

[on Philip’s attempts to outwit the oracle foretelling his assassination] Such unwavering inevitability in respect of the father had prepared something similar for the son, Alexander.

Valerius’ representation of the relationship between Philip and Alexander has overarching potential for understanding his project as one which takes dynasty in the broad sense as its fons et origo, as we saw above. This grand narrative reading scheme plays up the inevitability of hindsight. The father-son relationship between Philip and Alexander carries over into a paternalistic and genealogical paradigm for relations between man and gods; thus Praef. 1, discussed above, becomes important again as this next extract (opening the “foreign” section of the theme of arrogance and lawlessness) makes clear:

Satis multa de nostris: aliena nunc adiciantur. Alexandri Regis uirtus ac felicitas tribus insolentiae evidentissimis gradibus exsultauit: fastidio enim Philippi Iouem Hammonem patrem asciuit, taedio morum et cultus Macedonici uestem et institute Persica adsumpsit, spreto mortali habitu diuinum aemulatus est, nec fuit ei pudori filium ciuem hominem dissimulare (9.5 ext.1)
That’s more than enough of native examples: let foreign ones now be added to the mix. The manly virtue and good fortune of King Alexander became uncontrollable over the course of three clear stages of insolence: disdaining Philip, he adopted Jupiter Hammon as a father; tiring of Macedonian customs and manners, he assumed Persian dress and practices; scorning everyday mortality, he emulated the divine. So he was not ashamed to conceal his nature as a son, a citizen and a person.

The juxtaposition of nostrum and aliena reminds us of the ambiguity of Valerius’ structural separation tactics. Yes, aliena does mean “foreign” examples, but it also suggests something less extreme: simply that the things under consideration are not of “our” family or friendship circle; this implicit sense is enhanced by noster—frequently referring to someone of one’s own group—familial, social, or political. The choice of this story is unsurprising, and Valerius’ treatment picks out standard accusations against Alexander. But taken in the context of our previous extracts it gains particular bite. Firstly, “Roman” Alexander (with key Roman values: virtus and felicitas) is transformed through three stages into something easily characterized as insolentia. In the first place, he denied the filial connection between himself and Philip and adopted Jupiter Ammon as his father; second, he refused to perform his citizenship by means of traditional manner and dress; third, he denied his humanity, and tried to represent himself as equal to the gods.

We saw (in section 1) how Tiberius’ divinity is not something he pretends to but an inevitable consequence of being, empirically, the son and grandson of gods. By contrast, Alexander perverts the socially cohesive Roman practice of adoption and makes himself out to be something that he is not: equal to a god. Nevertheless, Alexander’s annihilation of filial pietas and his warped use of adoption in order to provide himself with a more appropriate father are closer to Valerius’ address to Tiberius (1, Praef.) than we might at first think. Augustus was the adopted son of Caesar, and Tiberius the adopted son of Augustus. Augustus’ disinclination to entrust the principate to his stepson was already a commonplace in the ancient sources, making the smooth progress from astral deities to Tiberius far from clear-cut: Valerius’ almost fulsome prefatory address seems to be protesting too much.

Returning to 9.5 ext.1, Alexander’s abandonment of traditional Macedonian mores and dress exiles him from his community’s shared values and kinship bonds; his attempt to join the ranks of the gods exiles him from the whole family of humanity. Valerius’ opening address to Tiberius suggested that gods, mortals, and mortals who
have the attributes of gods can coexist and prosper in the sophisticated Roman world of the early first century A.D. Reading 9.5 ext.1 against this, the connection between Alexander and Rome is articulated allusively and semantically—key terms such as *ciuis, mos,* and *ascisco*—into a paradigm that also draws in Valerius’ use of Jupiter. Mueller suggests that whereas Valerius specifically configures Roman Jupiter (broadly speaking, Jupiter Optimus Maximus) as a model for Roman greatness and cornerstone of the *mos maiorum* (traditional ancestral practice), he (implicitly) downgrades other Jupiters, such as this one (Alexander’s Jupiter Hammon), making them in effect into Romans manqué. Unlike Tiberius, Valerius’ Alexander got it wrong by choosing the wrong Jupiter.

Age, Philippi quam probabilis epistula, in qua Alexandrum quorundam Macedonum beniuolentiam largitione ad se adtrahere conatum sic increpuit! “quae te, fili, ratio in hanc tam uanam spem induxit, ut eos tibi fi deles futuros existimares quos pecunia ad *amorem* tui compulisses?” a caritate istud pater, ab usu Philippus, maiore ex parte mercator Graeciae quam uictor. (7.2 ext.10)

Come then, how admirable was that letter of Philip’s in which in these terms he upbraided Alexander for having tried to attract to himself the good-will of certain Macedonians by means of largesse: “Son, whatever rationale led you into so vain a hope as this, that you would think that those whom you had forced by money to love you would remain loyal to you?”! This resulted from his affection as a father, and from his experience as Philip: more of a purchaser than a conqueror of Greece.

Moving back from Book 9 to Book 7, we can see some of the less palatable genealogical qualities that Valerius chooses to foreground in his presentation of Philip and Alexander. Philip’s admirable letter of advice (itself a *topos* frequently associated with Alexander) is undermined in the punch-line whereby Philip’s mercenary approach to imperialism proves to have been the root cause of Alexander’s poor judgment: like father, like son, this anecdote implies. Macedonians (and by extension, Romans, unlike most Greeks) cannot be bought; Alexander’s attempt to purchase amor (love) is, moreover, at least implicitly meretricious. Alexander is attempting to purchase the kind of love that is proper to a family or to a sexualized relationship, but this shows how the warped filial connection between father and son has eventually invaded the public sphere of the citizen-family as a whole. Fidelity cannot be purchased, this anecdote emphasizes, but in broader terms it also shows the problematic way in which monarchy personalizes and
individuates societal and political models that ought more properly (in Roman terms) to operate collectively. Alexander seeks *amor* rather than *amicitia* (friendship); Philip writes to Alexander out of *caritas* (affection), but this fatherly affection is overlaid in the anecdote by the punch-line that tells us that Philip is no staunch Roman *paterfamilias*. Instead of setting an example as a *uictor* (conqueror) or statesman for Alexander, his son, he is characterized as a merchant (*mercator*).

### 4. Clemency: From Pompey to Alexander

Commemoratione Romani exempli in Macedoniam *deductus*, morum Alexandri praeconium facere *cogor*, cuius ut infinitam gloriam bellica uirtus, ita praecipium amorem *clementia* meruit. . . . (5.1 ext.1a)

[The preceding vignettes recounted Pompey’s clemency to Tigranes; the lack of respect accorded to Pompey’s corpse; Caesar’s admirable treatment of Pompey’s corpse and Cato’s children; and Antony’s honorable treatment of Brutus’ corpse, at Philippi (5.1.9–11)] Having been led by the commemoration of a Roman example into Macedonia, I am compelled to make a pronouncement on the characteristics of Alexander, whose valor in war deserved infinite glory just as his *clemency* deserved all-surpassing love. . . .

The closing Roman anecdotes of section 5.1 deal with instances of clemency in the last days of the Republic. Much has been written already about the social politics of gift-giving and exchange, with particular focus on the virtue of *clementia* as played out in the first century B.C. Bloomer’s 1992 study offers a highly nuanced reading of how this works in Valerius’ handbook.33 This extract is worth pausing on briefly, in order to observe Valerius’ syncretism between Alexander, Macedonia, and Rome at work. Valerius ends 5.1 with an account of Pompey’s keenness to restore his defeated enemies to their former state. The irony is acute that a man of such humane (or all-too-human) qualities, and a triple *triumphator* to boot, who delighted in re-crowning kings, should have his neck severed.34 The severed head, in Valerius’ version, inspires a deep sense of empathy in Caesar, re-imagining himself not as Pompey’s enemy but as his father-in-law. Caesar as *diuinus princeps* (godlike Princeps) recognizes that the whole world (*orbis terrarum*) had rested metaphorically on Pompey’s neck, and in this intertextually charged atmosphere Valerius moves forwards to Philippi, Philip’s foundation.35 There, Antony’s respect for Brutus’ corpse inspires appreciation from the battlefield itself.
Antony, a Roman Alexander on the plain at Philippi, draws Valerius etymologically, as it were, to Alexander himself. So having expressed the idea of clemency as the quintessence of Roman and even human virtues, Valerius is maintaining to his audience that the inevitable next stop is a story praising Alexander’s clemency—a Roman virtue—as comparable in quality to his martial courage and integrity.

5. The Politics of Amicitia (Friendship)

Valerius’ discussion of clementia is in many ways the sequel to his consideration of another very Roman institution: amicitia.

Contemplemur nunc amicitiae uncinulum potens et praeualidum neque ualla ex parte sanguinis uiribus inferius, hoc etiam certius et exploratius quod illud nascendi sors, fortuitum opus, hoc uniuscuisque solidi iudicio incohata voluntas contrahit. (4.7, Praef.)

Now let us consider the bond of friendship: powerful and exceedingly strong, and in no way inferior to the strength of blood. This bond is even more reliable and secure because the latter is dependent on accident of birth—a work of chance—whereas in every case this is entered into as an act of will, grounded in solid judgment.

Structurally, friendship follows “Love between husband and wife” and precedes “Liberality.” Ethically, Valerius makes friendship just as important as ties of blood, and this meshes neatly with a unifying reading of the handbook. The compendium’s representation of Roman versus “foreign” seems to propose a narrowly nationalistic and divisive approach to the Mediterranean, but Valerius’ politics of amicitia offers a much more nuanced if equally culturally imperialistic perspective. Amicitia, a cornerstone of traditional Roman society, transforms kinship units into power units through alliances and friendships between individuals and clans. For Valerius, friendship is never accidental, and always a matter of careful consideration. Friendship, too, blurs the structural boundaries between “us” and “them” that inform the text, particularly taken in the context of the terminology used to designate Rome’s client kings and states: reges socii et amici populi romani (allies and friends of the Roman people). Accident of birth can make one Roman (or Macedonian), but the status of “friend,” bestowed as a Roman conceit by Rome to designate states coming increasingly under Rome’s influence, lends this prefatory extract bite.
If we move further into 4.7, to the conclusion of *amicitia* and opening of *liberalitas* (liberality), we find these themes coalescing. At 4.7 ext.2a, Valerius opens with the famous incident where Darius’ mother guesses wrong and addresses Hephaestion as Alexander. Alexander magnanimously replies that he and his friend are as one, so the mistake is of no consequence, but it is noteworthy that *amicitia* itself does not explicitly feature in the anecdote. Instead, the penultimate sentence characterizes Alexander as the *dernier mot* in regal magnanimity (*maximi . . . animi rex*). To what extent does this contaminate the paragraph’s closing thought: that Alexander’s “gift” to Hephaestion reflected equally well on both (*danti partier atque accipienti speciosum*)? Valerius’ terminology characterizes Alexander’s act as a kingly “gift” (*donum*) rather than a reciprocal favor (*beneficium*), part of the discourse of friendship. This politicized reading of friendship fits with Valerius’ earlier comments (4.7, *Praef.*) to the effect that water is thicker than blood, rather than vice versa.

Yet whereas his opening comments in 4.7 and this anecdote about Alexander seems designed to illustrate friendship’s public and politicized qualities, Valerius then makes one of his authorial interjections and dramatically shifts the focus onto his own private life:

> Quod priuatim quoque merito ueneror, clarissimi ac disertissimi uiri promptissimam erga me beniuolentiam expertus. Nec metuo ne parum conueniat mihi Pompeium meum instar esse Alexandri, cum illi Hephaestio suus alter fuit Alexander. Ego uero grauissimo crimini sim obnoxius, constantis et benigne amicitiae exempla sine ulla eius mentione transgressus cuius in animo uelut in parentum amantissimorum pectore laetior uitae meae status uiguit, tristior acquieuit, . . .
> 
> *Nostrum opus pio egressu ad proprium dolorem prouec-tum in suum ordinem reuocetur, . . .* (4.7 ext. 2b–4.8.1)

This is rightly something which I honor in private, having personally experienced the readiest benevolence of a most illustrious and eloquent man. And I have no fear that it should be inappropriate for my own dear Pompeius to be like Alexander to me, since to Hephaestion, his friend Alexander was another self. But I myself should be liable to the gravest reproach if I passed through examples of loyal and generous friendship without any mention of him in whose mind, just as in the heart of the most loving parents, the happier condition of my life flourished, and its sadder found relief. . . .

My work, which after this reverential digression shifted onto my personal sorrow, should be recalled to its sequence. . . .
He explicitly states that it is as a private citizen that he pays particular honor to Roman behavior modeled on Alexander. Valerius’ claims that his friend Pompeius (another “the Great” or Magnus) was his other self, yet significantly, he makes no moves to test Alexander’s proclaimed interchangeability with Hephaestion—his patron (Pompeius) still gets the Alexander role, while Valerius plays the companion. He is therefore careful to perform appropriately in this drama of ancestor-fashioning; Pompeius, who plays Alexander here, is dead. Explicitly a father figure in life, he has already joined the ranks of the maiores and so is legitimately, obviously, and perhaps inevitably the “Alexander” in this relationship.

Interesting here, also, is the vivid familial simile that Valerius uses to illustrate a personal bond grounded in parental or even genealogical imagery. This is certainly not, then (any more than was in fact the case with Alexander and Hephaestion), a friendship of equals. Pompeius is never called amicus, nor is the relationship termed amicitia. With Valerius’ obituarial comments on “his” Pompeius, the section ends, and Valerius starts afresh by characterizing what had gone before as a reverential digression from which his focus needed to be recalled to the task at hand. An excess of pietas forced him from his proper task, but has also led to a tricky acknowledgment. Discussing Alexander in this context highlights how a powerful patron is not a friend, but more or less a king.

6. Conclusion: Us versus Them

I conclude by considering a selection of fairly brief extracts that help sum up some of the ways in which Valerius blurs the apparently clear-cut traits of “people like us.” Section 1 (Dunasteia) concluded with Masinissa, by birth a “barbarian,” undoing the sacrilege committed by one of his underlings. Origins are, clearly, extremely important in Valerius’ overall narrative scheme, but through this exemplum he emphasizes that nationality (or even ethnicity) is not the best way of assessing mores. Moreover, as Sallust makes clear in his influential account (BI 5), Masinissa was in effect adopted into the extended Roman family—appropriate contact with Rome (via Scipio Africanus) drew him into Rome’s networks of reciprocal amicitia. The beneficium of assistance against Carthage merited a proportionate officium (a return of the favor)—a substantial grant of conquered land. Masinissa’s position in Roman cultural memory is as a friend of the Roman people in the project of Roman imperialism. Moving further into the handbook, we see again the tension of definition arising.
Ceterum etsi Romanae seueritatis exemplis *totus terrarum orbis* instrui potest, tamen externa summatim cognosse fastidio non sit. (6.3 ext. 1)

Although *the whole world* is able to be thoroughly kitted out with examples of Roman severity, still one should not disdain to investigate external ones in brief.

Masinissa was both barbarian and Roman *amicus*: simultaneously outside and within the Roman *oikoumenē* (known world). Here Valerius makes the whole world susceptible to reinvention in Roman terms, but proposes that external examples can still be considered. Roman political hegemony does not make for a Roman monopoly on Roman virtues; “barbarians” sometimes turn out to be the noblest “Romans” of them all. But how far must one go to find such a “foreign” paragon? The ambiguity of *alienus* (“other” or “external” to what?) leaves the problem hanging.

Valerius continues to worry away at this in my next extract:

> Tempus deficiet domestica narrantem, quoniam imperium nostrum non tam robore corporum quam animorum uigore incrementum ac tutelam sui comprehendit. Maiore itaque ex parte Romana prudentia in admirazione tacita reponator, alienigenisque huius generis exemplis detur aditus. (7.2 ext. 1a)

Time will run short in the telling of domestic examples, since our empire, not so much from strength of body as from liveliness of mind, encompasses both expansion and security. So let Roman prudence mostly be put away in silent admiration, and let the floor be opened to foreign-born examples of this kind.

The most important quality of Valerius’ Roman imperialism is not brute strength but good sense: expansionism is always tempered by an understanding of the need to keep the empire secure. Valerius’ definition of Roman imperialism is thus diametrically opposed to Alexander’s legendary fixation on expansion. In characterizing Roman power explicitly in this way, Valerius draws Alexander allusively into the frame as the antithesis of the paradigmatic well-functioning empire.36

Three final snippets offer a useful closing set:

> Graeca quoque industria, quoniam nostrae multum profuit, quem meretur fructum Latina lingua recipiat. (8.7 ext.1)

> Neque ab ignotis exempla petere iuuat et maximis uiris exprobrare uitta sua uerecundiae est. ceterum cum propositi fides excellentissima quaeque complecti moneat, uoluntas
operi cedat, dum praeclara libenter probandi necessaria narranti conscientia non desit. (9.3 ext., Praef.)

... monuit cum eo aut quam rarissime aut quam iucundissime loqueretur, quo scilicet apud regias aures uel silentio tutor uel sermone esset acceptior. (7.2 ext. 11a)

Let Greek industry also, since it has been of so much assistance to our own, receive a deserved reward in the Latin tongue.

Of course one does not derive benefit by seeking examples from unknowns, and one forbears to call great men to account for their faults. Yet since fidelity to my project urges me to embrace that which is most outstanding, let my feelings give way to the work in hand, as long as the recounting of necessary examples does not lead to the omission of generous approval for admirable examples.

... he [Aristotle] advised him [Callisthenes] that when speaking with [Alexander] it should be either as infrequently or as pleasantly as possible. From which one understands that his refuge should be silence, should his conversation not be acceptable to the royal ears.

Valerius nudges up against the trope made famous by Horace when he characterizes Greek industry (an interesting choice of terms) positively, but makes it clear that for Greek words and deeds—and their merit—to have real bite, they need to be articulated in Latin: the conquering language of meaningful memorialization. Alexander’s lively Latin afterlife is thereby a gift from Rome to Alexander, without which the cluster of vivid associations which continue to make Alexander memorable might have been erased from the sweep of history. The last two passages quoted above sum up Valerius’ exemplary program excellently, and I conclude with his earnest attempt to tread a delicate line between positive examples (exempla) and dangerous negative anecdotes. He quotes Aristotle advising Callisthenes—if you can’t say something nice don’t say anything at all—before he sent him to accompany Alexander. As Callisthenes might well have replied with hindsight, you should never meet your heroes.

Summing up, the image of Alexander the Great is one more element in the drunken rampage from (mythic) history to the Craggy Island of (trans-)cultural memory. Like Father Ted’s Henry Sellers, Alexander “reminds” Valerius of Rome’s most traumatic historical moments—the Punic and Civil Wars—just like in “you know, the films.”
In the half-century since World War II, a distaste for imperialist ideology\(^1\) as well as an increased sensitivity to the rhetorical aspects of ancient sources for Alexander the Great,\(^2\) has led scholars to view the Macedonian king more critically, and to take a more generous look at Philip’s own achievements as well.\(^3\) More can be done, however, to understand why Philip has needed rehabilitation in the first place. The historical neglect of Philip is traceable to his original bad reputation in classical Athens—of which Demosthenes, his most scathing detractor, still remains the most powerful voice.\(^4\) But this reputation might not have been reinvigorated were it not for the sheer distraction caused by Alexander’s moment of glamour in the late first/second century A.D.\(^5\)

For the most part, this glamour comes from the side of classicizing Greek writers of the Roman Empire, or the “Second Sophistic”—some of whom provided the material that made Alexander “Great” again in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.\(^6\) The three authors I treat in some detail here—Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch, and Arrian\(^7\)—promote idealizing images of Alexander that tend automatically to put Philip into the background, but to different degrees, and with striking moments of resurgence against his dominant/domineering son. By studying these writers’ depictions of Philip’s and Alexander’s father-son relationship, I hope to shed modest new light on how Roman Greeks conceived of the opportunities and limitations of imperialism in general—and, by extension, Roman imperialism.

Before we turn to images of the idealized Alexander and his father in our three authors, however, I will first make some comments on the role of the Macedonians in the Second Sophistic. Second, I will briefly examine some Greek and Roman ideas about “the father-son relationship” that may have an impact on how Dio, Plutarch, and Arrian characterize the two kings.
The Second Sophistic and the Macedonian Past

Recent scholarship has borrowed Philostratus’ term “Second Sophistic” for those classicizing writers who flourished under the philhellenic emperors from the mid-first to the mid-third century A.D. Admittedly they are a varied group, but we have good reason to classify them together: each articulated his sense of being Greek under the Roman Empire with regard to his status as a pepaideumenos, or a man possessed of paideia. The latter word encompassed a somewhat subjective and variable range of positive attributes that amounted to cultural and ethical aretē, which replaced traditional warrior aretē for elite imperial subjects who had no Greek wars left to fight. Paideia was the Greek bailiwick to counter the perceived one of the Romans—military power. And yet the unavoidable fact is that these Greeks were Romans: Roman citizens, Roman senators; and some, like Arrian, even held leadership roles in the Roman army.

For writers wishing to test a combination of Greek and Roman aretē, Alexander was an ideal medium. Like the philhellenic emperors who were promoting the sophists’ activities, Alexander—with his ancestral links to Achilles and Heracles, love of Homer, education by Aristotle, and conquest of the Greeks’ greatest enemy—could be seen as a “Greek” imperialist. Thus he was a means by which a writer might articulate his sense of existing between Greek culture and Roman power and ultimately relate this to his individual conception of paideia. Very few writers, however, took advantage of this possibility. There was an entire range of reactions to Philip and Alexander in the Second Sophistic. This includes total rejection, as with Aelius Aristides. Anecdotal writers like Pausanias and Athenaeus, on the other hand, mined the Hellenistic sources for juicy stories about Alexander, Philip, and other Macedonian kings, but did not seem to have any specific ideological use for them.

Why some writers and not others? Answering this question with an admittedly broad stroke, what seems to distinguish writers like Aristides, Pausanias, and Athenaeus from Dio, Plutarch, and Arrian is that, unlike the latter writers, they show no urge to associate paideia with militarism—that is, to luxuriate in the idea of “Greek” world-conquest. One anecdotal writer, however, gives a hint as to why the Macedonian past might be important to a Second Sophistic writer even without an idealized Alexander. This is Polyaeus, who wrote the Stratagems. He alone of Second Sophistic writers specifically conflates his panhellenic stance with his “Macedonian” identity—and this in a book dedicated to Antoninus Pius and Verus,
who were now fighting the reinvigorated Parthians. I see here a connection between pride in Greek *paideia* (shown by the act of writing), personal authority on military matters (shown by the assertion of Macedonian identity), and self-linkage to Rome (shown by the composition of “stratagems” in particular)—very much akin to that which is being exploited by Dio, Plutarch, and Arrian when they idealize Alexander. The figure of Alexander helps our three writers tread in that area where Greek and Roman *aretē* (i.e., cultural and military) can conceivably meet. Philip, who died before attaining an empire comparable to Alexander’s, is unable to occupy that territory as fully. 13

Philip-Alexander as Father-Son—in Greek and Roman Terms

Philip’s main purpose for Dio, Plutarch, and Arrian, then, is to help support Alexander’s image as “Great.” To create this effect, each writer rhetorically reverses the natural hierarchy of father over son—in both subtle and more direct ways. The subtle rhetorical pattern, and the one more prevalent in Dio and Arrian, bonds father and son by acknowledging, in some way, the father’s contribution to the son’s greatness. The more direct rhetorical pattern, on the other hand, is more common in Plutarch, and argues forcefully for Alexander’s superiority over his father by revealing Philip’s weaknesses or by criticizing him. Ultimately, both of these patterns are used in some way by all three authors, and both privilege Alexander over Philip. The purely hierarchical situation in which father Philip appears to wield authority over his son Alexander occurs rarely and, when it does, is all the more striking for its rarity.

Barry Strauss has shown that the father-son relationship was a dominant metaphor in earlier Greek thought. In Strauss’ analysis, the greatly-desired young rogue Alcibiades represented a “powerful minor key” of “admiration for the independence and vigor of the son” that runs through the “Athenian (and Greek) normative discourse [that] usually emphasizes the authority of the father, the obedience of the son, and their mutual affection,” the latter represented by Alcibiades’ adoptive father Pericles. 14 While Alcibiades’ strain of independence is surely reflected in the Second Sophistic Alexander, what is in short supply in our authors is the classical anxiety over the subverted “authority of the father.”

A Romanizing impulse may be at work. The more subtle rhetorical patterns of interaction between Philip and Alexander seem to suggest
mutual acts of *pietas*, and yet often this mutual *pietas* seems to mask a subversion of parental authority.\textsuperscript{15} There may be significance in the fact that from 27 B.C. (when Octavian became Augustus) onwards, the *princeps* took on an explicitly paternal authority over the entire citizen body,\textsuperscript{16} revering the memory of the father and yet making it fully dependent. But we can make a much more obvious connection between the Second Sophistic Philip-Alexander pair and Rome: the relationship between Nerva and Trajan, his adopted son. The latter, during whose reign Dio and Plutarch both wrote,\textsuperscript{17} brought *imitatio Alexandri* back into vogue after Nero’s admiration of Alexander had given the Macedonian king a bad name.\textsuperscript{18} Like Alexander, Trajan was both philhellene and a man of intense imperial ambition who proved his legitimacy as *optimus princeps* through his expansionist policies in Dacia, Arabia, and Parthia. From Trajan’s reign onward, official proclamations of the emperor’s *pietas* were directed more forcefully away from the family toward the gods.\textsuperscript{19} Trajan’s lack of displays of filial *pietas* toward Nerva was, indeed, the ultimate rejection of father-son hierarchy.

The issue of familial *pietas* aside, however, the Second Sophistic Philip sometimes seems less a “father figure” than a workaday foil to Alexander’s superior image, particularly in Plutarch. Whether in a certain context Philip appears significantly as a “father” or as merely part of an outdated past, the result is the same: subordination to Alexander’s image of the “Greek” warrior who once had an empire. That said, Philip is likely to be used more unforgivingly as a foil by writers like Dio and Plutarch whose main concern is to emphasize Alexander’s (actual or potential) *paideia*. It is not an accident that we do not see the same judgment of Philip in Arrian, who admires Alexander largely for his qualities as leader of the army.

**Dio Chrysostom**

Given Trajan’s dominance in this age of classicism, there is no better starting point than Dio\textsuperscript{20} for theorizing the Greco-Roman Philip and Alexander—who are quite evidently stand-ins for the emperor and his (adoptive) father in the *Kingship Orations* (*Orations* 1–4). The overlying theme is the *paideia* of kings. Dio is a philosopher, and an eminently practical one who uses Platonic, Stoic, and Cynic ideas to tackle the question of how to produce good rulers,\textsuperscript{21} and argues that the philosopher must learn how to “be” a ruler in order to teach powerful men how to rule.\textsuperscript{22} In the *Kingship Orations*, Dio makes the case both for Trajan’s good rule and for his own role as philosophical
His son’s father? 197

Advisor to the emperor. I focus in particular on Oration 2, a dialogue on Homer as the teacher-poet of kings, the first half of which stages a dialogue between “Philip” and “Alexander,” who act, respectively, as Nerva- and Trajan-figures.

However, because Dio himself has taken on a didactic role toward the emperor, his writing is rather circumspect, and Alexander and Philip cannot be taken as straightforward representations of the emperor and his father. Dio is a master of creating personae—including ones that stand for himself and his philosophical ideals—through which he can articulate his various ethical positions from a distance, employing analogy rather than direct criticism, and tempering criticism with praise so as to avoid insult. As one of these personae, Alexander’s moral content shifts from ideal or potentially ideal king in Oration 2 to tyrant in Oration 4 (opposite Cynic hero Diogenes/Dio), where he is perhaps meant to be seen as a “Domitian” figure. The possibility that Alexander can stand for either Trajan or Domitian suggests that Dio found him the best medium through which to offer the emperor both positive and critical feedback. Trajan was around this time promoting himself as the embodiment of classic Roman military virtue (virtus) and the ideology of civilizing rule (humanitas); for Dio, however, there is an imbalance between the two qualities. Alexander is a man whose virtue may appear to go beyond courage on the battlefield toward excessive militarism; for him to become an ideal ruler, this must be tempered with the gentler, “Greeker,” aspects of imperial humanitas. Or to put it in Dio’s roughly equivalent Greek terms: andreia must be tempered by philanthropia and paideia.

But, as the case may be, Philip plays his most significant role in Oration 2, and this is where Alexander enjoys his most shining moment, incorporating the best of Greek culture and Roman-style power. Philip, whose image is also variable in Dio’s corpus, is here presented as a devoted and concerned father who habitually defers to Alexander’s precocious pontifications (in a dialogue that will eventually turn into a monologue on the part of Alexander, who now becomes a Dio-figure). For the most part, the subversion of father’s authority by son is subtle rather than direct. Dio keeps the tone of their conversation artfully light, despite the seriousness of the subject matter. The general pattern up until section 49, the last we hear from Philip until the very end (79), consists largely of Philip prodding Alexander with brief questions and Alexander answering lengthily (and “correctly,” from Dio’s point of view).

Dio begins by setting a scene that combines Alexander’s love of poetry with his military/political aspirations—the best of his Greek
and proto-Roman self. “It is said that once upon a time” (legetai pote), the youthful Alexander had a conversation with his father about Homer in a very manly and lofty manner (mala andreiōs kai megaloophronōs), a conversation which was practically also about kingship (schedon ti . . . peri basileias) (Or. 2.1). Philip wants to know why his son ignores all poets besides Homer; Alexander answers that Homer is suitable for kings and those who wish to rule the world. By emphasizing the military aspects of the most admired of Hellenic poets, the answer attaches the Alexander-figure to Trajan through cultural philhellenism and military expansionism. Alexander’s rationale for appreciating Homer above all other poets also reflects Roman Stoic ideals of kingship, which are more fully embodied by Heracles/Trajan in Oration 1, where we witness him being led to perfection with the help of Hermes/Dio.29

As the conversation progresses, Philip frequently reacts to Alexander in terms of affection or delight—for example, 8: panu . . . ēgasthē (he admired him greatly); 13 and 17: gelasas (laughing). At the end, he is “delighted” by his son (79: hēstheis). Alexander’s reactions to his father, on the other hand, are more muted, and in one instance slightly intimidating: in 16 he smiles quietly (hēsuchei meidiasas) at his father after a slightly heated exchange; in 29, he glares menacingly at him like a lion: gorgon emblepsas hōsper leōn. The lion image is particularly interesting: while on one level it clearly associates Alexander with the courage of his ancestral Heracles, within the context of the Orationes (and even beyond Dio) it can denote a certain unruliness in Alexander’s character that Dio would reasonably want Trajan to avoid.30

There is a moment when Alexander connects his ambitions to his father’s (15). Philip asks his son whether he would like to have been an Agamemnon or Achilles, to which Alexander replies that he wants to go far beyond these, for Philip is no less worthy than Peleus, Macedonia no less powerful than Phthia, Mt. Olympus no less famous than Pelion, and his education by Aristotle no less than Achilles’ by Phoenix. In making this extended comparison between himself and Achilles he highlights Philip’s support role in his own glory—and it is at this point that Philip momentarily asserts his parental authority. When Alexander declares that, unlike Achilles, he could never submit to the authority of a mortal king, Philip, “getting almost angry” (mikrou paroxuntheis), exclaims: “But you are ruled by me as king (all’ hup’ emou ge basileuē!)” Alexander’s quick response is that he listens to Philip as a “father” and not as a “king” (16–18). This seems to soothe his father’s ego, but does not negate the force of the young prince’s initial comment on who his true authority is: god. By having
Alexander* *qua* *Trajan claim to be unable to obey any mortal authority, Dio is again signaling Alexander’s Greco-Roman hybridity: the idea of Alexander’s “divine authority” invariably calls to mind his famous self-promotion as a son of Zeus,* but the immediate philosophical context is Stoic, referring to the good king’s authority from Zeus (a theme seen everywhere in the *Kingship Orations*).* Unlike Plato’s Socrates, who in the end always dominates his interlocutor, the querying Philip only gets the literal “last word” (in the final section, 79) with a great act of self-effacement, when he concedes Alexander’s excellent education to another authority altogether, Aristotle: “Alexander, it is not for nothing that we appreciated Aristotle so greatly. . . . He is a man worthy of many great gifts, if he teaches you such things about rule and kingship, either by interpreting Homer or in some other way.”*33

It is clear, then, that Philip has been minimized for Alexander’s benefit. But how does this minimized Philip fit in with Trajan’s Nerva? Trajan’s own propaganda, in fact, denigrated the memory of Nerva much more profoundly than is reflected in Dio’s text. Pliny in his *Panegyricus*, perhaps as reliable a source for Trajan’s own propaganda as they come,* shows good evidence for this when he characterizes Nerva as thoroughly impotent (6–8, 10–11, and 89). Indeed, the *adoptio* of Trajan is presented as Nerva’s one good deed—a deed for which he, the father, should *thank* the son. Dio, by contrast, walks the line on Nerva. Not only does he represent Nerva with a wise and nurturing Zeus in *Oration* 1, but there is a clear implication in *Oration* 2 that the emperor’s father is a man of culture. Philip makes the argument (which he stops pressing by section 32) for privileging Hesiod over Homer (8–14) in Alexander’s presence, but even more surprising is Dio-as-narrator’s reference to Philip’s letter writing (25), the only such reference I have seen in a literary text. Certainly there were some fake Philip-letters in circulation in antiquity, but one may easily suspect that the reference here has less to do with the historical Philip than with Nerva’s own literary ambitions: according to Martial, Nero had compared Nerva’s poetry to that of Tibullus (8.70.7–8).*35

As a Nerva figure, then, the Philip of the *Kingship Orations* may appear as a slight rebuke to Trajan for neglecting mutual *pietas*. Ultimately, however, no real authority is ceded by Alexander to Philip. The very mortal Philip/Nerva of *Oration* 2 is not divine Zeus/Nerva of *Oration* 2. Dio’s Philip exists to be dominated by his son, who, like Trajan at his very best, has that capacity for *virtus* and *humanitas* that will keep him looking culturally and spiritually upward and expanding militarily outward.
Plutarch

Plutarch’s view of statesmanship is, in general, essentially philosophical and ethical, although it is rather unusual to see him meld philosophy and politics to the degree that he does in the figure of Alexander.° Unlike Dio, who wrote under the constraints of Trajan’s potential readership, Plutarch is free to dive wholeheartedly into the process of creating his ideal Greco-Roman Alexander. His subordination of Philip to Alexander is also more complete.

First there is Plutarch’s set of rhetorical treatises, De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute, the idealized Alexander of which (as I have argued in detail elsewhere)°° is a philosopher-of-action who melds the best of Greek culture, or paideia—which Plutarch conflates here with philosophia—with the best of Roman imperial ideology.α Here no pietas is directed toward Philip—even when we are told that Alexander taught the barbarians to reverence their parents and the gods (1.5). Indeed, the sweeping generalization of De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute is such that the subordination of Philip is in fact totally impersonal. Like so many others, Philip is, in the end, just another non-Alexander.

At the outset, Philip’s war against the Greeks and the debt he left behind are unceremoniously lumped together with all the other political problems—Macedonian, Greek, and barbarian—that Alexander had to overcome as he acceded to the throne (1.3). At another point, Plutarch criticizes Philip along with Dionysius of Sicily, Alexander of Pherae, the Scythian Ateas, and Archelaus of Macedon for lacking philanthropia toward artists, which he considers to be among the virtues of a good ruler (2.1). Plutarch also symbolically strips Philip of his paternal claim, in a number of ways that recall Dio. In 1.4, we read that Alexander had gained more knowledge from Aristotle than he had from Philip, recalling the final passage of Dio’s Oration 2, but also making a more pointed statement against pure military might and in favor of paideia: “Alexander crossed into Asia having much greater equipment from his teacher Aristotle than from his father Philip.” His military art itself is credited not to Philip but to Heracles and Achilles in 2.2; his penchant for civilizing, to Heracles, Perseus, and Dionysus, the last of whom is named a progenitor. Alexander is also said to have been created by “a god” (2.12), presumably Zeus—which is interesting considering the ambivalence Plutarch shows in the Life of Alexander concerning the propaganda that claimed Zeus Ammon as Alexander’s real father.α°

The reversal of hierarchy between father and son is even more obvious in Philip’s moralizing and apologetic Life of Alexander, where up until Philip’s death Alexander is systematically differentiated from
his father, along with his mother Olympias and his homeland of Macedonia (which, unlike in Dio, gets no credit in Plutarch for being the home of warriors). That is to say, we seem to have a more elaborate version here of the heaped-together non-Alexanders whom we saw in *De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute*. While Alexander is not as fully idealized as he is in that rhetorical piece, he is still the same leader whose virtue takes him far beyond backwater Macedon and toward the ideal of the humane, civilizing rule of barbarians. Plutarch’s cradle-to-grave method of writing creates a rather short and smooth series of episodes in sections 5–10 of the 77-section long *bios*, in which we watch Philip and Alexander interact prior to the king’s murder. Unlike the rhetorical genre, biography required Plutarch to deal with what everyone already knew about Alexander: that his journey would ultimately end in blood and tears. Plutarch’s goal was to emphasize that Alexander was, regardless of his future weaknesses, from his very youth naturally philosophical and moderate—and that he therefore had the great potential of turning into a philosophical and moderate imperial ruler. Indeed, in the end Alexander bears little blame for his own shortcomings.

Philip’s specific role in the *Life of Alexander* is as a foil to Alexander’s superior character, which is demonstrated already in his youth. Take, for example, the young prince’s famous interview of the Persian envoys who, upon meeting, him “were amazed and thought that Philip’s much-discussed ability was nothing compared to his son’s enthusiasm and eagerness to do great things” (5.3). The curiosity for world affairs that Alexander shows here, while it will later help him defeat the Persians, is accompanied by the lament that his father will leave him nothing to achieve. This is certainly a flattery of Philip’s achievements, but one that is quickly swept aside to offer a comment on Alexander’s superior motivation. Plutarch also shows Philip actively disappearing from his son’s life—even showing explicit deference to Alexander’s ambitions. In the wake of taming the wild Bucephalas—perhaps a foreshadowing of Alexander’s taming of the barbarians—Philip responds to his son in awe, and in the process ghettoizes himself as merely “Macedonian”: “My son, go find a kingdom equal to yourself; Macedonia has no room for you” (6.8). Recognizing that Alexander needs a tutor of the highest caliber, Philip hires Aristotle (7.1–9), whom we saw replacing him as a father figure in *De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute*, as well as in Dio’s *Oration* 2. It is a Greek, not Philip, who provides Alexander with the *paideia* he will use to civilize the east. But in another episode, Philip allows himself to be subordinated to his son as a king altogether, in the eyes of the soldiery: in 9.4–5, Plutarch tells us that Philip “loved his son excessively, so as even
to take pleasure in hearing the Macedonians call Alexander their king, but Philip their general.” Here Plutarch firmly marks the distinction between the good ruler of men and the (mere) military man.

Philip’s rosy paternal pride, however, does not last; immediately following is the description of a fight between the two men at Philip’s wedding with a new wife, Cleopatra, whose uncle Attalus calls into question Alexander’s legitimacy as Philip’s heir. After Alexander throws a cup at Attalus, Philip goes after him with a sword, but he trips, and hence incurs his son’s mockery. It is Philip, not Alexander, who is then chastised by a “Greek” authority—Demaratus the Corinthian—who says to Philip, with much sarcasm: “It is surely very appropriate . . . that you care about Greece—you who have packed your own house with such great discord and evil” (9.13). Hearing this, we see Philip again recognizing his son’s superiority and trying to make amends with him. Things soon start to disintegrate again, however, when Alexander intervenes in Philip’s alliance with Pixodarus, for which Philip strongly abuses him for wanting to become the son-in-law of a “Carian and slave to a barbarian king” (10.3). Ultimately the king exiles Alexander’s friends; later in the Life, Alexander will reassert authority among the Companions by eliminating members of Philip’s Old Guard—actions that Plutarch will largely justify. Plutarch holds off on criticizing Alexander for the Pixodarus affair; perhaps we can take this as another episode that shows Alexander dealing with barbarians wisely. 43

Philip does have a moment of vindication as Alexander’s “true” father when Clitus complains of Alexander’s pretensions to divine sonship—before he succumbs to Alexander’s sword (a moment where Plutarch, unusually, codes him as barbaric). 44 On the whole, however, Plutarch’s subversion of the hierarchy of father and son is quite complete. The rejection of Philip of the Life of Alexander helps draw a deep furrow between Alexander’s worldliness and the provinciality of his origins. It thus contributes to the overall picture of the son as a singularly ambitious figure whose combination of paideia/philosophia and philanthropia—or Plutarch’s version of humanitas—tacitly proves his worth as a precursor to the Roman emperor, or what the emperor should be. 46

Arrian

Philip has a very small but significant role in Arrian’s Anabasis. While his limited appearance naturally subordinates him to his son, when he does appear he not only contributes to his son’s credibility, but
also helps Arrian establish proper limits on Alexander’s outsized ambition.

Arrian, whose main sources are two of Alexander’s men, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, is in some ways more forgiving of the king even than Plutarch. While Arrian does not shy from criticizing Alexander for his acts of cruelty—he describes the king’s treatment of Bessus as “barbaric” (4.7.4)—this rarely affects his assessment of Alexander as a great military leader. A clue to his attitude may be found in his own biography. Like Dio and Plutarch, Arrian was a philosopher, and also friend of fellow stoic Hadrian; he was also a Roman general, provincial governor, and probably a senator. Unlike Dio and Plutarch, and despite his philosophy “credentials,” Arrian does not imbue the Macedonian king with philosophy. According to the Anabasis’ “Second Preface,” his Alexander is, rather, the living embodiment of the warrior Achilles, to whom Arrian himself plays “Homer.”

The fact that Arrian is the only Second Sophistic author to give the Macedonian fighting forces their due seems to line up with his unusually positive attitude toward Philip as their original leader. The action of the Anabasis begins at Philip’s death, but his memory lives on. In his speech at Opis, Alexander shows filial piety when he lectures his soldiers on how Philip civilized their Macedonian ancestors and put them into towns with good order and customs, helping them stave off the threat of the Illyrians and the Triballians, and put the Greeks in their place and became leader of the expedition against Persia (7.9.1–5). Alexander goes on to note in the same chapter that his father left him a lot of debt—thus reasserting his superiority over Philip—but his segue into his own achievements is rather organic, and the result is that Philip and Alexander appear as co-civilizers. Brian Bosworth has called this story of civilizing the Macedonians “wildly inaccurate” and has suggested a parallel to Arrian’s account in the Indica of Dionysus’ transformation of the Indian “barbarians” into city dwellers (7.2–7). If this is the case, it seems that we are seeing Arrian’s own (unphilosophical) version of humanitas at work, and one that effectively gives as much credit to his father as to Alexander.

Indeed, Philip may, for once, have the “real” last word. Near the end of the Anabasis, Arrian tells us a story hinting at Aristobulus’ ambivalence over Alexander’s insatiability (7.20), the pothos referred to elsewhere (e.g., 2.3.1, in the episode of the Gordian knot). According to Arrian, Aristobulus compared this insatiability to that of Icarus, who flew to his death specifically against his father’s warning. Perhaps in his death, Philip has here managed (first through Aristobulus and now Arrian) to flip paternal authority back to himself. An imprecise but nonetheless compelling Roman parallel suggests itself. After
Trajan died, his allegedly adoptive heir Hadrian declared his predecessor’s Asian expedition a mistake—hence establishing a less eagerly expansionist persona for emperors. If the *Anabasis* was written around this time, it may give us a clue as to why this sentiment, which concerns a man who warned against empire, gains approval here.⁵²

Conclusion

As Roman subjects, Greek intellectuals had something at stake in the quality of those who ruled over them, and in the quality of the empire on the whole. Alexander the “humanist” king and conqueror could embody Greeks’ best hope for the type of rule they might receive. On one level, Philip’s subordination to his more accomplished son seems like an obvious way of enhancing Alexander’s image, but those fleeting moments in which he asserts his parental authority over the wildly independent Alexander may be interpreted as limits to the son’s outsized—and vaguely menacing—ambition.

In his *Kingship Orations*, which idealize Alexander for Trajan’s benefit by mixing Greek *paideia* with contemporary stoic ideas of “good rule,” Dio allows Alexander-as-Trajan to outshine Philip-as-Nerva. The limits of his patience for autocratic self-aggrandizement, however, are shown in his tacit critique of Trajan’s absolute denigration of his father’s memory. The moralizing writer Plutarch idealized Alexander less ambivalently, couching Alexander’s *virtus* and *humanitas* in Greek philosophical terms, and differentiating him from Philip and his Macedonian roots. But even Plutarch found his limit in Alexander’s self-promotion as the son of a god. Finally, Arrian: while Philip’s very minimal presence automatically puts him in an inverse-hierarchical role with Alexander, his moment to shine as the founder of the Macedonian state makes him a precursor to Alexander’s own civilizing rule; his unheeded warning to Alexander not to fly too close to the sun may also offer a mild critique of the type of expansionism that was no longer in vogue at Rome.
Alexander in the Underworld

Daniel Ogden

As a semidivine figure cast in the mold of the great heroes of myth, one expects to find Alexander’s tradition conferring upon him a *katabasis*, a descent to and a return from the underworld in life. After all, Alexander’s own Heracles had managed such a thing more than once. The tradition’s clearest construction of such a *katabasis* for Alexander is found in the *Alexander Romance*. And this is indeed just where we would expect to find it, for the Alexander of the mature versions of the *Romance* at any rate triumphs in all dimensions, conquering not only, of course, the extreme East, but also the extreme West (Rome: *A[l]exander R[omance] 1.27* [γ]), the depths of the sea (in a diving bell: *AR 2.38* [β]) and the heights of the air (in a basket carried by giant birds: *AR 2.41* [β]). The episode in question is Alexander’s visit to the Land of the Blessed, which the king narrates in the first person in the letter of marvels he sends back home to Olympias, in the latter part of the second book.¹ I summarize the tale as supplied by the Leiden (L) MS of the β recension (39–41).

Alexander tells his mother how he arrives in the Land of the Blessed (*makarôn chôra*), “a place where the sun does not shine” and wishes to investigate it to see whether it constitutes the end of the earth.² Alexander wants to proceed into the land on his own, but Callisthenes persuades him to take a picked army with him, leaving behind the women and the old men. However, there is in the army an interfering old man, whose sons are selected to march with Alexander. He begs them to take him with them, disguising him by shaving off his beard: they will not, he protests, find him a burden, and a moment of danger will come in which Alexander will need an old man; they will be greatly rewarded if they can then produce him.

The army sets off. After three days they come to place full of fog, and with no paths. After bivouacking for the night Alexander decides to proceed further taking with him the bulk of his army, and turning left, because that direction is the lighter. They pass through a rocky and precipitous land for half a day, but then turn back because it is impassable. So Alexander decides to turn right instead. This way the road is less rough, but the darkness is complete and Alexander is
advised by the young men around him not to go any further in case the horses should become scattered in the darkness, and they may not be able to get back. At this point Alexander laments that he has not brought an old man with him to advise him what to do in such a situation. The old man smuggled along is duly produced. He advises Alexander to choose out the mares with foals and leave the foals behind, going forward only with the mares, which will then by instinct be able to bring Alexander and his men back to where they started.

So Alexander continues in this way. The old man also advises his sons to pick up anything they find on the ground in the dark and put it in their bags, which they duly do. Eventually they come to a clear spring, the water of which flashes like lightning. The air in the place is fragrant, and it is less dark than it had been. Alexander is hungry, so he commands his cook to prepare some food for the troops. As the cook washes off a dried fish in the spring it comes back to life (εψυχόθε) and leaps out of his hands. He does not tell Alexander about this, but drinks some of the springwater himself. Alexander drinks from another of the surrounding streams (39).

Alexander proceeds again with the march and eventually he sees a light that comes not from the sun, moon, or stars. Two birds with human faces speak to Alexander in Greek from the air: the first asks him why he approaches a land that belongs only to the gods and instructs him to turn back. He may not tread upon the Land of the Blessed and may traverse only the land that has been given to him. The second tells him that the east is calling him and that he will conquer the kingdom of Porus. Thus chastened, Alexander puts the mares at the head of the army and they duly lead it back to the point where he left the foals. When the army has returned to the light, the two sons of the old man find that they have brought back with them plenty of gold and pearls (40).

It is only at this point that the cook tells Alexander about the spring and the fish and is duly punished, for all that, having drunk the water himself, he must remain immortal. Alexander concludes from his experiences that the place he has visited is the end of the world. He sets up an arch at the entry point inscribed with the words, “Whosoever want to enter the Land of the Blessed, journey to the right-hand side (dexiai poreuesthe), lest you meet your doom” (41).

This episode of the Romance is hard to date. The Leiden MS preserves a unique version of the β recension, a version composed at some point prior to the eighth century A.D. The episode is not in MS A, the sole representative of the earliest Greek recension, α, composed ca. 300 A.D., but it is present, in what is evidently an abbreviated form, in the ca. 500 A.D. Armenian translation of a lost Greek text closely
related to (and evidently better than) the text of A. It is also present, in a differently abbreviated form, in the basic β recension as reconstituted by Bergson, composed, it is thought, at some point between 338 and ca. 500 A.D. All the motifs upon which my analysis depends are either explicit in the Armenian text or in Bergson’s β recension, or are presupposed by them. However, the Leiden MS also embraces isolated details that are indisputably medieval in the form transmitted, such as the personal names Ounna and Neraida.3

It does not take too great a leap of imagination to accept that Alexander has in this episode entered the underworld, or at any rate a land strongly assimilated to it: the very name of the place, the Land of the Blessed, is evocative of that of a zone inhabited by the fortunate among the dead in the Greek literary tradition, the Isle(s) of the Blessed (makarōn nēsoi), to which Hesiod had sent the heroes of Troy, to which Pindar had sent those who had lived through three life cycles without injustice, and to which Plato in the Gorgias had sent those that had lived a just and holy life.4 Furthermore, the Land of the Blessed’s perpetual darkness, gloom, and fog are also characteristic of the canonical underworld, already in the Odyssey a land of Night (Hom. Od. 11.12–19). Its location, too, at the very end of the world on the horizontal plane, is similarly characteristic of the canonical underworld. The Odyssey’s underworld lies beyond Ocean (10.508, 11.13), as do Hesiod’s Isles of the Blessed (Op. 169–72).

But it is in fact possible to contextualize the central imagery of this episode much more closely against an established and tight set of ancient underworld-related motifs: those found in the so-called Orphic—but more self-professedly Bacchic—tablets or “lamellae.”5 Of these gold lamellae, or “plates,” about forty survive. They were buried with initiates, either in amulet pouches that the initiates wore around their necks, or dropped into their cremation urns. The plates gave the dead person instructions on how to negotiate his (or her) way through the underworld, and supplied him with password phrases to utter before the underworld guards he would encounter, in order that he might achieve a state of blessedness. The earliest tablet dates from ca. 400 B.C., and they flourished from this point until the first century A.D.; a straggler from Rome is dated to the second or third century A.D. period. They are found as far west as Rome and Sicily, as far east as Lesbos,6 as far north as Macedonia, and as far south as Crete.

The flavor of the set may be conveyed by the earliest tablet, that of ca. 400 B.C., which hails from Hipponion in Calabria. It helpfully encompasses most of the most vigorously recurring and kaleidoscoping motifs across the set as a whole. The tablet had been strung around its owner’s neck as he was placed in his coffin:
This is the task for Memory, whenever you are going to die and go down to the well-built house of Hades. There is a spring on the right, and a white/shining cypress stands beside it. Going down to there the souls of the dead are refreshed (**psychai nekuôn psychontai**). Do not go near this spring! Further on you will find cold water pouring forth from the lake of Memory. There are guards above it (**ephuperthen**). They will ask you with clever minds why you are inquiring into the darkness of gloomy Hades. Tell them: “I am the son of Earth and starry Heaven.” I am dry with thirst and I am dying. But quickly give me the cold water of the lake of Memory to drink. And they will speak to the underworld king. And they will allow you to drink from the lake of Memory. And you as well, after drinking, will travel along the sacred road taken by the other glorious initiates and bacchants.

Let us compare the motifs in this and the other tablets with those of the *Romance*.

1. Underworld Context

The underworld context of the tablets is self-evident. They were given to the dead to take with them into the next world. They speak to their wearers as they are on the point of dying (L1–2), and speak of them being in Hades (L1–4, L16l) or below the earth (L7a–b). Hades the god is made to preside over the realm either under this name (L1–4), or in the guise of “underworld king” (L1), “Pluto” or simply “master” (L15a), as is Persephone, either under this name (L7a–L8, L14–15, L16b, L16k) or under the title of “underworld queen” (L2) or “queen of the chthonic” (L9–10b). It is of particular interest for Alexander’s adventure that some of the tablets lay emphasis upon the enveloping darkness of Hades (L2–3), or describe the soul’s entry into it as a forsaking of the light of the sun (L8). In the latter connection we may note that the *Romance* introduces Alexander’s arrival in the Land of the Blessed with the phrase, “within two days we came to a place where the sun does not shine.”

2. The State of Blessedness

The condition in the underworld for which the tablet-bearers are heading is characterized by the word *olbios*, which can mean either
“fortunate,” or, more particularly, “wealthy.” The word is found in five tablets (L9–10b, 7a–b), indeed in the intensive form trisolbios (“thrice-fortunate”) in two of them (L7a–b), and another tablet associates it with the term makaristos, “most blessed” (L9). The tablet-bearers’ condition in the underworld will then have been akin to that of those who had been consigned to a blessed zone within the wider underworld in the venerable literary tradition that went back all the way to the Odyssey’s Elysium and the Hesiodic and Platonic Isles of the Blessed (makarōn nēsoi) mentioned above, the former of which, incidentally, is specifically said to be the home of the “fortunate” (olbioi), while the inhabitants of the latter are said to live “in all good fortune” (eudaimonia). The tablet-bearers were then evidently heading for a condition very much akin to that afforded by the Land of the Blessed, the makarōn chōra as Alexander terms the land in which he travels (2.39, 41). And the land in which Alexander travels could evidently be described as olbios in the more crude and reductive sense of “wealthy,” being, as it is, a land in which the gravel consists of precious stones.

Of what does the good fortune or the blessedness offered in the underworld of the tablets consist? Two of them specify that their bearers will become gods instead of being mortal (L8, L9) and a third that their bearer will become divine (dia, L11). It is of course precisely divinity and immortality that is bestowed by the Romance’s water of life, although this is a quality that its Alexander, more crudely and more reductively, seeks to bring back with him into the world of the living.

3. The Focal Importance of Water Sources

The focal motif of the water source appears in the first twelve tablets in the Bernabé-Jiménez San Cristóbal series. In some of the tablets, such as those from Eleutherna (L5a–L6a), we just get a single water source, an evidently good spring from which the tablet-bearer professes himself eager to drink, and the draught of which will, apparently, though not explicitly, translate him to a state of blessedness. However, in the more elaborate texts (L1–4) a more complex arrangement is described. Here a spring, apparently a bad spring, or at any rate a useless one, is differentiated from a lake of Memory. One must avoid the former and drink rather from the latter. In one of these tablets (L2), the bad source is a lake like the good source, in another (L4), the good lake, having been introduced, seems to be reidentified as a
good spring, perhaps under the influence of the simpler texts. The polarization between the water sources, and the identification of the good one as “Memory,” invites the supposition that the bad or ineffectual spring is to be identified with the spring well known from other ancient epigraphic and literary references to the underworld, that of Lethe, “Forgetting.”

The four more elaborate tablets make a three-way wordplay with the terms “souls” (psuchai), “cold” water (psuchron) and “refresh” (psuchontai, from psuchō). The existing “souls” “refresh” themselves at the bad spring, whereas the tablet-bearer aspires to drink the “cold” water of the lake of Memory. One might have thought that this “refreshment” was a good thing for “souls,” replenishing them, as it were, with their essential quality, especially when we recall that Homer has Ocean sending breezes to “refresh” (anapsuchein) those in Elysium and that Pindar has Ocean breezes blowing around his Isle of the Blessed, but evidently this is not the case. It could be that psuchontai is to be interpreted at one level, in this context, as meaning that the souls “are given (new) life,” that is that they are reincarnated, or at any rate destined for it, a process with which the erasure of the memory of their previous life is appropriately coordinated.

How does this relate to the Romance? Alexander also enters a world in which he finds two distinct varieties of water source. The evidently good spring that offers the water of life and with it immortality, and the bad or at any rate ineffectual springs that surround it, from which he has the misfortune to drink himself. But the analogy becomes a little more kaleidoscoped when we pay attention to vocabulary. For when the cook puts his pickled fish into the water of life, and it is restored to life, presumably to everlasting life, the word the Romance employs for the action is epsuchōthē (from psuchao, 2.39, 41), which, while not identical, is strongly reminiscent of the word applied to the action of the water of the bad spring in the tablets—more reminiscent of this certainly than of psuchron, the word the tablets apply to the water of the good lake of Memory. And Alexander laments, “O for my bad luck, that it was not ordained for me to drink from that immortal spring giving life to the lifeless” (2.39). This final phrase too, “giving life to the lifeless,” zōgonousēs ta apsucha, seems somewhat akin to that describing the refreshment of souls at the bad spring in the tablets, psuchai . . . psuchontai. But perhaps the kaleidoscoping does after all make a kind of sense, and aligns with the Romance’s crudely reductive take on “blessedness.” For the eternal life on offer here, and that to which Alexander aspires, is not that of an ethereal, underworld variety presumably offered by the tablets, but a lusty, full-blooded, earthly variety, which is in some ways
strangely more akin to the reincarnated lives that seemingly await the souls that drink from the bad spring. 13

4. The Importance of Turning Right

Thirteen of the tablets explicitly discuss the direction in which one should turn within the underworld (L1–L6a, L8). In all except two of these, the direction mentioned is rightward. 14 In one particularly emphatic though partly obscure tablet (L8), the tablet-bearer is directed toward something (a group of worshippers?) on the right and then again directed to follow a rightward road to the meadows and groves of Persephone. 15 The tablets that mention only a single (good) water source, such as those from Eleutherna, assert that this is “on the right” (L5a–L6a). More complicated are the directions in the more elaborate tablets. These for the most part assert, initially, that the bad source is on the right, and tell the tablet-bearer not even to go near it. Does this imply that the direction in which the bearer must turn to find the good source is leftward? Not necessarily. Some tablets (e.g., L1) seem to imply that the good source is simply further on in the same direction, i.e., further rightward. 16 The default notion that the good source should be on the right, and the natural assumption that it should be on the opposite side to the bad spring, may explain why one tablet, the one from Petelia (L3) should begin by locating the bad source explicitly on the left, for all that it does not then go on to specify the location of the good source. One further tablet (L6a) does explicitly locate the good spring “on the left,” albeit not on the left of Hades as such but merely to the left of the cypress tree, which, confusingly, is associated with the location of the bad source in the other tablets. 17 The importance of taking a right turn in the underworld has a pedigree also in the broader literature of the underworld. In the Republic Plato has the souls of the just, after judgment, take the right-hand road, while the unjust take the left. We may map this onto his claim in the Gorgias that the dead are judged in a meadow, from which two paths lead away, one to the Isles of the Blessed, and one to Tartarus, “Hell,” although no directions are specified here. 18 And even more famously Virgil too presents us with a bifurcation in the underworld, with the left path leading to the tortures of Tartarus and the right to the delights of the Elysian Fields. 19

How does this relate to the Romance? The Romance is emphatic that the left-hand path is fruitless for Alexander, even taking him down it for a wasted half day before bringing him back again just to make the point. The right-hand path is similarly marked out as the
correct one, by the discovery of the water of life at the end of it, by the
wealthy jewels picked up en route, and then, most emphatically, by
the arch set up and inscribed by Alexander upon his return: “Whoso-
ever want to enter the Land of the Blessed, journey to the right-hand
side, lest you meet your doom.” For Alexander both the bad and the
good source are alike on the right, but that is, as we have seen, quite
compatible with the bulk of the tablet set.

5. Tree Imagery

Tree imagery is important to the tablets. Fourteen of them (L1–L6a)
give us a cypress tree adjacent either to the good source or the bad
source, and five of them specify more closely that it is a white or
shining (leukos) tree (L1–4, L6). Additionally, a further eight tablets,
one of which themselves mention trees, are shaped in the form of
leaves, leaves which have been variously identified as those of laurel,
myrtle, or ivy (L7a–b, L16a–e, L16j). The last possibility is interesting
in view of the anonymous third-century B.C. poem addressed to the
tragedian Phílicus, which bids him process to the “Islands of the
Blessed” while rolling out well-sung words from an ivy-clad head.
It has, furthermore, been suggested that the puzzling opening phrase
of the Hipponion tablet (L1) should be read not as “This is the task for
Memory” but as “This is the leaf for Memory” (i.e., thrion, not ergon).
We are forcibly reminded, in this respect, of the golden bough that
Aeneas takes down into the underworld with him, before turning
right (Verg. Aen. 6.133–636). There is no obvious sign of a tree in the
Romance, but we do perhaps miss one in it: where, after all, are we to
imagine that the birdlike creatures that address Alexander and turn
him back live?

6. The Guards

In the case of four tablets the bearer is confronted and interrogated by
the “guards” (phulakes) of the lake of Memory (L1–4). We are given
no physical description of these guards whatsoever. However, while
one of the tablets says that they are “in front of” the lake of Memory
(epiprosthên, L3) the other three specify that they are “over”
(epuperthen) it (L1–2, L4). The meaning of this word is simple and
clear, but it has caused the translators difficulties. Bernabé and
Jiménez San Cristóbal translate it to mean that the guards are on the
banks of the lake, and therefore “above” it in this sense. This seems a
stretch, but at least it attempts to honor the word’s irreducible meaning. Johnston in the Graf edition, oblivious to the problem, simply mis-translates the term as “before,” as if directly equivalent to *epipros-then*. If we follow the simple logic of the Greek language, we will read *epuperthen* to mean that the guards are hovering in midair over the lake, or that they are sitting on the branch of a tree that extends over it, in other words that they birdlike creatures. If the tablets’ guards are indeed birdlike creatures endowed with human voices, they form appropriate prototypes for the birds with human faces that speak to Alexander and turn him back in the *Romance*. The first bird to address Alexander asks him why he approaches a land that belongs only to the god (2.40). This too seems to parallel the question posed by the guard in the Hipponion tablet quoted above—“Why you are looking into the darkness of gloomy Hades?”—not least when we bear it in mind that the darkness of gloomy Hades is, for the tablet-bearers at any rate, a land that belongs to them qua gods. It is not my primary purpose here to elucidate the *Orphic* tablets in their own right, but I suspect that the *Romance* may in this respect at any rate be able to make an important contribution to the explication of their imagery.

Much of the *Romance’s* account of Alexander’s visit to the Land of the Blessed is, therefore, structured, albeit in slightly kaleidoscopic fashion, in accordance with a vision of underworld topography and eschatology strongly akin to that found in the Orphic tablets.

We seem to find Alexander negotiating a broadly similar underworld topography toward the end of Lucian’s thirteenth *Dialogue of the Dead*. Here Alexander, now entering the underworld in death, is talking—absurdly and vainly in the view of his interlocutor Diogenes—of being about to become a god. When this ambition is considered in the context of the Orphic tablets, and that of their aspirations for their bearers’ immortality, it may seem less absurd. Diogenes’ advice is that since there is no hellebore—the established cure for insanity—to hand, Alexander should rather drink from Lethe, so that he may forget all the nonsense Aristotle has taught him. As he says this, he sees the souls of Clitus and Callisthenes and the other people Alexander has murdered bearing down on him in the desire to tear him apart. “So you take this other of the two paths here (*tên heteran . . . tautên*), and keep drinking, as I said,” says Diogenes. These sparse details are sufficient to convey an underworld topography broadly compatible with the simple scheme of the Petelia tablet: the decent Clitus and Callisthenes, whom we can well expect to be dwelling in the blessed zone, arrive to pogrom Alexander by coming back down the rightward path, while Diogenes sends Alexander off down the other path, the lefward one, to drink Lethe (Lucian *Dial.*
Mort. 13). Lucian’s skit may presuppose the existence of Orphic-style underworld-journey narratives for Alexander, and may, accordingly, offer the possibility of anchoring the tradition of them back into the second century A.D. at least.

We have not yet said anything of one of the most striking aspects of the Romance episode, the subordinate tale of the father, his two sons, and his advice about exploiting the mares for guides by leaving their foals behind. 26 This reflects a folktale with an independent life of its own, as we can tell not least from a striking Romanian analogue. 27 But the tale may also, more germanely, lead us on to other underworld imagery elsewhere in the Alexander tradition. The episode in question is located at the beginning of Alexander’s famous siege and conquest of the supposedly impregnable rock of Aornos in India, the modern Pir-Sar. 28

Diodorus tells that as Alexander contemplated how to take the rock he was approached by an impoverished old man with two sons. He had lived long in the region and inhabited a cave in which he had carved three beds out of the rock. Dwelling here with his sons, he had come to know the local topography well. Approaching the king, the old man explained his situation and promised to escort him over the difficult ground and bring him out above (or above and to the right of?—huperdexion) the barbarians who held the rock. Alexander promised to give him great gifts and employed the old man as a guide (17.85). Curtius tells that as Alexander pondered how to take the rock, he was approached by an old man who knew the area, together with his two sons, and that he offered to show him the way up if he was rewarded. Alexander offered him eighty talents. He then sent the father off to lead the way, while holding back one of his sons as hostage (8.11.3–4). 29

The particular interest of this episode for our current study will already be apparent. Here, as with the Romance’s Land of the Blessed, we have the distinctive trio of an old man and his two sons. Here too the old man gives indispensable direction-finding advice, and once again his sagacity enriches his family. And here, further, we have the motif of the offspring held back at the starting point to ensure the return of the parent sent on ahead, although these motifs are here imposed upon humans rather than upon equines.

It is difficult to suppose that there is no genetic connection between this episode and that of the Romance’s Land of the Blessed. But how might the old man and his two sons have come to travel from the one to the other? The answer may lie in a further feature of the rock’s tale: its very name, Aornos. The origin of the Greek name may lie in the rock’s local Sanskrit name, which is now unknown to us, though
Avarana, which would have meant “stronghold,” has been suggested as a possibility. For the Greeks and Romans the name Aornos meant “birdless” (a-privative, ornis). The Romance, which itself offers only a vestigial account of this episode, explains the rock’s name compatibly, while feminizing it (Aorne): the rock was “birdless” because birds could not rest on it (AR 3.4.8–10). Philostratus similarly implies that the conventional explanation—which he himself rejects—was that the rock was too high for birds to reach its summit (VA 2.10). However, the name and adjective aornos had a long history in the broader Greek tradition of denoting entrances to the underworld. Indeed the term seems to have originated as a hellenization of the Italic name of one of the most famous underworld entrances, that of lake Avernus in Campania, the lake through which Aeneas made his descent, and this had then in turn been folk-etymologized to give the meaning “birdless,” with the supporting explanation that the holes killed overflying birds with their noxious exhalations. In due course the term came to be routinely applied to underworld passages around the world, including the marshes on the Acheron in Thesprotia and at Tartessos in Spain, and the mephitic cave or charōnion at Thymbria in Caria.

I suggest then that, for all the general paradox of an underworld towering into the sky, and the more specific paradox of its “birdlessness” contrasting with the mysterious birdlike guards of the Land-of-the-Blessed underworld, the rock-of-Aornos tradition was read by some, at some point, either literally or metaphorically, as a visit to the underworld and a triumph over it by Alexander. Such a reading of the episode, I believe, can be seen peeping through elsewhere in Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead. The twelfth dialogue addresses the (real or imagined) rivalry between Philip and Alexander that constitutes this volume’s major theme, and shows us the pair arguing with each other in death. Philip mocks Alexander, who in life had ousted him in his role as father in favor of the divine Ammon, for his now all-too-evident banal mortality. The exchange concludes with Alexander’s desperate boast that he has outstripped both Heracles and Dionysus in conquering Aornos. This is not just a boast to have done better than the two divine figures that had conquered their way around India before him. Given the underworld context of the conversation, and Philip’s sharp response to the effect that Alexander should remember that he is a corpse, the protestation must be read at some level, if only that of ironic subtext, as a claim to have conquered the underworld. And indeed Philostratus subsequently goes on to explain the rock of Aornos’ name with reference precisely to this tradition of underworld entrances: there was, he tells us, a cleft on its peak that drew birds into itself, presumably by emitting noxious gases (VA 2.10).
And so the question arises: In which direction did the motif of the old man and his sons travel between the two episodes? This is a strangely difficult question to resolve. On the one hand the rock-of-Aornos tale, with its old-man motif, is evidently attested much earlier than the Land-of-the-Blessed tale. The former is found in Diodorus and Curtius, a combination that would normally point to an origin in Clitarchus, who is now thought to have published soon after 310 B.C. This would suggest that those aspects of the rock-of-Aornos tale that were evocative of the underworld, in the first instance the rock’s name, facilitated the transfer of its old-man motif into the context of the Land-of-the-Blessed tale, with its more explicit underworld imagery.

On the other hand, considerations of folktale shape and of narrative logic may urge rather that the old-man motif traveled effectively in the opposite direction, from a prototype version of the Land-of-the-Blessed tale to the rock-of-Aornos tale. First, it is easier to get to the rock-of-Aornos version of the old-man tale from the Land-of-the-Blessed version of it than vice versa. We can hardly imagine that the folktale was stripped of its horses for the rock-of-Aornos tale only to reacquire them mysteriously for the Land-of-the-Blessed tale. And it seems that the key detail normally associated with the horses, that of the parent sent forth and the offspring held back, has been transposed onto the old man himself and one of his sons in the rock-of-Aornos tale. Secondly, the old man’s cave in the rock-of-Aornos tale may reflect the underworld cave also lurking behind the Land-of-the-Blessed tale (note further here the stone arch entrance that Alexander constructs for his Land of the Blessed). Thirdly, the old-man tale just seems to work so much better in the Romance context than it does in the rock-of-Aornos context. The Diodoran and Curtian narratives both set a hare running that they then decline to pursue: why do they specify that the old man has two sons, when only one of them is then made use of? By contrast, the Romance narrative does seem to have a significant role for two sons, in that it strongly implies that they march on either side of the old man and so help preserve him from detection (“I will march together with you in the middle of the rank”). So all this would suggest that the rock’s name with its underworld connotations, however acquired, encouraged the importation into its story of a version of the old-man tale from an already established account of Alexander in the underworld, strongly foreshadowing the tale of the Land of the Blessed. But if the rock-of-Aornos story, already incorporating the old-man tale, was indeed already present in Clitarchus, then Alexander’s underworld adventure must have been established in the tradition even before ca. 310 B.C.: but that’s just not believable . . . is it?
“And Your Father Sees You”


*Gideon Nisbet*

Pay attention, lad. Your father still watches over you.


What a great story. Why hasn’t it been told?

—Oliver Stone, *Resurrecting Alexander* (DVD feature)

**Introduction: *Alexander’s Paternity***

This chapter explores the narrative functions of the relationship between father and son in Oliver Stone’s recent epic film, *Alexander* (2004). I limit my remarks to the cinematic release, rather than the director’s two extended and revised versions (thus far) on DVD, the Director’s (2005) and Final (2007) Cuts—the latter also known as *Alexander Revisited*. These attempts to reposition *Alexander* as a neglected modern classic reflect Stone’s own carefully publicized identification with the hero’s character arc, but were even more poorly received by critics and audiences than the version originally released in cinemas worldwide in 2004 and written off at the time as “Olly’s Folly.” This chapter does not address the reception of Stone’s film in fan and critical discourse (a potentially rich topic), and is not concerned with developing a critical account of its flaws as a piece of cinema. Nor does it set out to recuperate *Alexander* by arguing that it has been misunderstood or unjustly maligned, along the lines attempted by Martin Winkler and his academic collaborators in defense of Wolfgang Petersen’s *Troy* (2004), another recent classical epic poorly received by critics on its release. *Alexander*’s cinematic shortcomings and postrelease misfortunes have been addressed elsewhere, by me among others.¹

It is certainly the case that more exciting things could have been done with Alexander’s story. A proposed version by *Moulin Rouge* director Baz Luhrmann starring Leonardo DiCaprio is merely the most famous of numerous, ultimately unsuccessful rival film projects of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Indeed, for several years the
Luhrmann *Alexander* was the clear favorite in a modern “War of the Successors” fought with press releases and casting coups. Borders and allegiances were in continual flux: in a pre-Luhrmann phase this particular *Alexander* had been a pet project of Ridley Scott, the British director of *Gladiator*, and DiCaprio was one of several leading men (including Jude Law and Matthew McConaughey) attached at various times to a separate script by Christopher (*The Usual Suspects*) McQuarrie. With Martin Scorsese lined up to direct, McQuarrie’s *Alexander* briefly led the field in 2001–02. Prominent among several other Alexanders in preproduction at this time was a proposed HBO television miniseries based on the novels of Mary Renault and directed by Mel Gibson. These and a miscellany of minor projects, some of them intriguingly alternative in focus, formed the backdrop against which Stone formulated his own version as it edged into funded viability. Aspects of their prepublicity aroused negative reactions in special interest groups, most notably self-appointed spokespersons of expatriate Greek communities; Stone took note, crafting a thematically unadventurous *Alexander* that was calculated to avoid upsetting anyone. As a result, it pleased no one.²

Would the lost Alexanders of the 1990s and 2000s have delivered a more “authentic” story, a more compelling hero? We will never know; however, if we look beyond conventional Hollywood epic we can see that more exciting and diverse applications had already been found for Alexander, including Bollywood and manga versions and (infamously) a 1964 television pilot starring William Shatner—the latter in fact is surprisingly nuanced and provocative of thought in its treatment of the ancient hero’s own self-mythologization. It is perhaps a shame that Stone did not take the lessons of these projects on board, and instead committed wholeheartedly to an unproductive model of historiophotic semiauthenticity.³ However, my focus in this chapter is only incidentally, and belatedly, on roads not taken.

Instead I read *Alexander’s* unusually prominent father/son dynamic as a reflexive commentary on the film’s troubled relation to existing Alexander narratives, and specifically Robert Rossen’s *Alexander the Great* (1956), of which Stone’s picture is a quasi-remake. Many readers of this volume will be familiar with the earlier film, starring an alarmingly blond Richard Burton as the young conqueror. Colin Farrell as a hard-drinking, Burton-esque Celt-in-a-fright wig is one of many small visual “steals” from Rossen’s film, selectively reported in my recent monograph.⁴ On a narrative level, and despite the hazy memory and special pleading of Stone-apologists,⁵ *Alexander* closely follows Rossen’s scenario. For all the much-vaunted personal
vision of its creator, *Alexander* is much more derivative of its prototype in style and substance than was its commercially successful ancient-world predecessor, *Gladiator* (2000), of its own unacknowledged plot source, Anthony Mann’s *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (1964).

Rossen’s epic presents thoughtful critique and some striking stylizations, but is overwritten and extraordinarily slow to build momentum. As director, writer, and producer, Rossen leaned heavily on his background in theater; Alexander’s sulky youth in Macedonia consequently makes for a long and uncinematically static first act. (Effectively we get a double bill of sub-Shakespearean history plays: Alexander III, parts 1 and 2.) Stone’s film follows Rossen’s lead in lingering on a pre-Greatness Alexander, with similarly unhappy consequences. Although Stone shuffles the pieces around more, *Alexander*’s audience must endure a slow three quarters of an hour of its protagonist’s growing pains before seeing any of the epic action they have been led to expect by the promotional campaign.

Still worse, the first-act business cut by Stone returns to clutter later parts of the narrative, killing the momentum of the film’s second half. Alexander’s huge potential for exciting (and admittedly expensive) epic content—sieges and Siwa, marches and massacres—is largely squandered, relegated to retrospective voiceover as an older Ptolemy dictates history lessons to a bored scribe. Meanwhile, Alexander processes his daddy issues.

“What without it, you’re nothing!”: *Alexander*’s Bad Blood

“That was not your father’s mission.”
“I’m his only worthy son.”
“What am I, you son of a dog?”
“You bastard! You’re no son of mine!”
“Do you think it’s because of your father?”
“My son! My son!”
“This day, your father would be very proud of you.”
“And I am not my father.”
“Your father must be turning in his grave.”
“I’m honored, father.”
“I’ve taken us further than my father ever dreamed.”
“I wish you a son.”
“How far you’ve turned from your father’s path.”
“Was it not your father?”
“Father, it’s best I go with you.”
“No, Alexander. Zeus is your father.”
As these excerpts indicate, paternity is an idée fixe of Stone’s *Alexander* and saturates the dialogue of its characters. The protagonist’s struggle to come to terms with his dead father structures and inflects the entire film narrative as a direct consequence of its nonlinear storyline. Rossen’s film at least got Philip permanently out of the way at the halfway point; but Stone intercuts the adult conquest of the East with the early years in Macedon. When we are not flashing back, the paternal past is teleporting forwards—twice in India Alexander literally sees Philip in the crowd at moments of crisis in his personal journey.

The first of these posthumous, magic-realist cameos is the catalyst that aggravates a drunken quarrel into the killing of Cleitus by Alexander at the banquet in India (1h47m–1h51m; timings refer to the standard cinematic cut, released on DVD in 2005). Cleitus’ toast is to Philip, “a real hero”—and he taunts the son with comparisons to the father: “Is his blood no longer good enough? Zeus? Ammon, is it? . . . Never would your father have taken barbarians as his friends.” He threatens revolt, in terms that predicate the legitimacy of Alexander’s Eastern campaign on his questionable status as Philip’s biological son and heir: “This army is your blood, boy!” And he is not alone. An equally drunken Alexander is now struck dumb (1h50m) by a hallucinatory vision of Philip—coughing up red arterial blood as at his own murder.

Stone’s intercutting heightens the shock effect; we have not yet seen Philip’s assassination, although we know that something must have happened to remove him from the story, so this vision is as disturbing and unexpected for us as it is for Alexander himself. The interleaved narrative of *Alexander* will in fact show Philip’s death (1h58m) in the course of the extended flashback which immediately follows (1h53m–2h04m), retrospectively clarifying the subtext of the present scene. Endorsing Cleitus’ assertion (“This army is your blood”), the apparition at the Indian banquet bellows: “Without it, you’re nothing!”

The ghost-Philip’s “it” is productively ambiguous, blurring the distinction between army and blood. The army is Alexander’s blood in two important and inseparable figurative senses: his source of strength and his birthright as Philip’s purported biological heir. Dialogue and mise-en-scène blur into each other in a violent image that aggressively merges and concretizes paternity and power: the “blood” that flows in Alexander’s veins (or does it?), Philip’s blood, literally drenches the Philip-apparition as he delivers his line. In the extended flashback immediately following the Indian banquet, we learn that Alexander’s panic and self-loathing at his own drunken killing of Cleitus are primarily driven by his love/hate relationship with his father. In the flashback to Alexander’s youth in Macedon, Philip—immediately before his own murder—commends his boy to
young Cleitus (1h55m) as to a surrogate father: “This man you can always trust, Alexander. Treat him as you would me.”

This is admittedly not the first of Stone’s films to have built its story around a father/son problematic; the idealistic volunteer Chris Taylor in Stone’s Vietnam epic *Platoon* (1986), torn between “good” and “bad” father figures in Sergeants Elias and Barnes, comes readily to mind. Nor is paternity the only important familial theme in *Alexander*: much could profitably be written on Alexander’s suffocating relationship with Angelina Jolie’s Olympias. “I wonder sometimes if it’s not your mother you run from,” Hephaestion tells Alexander (1h14m), shooting down his leader’s explicitly voiced pretensions (first flagged up by Ptolemy a mere four minutes into the film) as a rival to Prometheus; and in the end he can never run far enough, as Stone’s mythic subtext makes abundantly clear. It is also a critical commonplace that historical epic film offers postindustrial culture a space for working through its masculinity issues generally. By this account, the epic genre exploits the preindustrial past as a reservoir of as-yet-uncontaminated “natural” manliness against which contemporary masculinities can be interrogated and tested. Premodern epic heroes are thus belated echoes of the old Romantic idealization of the noble savage; they stand closer to nature, and possess a wisdom, dignity, and authenticity which we may fear we have forgotten in our sedentary age of modern convenience. In particular, historical epic set in the ancient world has always been especially effective at foregrounding the question of what big boys are, or should be, made of—often in tandem with the question of how high their hemlines should go. These dissections include on occasion explicit interrogation of the values and limits of paternity.

Often this testing of manliness against the template of the father is redemptive at the level of the individual character arc and lends additional narrative impetus to a robust conventional plot. Fitzgerald notes of Roman historical epic that the films of the 1950s and early 1960s endlessly work through

an ongoing problem with male authority that expresses itself clearly in the sphere of fatherhood, real or symbolic . . . in the world of the toga movie, Rome is the stern father under whose eyes “brothers” are set against each other but thereby brought together.

Fitzgerald’s insight is worth pausing to assimilate; *Ben-Hur* (1959) and *The Fall of the Roman Empire* are two obvious cases to which it can be productively applied. So, too, is his highly plausible explanation for Roman historical epic’s fixation on symbolic fatherhood in terms of the toga film’s symbiotic relation with the epic subgenre in
which the relation of Father to Son is at its most transcendentally archetypal: Biblical epic. The divide between Roman and New Testament biblical epics has always been highly permeable; the two subgenres conveniently share a notional timeline, enabling Jesus of Nazareth to make walk-on appearances in films including *Ben-Hur*, *Quo Vadis* (1951), and *The Robe* (1953). Indeed, based as they are on popular evangelical narratives of the late nineteenth century, the classic Roman toga epics may be said to derive their original impetus and narrative force from their teleological relation to the ever-evolving foundation myth of the early Church. Maria Wyke convincingly demonstrates that the Rome of mid-twentieth century cinema is a vibrant etiological allegory, projecting the past clearly and enthralingly onto the concerns of contemporary audiences. This Rome is there to decline and fall for us; to schedule martyrs’ dates with destiny; to shock and thrill us with pagan wickedness against which we affirm our own contemporary virtue.

In strong contrast, the subgenre of Greek historical epic (into which *Alexander* falls) does not share the teleological frame of reference common to Biblical and toga epic; all its best stories are set inconveniently in the B.C. era. Consequently, the gulf between the subgenres of Roman and Greek historical epic—toga and *peplum*—is much, much wider than that between Roman and biblical epic. In its lack of a clear presentist focus, the *peplum* might be said to have more in common with nonancient historical epic genres—at least at the level of narrative and theme. Writing of the historical epic in a more general sense, and with more of an eye to psychoanalytic approaches, Hunt (a clear influence on Fitzgerald) reads the theme of biological paternity as a convenient storyteller’s shorthand for the larger and more abstract patriarchal structures which motivate and make sense of epic heroism:

Male epics . . . make it part of their project to address male narcissism . . . In their construction of a “more perfect, more complete, more powerful ideal ego,” the films offer homoerotic images and relationships but pursue patriarchal themes and heroic codes. Both films [*Spartacus* and *El Cid*] are named after men who live according to rigidly defined codes of honour, and in doing so, become more than ordinary men (legends at least, and in *El Cid* something like a god), but give up their lives in the process. This transcendence, however, takes place within a specific relationship with the law and the father.

Hunt’s analysis of this “Oedipal problematic” in conventional historical epic is certainly useful in unpacking the excess pop-psychological
baggage of Stone’s protagonist—and might even be applied, albeit with tongue in cheek, to Stone himself in his self-fashioning as Hollywood’s heroic maverick director. Even given its genre, though, *Alexander’s* ongoing crisis of paternity is particularly overwhelming. The plot is never allowed to get out from under the long shadow of the protagonist’s conflicted feelings for his father. This is an anomaly: a phenomenon not apparent in Stone’s earlier oeuvre (e.g., *Platoon*), or, for that matter, in previous historical “male epics,” no matter how serious and sustained their engagement with father/son relationships (e.g., *El Cid*). We may legitimately dig deeper.

One potentially productive explanation would read *Alexander’s* father/son dynamic as reflexive allegory, dramatizing the film’s awkward relation to its own unacknowledged parent—Rossen’s film of 1956. This is extremely unlikely to have been Stone’s conscious intention—as if we could ever really know that, and as if we need care, in the age of the Death of the Auteur. Regardless, it is how the film plays out, for an audience that comes to it with knowledge of the earlier version . . . or even just with the awareness that there has been a previous version. In the words of Ptolemy’s voiceover (0h07m), “truly there was not a man in Macedonia who didn’t look at father and son side by side, and wonder.”

In the remainder of this chapter, I examine three further important scenes, presenting a transcript of the dialogue of the first and third (the second has minimal verbal content). My aim is to develop a “thick” explanation that reveals the film’s father-son fixation as multiply overdetermined. That is, *Alexander’s* status as a remake-in-denial amplifies the source anxieties already implicit in the paternity discourse of the historical epic genre; and its own figurations of *dunasteia* additionally speak to the film’s struggle to define itself against the spin and panic of rival cinematic Successors in the 1990s and early 2000s.

“One Day I’ll Be on Walls Like These”: A Father’s Shame

My starting point (0h21m–0h25m) is a scene much mocked by the reviewers: Philip and Alexander in the (archaeologically nonexistent) caves below the palace in Pella, complete with thrillingly primordial cave-paintings of figures from Greek myth—Achilles, Prometheus, Medea, and Heracles. Philip uses these mythic scenes as primitive PowerPoint in a pep talk that aims to distance Alexander from his overprotective mother. These strong masculine role models will toughen up a sensitive son in readiness for the day when he will take
over the family business of command. “A king must learn how to hurt those he loves,” Philip says, glugging unmixed wine from a goatskin against the emotive orchestral synthetics of Vangelis’ soundtrack. The dialogue for this scene establishes him as a difficult father in specifically presentist terms derived from the clichés of therapy and intervention culture. Stone’s Philip is written as a self-destructive workaholic with a contemporary Western drinking problem. He drinks alone (a classic Al-Anon telltale), and dissociates himself from his substance abuse by romanticizing himself as a helpless victim of addiction—“they make of us slaves”:

P: You dream of glory, Alexander. Your mother encourages it. There’s no glory without suffering, and this she will not allow.
A: One day I’ll be on walls like these.
P: Prometheus stole the secret of fire and gave it to man. It made Zeus so angry he chained Prometheus to a rock in the great Caucasus, and each day his eagle pecked out the poor man’s liver. Each night, it grew back again so that it could be eaten the next day. Miserable fate.
A: Why?
P: Who knows these things? Anyway . . . Oedipus tore out his eyes when he found out he’d murdered his father and married his mother—knowledge that came too late. Medea: she slaughtered her two children in vengeance when Jason left her for a younger wife.
A: My mother would never hurt me.
P: It’s never easy to escape our mothers, Alexander. All your life, beware of women. They are far more dangerous than men. Heracles; even after he accomplished his twelve Labors he was punished with madness, slaughtered his three children. Poor Heracles. Great Heracles. All greatness comes from loss. Even you, the gods will one day judge harshly.
A: When I’m king like you one day, father?
P: Don’t rush the day, boy. You risk all. My father threw me into battle before I knew how to fight. When I killed my first man, he said: “Now you know.” I hated him then, but I understand why now. A king isn’t born, Alexander. He’s made, by steel and by suffering. A king must learn how to hurt those he loves. It’s lonely; ask Heracles.

This semiarticulate, emotionally damaged man is unable to distinguish between masculinity and violence, and so perpetuates a familial cycle of abuse in which he is as much a victim as he is a perpetrator. (“My father threw me into battle before I knew how to fight . . . but I understand why now.”)13 His characterization echoes a familiar cine-
matic stereotype: the American blue-collar father, hardened and blunted by toil in a declining heavy industry, and now struggling to communicate his idea of masculine pride to a more educated and sensitive son who wants no part of that world. (A man “isn’t born . . . He’s made, by steel and by suffering.”)

This scene is important enough at the level of character, but it is even more vital to the film’s articulation of narrative: the cave paintings set up Stone’s ponderous mythic structure. Alexander will live out all of these archetypal stories, each one intrusively signposted by Ptolemy’s voiceover or in the dialogue of supporting characters. (Just in case anyone in the audience has managed to miss the point, the director and his celebrity historical adviser Robin Lane Fox make heavy weather of ticking off the myths on their collaborative DVD commentary.) When Alexander kills Cleitus, for instance, he is also metaphorically killing his father—an interpretation which, as we have seen, is explicitly and repeatedly forced on us by the film’s dialogue; and he has already slept with his mother by proxy, in the form of the barbarian princess Roxane, whose function as an Olympias-substitute is unsubtly connoted through mise-en-scène, particularly costuming and makeup. In other words, he has become Oedipus, and Stone will not let us forget it.

Stone’s obtrusive pop psychology does his structure no favors, and I broadly endorse Pomeroy’s sharp critique of its detrimental effect on how audiences experience the film’s characterization. But the cave paintings in this scene, unfortunately so formative of character and plot, also betray source anxiety. On the night after the Battle of Chaeroneia in the 1956 film, clad in furs, a drunken Philip staggers across the corpse-strewn battlefield, repeatedly bellowing a petulant repudiation of Demosthenes’ taunts that is also a self-hating admission of their truth: “Philip the Barbarian!” In Stone’s quasi-remake, he regresses even further from civilization—from barbarian to caveman; this is Rossen’s shaggy Philip amplified to the point of unwitting self-deconstruction. Caves under the palace at Pella? With cave paintings of a Stone Age Prometheus and Medea? Audiences weren’t buying the clash of registers; the incongruity quickly became comic.

“We’re Going Home”: Alexander the Good Son

My second scene (2h22m–2h24m) is largely visual, and comes near the end of the film. Returning from the brink of death after the savage battle at the Hydaspes, Alexander emerges from his tent to announce the army’s return from India to Persia. Weak and pale from his wound,
he announces with quiet emotion: “We’re going home.” As cheering soldiers lift him onto his horse, Alexander once again sees Philip look on from among the crowd, glimpsed in the middle distance as a static figure among bustling camp followers on the ridge above the camp. This time the film cuts repeatedly back and forth over emotive musical orchestration, using reaction shots to establish an empathic dialogue of mutual regards. Alexander (in close-up) looks tenderly to Philip, Philip to Alexander. This time there is no harsh rebuke—no words need be spoken. In his father’s eyes, the son has become a man.

Philip’s approving presence effects reconciliation and moral endorsement from beyond the grave, a sentiment backed up by the mushy soundtrack. In respecting the wishes of his army—earlier equated by Cleitus with his paternal “blood”—Alexander knows that at last he has earned the respect and acceptance as a “worthy son” that his emotionally crippled father was incapable of expressing in his own lifetime. (One significant detail of mise-en-scène is that Alexander’s horse in this scene is a new one. The death of Bucephalus, the embodiment of Alexander’s struggle for Philip’s attention and approval as a boy, is a major narrative element of the immediately preceding battle and supplies one of the film’s keynote visual images.)

This scene takes as its immediate model not Rossen’s Alexander the Great but the execution of William Wallace in Mel Gibson’s Braveheart (1995). The two scenes situate their films within the tendency of historical epic in the 1990s and 2000s to factor in a reified New Age spirituality, typically from the heroic male lead’s subjective point of view, in order to explore a more emotionally available and vulnerable masculinity. Here, as in Braveheart and Gladiator, magic realism delivers a classical deus ex machina in terms that play to a modern audience’s preconceptions. Because the protagonist is near death we can choose to rationalize his perception as a hallucination, while simultaneously experiencing the emotionally satisfying catharsis of an otherwise unobtainable moment of closure that resolves the film’s most important and most troubled relationship. Susceptibility to an altered state of consciousness is an updated manifestation of the Romantic closeness to nature endemic to the heroes of premodern historical epic film; it is very hard to imagine such a scene playing in any other genre.15

Gibson’s film carries its own male-epic share of father-angst—I take the title of the present chapter from its dialogue—but the hero’s vision is of his dead wife, Murron, moving silently among the crowd at his final ordeal. Wallace’s romantic relationship with Murron is the motor for Braveheart’s plot; similarly, Gladiator’s Maximus is primarily motivated by his wish to be reunited (whether in life or death) with
his beloved wife and child. Here, as elsewhere, Alexander privileges the paternal over the marital—Alexander’s wives are treated perfunctorily throughout. Viewed purely in terms of story, this is absolutely unnecessary and manifestly counterproductive. It is next to impossible to sell Alexander to audiences as, in Ptolemy’s words, “Megas Alexandros—the greatest Alexander of them all” (2h40m—the last line of the film) when he is daddy’s little soldier from start to finish.

“Our Sons Will Play Together”: Paternity and the Closet

My third and final scene (2h25m–2h29m) comes shortly afterward. Returned to Babylon from the ends of the earth in a grueling desert march that leaves his army in tatters (a part of the narrative relegated to voice-over narration), Alexander is called to the bedside of a typhus-ridden and clearly dying Hephaistion. Fond reminiscences of a shared childhood inspire the king to an impassioned soliloquy. Turning away from Hephaistion to look out over the waterways of Babylon, he conjures up a future in which the heroic pair will be as inseparable as ever:

H: I feel better. Soon, I’ll be up.
A: We leave for Arabia in the spring, and I couldn’t leave without you.
H: Arabia. You used to dress me up like a sheikh . . . Wave your wooden scimitar.
A: You were the only one who’d never let me win; the only one who’s ever been honest with me. You saved me from myself. Please don’t leave me, Hephaistion.
H: My Alexander. I remember the young man who wanted to be Achilles and then outdid him.
A: And you, Patroclus. And then what happened? Ours is a myth only young men believe.
H: But how beautiful a myth it was.
A: We reach, we fall. Oh, Hephaistion.
H: I worry for you without me.
A: I am nothing without you. Come, fight, Hephaistion. We will die together. It’s our destiny. We’ll have children with our wives, and our sons will play together as we once did. A thousand ships we’ll launch from here, Hephaistion. We’ll round Arabia and sail up the gulf to Egypt. From there, we’ll build a channel through the desert and out to the Middle Sea. And then we’ll move on Carthage. And that great island, Sicily, they’ll pay large
tribute. After that, the Roman tribe, good fighters—we’ll beat them. And then explore the northern forests, and out the Pillars of Heracles to the western ocean. And then one day, not ten years from now, Babylon, with its deep-water harbor, will be the center of the world. Alexandrias will grow; populations will mix and travel freely. Asia and Europe will come together. And we’ll grow old, Hephaistion, looking out our balcony at this new world . . . Hephaistion? Hephaistion?

Once again, *Alexander* places pressure on its audience to note and admire Stone’s paint-by-numbers mythic structure. The allusions are made easy to follow: the relationship of Achilles and Patroclus has been flagged up in the schoolroom and cave scenes earlier in the film, and the “thousand ships” might jog a memory of *Troy*, released earlier that year. However, there are major source anxieties leaking into the script here: much of the scene reads as *pietas* to the input of Robin Lane Fox, whose relationship with the film was extraordinarily intimate. As Alexander moves away from Hephaistion toward the window and Babylon beyond, his long soliloquy spins a first person “Alexander-romance” that methodically name-checks mainstream ancient and modern receptions alike. The historiographic counterfactual of an Alexander turning West to face Rome is a defining *topos* of the classical Latin literary Alexander-discourse explored in Diana Spencer’s chapter in this volume on Valerius Maximus, and more fully in her *The Roman Alexander*. Conversely, Alexander’s vision of a Panhellenic United Nations—“populations will mix and travel freely. Asia and Europe will come together”—gestures with Lane Foxian scholarly nostalgia toward the optimistic liberal historiography of the early- to mid-twentieth century, exemplified by Sir William Tarn. The film knows that this is a version in which Alexander hobbyists can no longer believe, and footnotes it briefly as a wistful counterfactual. As cinema’s would-be last word on Alexander, *Alexander* is studiously covering all its bases; allusion turns “the greatest Alexander of all” into the cumulative capstone to *all* the Alexanders of mainstream Western tradition.

This is not merely piquant subtext for the *cognoscenti*; the film has also taken care to equip its nonacademic audience to understand that this dream of Greece can never be realized. “Our sons will play together as we once did . . . And we’ll grow old” is very clearly not on the cards in a film that has opened with Alexander’s own early death without a named successor. There will be no sequel, no cash-in, no straight-to-DVD *Son of Alexander*: Stone’s epic will forever be “Megas Alexandros—the greatest Alexander of all”—in magnificent isolation, as though none of the other cinematic rivals of the 1990s and early
2000s had ever been mooted. But this is not all: Alexander’s physical retreat from Hephaistion’s bedside as he embarks on his soliloquy (2h28m) also reflects the film’s awkward ambivalence about their relationship. An openly gay or bisexual Alexander can never happen either, or have happened—the clumsy hints we’ve been getting along the way are retrospectively overwritten. “Do you love him?” asks Roxane on her wedding night (1h27m)—a moment of unintended comic relief for many bored audiences. Or consider the unintentional bathos of the coy and awkward exchange between Alexander and Hephaistion on the night before Gaugamela (0h42m): “on the eve of battle, it is hardest to be alone.” Not tonight, Hephaistion; Alexander enjoys a chaste goodnight hug and retires unaccompanied to his tent, saving his energy for the big game. But even these soft-pedaled glimpses of homoeroticism are now retroactively disowned.

*Alexander* reached the market as the result of a drawn-out War of Succession with rival Alexander projects in which the lead character’s sexuality was pulled this way and that by publicity stunts, star image, and ethnic and political interest groups. Roman epic film has occasional moments of homosexual panic—“oysters and snails” on Spartacus’ cutting-room floor, or the smoldering glances thrown by Stephen Boyd’s Messala at Heston’s uncomprehending Ben-Hur—but the toga film had always been able to fall back on heterosexual credentials based equally in pagan lust and evangelical uplift. The whip-cracking Marcuses of films such as *The Sign of the Cross* (1932) and *Quo Vadis* are diamonds in the rough who just need to meet the right Christian girl to set them on the straight and narrow path of the virtuous epic action hero. These credentials are forever unavailable to the *peplum*, set in a pre-Christian culture with a two-edged reputation for being sensitively artistic. In particular, Victorian fumblings over “Greek love” set up any film set in ancient Greece for camp appropriation—a trend the recent *300* cunningly met halfway and ran with.19

Alexander’s, in particular, turned out to be a story in which many claimed a share. While rival projects were talking up their historical accuracy and contemporary relevance with claims that their Alexander would be the most authentically bisexual, Stone’s film played its cards close to its chest; and even it ended up tangling, sometimes litigiously, with the native and expatriate Greek communities who were the most consistently vocal advocates of Alexander the Straight. (We might compare the reception of Alexander as a Church Father in the later Alexander-Romance.)20 The result is an unhappy compromise—don’t ask, don’t tell—which also faithfully reflects Lane Fox’s longstanding tendency of strategic euphemism. (Hephaistion is, in his words, Alexander’s “beloved friend.”)21
In this scene, the dialogue leans on the topos of paternity to hedge Alexander and Hephaistion from conservative opprobrium. Alexander physically turns his back on his maybe-kind-of-boyfriend and walks away, back into the closet as a husband and prospective father. The two “beloved friend[s]” are now defined by their wives—this is the first we have heard of Hephaistion getting married—and by the unborn sons who will one day succeed them. “You used to wave your wooden scimitar . . . You were the only one who’d never let me win”: best friends forever, and no more. “Ours is a myth only young men believe”: thank heavens it was just a phase.

Conclusion

This chapter began by suggesting that we approach the father/son problematic of *Alexander* as a figuration of the film’s uneasy relation to its own unacknowledged “parent”—a difficulty it shares with *Gladiator* among others. Twisting Ptolemy’s words just a little, “truly there was not a nerd in the multiplex who didn’t look at father and son side by side, and wonder.”

This reading has much to recommend it. Alexander’s insistence that “I’ve taken us further than my father ever dreamed” (1h22m) is so much hot air, and knows it is: the relation of Stone’s film to Rossen’s is unusually close, and Farrell’s Alexander has been anticipated by his prior self at almost every step. “Alexander, son of a god—it was a myth, of course,” harrumphs gouty old Ptolemy (0h36m), a comment that applies equally well to *Alexander’s* own failed self-mythologization. Uneasy in its status as an unmistakable by-blow of Rossen, *Alexander* makes heavy weather of asserting a transcendent origin in the collective creative genius of director, star, and historical adviser; it protests too much, and its mythic bluster is very quickly seen through.

As we have seen, the father/son dynamic is fundamental to the historical epic as a subset of its discourse of masculinity. It is, perhaps, especially prevalent in specific subgenres within premodern historical epic, most obviously the toga film, where (as argued by Fitzgerald) it assumes its most explicitly transcendental form; but we have seen that the *peplum* shares little if anything with the toga film in this regard. We might then say that *Alexander’s* paternity discourse is unexceptional in its basic type within the general context of historical epic, but is strikingly anomalous in its frequency and intensity. Even allowing for genre, then, this Alexander’s father issues are to a large degree his own. This seems consistent with my initial
proposal that cinematic parentage and descent are an important underly-
ing impulse in this particular case. Alexander struggles to be Rossen’s “only worthy son,” but must also seek to deny its paternity if it is to stand outside the shadow of the earlier film. In the event, of course, it achieves neither of these.

Paternity discourse additionally serves to contain and countermand the film’s underdeveloped subtexts of same-sex desire—subtexts that were already repressed to the point of inadvertent comedy—in anticipation of conservative protest. Hephaistion’s death scene leans on potential future fatherhood in an attempt to put the lid back on the can of worms opened by the sexually liberal Alexander-discourse of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The father/son tensions of Alexander thus turn out to be about rather more than just cinematic dunasteia; and this makes them important to think about, and good to think with.
Notes

Chapter 1

1. Translation adapted from Perrin 1928.
3. See, e.g., Fredericksmeyer 1990: 303. Thomas 2007: 120 is illustrative: “Philip seems to have had dealings . . . with one Pixodaros, ruler of a part of Karia in southern Anatolia.”
4. The Hecatomnids did oversee extensive hellenization in Caria, transforming native centers into poleis whose citizens met in assembly and recorded decisions in Greek inscriptions (Hornblower 1982: 332–51), but neither contemporary observers nor later writers seem to have taken much notice of this. Strictly speaking, Pixodarus was not the last of the dynasty, but his successors have no independent histories. Pixodarus’ daughter Ada, the would-be bride of Arrhidaeus, married a Persian, Orontobates, who became satrap after Pixodarus’ death, but after (probably) withdrawing from Caria following Alexander’s capture of Halicarnassus in 334, she disappears entirely from view. Alexander restored Pixodarus’ sister Ada to a position of rule in Caria, and she survived until perhaps 324. See Ruzicka 1992: 133–55.
6. Paus. 1.29.7 attributes that successful relief of Perinthus to Arsites, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and says nothing of other satraps. Most likely, Arsites’ name alone came to be connected with what was actually a joint relief effort, because Arsites, as satrap of the region opposite Perinthus, had overseen the final assembly of supplies and reinforcements. Immediately after Artaxerxes III’s recovery of Egypt in 343, Mentor of Rhodes, who had been instrumental in Persian success in Egypt, was appointed “satrap of the coast,” evidently to deal with recalcitrant dynasts like Hermias of Atarneus. But he did this job very quickly and
may have transferred troops under his command to Artaxerxes for use in the Cadusian War before Philip’s attack on Perinthus, so these would not have been available for use against Philip in 340. See Diod. 16.50.7. Debord 1999: 420 is skeptical about Hecatomnid involvement in the defense of Perinthus and other sites at this time because of the absence of any direct evidence.

7. There were Hecatomnid garrisons in Rhodes and Cos, at least in the 350s: Diod. 15.3, 27; Ruzicka 1992: 92–93.


10. Mentor disappears from sources entirely after Diodorus’ mention of his dispatch of mercenaries, and Memnon is henceforth leading figure in the region, see Beloch 1922: 603; Debord 1999: 435.


13. Carney 2000a: 54 attributes the remarks about fighting war through marriage to Athenaeus himself rather than Satyrus.

14. Nowhere in Alex. 10.1–3 does Plutarch explicitly state that Pixodarus initiated contact with Alexander and was the first to propose a marriage alliance. Plutarch states only that Pixodarus wished to “slip into” an alliance through a marriage and for that purpose sent Aristocritus to Philip. That could well describe Pixodarus’ response to Philip’s offer, and it may be that Plutarch simply started his account with Aristocritus’ journey to Pella, since it was the quarrel that subsequently occurred there that interested Plutarch, not any of the details of the sequence of diplomatic exchanges.

15. Worthington 2003a: 92 can serve to represent this scholarly consensus.

16. Thus French and Dixon 1986: 77–80, who are alone in having the Pixodarus affair begin (with Pixodarus’ supposedly initial overture) while Alexander was still in Illyria.


18. Contra Carney 1992a: 177–78, who characterizes Alexander’s exile as “not lengthy” and refers to the probability of Olympias’ “relatively rapid return from exile.”


20. Perhaps also on Arrhidaeus’ mental disability, probably some degree of mental retardation (Carney 2001: 77–79). However, as Carney
2006: 155 n. 104 observes, assuming Pixodarus was aware of Arrhidaeus’ limitations (evidently responsible for his characteristic passivity), he may have looked favorably at this situation since it meant that Pixodarus’ daughter would assume the dominant position in governing Caria, thus perpetuating the practice of rule by Hecatomnid females.

23. Adapted from translation by Perrin 1928.
24. Demosthenes (18. 294–96) rails against Demaratus (among others) for his early, traitorous support of Philip—his philippismos, to use Demosthenes’ word. Certainly collapse of Philip’s power would have entailed great danger for Demaratus and his haste to admonish Philip and facilitate termination of potentially debilitating strife in the Argead house is understandable.
26. Philip was certainly reminded of the dissension within the Argead house following the death of his father Amyntas III and would want at all costs to avoid actual hostilities which might fragment Macedon as inter-necine conflict had in the 360s. Mortensen 1992: 56–71 provides a good description of the situation at that time.
27. All Plutarch probably really knew was that Philip and Alexander were reconciled. Since the rift had originated with Attalus’ implied disparagement of Alexander’s lineage and Philip’s failure to protest, Plutarch imagines that the evident healing had to involve Philip’s validation of Alexander’s lineage, which Plutarch presents in Greek terms by contrasting Alexander with a “barbarian”—worse, actually, the “slave of a barbarian king.”
28. Contra Hatzopoulos 1982b: 61; Arrian’s attribution (Anab. 3.6.5) of Philip’s exile of Alexander’s “friends” to the estrangement between Philip and Alexander because of Philip’s marriage with Cleopatra does not necessarily contradict Plutarch’s report that Philip exiled Alexander’s friends at the end of the Pixodarus affair (Alex. 10.3). The fracas at the wedding celebration was after all the beginning of the estrangement out of which the Pixodarus affair and ultimately the banishment of Alexander’s friends proceeded (Hamilton 1969: 27). We may imagine that in Pella prior to his flight to Illyria, Alexander as crown prince had his own cadre of hetairoi paralleling that of the king and representing his own special subordinates. On hetairoi, see Heckel 2003: 205.
the story of Alexander’s continuing display of competitiveness toward and resentment of Philip long after Philip’s death. See also the remarks on father-son competitiveness in Carney 1992a: 177 n. 24.

Chapter 2

This article is dedicated to Adolf H. Borbein, with gratitude and affection.

1. Smith 1988: 46. I agree with him (46 n. 2), and with Queyrel 2003: 19, 205, that the theory of Linfert 1976 about the “Thronprätendentenbart” is not convincing.

2. Diod. 17.37.5; 66.3; Curt. 3.12.16; 5.2.13–15; 7.8.9; Arr. Anab. 2a.12.6.

3. Plut. Alex. 4.1–7, Mor. 53d, 335a–b.


5. SVF 3.198. English translations from Greek are taken from the Loeb Classical Library: F. C. Babbitt and B. Perrin (Plutarch), Ch. B. Gulick (Athenaeus) and R. D. Hicks (Diogenes Laertius).

6. Again, oddly enough, literary and epigraphic testimonia on the portraits of Alexander decline to comment upon his clean-shaven face, in contrast to the famous anastolē: see Evans 1969: 56–58 and specially Stewart 1993: 359–416 for the evidence, although neither of them discusses this fact. Perhaps the smooth chin was so obvious a characteristic of Alexander’s image that, with the passing of time, it did not require any further explanation: it became consubstantial with him and so it became invisible. Roman portraiture of emperors followed this fashion, thus reinforcing the impression of obviousness.


8. On the contrary, the widespread amazement occasioned by Hadrian’s new fashion was duly registered (Cass. Dio 68.15.5; SHA, Hadr. 26.1). The lack of criticism and ethnocentrism in ancient thought as regards facial hair are perfectly epitomized in Pliny’s analysis (HN 210) on the shaving habits of humanity: Italo Calvino 1999: 53–54 has seen it clearly.


10. For other possible representations of the young prince made by painters, see Moreno 1993: 101–08; Stewart 1993: 105–22.

11. Bieber 1964: fig. 5; Hölscher 1971: pls. 1–2; Smith 1988: pl. 2; Stewart 1993: pl. 1, fig. 5.


15. It was Gebauer 1938/39: 72–73 who first called attention to this connection. For this sculpture see Richter 1965: figs. 449–50; von Graeve 1973: figs. 3–8.

16. As Stewart 1993: 108 maintains, developing Gebauer’s reading. Obviously the contrast would work also on the hypothesis that both heads were copied from the Philippeum group.

17. Cf. Schultz 2007: 213–21 on the material, composition, and appearance of the statues, although he does not deal with their facial hair; and Carney 2007a for the dynastic dimension of the monument.


19. According to the archaeological reconstruction (see, e.g., Themelis 1991: 52–53), the sculptor would have divided the figures into two groups: one made up of naked and unbearded athletes, and the other of robed and bearded forefathers, cast in the role of civil and military personalities.


24. It has been argued that both the beard and the Corinthian helmet formed part of a conventional depiction of a stratēgos (so Poulsen 1993: 161–62 n. 6), but let me note that the figure on horseback and his spear evoke the Macedonian cavalry, rather than a Greek infantry general. Cf. also Hölscher 1973: 176, who rightly refers to the old scenes of heroic single combat.


26. Philip’s concern for the internationalization of his official image has been recently underlined by Carney 2007a: 28–30. On the Olympian tholos as a theatrical space, designed for viewing and display, proclaiming the Argead’s status as the most powerful man in the Greek world, see Schultz 2007: 221–25.
27. On this see Wannagat 2001: 54–55 and especially Schmidt 2007: 106. Compare too the estimate of Le Bohec 1993 for the Argeads with the age groups as reconstructed by Davidson 2007: 78–82, 482.


29. E.g., *Alza la barba* are the words that Beatrice ironically uses to address Dante in the *Divine Comedy* in order to remind him that he was already an adult man and should behave as such (*Divina Comedia* 2.31.68).


32. Achilles with Briseis, with Lycomedes, and with Chiron: see Hölscher 1971: 48–49. For the three different representations of the hero (bearded, beardless, and athletic) compare the illustrations in King 1987, although the Homeric Achilles must have had little more than a trace of down on his face: see Mau 1897: 30. *Pace* Stewart 1993: 80, the Achilles’ outlook on the Attic red-figured amphora from Vulci (c. 440) might hardly have been the best model for the young prince at Pella. In any event, conjuring up the past meant again selective reconstruction and even invention of its forms: the Macedonian case is explored by Cohen 1995.

33. Cf. Stewart 1993: 65–66 for Pericles and also Zanker 1996: 108, who mentions the beardless statues of Alcibiades. On the erotic associations of this case, see Dover 1978: 86. As far as I know, the contrast between Alcibiades and his uncle and tutor Pericles, of the older generation, has not been duly highlighted, and the comparison between the pairing Philip-Alexander and Pericles-Alcibiades may be illuminating.

34. Note, for instance, the group of portraits of youths and young men from the Antonine period, mostly found in Greece, whose long, flowing hair and heroic expression have been compared to Alexander’s portraiture. However, the wearing of a short beard introduces an important differentiation, which refers to a broader classical source of inspiration. On this I agree with Zanker 1996: 248–49, as I also agree with Smith 1999: 457 that the image of the long-haired, youthful Christ might be more that of Christ the king than that of Christ the devotee of learning.


court (FGrH 115 F 225b = Ath. 6.260e–f; F 225a = Polyb. 8.9.6–13). Cf. too Davidson 2007: 360–66, 379–80, pointing to unorthodox amatory rules in aristocratic societies like Thessaly; note in this respect the painted grave stele from Demetrias, on which both the soldier and the man in civic dress are clean-shaven: see Schmidt 2007: 106–07 (fig. 83).


38. Ol. 1.67.8: see Dover 1978: 198.

39. On this see Hölscher 1971: 26, who also points out that the iconography of Alexander’s friends, like Hephaestion, adjusts rather to this conventional hairstyle. In fact, the Agias fits this category: see Themelis 1991: fig. 74; Stewart 1993: fig. 8.

40. For the masculinity of the Hellenistic king cf. Roy 1998, who rightly insists on the iconographic expression of this virtue. Compare Polybius’ literary portrait of Attalus I (18.41), positive, with that of Prusias II (36.15), negative and effeminate.

41. Plut., Alex. 11.6: see especially Le Bohec 1993: 784. Such prejudices about the new king might have been reinforced later by the literary (Theophrastan) tradition about him as a gynnis (Ath. 435a), so Ogden 2007: 104–05, who connects this tradition with Alexander’s shaving habits. The Athenians, in any event, were well aware of the three styles fashionable at the time, as the grave stele of Panchares shows: a hoplite in conventional armor, wearing both short hair and a beard, and clearly intended to be a mature adult (anēr); a fallen young man (neos), featured according to the athletic type, nude, his hair short and cleanly-shaven; and a cavalryman, also young and beardless, but long-haired: see Cohen 1997: 32.

42. Cf. Smith 1988: 51–53, 60. For the expressiveness, both radiant and frightening, of the magni oculi (compare Polem., Phgn. 144 Foerster and Ael., VH 12.14), see L’Orange 1947: 111; Evans 1969: 57; Stewart 1993: 141; Cohen 1997: 119. Dover 1978: 71 reminds that some black-figure vase-painters distinguished between female and beardless male faces by giving the latter wider and bolder eyes.

43. Stewart 1993: 144 is almost sarcastic, but scores a bull’s-eye when he notes that “Darius may have shot his last bolt, but unlike Alexander he at least wears a beard.” Of course, beards can be very comic, yet this is not the case here. After all, who could resist Alexander? Cf. Cohen 1997: 110, 119, 174.

44. For a plausible reconstruction of the Macedonian group on the painting see Hölscher 1973: 136; good photos in Moreno 2000: pls. 5, 7. Schreiber 1903: 130–38 had rightly compared these sideburns with those of the Capitoline portrait—but we should add those of Alexander with Roxane in the Pompeian fresco and on the Aboukir medallion at the
Gulbenkian Museum; he had also correctly interpreted the three parallel lines of *tesserae* in a darker color following the sideburns as a mere shadow line (133 n. 25). However, Schreiber’s statement that this facial hair of Alexander is the source of inspiration for future royal bearded portraits is unsound and unnecessarily complicated, let alone his refusal to accept Athenaeus’ information about the change in shaving habits. His ideas have been partially resuscitated by Queyrel 2003: 87, 204–06, to explain the source of inspiration for some Hellenistic bearded portraits. As will be seen immediately, the vogue for facial hair never faded and had stronger models than Alexander’s whiskers in the Pompeian Mosaic: the beard style of the Diomedes at the Glyptothek in Munich, for example, can account much better than Alexander for Ptolemy’s portrait on the Louvre gold ring (see below n. 50): cf. Schröder 1995: 296 n. 28.


46. Bieber 1964: 47.

47. Goukowsky 1978–81: i, 110.


50. To the four cases mentioned by Smith (1988: 46 n. 2) in royal portraiture (Philip V, Perseus, Achaean, and Demetrius II), I would like to add the beards of Philip III, Seleucus II, Antiochus IX, Demetrius III, and at least one of the late Ptolemies (Richter 1965: figs. 1837, 1841), let alone the Pontic and Bithynian kings: see Linfert 1976: figs. 3–19; Smith 1988: pls. 25, 39.1–2, 40, 48.3–4. Therefore, Zanker’s statement (1996: 108) that “the Hellenistic kings and their courts, I believe, all adopted the new fashion” of shaving, should be nuanced. See below n. 61.


52. Add Plut. *Thes.* 5.4; Polyaenus *Strat.* 4.3.2; Synesius *Caluitii enc.* 15–16: on them cf. Stewart 1993: 74 n. 7.

55. Andronicos 1984 argued that Tomb II was that of Philip II, erected by Alexander. This is not the place to discuss the question: see the last overviews by Landucci 2003a: 44–56, and Borza, Palagia 2007.
57. See Richter 1965: figs. 976–1013 for the whole series of Aristotle’s busts and Zanker 1996: 67–77, fig. 41, who concludes that Plato’s or Aristotle’s beard was not yet the “philosopher’s beard,” but the normal style worn by all citizen men.
60. Augustus had himself depicted clean-shaven, unlike the defeated Antony (Zanker 1990: 33–77), and his style endured among his successors. Later, when Hadrian became the princeps and decided to retain his earlier beard as a sort of cultural message, his new hairstyle was immediately adopted as the norm throughout the empire by men young and old: cf. Zanker 1996: 218. This mimetic behavior was basically due to the centralized character of Roman civilization, with the Urbs and the emperor playing the role of canonical references, as Alföldy (1986: 334–77) and Zanker (1990) have masterly explained.
61. We have from Athens bearded faces of Greek leaders, c. 330–275: see Smith 1993 and Zanker 1996: 63–66, 83–89, figs. 36–37, 48–50, with busts of Miltiades, Periander, Demosthenes, and Olympiodorus, as well as Spartan kings such as Archidamus III and Nabis (Richter 1965: figs. 888–89, 1760; Kraay, Hirmer 1966: fig. 522). I fully agree with Palagia 2005: 292 that beardlessness may not have been as widespread in Athens and in other parts of mainland Greece as among the Successors. See also the critical remarks of Smith 1999: 453–54.
62. Cf. Stewart 1993: 278, with the previous bibliography.
63. Gonatas honored Pan as the true architect of his victory over the Celts in 277 and he struck silver coins bearing a Macedonian shield with the god’s head in its centre on the obverse (see e.g., Richter 1965: figure 1745). Some issues equip Pan with a diadem, while on others the legend “of king Antigonus” is repeated on the obverse. Possibly, then, his Pan’s head is intended to be a crypto-portrait of the king himself, casting the Antigonid as the protector of Macedonia against the country’s invaders: cf. Stewart 1993: 287. Furthermore, note that although Pan was normally represented in Greek coins and Hellenistic sculpture as a bearded divinity, this presumed Gonatas-Pan appears clean-shaven. In this occasion the mon-
arch’s outlook might not be void of meaning: the Macedonian civilized leader would contrast with the Celtic otherness, normally featured by the typical moustaches of its warriors, in addition to the torques. This numismatic evidence is not discussed by Kabus-Preisshofen 1989: 105, who argues for a bearded Gonatas, “Philosoph auf dem Thron,” nor by Dontas 1983, for whom the bearded bust from Copenhagen would not be Philip II’s, but Gonatas’, in mourning for his son Halcioneus. Finally, it is worth mentioning Stewart’s perceptive analysis of the seated and unbearded Antigonid king in the Boscoreale frescoes (1993: 279 n. 46).


66. See Wannagat 2001: 57–60 and Davidson 2007: 527 n. 29, who has called attention to the fact that beards are “ethnically marked.” Not without interest is also Miller 2007: 316–18.

67. For a battle of images see Alonso, García 2009.

68. See Giesey 1985: 60–62; Burke 1992: 3, 28, 35, 37, 41, 44–45, 68–69, 195–97 (figs. 9, 10, 15); Schaub 2003; Mérot 2007. None of them, however, has explained the Bourbon’s change in facial hair from this point of view.

69. This study is part of the research project Iconografía de la realeza e identidad cultural en el Oriente helenístico (HUM2006–00980), financed by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia. The university libraries of Madrid and Oxford have helped me a lot to cope with the bibliography. I am grateful to O. Palagia and O. Tekin for comments offered when this paper was delivered in Clemson and later in Istanbul, thanks to E. Carney’s and M. Sayar’s invitations. Special thanks are given to the editors, E. Carney and D. Ogden, not only for their assistance with the English text, but also for their valuable criticisms and for the bibliographical orientations. R.R.R. Smith was kind enough to offer me his hospitality in Oxford (Lincoln College) and to read the last draft of this paper with a sharp eye for unwarranted suppositions and methodological issues. Remaining faults are, of course, my own.

Chapter 3


2. Cf. Lucian, D.M. 13 where the Cynic philosopher Diogenes taunts Alexander with his claim to be the son of Ammon.


5. Arr. Anab. 4.13–14; Curt. 8.6.7–8.21; Plut. Alex. 55; Just. 12.7.1–3.
Müller 2003: 155–65; Hammond 1997: 155–58; Badian 2000: 70–72; Bos-
treatment by Cartledge 2004: 73.

6. Arr. Anab. 4.13.2; Curt. 8.7.2. On Sopolis and his position as Ilarch
cf. Arr. Anab. 3.11.8.

7. In scholarship, he and his comrades are usually called “pages,”
whereas the ancient sources call them basilikoi paides, paides, nobiles
pueri, or regii pueri. Elizabeth Carney criticizes the anachronistic use of
the medieval term “pages” for this group and proposes the term royal
from adolescence to manhood and it is widely assumed that they were not
little boys anymore but were somewhere after the beginning of puberty
2007: 78 suggests that they were about fourteen when they began their
duty. Carney 1980: 228 assumes that they were in their mid to late teens.


9. The conspirators were Hermolaus, his lover Sostratus son of Amyn-
tas, Antipater son of the Syrian satrap Asclepiodorus, Epimenes son of
Arsiaius, Anticles son of Theocritus, and Philotas son of the Thracian Carsis
(Arr. Anab. 4.13.3–4). Curtius adds the names of Nicostratus and Elapto-
nius (8.6.9–10). According to Heckel 1992: 295, though, Nicostratus was a
doublet of the name Sostratus. Just. 12.7.2 speaks vaguely of many Mace-
donian nobles being executed. Plut. Alex. 55.2 also only speaks of those
who surrounded Hermolaus.

10. Arr. Anab. 4.13.3–4; Curt. 8.6.7–11.

12.7.2.

12. Curt. 8.7.12: “Persarum te vestis et disciplina delectant, patrios
mores exosus es. Persarum ergo, non Macedonum regem occidere volui-
mus . . .” Translation: J.C. Rolfe.


stances of his death were obscured even by the contemporary sources and
12.7.2; 15.3.4–6; Val. Max. 7.2.ext.11 A; 9.3.ext.1; Plut. Alex. 55.4–5;
Diog. Laert. 5.5. See also Müller 2003: 155–65; Rubinsohn 1993: 1324–27;


22. Cf. Hatzopoulos 1994: 97; Berve 1926: 153; Heckel 2003: 223; 2008: 110; Bosworth 1988a: 118; Cartledge 2004: 71; Carney 2002: 63; Engels 2006: 59. Will 1986: 138–39 thinks that Hermolaus was also especially insulted because the royal youths had to respond to Alexander’s sexual needs. This proposal is not supported by the ancient evidence and is obviously influenced by the earlier episode of Philip II’s murder by the *somatophylax* Pausanias as told by Diodorus (16.93.3–94.4. Cf. Just. 9.6; Plut. *Alex.* 10.4). The sources do not confirm that there was any sexual bond between Hermolaus and Alexander or between the ruler and any other of the royal youths. Curt. 8.6.3–4 reports that they brought *pelices* (concubines) in his bedroom, probably hinting at the Persian “harem” he had taken over (6.6.8). But he does not state that the royal youths were involved in Alexander’s sexual activities. Plut. *Mor.* 170 E–F only parallels Hermolaus and Pausanias to the means that both accompanied their rulers and desired to kill them.


25. Ael. *V.H.* 14.48: the *pais* left the road to have a drink when he was thirsty.


27. Consequently, Wirth 1993: 322 characterized the story about the boar hunt as the culmination of a disagreement, when Macedonian opposition was combined with Greek aversion to tyranny for the first time.


NOTES TO PAGES 28–29  245


31. Xen. Cyr. 1.4.14; Ctesias FGrH 688 F 40–41; Plut. Mor. 173 D. Cf. Briant 1996: 243; Seyer 2007: 58–60. According to Anderson 1985: 60, Xenophon’s report has to be read differently. He comments on a special and unique case: Astyages arranged the hunt for the special pleasure of his grandson forbidding anyone else to strike a blow only until Cyrus had hunted to his heart’s content.


43. Plut. Mor. 180 B; Alex. 29.4; Arr. Anab. 2.25.2; Curt. 4.11.10–16; Diod. 17.54.4–5; Val. Max. 6.4 ext.3. Cf. Wirth 1993: 296–97; Müller 2003: 66–68; Sisti 1994: 209–15. It is important to remember that the Macedonian ruler acquired land by conquest as his own possession. Cf. Hammond
1988: 389; Hampl 1934: 46–47. Therefore, he could increase his personal power by his conquests.


46. Even though it is not mentioned by Curtius. For demotion, relegation and exile as Alexander’s tools cf. Carney 1996: 27: “The king’s disapproval would be a potent weapon.”


51. There is an on-going debate about the fate of Hermolaus’ father Sopolis. Cf. Bosworth 1980–95: ii, 93; Heckel 2003: 223. It is unclear whether he should be identified with Sopolis who had been passed over for promotion from ilarch to hipparch (cf. Arr. Anab. 1.2.5) and was sent home to Macedonia to help with recruitment in the winter of 328/7, or whether he was sent home after the trial (cf. Curt. 8.7.2). In any case, Sopolis was dislodged from the court and the political center of Alexander’s empire. We do not know whether this elimination took place as a consequence of his son’s conspiracy and execution or happened beforehand and constituted an additional motive for Hermolaus. There is no record of Sopolis’ return. Cf. Heckel 2006: 253; 1986b: 300; Carney 1980: 228; Berve 1926: no. 736, 368–69. Curt. 8.7.2 reports that Sopolis was innocent.


53. Curt. 8.1.27; 8.1.30; 8.1.33–36; Plut. Alex. 50.6; Just. 12.6.1–3.


62. In Macedonia, the legend lived on. According to Plut. Demetr. 42.1–4, Demetrius Poliorcetes had to cope with it. Plutarch reports that Demetrius offended the Macedonians by giving no audience. They thought themselves insulted, not ruled, and they called to mind how Philip had acted.

64. Cf. Hamilton 1966: 235–41; Hampl 1965: 32; Fredricksmeyer 1991: 201; 1990: 311–12. The propaganda of Alexander’s special relationship with Zeus-Ammon played an important role. The story about the paternity of Zeus-Ammon being confirmed at Siwah, however, is to be seen in the context of the official reception of the new pharaoh by the Egyptian priests and should not be over-interpreted as implying that it was Alexander’s purpose to disown Philip. Cf. Engels 2006: 53–54; Heckel 2008: 72. Callisthenes endorsed Alexander’s divine descent in his official report and gives the impression that the oracles from Branchidae and Erythrae confirmed his divine origins. Even though Callisthenes’ propaganda was not successful, it was clear to him that the special bond between Zeus-Ammon and Alexander was not meant to replace Philip as a divine physical father or to render Alexander divine in his own right. Cf. Bosworth 1980–95: ii, 75–76. On the legend cf. Stoneman 2008: 6–21.

65. Cf. Wirth 1985a: 163–66. Alexander probably did not understand why Philip gave in to the hostile court faction. But Philip made him return from his voluntary exile in Illyria in 337 and signaled that he was willing to be reconciled with him and his Molossian supporters by celebrating the marriage of his daughter Cleopatra with her uncle Alexander of Molossia. This was also a sign of reconciliation with Olympias who was probably present at the wedding. Cf. Carney 2006: 37; 2000a: 66.


71. Curt. 6.11.23–24; 8.1.43; 8.7.13–14; Arr. Anab. 7.8.2–3; Diod. 17.108.2–3; Just. 12.11.5–6; Plut. Alex. 50.6.

72. Arr. Anab. 1.11.8; 3.3.1–2; 4.11.6; Plut. Alex. 2.1; Pyrrh. 1; Paus. 1.11.1. Cf. Ameling 1988: 657–92; Carney 2003b: 47–48. See also Zahrnt 1996: 129–47.

Chapter 4


3. The Philippeum was published in detail by Schleif et al. 1944.


6. Cf. Badian 1963 on the intrigues that led to Philip’s assassination.

7. Diod. (17.2.3) says that Europa was born only days before Philip’s assassination. On Europa, see Carney 2000a: 77–78.

8. Paus. 5.20.10: πεποίηται δὲ ὀπτῆς πλίνθου, κίονες δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐστήκασι. Φιλίππος δὲ ἐπούθη μετὰ τὸ ἐν Χαιρωνεία τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὁλοθεύω. Κείντα δὲ αὐτόθι Φιλίππος τε καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος, σὺν δὲ αὐτοῖς Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππος πατήρ έργα δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ταύτα Δεωχάρους ἐλέφαντος καὶ χρυσοῦ, καθα καὶ τῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος καὶ Εὐρυδίκης εἰσὶν αἱ εἰκόνες.
Paus. 5.17.4: Μετεκομίσθη δὲ αὐτόσε καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καλουμένου Φιλιππείου, χρυσοῦ καὶ ταύτα καὶ ἐλέφαντος, Εὐρυδίκη τε ἡ Φιλίππου . . .


10. If Philip II’s last wife had also been renamed Eurydice, as will be argued below, then Arrhidaeus and Adea may have assumed the names Philip and Eurydice echoing that particular pair, not Philip and his mother as is usually assumed.


13. Heckel (2006: 4) suggests that she was born by 335 at the latest since her father died around that time.

14. On these reigns, see Hammond (and Griffith) 1979: 172–88.

15. On the probability that Philip did not act as regent for his nephew but was appointed king directly upon his brother’s death, see Ellis 1971; (Hammond and) Griffith 1979: 208–09; Worthington 2008: 20–21. See also Heckel 2006: 23.


18. Hitzl 1995. Carney (2007a: 34 n. 26) also believes that the two female portraits were removed in Roman times.


23. Hammond (and Griffith) 1979: 184; Carney 2000a: 43–44. The attribution of the so-called Tomb of Eurydice at Vergina to Philip’s mother is at best problematic (cf. Palagia 2002). Panagiotis Phaklaris informs me that the tomb contained a helmet; it was therefore a man’s burial.
25. Only Lane Fox (1974: 504) identified Eurydice in the Philippeum with Philip’s last wife Cleopatra.
26. Plut. Alex. 9.6; 10.7; Diod. 16.93.9; 17.2.3; Paus. 8.7.7; Ath. 13.557d; Just. 9.5.8–9; 9.7.2, and 12.
36. For the formulas used on inscribed statue bases, see Guarducci 1974: 8–110.
40. Treu 1882: fig. on p. 67; Schultz 2007: 216.
42. The order of the statues proposed here would be, from left to right: Olympias, Alexander, Amyntas, Philip, Eurydice.

Chapter 5

1. See brief discussions in Ogden 1999: 273–77 and Carney 2000a: 27–29, both written without access to recent scholarship on Greek domestic space (see below). Mortensen 1997: 50–52 sees royal women as more secluded than either Ogden or Carney.
4. Spawforth 2007a: 91, citing as an example the royal wedding festival Philip held at the time of his daughter Cleopatra’s wedding
(see below). See Spawforth 2007a; Chaniotis 1997 on the growing theatricality of Greek public life in the Hellenistic period. Chaniotis 1997: 236 suggests that Alexander was probably the model for Hellenistic kings, whereas Spawforth 2007a prefers Philip.

10. E.g., Redfield 2003 or Pomeroy 2002.
13. Adea’s adoption of “Eurydice” is the only certain example, but others are possible. See Carney 1991: 159–60, especially n. 30. See also Heckel 1978: 155–58; Badian 1982a.
17. Hyp. 4. 19, 20, 24; Aeschin. 2.27, 3.223.
18. Naming cities after royal women also gave them a public presence, but the Successors initiated this practice, not the Argeads; Carney 2000a: 207–09.
20. SEG IX 2. Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 2007: 486–93 date them to 330–26 and suggest that the grain distribution was at least partly political in motivation. See also Laronde 1987: 30–34. The grain distributions were probably not free gifts from Cyrene, but rather purchased by those listed. Olympias and her daughter Cleopatra may have acted on their own initiative and with their own funds or for Alexander and with his funds (Carney 2006: 51). However, the commemoration refers only to them, not him.
25. Carney 2000b: 26, n. 27.

29. Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000: 397–400. The base reads “Eurydika Sirra.” She concludes that it was not a dedication but a label for a statue that, based on the location of the inscription on the block, was part of some larger group, with women on the end, as in the Philippeum.

32. Schultz 2007 makes a compelling case that the images were not, in fact, chryselephantine but that they must have looked as though they were.
37. Fredricksmeyer 1966. Even if she was not personally involved in Argead sacrifices, her ownership of the slaves implies that she was involved indirectly.
38. See references and discussion in Carney 2006: 96–100.
39. Hyp. 19, 20, 24, 25, 26. Whitehead 2000: 155–57 argues for a date of 330–24 for the speech. Whitehead (2000: 215–29), noting that the cult statue for the sanctuary to Hygieia in Athens was dedicated by a certain Pyrrhus, suggests that Olympias may have found a real or alleged link to her Aeacid line, possibly connected to the Athenian citizenship of earlier Aeacids. Hyperides’ language implies that Olympias made the dedication in person.
40. She gave the sanctuary 190 darics for golden crowns (SIG3 252N, 5–8; CID II 97), quite possibly using some of the plunder Alexander had sent her after the siege of Gaza (Plut. Alex. 25.4) or Granicus (FGrH 151, F1). Her indirect method of arranging for the crowns could signify that she did not dedicate them in person. Bousquet 1989 dates the inscription to 327/6.
41. See Carney 2006, 181, n. 78 for discussion and references on the authenticity of this oracular consultation.

42. Whitehead 2000: 228 provides references for the common Greek view that whoever wielded power in an area controlled the sanctuaries in it.

43. See Connelly 2007: 211–13, especially n. 96.

44. According to Justin 9.7.10–11, Olympias appeared at Aegae under the guise of doing her duty at the funeral of her husband, cremated the remains of Philip’s assassin, placed them over the tumulus of her husband, and later arranged a tomb for the assassin and annual sacrifice there. In respect to her conspirator’s corpse, her actions resemble the conventional funerary responsibilities of ordinary Greek women. The “facts” of Justin’s narrative are implausible—public celebration of Philip’s assassin—but its presumptions are suggestive.

45. On female burials generally, see Carney 2000a: 234–44. On the female burial in the antechamber of Tomb II at Vergina, see Carney 1991b; on the “Tomb of Eurydice” with its gigantic throne, see Andronikos 1994: 154–61. For the female archaic burials that are likely royal, see Kottaridi 2004a: 139–48.

46. Hatzopoulos 1982a: 37–42. See also Carney 2006: 181, n.76.

47. Ael. V.H 8.7; Arr. 7.4.4.4–8; Just. 12.10.9–10.

48. See Carney 2000a: 205 for discussion and references.

49. Oakley and Sinos 1993: 16 stress the importance of the bride’s adornment. Reeder 1995: 168 notes that brides are usually shown with jewelry and says (176) that the bride “would have glowed as a precious jewel herself . . . .”

50. Oakley and Sinos 1993: 22. Kuttner 1999: 116 asserts that any elite marriage was meant to be a spectacle and refers to Aetion’s image of Alexander and Roxane’s wedding, a painting intended to be shown at the Olympics (Lucian Herodotus sive Aetion 4–7). Lucian, who claimed to have seen the painting, describes the bride as beautiful, but with downcast eyes and wearing a veil that she removed for Alexander.

51. The anakalypteria: Oakley and Sinos 1993: 25 see the initial unveiling as happening in front of the wedding guests.

52. See references in Carney 2000a: 203–07.


54. Hoepfner 1996: 13–15 suggests that the double andron pattern found in the palace at Vergina/Aegae, perhaps in private houses at Pella, and else where in Macedonia, may have been intended for separate but parallel male and female symposia (a particularly interesting suggestion if the Vergina palace is Philip II’s work).

55. Kottaridi 2004a: 140 and 2004b: 69; Lilibaki-Akamati 2004: 91. Their conclusions are based primarily on material remains from burials.
56. Paspalas 2005 argues that this was the error that Philip Arrhidaeus and his handlers made.
57. See further Carney 2000a: 232.
60. See Carney 2000a: 307, n. 91 for discussion and references.
62. Llewellyn-Jones 2003: 11 cites Macedonian grave reliefs from the Hellenistic period that show about a third of women veiled; of course, the depiction of veils and being veiled are not synonymous matters. He also notes (2003: 34) that the face veil (telidion) only appears in our sources in the late fourth century when it is worn in Boeotia, Macedonia, Asia Minor, and Egypt. This timing could mean that the telidion had a Macedonian origin. Llewellyn-Jones also argues (2003: 124) that initially, as in Homer, veiling was an elite custom.
64. Dillon 2007: 64, discussing female portraiture, observes that “bodies were important because the faces were so normative” and argues that identity was displaced to the body. She also suggests (2007: 66) that the preference for marble in female statues may have resulted from the variety of hues of marble and thus the possibility of illustrating the colorful, expensive nature of elites female clothing. Schultz 2007: 217 points to the heavy (thus pricey) drapery of the Vergina Eucleia statue and agrees with Dillon that costume was a defining aspect of early Hellenistic portraits of women.
65. Connelly 2007: 87 argues that priestly dress was “associated with both royal and divine costume” and points to scepters as common attributes of priests, queens, and goddesses (and male equivalents). She speaks of priestesses imitating/impersonating the divinities to whom they were dedicated.
66. See Llewellyn-Jones 2003: 136–40 on women as conveyers/displayers of status and wealth. Van Bremen 1996: 142 comments “it is hard to overestimate either the sumptuousness and theatricality of an elite woman’s appearance, or the extent of their visibility on the public stage.” Dillon 2007: 76 deduces that that female statues, since they showed more costume detail and color than male images, would have attracted more attention. She also notes (2007: 79) that, thanks to concern for modesty as well as display, women had to be covered yet conspicuous.
67. Llewellyn-Jones 2003: 128. He observes that Penelope’s veiling not only expresses modesty but distances her from those below her and adds that in an era when one of the prime indicators of wealth was clothing, the more layers one wore (and the more inconvenient that layering was), the higher the social standing of the wearer.

68. See above for references. Of course, for cremation burials, nothing survives to suggest the fabric worn by the dead, but Andronicos (1984: 197) suggested that the damage done to the right end of the diadem from the female burial in the antechamber of Tomb II at Vergina means that the dead woman was wearing it on her funerary pyre and, at the last moment before the fire damaged it, it was snatched away. The inhumation archaic burial of the Lady of Aegae, with the in situ placing of gold decoration on what were once her garments (Kottaridi 2004a: 140–41), also indicates that these women were as splendidly dressed in death as in life.

69. Carney 1993b: 50–55 discusses relationship between female deaths in tragic drama and the forced suicide of two royal women Olympias wanted dead (Cleopatra and Adea Eurydice) and other similar deaths of royal women, historical and fictional. Whereas the deaths of these two royal women and other historical women met gender conventions—they occurred in private and involved the woman using her own girdle to kill herself, as in tragedy—Olympias’ death subverted gender patterns. It was public and came from a sword.


71. Kuttner 1999: 111 observes that Hellenistic palaces were placed near preexisting hippodromes or theaters or that hippodromes or theaters were subsequently constructed nearby. Here again Philip appears to be the model. See Schultz 2007: 224 for the theatrical nature of another construct of Philip’s, the Philppeum.

72. Von Hesberg 1999: 68 refers to Philip’s appearance as part of the procession in which his own image appeared with the Olympians, in the midst of the crowd, moments before his murder (Diod. 16.92.5) and speaks of the king’s “fluctuations” between physical closeness and psychological distance. Kuttner 1999: 111 remarks that Philip “mimed the status of being isotheos.”

73. Andronicos 1984: 44, though assuming a later date for the palace, points out what a change the veranda was from the “traditional plan of the closed house” and sees it as a clever innovation.

74. A private Hellenistic house in Aegae had, like the palace, both the typical central courtyard and an outward facing veranda on its north side. At least one and possibly two other examples of domestic verandas in Macedonia suggest that this unusual feature was of Macedonian origin. See AR 1996–97: 79; AEMTH 6: 85–89 and 7: 69–74. Nevett 1995: 91 argues that in the typical house the enclosed court suggests that it
75. Hatzopoulos 2001: 193, who assumes that the passage and the information it contains is derived from Polybius.

76. Cynnane, daughter of Philip by his Illyrian wife Audata, had military training and trained her daughter in the same way, presumably reflecting the military role some female members of the Illyrian elite played (see below). Alexander’s earliest tutor was an Aeacid (Plut. Alex. 5.4) and another, who may also have been an Aeacid connection or protégée (Heckel 2006: 153), so focused on Achilles, the supposed Aeacid ancestor, that he called himself Phoenix. Philip Peleus, and Alexander Achilles (Plut. Alex. 5.5).


79. Apparently, Alexander followed Persian rather than Macedonian custom in bringing his wives with him (Ath. 13.557b). Roxane, in Babylon at the time of Alexander’s death, must have been so the better part of a year, granted that she bore him a son a month or two later. The Metz Epitome (70) says that she bore him a short-lived child in India. Barsine bore him a son in 327, when Alexander was in Sogdiana, edging into India (Carney 2000a: 102–03).

80. Aeschines pictures the brothers, teenagers at the time, as still young enough to be held in arms, at a time when Philip may not have been in Macedonia. Hammond 1979: 184, n. 3, therefore rejects the historicity of the incident; Borza 1990: 193 accepts it, though he does not accept all of Aeschines’ details.


82. Pausanias (1.11.12) and Livy (8.24.17) place Olympias in Molossia before the death of Alexander. Diodorus (18.49.7) mentions that she had gone to Epirus as an exile because she had quarreled with Antipater. See Carney 2006: 52–53.

83. As O’Neil 1999: 6 seems to believe, suggesting that Polyaeuenus or his sources “embellished” the story in order to make her seem less than Greek. However, Polyaeuenus does not even mention her half-Ilyrian background, let alone stress it. Moreover, his testimony is supported, if indirectly, by Arrian. See further Carney 2004.


85. Bell 2004: 26 observes that ancient sources assumed that “the powerful were visible to the populace.” In the years after Alexander’s death, royal women were certainly among the powerful.

87. Diod. 19.11.2, 35.5–6, 49.1–51.5; Duris ap. Ath. 13.560f; Just. 14.5.10, 6.2–12.


90. Bell 2004: 5 discusses the need of virtually all governments to demonstrate their popularity and argues that autocratic governments, especially, need “ritual articulation.”

91. Kuttner 1999: 113, for instance, thinks that statues of Ptolemaic royal women were publicly visible but that the women themselves were not. The paintings of Room H of the Boscoreale Villa are often understood to represent a royal Macedonian male, seated and holding a scepter, and a woman of his household. See references in Paspalas 2005, 84, n. 57 to the many discussions of the meaning of the Boscoreale scenes and the identity of those portrayed. Paspalas suggests that the scene represented is a “private” one, such as a dynastic marriage.

Chapter 6

1. See, e.g., Borza 1990: 270: “... thus far, the archaeological evidence seems to support the notion that the Macedonian gentry was a hard-drinking lot.”

2. Carney 2007b: 173. In addition to Carney 2007b, important discussions of Macedonian symposia can be found in Tomlinson 1970; Borza 1983; Murray 1996; Nielsen 1998; Kottaridi 2004b; Vössing 2004: 66–92. My own intention is not to describe the symposia of Philip and Alexander, but rather to discuss how and why the Greek sources (mis)represented them.

3. While Alexander’s drinking has received much attention (esp. O’Brien 1992, although based largely upon often untrustworthy anecdotal evidence), discussion of Philip’s drinking is more prevalent among ancient sources than among modern ones (but see O’Brien 1992: 7–8).

4. Plut. Alex 9.6–11; cf. Pseudo-Callisthenes 1.21 and Justin 9.7.3–4, who does not mention Philip’s drunken clumsiness. Satyrus (ap. Ath. 13.557d–e) includes only the hurling of the cups (in his version, Attalus hurls one back at Alexander) and not Philip’s abortive attack on Alexander.

5. This incident appears in a number of ancient authorities: Plut. Alex. 50–52.2; Arr. 4.8.1–9.8; Curt. 8.1.20–2.12; Justin 12.6.1–16; Sen. Ep. 83.19


8. Another possible source is Diyllus of Athens (*FGrH* 73), whose pro-Athenian viewpoint (famously not shared by Theopompus) may have colored his interpretation of this anecdote; see Hammond 1937: 83–84 and 89–90 and Flower 1994: 110.

9. “Just as Philip at Chaeronea, although he talked foolishness because of his drunkenness and made himself a laughing-stock . . .”

10. No *kômos* is mentioned in this earlier passage, but Philip’s treatment of the Greeks after Chaeronea is grouped with other examples of excessive (i.e., hubristic) behavior after conquest.

11. Cf. Carney 2007b: 166–67: “If a Macedonian victory was an inescapable fact of life, then it might be more bearable if it were attributed to an uncivilized lout; the Greeks experienced military but not cultural defeat, as the Demosthenes/Demades stories suggest. Of course, for Philip’s contemporaries, such stories could function as tools used by his enemies in an attempt to undermine his victory and the support it could generate. His supporters had good reason to offer opposing versions.”


13. Speusippus, *Letter to Philip* 12 (= *FGrH* 115 T 7) and Sozomen, *Ecclesiastical History, Hypothesis* 5 (not included in Jacoby’s * testimonia*). While the tradition of Philip’s patronage of Theopompus has generally been accepted (see, e.g., Flower 1994: 21 and 52–55 and Natoli 2004: 56–59 and 151, with reservations), if such patronage did in fact exist, it can only have been in a most informal capacity, given the general tenor of the *Philippica*, and Theopompus’ own claim (*FGrH* 115 F 25) that he was independently wealthy and did not need to write speeches or accept students to make a living (see Natoli 2004: 57 n. 150). Nor is there any evidence for the suggestion that Theopompus was a candidate for the appointment of Alexander’s tutor (which Aristotle ultimately obtained), as suggested by Lane Fox 1986: 112 and Shrimpton 1991: 6; see Flower 1994: 55 n. 12 and Natoli 2004: 59 n. 163.

14. These passages are too lengthy to cite in full, but a short excerpt from F 225b illustrates the similarity to the Demosthenes passage:
Philip used to reject as unworthy those who were decent in character and in control of their private affairs, but he used to praise and honor those who were extravagant and passed their time gambling and drinking. Therefore, not only did he make provisions for them to have such pleasures, but he also made them competitors in every other unjust and revolting act. . . In addition, instead of being sober, they loved to be drunk, and instead of living decently, they sought to plunder and to kill.

I discuss the similarities between Theopompus’ and Demosthenes’ denunciations of Philip in Pownall 2005: 255–78.

15. Shrimpton’s suggestion (1991: 170–71) that this informant was Theopompus himself, however, seems a little far-fetched.


21. As tyrant of Samos (FGrH 76 T 2), it is likely that Duris was a guest at symposia hosted by the Successors, although he was too young to have participated in those hosted by Philip or Alexander. His brother, Lynceus, recorded his own attendance at banquets hosted by Antigonus (probably Gonatas—see Billows 1990: 335 n. 15) and Ptolemy (probably Ptolemy II—see Dalby 2000: 580 n. 8). He provided narrative of a banquet hosted by Demetrius Poliorcetes in honor of his mistress Lamia in such detail as to leave the impression that he was an eyewitness (Athenaeus 3.100e–f, 3.101e–f, 4.128a–b; Plut. Demetr. 27.2=Dalby 2000: Texts 2–5; cf. Kebric 1977: 5–6; and Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 18).


26. Ath. 10.437a–b (=FGrH 125 F 19a) and Plut. Alex. 70.1–2 (=FGrH 125 F 19b); cf. Ael. VH 2.41.

27. Athenaeus (10.434d) cites Lynceus (=Dalby 2000: Text 34) and Aristobulus (=FGrH 139 F 32) as other authorities for this anecdote, which is repeated by Plutarch (Mor. 454d–e and 623f–624a); its ultimate source is probably oral tradition (Dalby 2000: 277).


31. This assessment is somewhat undercut by Arrian’s assertion (4.8.2) that Alexander’s drinking habits became “more barbaric” after the murder of Cleitus; on this passage, see Bosworth 1980–95: ii, 53–54 (with Tritle 2003: 138–39, who suggests that Alexander was by this point suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder).

32. It should perhaps be noted, however, that later in the passage Plutarch emphasizes the extravagance of the dinners hosted by Alexander (Alex. 23.6 and 10).

33. Cf. Curtius (5.7.1) and Justin (9.8.15) on Alexander’s proclivity to excessive drinking; notably they do not resort to mitigating factors. Nor does Aelian (VH 12.26), who reports Alexander to have surpassed all others in drinking; his list of the greatest known drinkers also includes Proteas, Alexander’s childhood friend and nephew of Cleitus. This is the same Proteas whom Ephippus alleges to have traded toasts with Alexander from the famous twelve pint cup (FGrH 126 F 3); as Heckel 2006: s.v. “Proteas” notes, it is possible that Ephippus means to imply that the drinking contest served as some sort of “poetic justice” for the death of Cleitus.


38. On the initiatory and educative functions of the symposium during the Archaic Period, see Bremmer 1990. On the complex topic of the social and political functions of Greek homosexuality, see Davidson 2007.

39. See, e.g., Murray 1990c.


44. Hammond and Griffith 1979: 400–02 and Hammond 1990; the institution itself may, however, predate Philip (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 168 n. 1 and 1990: 261–64).

45. On the educative aspect of the institution, see Hammond 1990.

47. Carney 2007b: 144 n. 58 observes that the most famous (alleged?) example of this prohibition, which resulted in Cassander’s inability to recline even by the age of thirty-five (Athenaeus 1.18a), most likely originated in the propaganda of his political opponents.


51. On Alexander’s propensity for large cups, see also Athenaeus 10.434d and Plut. Mor. 454d–e and 623f–624a.


53. On Alexander’s education, see Carney 2003b.


55. Diod. 17.117.1; Plut. Alex. 75.5; Sen. Ep. 83.23.

56. O’Brien 1992: 7–8 and Carney 2007b: 163–65 and 172–73. Philip’s ability to outdrink his fellow symposiasts won the admiration of even the Athenian ambassadors in 346, prompting the bitter retort of Demosthenes that such a quality befitted a sponge rather than a king (Plut. Dem. 16.4).

57. These included Proteas (FGrH 126 F 3) and Hephaestion, whose death was said by some (in a perhaps deliberate parallel to that of Alexander) to have been caused by the draining of this cup (Plut. Alex. 72.2).

58. One exception is Polybius’ criticism of Theopompus for making this claim (8.9.4=FGrH 115 F 27); as discussed above, however, Theopompus’ characterization of Philip is tendentious.

59. See above, n. 27.

60. Murray 1996: 18; cf. Vössing 2004: 66. Carney 2007b: 156 n. 108, however, remains skeptical. It is also worth noting as an aside here that the drunken κόμοι that Diodorus reports both Philip and Alexander to have engaged in were all held on occasions of particular importance and likely do not reflect usual practice either (cf. C. B. Welles on p. 473 of the LCL translation of Diodorus): 16.87.1 (Chaeronea); 17.72.3–4 (burning of Persepolis); 17.106.1 (feast in Carmania celebrating the safe return of the army); 17.117.1 (Alexander’s last banquet, held in commemoration of the death of Heracles).


Chapter 7

2. Dem. 5.22.
4. Just. 8.3.1–6.
5. Just. 8.5. It is difficult to think that this passage is taken from Theopompus because it would be contradictory to what he stated before. It seems more likely that it comes from another source who was using Demosthenes’ anti-Macedonian arguments. For the Theopompus attribution: Momigliano 1969: 233; Hammond 1991: 499; 502–08; Hammond 1994: 367–74; contra Buckler 1996: 385–86.
6. Paus. 10.2.3–4; Diod. 16.60. 1; see Buckler 1989: 141–42; Squillace 2004a: 53.
7. Just. 8.2.3. The highly symbolic value of the act—which is carried out deliberately before the battle—emerges from the parallel description made by Diodorus, who underlines the fact that the king, after being defeated twice by Onomarchus, had to encourage his troops and regain their obedience, after being abandoned by them: Diod. Sic. 16.35.2.
8. Just. 8.2.4–5: Phocenses insignibus dei conspectis conscientia delictorum territi abiectis armis fugam capessunt, poenas violatae religionis sanguine et caedibus suis pendunt.
10. Diod. 16.56.7–8.
11. Diod. 16.58.4–6.
12. Diod. 16.61.
13. Diod. 16.38.2.
14. Diod. 16.64.3.
15. Cephisodoros FGrH 112 T 1; Anaxim. FGrH 72 F 8; Arist. FF 615–17 Rose; Diog. Laert. 5.26; Callisth. FGrH 124 T 25; F 1; Cic. Epist. 5.12.2. On the origin and spread of these writings see Schwartz 1900: 106; Bosworth 1970: 408; Robertson 1978: 51; Bousquet 1984: 74–80; and Squillace 2004a: 54.
16. Theophr. FGrH 115 FF 156; 247–49.
19. Paus. 10.2.5.
21. Diod. 16.35.5–6.
22. On the religious meaning of death through drowning (katapontismos): Hdt. 3.30; Lys. 14.27; Paus. 1.44.8; see Glotz: 1900: 808–10; Schulthes 1919: 2480–82; Parker 1983: 172; Squillace 2004a: 58–59.
24. Dem. 2.18.
25. Dem. 2.5.
26. Dem. 3.16.
27. Dem. 3.20.
32. For this fault Arthmios had been deprived of all his civil rights in Athens: Dem. 9.41–45.
33. Diod. 16.27.5; Paus. 3.10.3; 4.28.1; Just. 8.1.11; Buckler 1989: 23–28; Worthington 2008: 54–56.
34. Diod. 16.57.
35. Just. 8.2.8–12.
37. Dem. 1.5.
45. Speus. Epist. Socr. 28.8–9 Isnardi Parente. Also, Diodorus remembers the deportation of the Driopians, due to their sacrilege against the Delphic sanctuary: Diod. 4.37.
47. Speus. Epist. Socr. 28.5–7 Isnardi Parente.
49. Just. 8.3.7–10.
50. Diod. 16.55

53. Diod. 16.89.1–3.

54. Polyb. 3.6.12–13. We also find this slogan in Cicero, though in a synthetic form. He saw the war, planned by Philip and carried out by Alexander, as based on the pursuit of a vengeance for the destruction of the Greek temples (Graeciae fana poenire): Cic. Rep. 3.15.


56. Isoc. 5.104.

57. Diod. 16.91.2.


64. Arr. 1.11.6–12.1. This information can also be found in other sources, such as: Anaxim. FGrH 72 T 27; Cic. Pro Archia 24; and Ael. V.H. 12.7.

65. Plut. Alex. 15.7–9.

66. Diod. 17.17.2–3; 17.6–18.1.


69. Callisthenes was aware that the fame of the Macedonian king depended upon his Alexandrou Praxeis: Arr. Anab. 4.10.1. On the role and figure of Callisthenes, see: Berve 1926 (II): 191–99, n. 408; Prandi 1985: 20–22; and Heckel 2006: 76–77.


71. Isoc. 5.110.
74. Hdt. 7.54.
75. Hdt. 7.35; Aeschy. Pers. 748–49.
76. Hdt. 7.33; 7.11.16; 7.120.
77. Hdt. 7.43.
78. Hdt. 5.102.1; 5.105; 7.1.1; 8.1–3; 8.138.1.
79. Arr. Anab. 1.11.7–8.
80. Callisth. FGrH 124 F 38. Even on the basis of the vocabulary used, Callisthenes modeled his narrative after Herodotus. The terms found in Hdt. 7.43.2 correspond not only to Plut. Alex. 15.8, but also to Arr. Anab. 1.11.7. On the relationship between Callisthenes and Herodotus’ works, especially with regard to some episodes, see Prandi 1985: 91–93.
81. I would like to thank Beth Carney for inviting me to this international symposium and for her excellent organization and wonderful hospitality.

Chapter 8
2. Theophr. Hist. pl. 3.12.2 (the only surviving contemporary source); Arr. Anab. 1.4.1, 3.14.3, 4.8.8, and 9.2; Diod. 17. 100.6; Curt. 9.7.19; Poly-aen. 4.2.10. After Alexander’s death “Macedonian equipment” was often found employed by non-Macedonian troops (Diod. 19.14.5, 27.6, 29.3, and 40.3).
4. Tsimbidou-Avloniti 2002: Plate 23B.
8. Plate 12 of Kahler 1965 shows the interior of one shield containing a central arm ring and a hand grip near the rim.
13. Markle 1999: 219, 221, 242–43, and 251–53. Additional blocks to be associated with this wall are found in the sculpture garden of the city’s archaeological museum.

17. As the later argyraspids (for identification, see Anson 1981: 117–20), they also engaged in such activities (Diod. 19. 43. 1).

19. τῆς Μακεδονικῆς φάλαγγος τοῖς κοκυφότατοις. κοῦφος carries the meaning of light and nimble (LSJ s. v. κοῦφος).
20. τῶν πεζῶν ὅσοι βαρύτεροι ὡπλισμένοι ἦσαν . βάρυς suggests both weight and strength (LSJ s. v. βάρυς).

21. On Arrian’s often imprecise use of military terminology, see Milns 1978: 374–78.
22. Arrian (Anab. 1.6.2) states that Alexander ordered his troops to hold their spears (δόρατα) upright and then lower them as if for a charge. This passage clearly is referring to troops armed with sarisai (despite Markle’s claim that these maneuvers would have been impossible for troops carrying sarisai [1979: 492]).
26. These greaves may have been made of leather (Miller 1993: 51–52, n. 96).
28. The diameter of the smaller shield possessed by the pikemen was twenty-four inches; the hoplite shield averaged thirty-four inches (Markle 1977: 326).
32. The hoplites armed only with their spears had stripped themselves of their shields and armor (Xen. Anab. 5.2.15).
33. Markle 1979: 491–92; see also, Liampi 1988: 15, 18. The association of the peltē and the dorus (long spear) is found in Arrian (Anab. 7. 6. 5. 13. 2) and Polyaeus (4. 2. 10).
Both Bosworth (1973: 247–48) and Griffith, in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 711, argue that the asthetairoi represented half of the phalanx brigades.

36. τὴν μὲν μίαν τῶν νεῶν οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ ἔλαβον... τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ ἡ Κοίνου τάξις οἱ ἀσθέταιροι καλούμενοι.

37. While the general consensus is that Alcetas took over his brother’s taxis on the latter’s promotion to hipparch (cavalry leader; see Heckel 1992: 135 and n. 378), it is possible, given the nature of this mission that Attalus is here leading, that this is Perdiccas’ old brigade (cf. Berve, 1926: 209, n. 2).


41. See note 37.


43. Richards 2002: 8–9, 19–22, 63.


49. See Anson 2004: 1–33.

50. Diodorus has omitted from his enumeration of both opposing forces reference to light-armed infantry (see Devine 1985: 77–78, 81). While these troops are not listed in Diodorus’ description of Eumenes’ army, his listed total for the latter’s forces differs from that for the indicated units by about 18,000. The general assumption is that these represented the light-armed contingents (see Devine 1985: 77–78). The corresponding listing of Antigonus’ forces included in his phalanx explicitly does not include light-armed troops (Diod. 19.29.1–6).

51. The argyrapids are Alexander’s former hypaspists (see Anson 1981: 117–20).


55. As Hammond (1978: 130) notes, “Philip II in his earliest years . . . recruited only from Lower Macedonia . . .”
57. While Markle 1977: 323 initially argued that the pike was introduced into the infantry by Alexander III, he subsequently changed his mind and stated that Philip introduced the weapon sometime between 338 B.C. and his death in 336 (1979: 483, 491; 1999: 243 n. 39).
60. LSJ s.v. ἄσσον.
64. Griffith, in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 711.
65. Griffith, in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 711–12
71. Liampi 1988: 18, 80.
73. This design along with the “star” is also found on Illyrian and Thracian shields.
74. Liampi 1988: 36.
75. See the photograph in Griffith 1980: 60, fig. 37: in general, Miller 1993.
81. Voiceless consonants brought before a rough breathing are roughened.
85. Arr. Anab. 1.23.3; 2.7.1, 8.6, 9, 9.3, 20.2, 4, 24.2, 25.4; 3.7.3, 16.1, 19.1, 27.4, 30.8; 4.2.2, 4.1. 1, 2.2, 16.4, 20.2, 23.2, 28.1; 5.4.1, 5.5, 22.1; 6.14.5; 7.10.3, 16.2; 8.6. 1, 7.8, 8.9, 10.5, 12.5, 19.2, 21.8, 13, 26.2, 40.1.
Chapter 9


2. “Nam cum ante equites in suam quisque gentem describerentur seorsus a ceteris, exempto natione discrimine praefectis non utique suarum gentium, sed delectis attribuit.”

3. “He added the infantry reinforcements to the other units, assigning them according to their individual tribal origins, and he also formed two lochoi in each ile, there having been no cavalry lochoi previously, and as lochagoi he appointed men from the hetairoi who had been distinguished for their excellence.” See Bosworth 1980–95: i, 320–21.

4. For the 6,000 infantry reinforcements see Diod. 17.65.1; Curt.5.1.40 with Bosworth 2002:71–72.

5. Curt. 5.2.3–5; “Novem qui fortissimi iudicati essent, singulis mili tum milibus praefuturi erant (chiliarchas vocabant) tum primum in hunc numerum copiis distribuitis.” “septimum locum Theodotus <***> ultimum obtinuit Hellanicus.” No corruptions in Curtius’ text are more frequent than lacunae, and it would be the simplest scribal error to omit the eighth of the nine names.


7. For the Ephemerides and their authenticity see Bosworth 1988b: 182–84.

8. Alexander seems to have endorsed the principle of divide and rule. It is significant that he divided the command of the Companion cavalry after the death of Philotas. The veteran Cleitus was coupled with Alexander’s young favorite Hephaestion who seems to have had no previous command experience (Arr. 3.27.4: cf. Bosworth 1980–95: i, 463).

9. For his actions at Halicarnassus, which allegedly turned the tide of battle, see Curt. 5.2.5; 8.1.36 and for his double dealing later at Susa see Plut. Mor. 339 B–C. Atarrhias lost the sight of one eye during Philip’s siege of Perinthus, and was clearly one of the most battle-hardened of the hypaspist corps (cf. Berve 1926: 91–92, no. 178; Heckel 2006: 60). Hellanicus (Berve 1926: 150, no. 298; Heckel 2006: 133) is less well known, but he was clearly of the same mold as Atarrhias; he expertly protected the Macedonian siege engines whose defense Alexander had assigned to him (Arr. 1.21.5).

10. Cf. Bosworth 2002: 66–73, where the total infantry numbers in Sittacene are estimated at something over 20,000. Contrast the calculations
of Badian 1994b: 265–67 and Billows 1990, which give a comparable total. The hypaspist numbers can only be guessed at, but they can hardly have been as large as 9,000.

11. Curtius (5.2.2) simply states that there was a panel of assessors (“iudices dedit”) which made a ranking list of men who were adjudged outstanding in military prowess. The nine who topped the list were assigned to the command of the newly constituted chiliarchies. The competition was a huge attraction, and it is more than likely that Alexander made his choice known to the assessors. Curtius makes it clear that they were in a sense on trial themselves (“testis eadem cuiisque factorum et de iudicibus latura sententiam”).

12. “καὶ Άδαιος, χιλιάρχης οὗτος, καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν συκ ἡμελημένων Μακεδόνων (“and Adaeus, who was a chiliarch, and other highly distinguished Macedonians”). Here I accept Krüger’s reading; compare Arr. 1.16.3: ἄδελφος οὗτος. There are three other explicit references to Macedonians in the passage.

13. See Arr. 1.22.2–3, where Alexander’s exploits are covered in detail, with the usual comment that the enemy were repulsed without difficulty (οὐ χαλεπῶς).

14. Arrian adds that the city could have been captured had Alexander not sounded the retreat. He desired to save Halicarnassus, as he had done with the mercenaries at Miletus (Arr. 1.19.6).


17. ἔπινε πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν. This is almost a mantra and is repeated in the Ephemerides in the same words (Arr. 7.25.1; cf. Plut. Alex. 75.3–5). Both Ptolemy and Aristobulus agreed that Alexander drank heavily during his last fever, but Aristobulus claims that he only took wine when his fever was well advanced and he was parched with thirst (Plut. Alex. 75.6 = FGrH 139 F 59; cf. Arr.7.29.4). For Ptolemy it was the recreational aspect of the drinking that mattered.

18. Arr. 3.16.11; Curt. 5.2.6; see above, p. 171.


20. Arr. 6.27.6: διένειμε γὰρ ξύμπαντα, Ἀλέξανδρος τοῖς μὲν ἣγεμόσι κατ’ ἄνδρα, τοῖς δὲ κατ’ ἱλάς τε καὶ ἑκατοστύας τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόχους, ὅπως τὸ πλῆθος τῶν υποζυγίων τε καὶ καμήλων αὐτῷ ξυνέβαινεν.

21. Arr. 6.25.1; Strab. 15.2.5 (722). The troops deliberately killed and devoured the pack animals.

22. That is the clear meaning of the Greek text. Brunt’s translation (“in proportion to the total number of camels and transport animals he received”), which is followed by Zambrini in the Mondadori edition,
verges on paraphrase. The difficulty comes in the interpretation of \( \xi\nu\varepsilon\beta\alpha\nu\epsilon \nu \), which should be taken literally, describing the two columns amalgamating (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.17).


24. Leonnatus had a non-Macedonian expeditionary force for his campaign in Oreitis (Las Bela); it comprised all the Agrianians, some archers, and Greek mercenary infantry and cavalry (Arr. 6.22.3). In 324 there were enough mercenaries to supply the entirety of the population of the city founded in the lower Euphrates (Arr. 7.21.7). Macedonians at this stage may well have been a minority.

25. Arr. 4.2.1; 4.25.2; 5.15.7. See n. 19 above.

26. I accept the recent theory that the *sarisa* was composed of two shafts connected by a coupling device. Such a weapon would have been relatively easy to dismantle and to reassemble before action. In transit it would be much more manoeuvrable loaded on a mule’s back than struggling with the full twelve cubit pike shaft. See now Heckel, Jones, and Hook 2006: 13–14.

27. Polyb. 12.19.6 = Callisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F 35; see also Arr. 2.8.2–4.


29. This approach was taken by Droysen 2004: 726–30. No source addresses Alexander’s motivation for creating the new mixed phalanx. Some have seen it as an exercise in social engineering, an experiment in the “policy of fusion” (cf. Milns 1976: 127–29); others see a military function. Högemann 1985: 171–76 argued that it was intended for desert fighting against the Arabs, but the logistical problems would have been insuperable (Buraselis 1988: 243). I would maintain that the new phalanx was intended to counter Carthaginian mercenary armies which had the same blend of heavy Greek infantry and light armed slingers.

30. Arr. 7.23.3–4. This is the only detailed evidence of the composition of the files. Diodorus (17.110.2) mentions the arrival of Peucestas and his 20,000 Persian light armed, but the incident is placed anachronistically in summer 324, at least a year before it occurs in Arrian’s account.

31. Cf. Diod. 19.106.2: the Carthaginian army that attacked Agathocles included Balearic slingers as well as 10,000 Libyan light armed.

32. See Thucydides’ famous characterisation of the Macedonian foot soldiers (4.124.1) as “a great throng of barbarians.” Whatever one makes of the ethnicity of the Macedonians (on which see Hornblower 1996: 391–93) Thucydides’ remark is certainly not complimentary and is inconsistent with an organized and disciplined army like the later phalanx.

33. *FGrH* 73 F 4. The passage is attested by Harpocration, Photius, and the “Suda.” There is no textual variation, and no doubt about the reading.

34. For Anaximenes’ historical work see the brief discussion by Harding 2006: 20–21.
35. “The most numerous body, namely the infantry, he divided into lochoi and dekades and the other command units and termed them pezhetairoi” (τοὺς δὲ πλείστους καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς εἰς λόχους καὶ δέκαδας καὶ τὰς άλλας ἀρχὰς διελὼν πεζεταίρους ὠνόμασεν).

36. Arr. 7.11.3; cf. Justin 12.12.1–6. Arrian makes it clear that it was the adoption of their nomenclature that broke the Macedonians’ spirit. They had been reduced to silence by Alexander’s impassioned tirade, and the tempo of the confrontation increases as Alexander turns progressively to the Medes and Persians. Arrian gives more detail of Alexander’s promotion of the Orientals: they are drafted into units (lochoi) in Macedonian style and then receive Macedonian military titles, culminating with the elite royal agēma. The Macedonians immediately capitulate (οὐκέτι καρτεροὶ σφῶν ἦσαν), and it is the profanation of their traditional campaign vocabulary that literally brings them to their knees.


40. Preserved in a scholiast’s note on Demosthenes 2.17 (FGH 115 F 348).

41. Ἀναξιμένης ἐν ά Φιλιππικῶν περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου λέγων φησίν.

42. Brunt 1976.

43. “For him, ‘his’ Alexander virtually created the Macedonian army, horse and foot at one and the same time. To write this is to write nonsense.” (Griffith, in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 707). Here Griffith quotes Anaximenes and in the same breath dismisses what he says as rubbish.

44. IG ii² 102 = Tod 129; cf. Cargill 1981: 85–8-6; Borza 1990: 189–91 (the stone is not published in the collection of Rhodes and Osborne).


46. The evidence comes from a speech which Aeschines (2.27) claims to have given at the Macedonian court in 346. It contains much that is contentious, but there is quite minute detail about Pausanias. He captured the cities of Anthemus, Therma, and Strepsa in the territory between the Thermaic Gulf and Mt. Kissos, and it looks as though he was in league with Olynthus, a traditional haven for disaffected Argeads. He remained active as late as Philip’s accession (Diod. 16.2.6).

47. Alexander II only reigned for a single year, from his father’s death in 369 to 368 (Diod. 15.71.1; 77.5) and was followed by his assassin, who ruled for another three years.

49. See also the descriptions of Polyaeon (4.2.10) and Frontinus (Strat. 4.1.6) with Hammond 1980: 54–57 and Hammond 1989a: 100–06.

50. The accounts of the battle are very vague and uninformative: Diod. 16.4.3–7; 8.1; Front. Str. 2.3.2; Justin 7.6.7. There is a brief reconstruction by Hammond 1989a: 106–07; see also Buckler 2003: 390–92.

51. Frontinus underlines the disruption caused by the Macedonian charge: “sinistrum latus hostium invasit turbataque tota acie victoriam profligavit.”

52. Diod. 16.8.1 emphasizes the magnitude of Philip’s achievements, expanding his kingdom to include mountain peoples as far as Lake Lychnitis. This constituted a firm boundary in the northwest, and there is every reason to think that the principalities to the south were annexed to the Argead throne. Buckler 2002: 391 claims that “Philip’s victory was indecisive.” That is excessively sceptical. Parmenion admittedly won a great victory over the Illyrians in the summer of 356 (Plut. Alex. 3.8), but we have no indication which Illyrian peoples were involved. (They may, for instance, have been the Autaritae, who were considerably to the east of the Dardanians (Bosworth 1980: 66).) Philip had won a crushing victory by any standard, and the passes of the Pindus were open to him.

53. See particularly Polyb. 5.79.5 (with Walbank’s commentary; Livy 37.40.7 (Thermopylae); cf. Bar-Kochva 1976: 58–66.

Chapter 10

1. At the Fourth International Symposium on Alexander the Great, held in Clemson, South Carolina, we presented the results of these recent experiments. Carolyn Willekes offered observations on cavalry and infantry interaction; Graham Wrightson coordinated the infantry exercises. This study relies on such experimentation, wherever possible, for the understanding of the practicalities of infantry maneuvers. It should be stressed, also, that drills executed by sixteen and thirty-two infantrymen in a large open area would be much more difficult to carry out in very large formations, with thousands of pezhetairoi crowded together on the battlefield. Hence we cannot simply conclude that the problems of mobility that we experienced in our recreation could be overcome by regular drilling of the troops. The numbers of men crowded into the phalanx at Gaugamela would have made any large-scale parting maneuver extremely difficult, if not impossible, to execute. This paper is a case study, based on both textual evidence and experimentation. For a similar approach see Heckel 2005.

3. For the distinction between these hypaspists and the so-called regular hypaspists (3,000 in number) see Heckel 1992: 247–53; Lendon 2005: 125.

4. It should be noted that when Arrian speaks of τῶν πεζῶν τοὺς κουφοτάτους (Arr. 3.21.2; cf. 3.23.3; 4.6.3; 4.28.8) he is not speaking of troops armed with the sarissa (at least, on the occasion described). These troops appear in situations involving pursuit or movement across rough terrain.


8. All translations of Curtius are from Yardley 2001.

9. Atkinson 1980: 443 notes the similar description of mutilations by Lucretius, De rerum natura 3.642 ff. “They say that in the heat and indiscriminate carnage of battle limbs are often lopped off by scythe-armed chariots so suddenly that the fallen member hewn from the body is seen to writhe on the ground. Yet the mind and consciousness of the man cannot yet feel the pain; so abrupt is the hurt, and so intent the mind upon the business of battle. With what is left of his body he presses on with battle and bloodshed unaware, it may be, that his left arm together with its shield has been lost, whirled away among the chargers by the chariot wheels with their predatory blades. . . . A head hewn from the still warm and living trunk retains on the ground its lively features and open eyes till it has yielded up the last shred of spirit.” (Translation from Latham 1994.)

10. The only serious threat to the phalanx appears to have been brought by the spears projecting from the chariot poles (i.e., the pole which connected the chariot to the yoke), if Curtius, who mentions this twice (cf. 4.15.4), can be believed. A full description is given at Curt. 4.9.5: “From the end of the chariot-pole projected iron-tipped spears, and to the cross beam [i.e., the yoke] on each side they had fixed three sword blades. Between the wheel-spokes a number of spikes projected outwards, and then scythes were fixed to the wheel-rims, some directed upwards and others pointing to the ground, their purpose being to cut down anything in the way of the galloping horses.” The projecting spears are absent from Xenophon’s description of the scythed chariots at Cunaxa (Anab. 1.8.10). At any rate, this would have been offset by the fact that the din created by phalanx on the chariots’ approach would have spooked many of the horses. Hence, it is likely that if “lanes” existed on the Macedonian left, these were created by disorder (i.e., the separation of the phalanx taxeis) rather than by design.

12. Bosworth 1988a: 82: “Mazaeus, the commander of the Persian right, had fewer chariots but he used them in conjunction with cavalry, and was able to exploit the few gaps made in the Macedonian line.” Possibly the chariots were responsible for widening the gap. If Arrian’s source (Ptolemy) really did wish to discredit Simmias and the sons of Andromenes, he may have omitted the effect of the chariots in order to make Simmias’ failure to keep up with the rest of the surging phalanx seem like incompetence.

13. See for example the comments of Sidnell 2006: 111–12, who recognizes that the accounts refer to different points in the battle. The version of Arrian is rightly seen as describing events on the Macedonian right, but Sidnell makes the peculiar remark that “the Companions had been warned in advance to open their ranks, making paths that the terrified chariot horses happily galloped through, eventually being rounded up once blown by the royal grooms and reserve infantry in the rear.” The Companions referred to in this part of Arrian’s account are, however, the Companion Cavalry, and not infantrymen. But Sidnell continues: “The group of fifty chariots that attacked from the centre were similarly allowed to pass through gaps opened between files of the phalanx, the horses being speared from either side as they passed through . . . .” This is, of course, a very difficult thing for the pezhetairoi to manage (despite Lonsdale’s comment [2004: 134] that they “simply [emphasis added] opened ranks to let them pass harmlessly through” or Fuller’s observation [1960: 173 n.1] that “it must have been very simple”). Finally, Sidnell remarks: “On the Macedonian left the remaining fifty chariots may have had more success, contributing to a desperate situation in which Parmenio now found himself. It is probably to this attack that Curtius refers in his often jumbled account when he describes some Macedonians ‘killed by the spears that projected well beyond the chariot poles and others dismembered by the scythes set on either side. It was no gradual withdrawal that the Macedonians made but a disordered flight, breaking their ranks.’ If such a rout occurred it was presumably only the screening light infantry units . . . .”

14. We avoid the loaded and often misunderstood term “Alexander Vulgate.”


16. Warry 1991: 62 observes that “at Gaugamela, the impact of the chariot attack was in any case certainly not decisive; nor does it seem much to have influenced the course of the battle.” In retrospect, this is true, but had the Persians properly exploited the gap on the Macedonian left rather than turning to plunder the field camp, the action might well have been decisive. For the Persian failure see Burn 1964: 118: “Once more discipline, or the lack of it, was decisive. Instead of turning to right
or left, where they might have done immense damage, this roaring tide of men simply rode straight on.”

Chapter 11

1. On these events, beginning with the death of Antipater (Cassander’s father) in the autumn of 319, see the now canonical synthesis in Will 1979–82: i, 45–54. For an analysis of the various passages in Diodorus 18 that deal with these events, see Landucci Gattinoni 2008, with expansive discussion of the main issues and full bibliography. A section of the introduction and a special table are devoted to problems of chronology, and chronological matters are discussed throughout the commentary itself.

2. On Olympias, see, most recently, Carney 2006.

3. All dates are B.C., unless otherwise stated.


5. On Cassander’s conduct, Olympias’ murder included, see Landucci Gattinoni 2003a: 27–56.


7. On Philip II’s marriages, see Athen. 13.557c–d, mentioning both Nicesipolis and the birth of Thessalonice; on Thessalonice’s birth, see also Steph. Byz. s.v. Θεσσαλονίκη. For the investigation of Philip II’s polygamy, see the bibliography in Carney 1988b: 386, n. 3; particularly pertinent observations are also to be found in Prestianni Giallombardo 1976–77: 81–110; Tronson 1984: 116–26; and Greenwalt 1989: 19–45.

8. In the light of the noble Thessalian origins of Nicesipolis and Philip’s habit of sanctioning his cultural and territorial precedence over peoples of diverse origin through marriages, some scholars (Ellis 1976: 84; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 524; Green 1982: 143) have justly determined upon 352 as the terminus post quem for Thessalonice’s birth. This was the year in which Philip succeeded in becoming tagus of the Thessaliens, thus combining in his person both the pan-Thessalian tagia and the Macedonian monarchy, and pulling Thessaly too into the Macedonian political and military sphere of influence (on the relationship between Philip and Thessaly, see Sordi 1958: 261–301; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 259–95 and 523–44; Errington 1990: 59–70; Sordi 1996: 88–92).

10. On the Macedonians’ nostalgia for Philip II, see the anecdote mentioned at Plut. Demetr. 42.6–7.

11. On this see Diod. 17.117.4; 18.1.4. On the epitaphios agôn in general in Greek tradition, see Landucci Gattinoni 2007: 155–70.


13. See Diyllus, FGrH 73 F 1: Κάσσανδρος, θάψας τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τὴν βασίλισσαν ἐν Αἰγαῖς, μονομαχίας ἄγωνα ἔθηκεν, εἰς ὃν κατέβησαν τέσσαρες τῶν στρατιωτῶν. See also Palagia 2000: 197 n.138. On Diyllus see the brief notes at Tuplin 2007: 162–64.

14. See Andronicos 1984, which remains the basic reference work on excavation findings.


18. On Tomb I see also Carney 1992b: 1–11.


22. This episode is recounted only in Arr. Succ. 1.22–23 within its correct chronological context, but it is indirectly recalled at Diod. 19.52.5, which, in discussing Cynna’s burial, hints at the role of Alcetas in her death (on Cynna, see Heckel 1983–84: 193–200; Simonetti Agostinetti 1993: 60–66; Carney 2000a: 69–70; 129–31; Heckel 2006: 100–01).

23. Diod. 19.52.5; on the funerals for Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Eurydice, see also Diyllus, FGrH 73 F 1.

24. See, for example, Lehmann 1980: 530 n. 41: “Evidently Cynna was buried elsewhere.”


27. Very brief references to this tomb are to be found also in Andronicos 1994: 161 and in Touratsoglou 1995: 242, where, at the end of the paragraph devoted to the tombs of the Great Tumulus (221–42), one reads: “To the north of these three tombs was discovered a fourth, with a free colonnade on its facade. Apart from the stylobate, the columns and a few stones from the walls, the rest of the building has been destroyed and quarried for building material.” See also Borza and Palagia 2007: 82 n.5, where we read: “A fourth tomb (Tomb IV) lies half outside the tumulus and dates from a later period, probably the third century B.C.”

28. For recent observations on the issue, and full discussion of the immense modern bibliography, see Fredricksmyer 2000: 136–66; see also Muccioli 2004: 105–58.

29. Diod. 19.105.1–2 is our sole literary source; there is also, however, the inscription RC n° 1, a letter sent by Antigonos to the inhabitants of Scepsis, a village in the Troad, to inform them on the clauses of the treaty, which was later inscribed by the community to perpetuate the memory of Monophthalmus’ “benevolence” toward the Greek poleis.


33. See Diod. 19.11.1, which alludes only briefly to Eurydice’s request for help to Cassander, and Just. 14.5.1–3, which makes explicit mention of the administration of the kingdom passing from Polyperchon to Cassander.

34. Here it must be noted that, even though the syntax of Diodorus’s text seems to suggest that the issue of Alexander’s impending majority was of rather more concern to Cassander than it was to the other Diadochi, the view that prevails in scholarship today extends a considerable degree of concern to all the Successors about the potential expiry of their power at Alexander’s coming of age. For this view, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 161 n. 3; Errington 1990: 141; Billows 1990: 132; Carney 1994: 377 and n. 34.


37. See in particular: Paus. 9.7.2, which underlines that both men were probably poisoned; Just. 15.2.4–5, which mentions a double murder without giving any clues as to its circumstances (see also Pomp. Trog. Prol. 15); Porphyry, FGrH 260 F 3.3, which alludes to the story of two anonymous sons of Alexander murdered by Cassander; Parian Marble, FGrH 239 B 18, which mentions the deaths of Alexander the Great’s two sons in the Attic year 310/9, neither describing their circumstances, nor mentioning Cassander (similarly, see also App. Syr. 54, which maintains that Alexander’s two sons had already died by the time of Antigonus’ and Demetrius’ royal accession); Heidelberg Epitome, FGrH 155 F 1.7, which mentions Alexander IV’s murder only; Plut. de vit. pud. 4 (Mor. 530c), which only hints at Polyperchon’s Cassander-induced murder of Heracles.

38. Diod. 20.20.1–2.


40. On δωρεαί in the Macedonian monarchy, see most recently Corsaro 2001: 233–44, with full bibliography.

41. See Diod. 19.105.2 (archon: Simonides—death of Alexander IV); 20.20.1 (archon: Hieromnemon—“detection” of Heracles); 20.28.1–2 (archon: Demetrius of Phalerum—death of Heracles); Parian Marble, FGrH 239 B 18 (archon: Hieromnemon—death of Alexander IV and of Heracles). Wheatley 1998: 12–23 clarifies the chronology of the deaths Alexander the Great’s sons. He brings the murder of Alexander IV and that of Heracles into temporal proximity by dating the latter’s death to the late Julian year 308 and the former’s to the late Julian year 309, positing a year’s gap between the two events. In the light of these observations, the assumptions underpinning the chronological chart in Wacholder 1984: 183–211 appear rather daring insofar as they postdate Alexander IV’s death to 305/4 to coincide with Seleucus’ accession to the throne.

42. See Diod. 19.105.1–2: Κάσσανδρος δὲ ὁ ὁρῶν Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν ἐκ Ῥωξάνης αὐξόμενον καὶ κατὰ τὴν Μακεδονίαν λόγους ὑπὸ τινῶν διαδομένους ὅτι καθῆκε προάγειν ἐκ τῆς φυλακῆς τὸν παῖδα καὶ τὴν πατρῴαν βασιλείαν παραδοῦναι, φοβηθεὶς ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ προσέταξε Γλαυκίᾳ τῷ προεστηκότι τὴν μὲν Ῥωξάνην καὶ τὸν βασιλέα κατασφάξαι καὶ κρύψαι τὰ σώματα, τὸ δὲ γεγονός μηδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαγγέλθαι. The same piece of information is also in Just. 15.2.3–4, even though the passage erroneously refers to Heracles because Justin inverted the names of Alexander the Great’s sons in the course of epitomating Trogus (Cassander . . . occidi eum [= Herculem] tacite cum matre Barsine iubet corporaque eorum terra obrui, ne caedes sepultura proderetur). That this is a mere inversion due to Justin’s carelessness is proven by the fact that the sequence of the
events is reestablished in the corresponding prologue by Pompeius Trogus (Pomp.Trog. Prol.15: *ut Cassander in Macedonia filium Alexandri regis interfecit, ac alterum Polyperchon*; on Justin’s misinterpretation, see in particular Schachermeyr 1920: 332–37, whose conclusions, already accepted by Tarn 1921: 18–28, are reechoed in Wheatley 1998, 19, n. 31).

43. On the identification of the male remains in Tomb III with Alexander IV see, for example, Hammond 1982: 116; Green 1982: 132–33; Andronicos 1984: 231; Adams 1991: 27–33; Andronicos 1994: 166. For a brief recap of the status quaestionis on the three royal tombs at the Great Tumulus of Vergina, see above, n. 15.


45. On the *Babylonian Chronicle*, which constitutes the foundation for most modern reconstructions of royal chronologies for the years immediately following Alexander III’s death, see observations in Landucci Gattinoni 2007: 29–54, with full discussion of bibliography.

46. See Adams 1991: 30: “After all, sooner or later someone would wonder what had happened to the boy... As a terminus post quem, the *Babylonian Chronicle* records the first regnal year of Seleucus Nikator as 306/5, and Alexander’s death or the official announcement of it was the necessary precondition to that, which also fits in with the assumption of the royal titles by Antigonus, Demetrius and Ptolemy... Thus, we have a fairly tight timeframe for the official burial and hence for Tomb III.”

47. On the datelines rendering Tomb III more recent than Tomb II, see Andronicos 1984: 224; the same opinion is also expressed at Touratoglou 1995: 237. Borza and Palagia 2007: 117 simply date the burial of Alexander IV to 311/10 B.c. (or shortly thereafter) without comment or discussion.


49. On the so-called Tyre proclamation see Landucci Gattinoni 2003a: 81 and n. 137.


52. See Diod. 17.2.1; Just. 11.2.1; on Alexander’s initial actions see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 3–12.

53. See Diod. 19.52.5; on the funerals for Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Eurydice see also Diyllus, *FGrH* 73 F 1.

54. On the fate of Cassander’s family in general see Landucci Gattinoni 2003a: 79–87; see also Just.16.1.15–19, a detailed passage in which the
author highlights Demetrius’s “vengeance” against Cassander’s family: (Demetrius addresses the army) Cassandrum . . . , extinctorem regiae domus, non feminis, non pueris pepercisse nec cessasse, quoad omnem stirpem regiae subolis deleret. Horum scelerum ultionem, quia nequisset ab ipso Cassandro exigere, ad liberos eius translatam. Quamobrem etiam Philippum Alexandrumque, si quis manium sensus est, non interfectores suos ac stirpis suae, sed ulteres eorum Macedonie regnum tenere malle. Per haec mitigato populo rex Macedoniae appellatur. See also Plut. Demetr. 37.2–4, describing Demetrius’ accession to the Macedonian throne. Plutarch omits any explicit reference to Demetrius’ role as “avenger,” but accuses Cassander of having committed serious abuses against Alexander, even after the latter’s death (on this Plutarch passage, see Landucci Gattinoni 2003a: 169–84).

Chapter 12

1. Paradoxically, the enormous wealth of Egypt kept it from being annexed sooner than it was: Cic. De Rege Alexandrino, esp. FF 1–6. For a recent commentary on the fragments see Crawford 1994: 44–57.

2. For the decline in Ptolemaic international status and the shift in the balance of power that followed the premature death of Ptolemy IV, see Eckstein 2006: 104–16.

3. For example, in 163 B.C. the Roman Senate supported the partition of Ptolemaic rule between Ptolemy VI Philometor and his younger brother Ptolemy VIII Physcon, Pol. 31.10.

4. Ptolemaic Egypt was annexed by Octavian in 30 B.C. Thirty years earlier (63 B.C.) the Seleukid kingdom had succumbed to the forces of Pompeius and Lucullus. For a detailed history of the dynastic state of affairs in the Hellenistic Kingdoms, see Ogden 1999 and Whitehorne 1994.

5. One should note the proposal of Ptolemy I at the conference of Babylon, namely that the empire could, instead of depending upon a king, be governed by a council of generals that would decide by majority-voting (Curt. 10.6.13–15, Just. 13.2.12). As Mooren argues (1983: 233–40), this incident could suggest that kingship might not have been “that essential to the Macedonian state.” In practice, however, such alternatives were only considered in times of real crisis. This recommendation, essentially to bypass the traditional constitution of Macedonia, vanished into thin air when Ptolemy was assigned his own satrapy. He exhibited no interest in governing his satrapy according to majority vote. For royal succession in Argead Macedonia see Hatzopoulos 1986, contra Greenwald 1989.

7. For an overview of events until the Battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C. see Billows 1990.

8. The most straightforward case of an outside pretender is apparently that of Argaios, who in 393 B.C. appears to have expelled Amyntas III from his kingdom with the help of Illyrians. Diodorus (14.92.4) mentions that he ruled for two years after that, but acceptance of this comment has become increasingly challenged: see Borza 1992: 182, 297 with references. However, although we possess no information as to his origins or family, he does bear an Argead royal name. According to Herodotus (8.139.1) an Argaios ruled Macedonia around the middle of the seventh century B.C. As Argead royal names have a high frequency of repetition, this might imply that the pretender Argaios was in some way related to the royal house. Of course, without any additional evidence this remains only a conjecture.


15. Weber 1978: 212–301 distinguishes between three ideal types of legitimate authority: legal (which, as the outcome of a legally established impersonal order, cannot find its parallel in the Classical and Hellenistic world), traditional, and charismatic.


17. Consider the Memphis Decree (OGIS 96 ll. 35–38 of the Greek, Budge 1989) where the legitimacy accrued by the various benefactions is extended not only to the king’s children/successors, but also backward to his ancestors.


20. For the Greeks and Macedonians as the source of dynastic stability for the Ptolemies see Bagnall 2007: 279.

21. The only unambiguous reference to a cult and priesthood of Alexander the Founder (Κτίστης) comes from a papyrus of 120–121 A.D. (SB 3.6611): see Fraser 1972: i.212. However, the so-called Alexander Romance of Ps.-Callisthenes, which was never intended as an accurate
historical account, but the importance of which for Alexandrian traditions and insights on Ptolemaic propaganda is acknowledged, informs us that the institution of a priesthood of Alexander was provisioned in his will: Ps.-Call. Rec. α 3.33.19–20. For the cult of Alexander at Alexandria see Taylor 1927. For the value of Ps.-Callisthenes as Ptolemaic propaganda cf. Bosworth 2000. An equestrian statue of Alexander the Founder in Alexandria is described in some detail by Nikolaos Rhetor of Myra at Ps.-Libaniós Progymnasmata 12.27. As for the worship of Alexander as a hero from the foundation of Alexandria, see Ps.-Call. Rec. α 1.32.5–13. This passage includes the story of the killing of the great serpent by Alexander and a description of how the people of Alexandria offered sacrifices to the slayer as hero: . . . θυσία τελείται αὐτῷ τῷ ἡρωί. Also, at Ps.-Call. Rec. α 2.21.19–20, Alexander designates one Moschylas, whom he had left in charge of affairs in Egypt, to found a temple to his name. Interestingly, an Aischylus is mentioned in Arr. Anab. 3.5.3 and Curtius 4.8.4, but only as an overseer and without reference to any temple commission. Taylor 1927: 167 n.3 posits other examples of founders of cities that were worshipped as such during their lifetime.

22. Diod. 18.28.4–5, Paus. 1.7.1; Kosmetatou 2006: 241, with references. For the date of the institution of the dynastic cult see Könen 1994: 50 and Stewart 1993: 247.


24. Ps-Call. Rec. α 1.32.11–12 and 2.21.12–21. Sanctuaries of Alexander in Alexandria are mentioned in connection to the celebrations of Alexander’ birthday, which are called Alexandrina.


27. According to Schwarzenberg 1976: 235: “every self-respecting Alexandrian household had a shrine dedicated both to the founder of the city and to its good genius.”

28. Contra Stewart 1993: 247. Reproductions of some versions of the Aigiochos type and a list of extant figurines with bibliography can be found in Stewart 1993: 241–42.

29. For the state cult of Alexander see Fraser 1972: i, 215. The Egyptian priestly class had its own reasons for promoting the legitimation of the new dynasty ever since the conquest by incorporating its kings into the traditional Egyptian king worship. According to Burstein 1991: 141: “A break in the line of god kings that stretched back to the beginning of Egyptian history literally threatened Egypt’s continued existence by making impossible the proper performance of the rituals on which its very existence depended and was, therefore, intolerable.”

33. Alexander wearing an elephant headdress appeared first in Ptolemaic Egypt around 319 B.C., and it was not until much later that the theme was picked up by other Successors; cf. Mørkholm 1991: 27, 63. Hölbl 2000: 111 and n. 213, Stewart 1993: 233–34 with bibliography. If the gold double daric form the Mir Zakah treasure representing Alexander with the elephant headdress is authentic, then a currently puzzling Ptolemaic iconographic innovation would prove a unique imitation of an Alexander lifetime issue: Bopearachchi and Flandrin 2005 and Holt, unpublished conference paper read at the École des Hautes Ètudes in Paris, March 2007. My thanks extend to Professor Burstein for kindly sending me an electronic version.
35. Paus. 1.6.3. For Alexander’s wish to be buried at Siwah see Curt. 10.5.4, Just. 12.15.7. Caracalla’s visit to the Sema/Soma is the last one recorded, Herodian 4.8.9. Cf. Chugg 2002.
38. For Ptolemaic court poetry as promoting the cultural agenda of its patrons see Stephens 2003.
40. Satyros \( \text{FGrH} \) 631 F 1, preserved in Theoph. 2.7, \( P.Oxy \). 2465. For the Argive ancestry of the Macedonian kings see Thuc. 2.99. Satyrus’ genealogy ends with the reign of Ptolemy IV Philopator. Certainly, he wrote no later than the reign of Ptolemy VI Philometor when his Lives were epitomized by Heraclides Lembus: \( \text{Suda} \), s.v, \( \text{Ἡρακλείδης}, \) η 462, Diog. Laert. 8.40, 9.26.
41. \( \text{OGIS} \) 54, (246–241 B.C.).
42. See Tarn 1933: 57. \textit{Contra} Collins (1997) who argues that the story originated in Macedonia by Ptolemy Ceraunus.
43. Curt. 9.8.22, Paus. 1.6.2.
44. Callix. \( \text{FGrH} \) 627 F 2 ll. 305–07, Rice 1983, Nikolaos Rhetor at Ps.-Libanios Progymnasmata 25.1–9. The building was a commission of either Ptolemy I or II: Kosmetatou 2004: 243–44 with bibliography.
45. Ael. \( Fr \). 285.7–9, καὶ τὸ αἷμα αὐτῷ παρέχειν τροφήν ὡς γάλα.
46. Mylonas 1946.
47. \( \text{Syll.} \) Cop. 505 (open wings, no thunderbolt).
52. Sanctuary of Zeus at Dion, Diod. 17.16, Hes. F7 MW and Steph. Byz. s.v. Makedonia.
55. Kantorowicz 1957.
56. Greenwalt 1989, Paus. 1.6.8. The practice of choosing the future king either through co-regency, co-rule, or direct bequest was generally adhered to throughout the history of the Ptolemaic dynasty (Ogden 1999).
61. Ath. 13.557b–e.
62. For example the marriage of Stratonice, the sister of Perdiccas II, and Seuthes, the nephew of the Odrysian King, Sitalces, Thuc. 2.101.5.
63. Ptolemais to Demetrius Poliorcetes, Plut. *Dem.* 32; Lysandra to Alexander V of Macedon, Porphy. *FGrH* 695, 698; Eirene to Eunostos, king of Soli in Cyprus, Athen. 13.576e; Arsinoe to Lysimachus, Paus. 1.10.3.
64. Seibert 1967: 122.
66. Paus. 1.6.8.
74. For the infrequency of Egyptian consanguineous marriages, see Shaw 1992: 274.
75. *Suda* s.v. βασιλεία.
Chapter 13


2. For a recent discussion of the exiles decree, see Dmitrieve 2004.

3. Diodorus in praise of euergesia: e.g., 13.27.1; 20.93.6–7; 31.3.1–3; Sacks 1990, esp. 43 n 82, 68–70, 78–79, 103. See Hornblower 1981: 269, for Diodorus’ language, although she thinks (209–10) that in this passage he borrowed the concepts of euergesia and eunoia from Hieronymus.

4. Cf. Diod. 18.55.1–2; 20.102.1; Rosen 1967: 51; Hornblower 1981: 152; Flower 2000: 127. I am not persuaded by the argument that Diodorus used a source other than Hieronymus for the Lamian War: e.g., Sordi 2002: 433–43, 463–75.

5. Diod. 19.17.5–6 erroneously calls the river Tigris.

6. See Bosworth 1992b: 68 (although he thinks that Plutarch exaggerated Peucestas’ negative portrait in his Eumenes); Schäfer 2002, e.g. 156; Anson 2004: 9.


8. See, e.g., Diod. 18.39.7, 41.4–7; 19.48.3–4. Hieronymus’ criticism of his former patrons Antigonus and his son Demeterius was never harsh and I see little hindrance for him to include it, as well as his preferential treatment of Eumenes, in his history, especially if he published it under Antigonus Gonatas; cf. also Hornblower 1981: 228–32; Simonetti-Agostinetti n.1 above.


11. Plut. Eum. 10.3–8. Although Diodorus and Plutarch give different versions of later negotiations between Eumenes and Antigonus, Diodorus’ account of this episode in 18.41.6–7 is briefer rather than different from Plutarch. Hence, I cannot share Anson’s suggestion that

12. Hornblower 1981: 12, 232, is more convincing than Seibert 1969: 170–71, who identifies in Diod. 19.81 two different sources. She also speculates that Hieronymus might even be one of the advisers reported to have (wisely) warned Demetrius against going into battle.


15. Plutarch perhaps overstates Euemenes’ virtues in his biography (see Bosworth 1992b), but I see no compelling reason to attribute his account here to Duris or a source other than Hieronymus, as claimed by Fontana 1960: 231–32; Hornblower 1981: 69. For the following, cf. Vezin 1907: 101–02; Schäfer 2002: 148–49.


18. Diod. 19.43.1–44.3; Plut. Eum. 17.1–19.3; Nepos Eum. 10.1–12.4; Just. 3.1–4.21; Polyaeunus 4.6.13.

19. Diod. 19.34.7, 37.1, 39.1; Plut. Eum. 15.4; Nepos Eum. 8.1–4. Polyaeunus 4.6.11 uniquely asserts that Eumenes himself distributed his army along a 1,000-stade road, but this distance alone is confirmed by the other sources.

20. Cf. Bosworth 2002: 142 n. 158, who confuses, however, Plutarch with Nepos when he says that the former highlights the troops’ luxuriousness. Plutarch’s 15.1 tois hēgemosin entruphōntes is best translated as “mocking the commanders.”


23. Distance covered by the army: Plut. Eum. 15.4; Polyaeunus 4.6.11. Eumenes’ mastering the troops: Diod. 19.38.2; cf. Plut. Eum. 15.9–19.

24. Diod. 19.33.1–34.7. See Bosworth 2002: 174–76, who argues that Strabo’s (15.1.30; cf. 62) very similar account may come also from this source.


27. Isaurians: Diod. 18.22.1–8; Pisidians: Diod. 18.46.1–47; Nabatean digression: Diod. 19.94–99.3, and Hieronymus as the source: e.g., Jacoby FGrH IIC no. 154, 559; Hornblower 1981: 144.
Chapter 14

1. The most famous of Alexander’s historians was Callisthenes until the two fell out and the king put the historian/educator to death. See especially Pearson 1960: 22–49.


3. Every Alexander historian writes of the problems which developed between Alexander and his Macedonians, especially after his policy of “orientalization” was launched. For a convenient recap of the growing rift, see O’Brien 1992: 101–210.

4. Examples are a legion, but see especially Anson 2004: 150–152, using Nepos (Eum. 7.2) where Eumenes even claimed to have had dreams of Alexander and consequently erected an “Alexander tent” to impress his army, from which orders were issued in Alexander’s name.

5. Pseudo-Callisthenes Alexander Romance passim.

6. From medieval France to the Islamic world, legends of Alexander flourished long after the vestiges of his political legacy were gone. See Stoneman 1991 passim for examples.


8. Of the major early historians Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon all mention Macedonia, with especially the first two providing brief excursions into its history and myth as background for their particular interests (e.g., Hdt. 8.136 ff.; Thuc. 2.100 ff.). None, however, provides an extended account of Macedonian history.

9. The extant accounts of Diodorus, Quintus Curtius, Arrian, Plutarch, and Justin provide the bulk of our knowledge today.

10. I will use the term Argead because I think it the term the Macedonians used to describe the dynasty which ruled Macedon from the seventh to the fourth centuries know of its use in Egypt in the third century to refer to the dynasty, and Athenaeus (659f) uses the word for what appear to have been dynastic rites. Based upon the purported Argive origins of the Macedonian royal house and Temenus, the eponymous link between the Greek polis and Macedonia (Hdt.8. 137), both Hammond 1989a and Hatzeopoulos 1996 are among the strongest proponents of the label Temenid.

11. Although some of the following authors have written on the topic more than once, see especially: Granier 1931; P. de Francisci 1948:ii, 345–495; Aymard 1950; Briant 1973; Lock 1977; Errington1978; Anson 1985 and 2008; Adams 1986; Hammond 1989a; Borza 1990; and Hatzeopoulos 1996.

15. Hatzopoulos 1996.
16. The literature on the early Hellenistic period concerning the vicissitudes of dynastic experimentation is immense. Among the best major accounts of the last generation are Billows 1990; Green 1990; and Anson 2004.
17. Borza 1990: 161–179. See Greenwalt 1994; 1997; 2003. Demosthenes seems to have expressed the doubts of many when he questioned the Hellenism of Philip (Third Olynthiac 3.24 and Third Philippic 9.30 ff.). Certainly, he would have thought the Macedonians in general to have been even more barbaric.
18. Lock 1997: 98 and 107, respectively.
19. See Hatzopoulos v. 2 1996: epigraphical documents nos. 1, 2, 4, 5; IG i³ 89; IG ii 105.
28. The translation is Rackham 1972. The subsequent translations of Aristotle are also from Rackham.
29. Discussions of these issues abound, but see especially Greenwalt 1989: 19–45. On the early Argead king list and its evolution see Greenwalt 1985: 43–49. During the “historical” period the Argead king list ran: Alexander I, Perdiccas II, Archelaus, Orestes, Aeropus II, Amyntas II, Pausanias, Amyntas III, Alexander II, [Ptolemy, regent, probably not an Argead], Perdiccas III, Philip II, Alexander III, Philip III/Alexander IV. All known pretenders to the status of kingship were also Argeads.
33. For Attalus in particular: Diod. 16.92–98.
34. See especially Fredricksmeyer 1979a and 1979b.
35. Plut., Alex. 9.4–10.8; especially 9.5 makes explicit mention of the disorders of Philip’s household.
36. See especially Errington 1978, for a review of the evidence.
37. On the unworthiness of Arrhidaeus for rule, see Greenwalt 1985; Carney 2001. For an excellent account of the troubles after Alexander the Great’s death from the family’s point of view, see Carney 2006: 60–87.
Chapter 15

1. All translations of Justin are from Develin and Heckel 1994: 91–92.


3. The number of books on Alexander is enormous, and Alexander can be lauded or condemned depending on the perspective of the author. Among the more recent biographies may be singled out Green 1974, Hammond 1989b, Hammond 1997, Cartledge 2003, and Worthington 2004. The best scholarly biography is still Bosworth 1988a, and see also Bosworth 1996. For more bibliography and discussion, see the bibliographic essays at Cartledge 2003: 327–47 and Worthington 2004: 320–332.

4. See below on the date of Justin.

5. There is no need to rehearse the details of these two kings’ reigns or to give copious references to all points in this essay: for these, any of the modern books cited in notes 2 and 3 (which quote further bibliography) may be consulted.

6. On the cultural and political significance of Alexander for Rome, how he may have been shaped by Roman political and cultural life, and these effects on writers of the time, see Spencer 2002. The best discussion of the problems of the sources for Alexander is Bosworth 1988b, and on this issue see further below.

7. On the relationship of Justin’s work to the original work by Trogus, see Yardley 2003; cf. Hammond 1991.

8. See further, Syme 1988 (arguing for the late date).


16. Currently collected together in Jacoby, FGrH IIB, nos. 117–53, with a German commentary in IID at pp. 403–542. (A completely new edition of FGrH is in progress, entitled Brill’s New Jacoby, publication of which will
continue until 2013.) Translations of all primary sources are in Robinson 1953: i; cf. Worthington 2003a. For discussion, see Pearson 1960.


19. Theopompus, FGrH 115 F27. On Theopompus, see Flower 1994, especially chapters 5–6 on Theopompus and Philip.

20. Many of the allegations must be taken with a pinch of salt. There is, for example, no proof that Philip was a pederast: see Worthington 2008: 70.

21. Dem. 1.5, 8.40, 19.265 and 342, 18.48, for example.

22. Cf. Diod. 16.93.3–4, Justin 8.6.5–8, 9.8.6–7.

23. This passage is one of several that has been wrongly interpreted to mean that Philip sought divine honors in his lifetime or was accorded them: see further, Worthington 2008: 228–33.


27. On the Lamian War, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 107–17, for example.


29. The phrase is difficult to translate precisely; literally it would mean “to do with (?according to) (the) war” but the first six marriages were not the product of one military engagement. On Philip’s marriages see further Tronson 1984 and Worthington 2008: 172–74, both also discussing this phrase. Very good arguments for Philip’s seventh marriage to Cleopatra being for a political reason, rather than for a personal reason, as is commonly accepted, are put forward by Carney 2000: 73–74.

30. Arr. 4.19.5, Plut. Alex. 47.7–8; on the political nature of the marriage, see Worthington 2004: 188–90.


33. [Plutarch], Moralia 327c, says that “all of Macedonia was ablaze with discontent, and was looking to Amyntas and the sons of Aeropus.” This is hardly true. Antipater immediately proclaimed Alexander king (Justin 11.1.7–10), the people quickly swore their loyalty to him (Diod. 17.2.1–2), and Alexander embarked on a purge of possible opponents: see further Worthington 2008: 187–89.
34. On these aspects, see Worthington 2010.
35. Cf. Aes. 3.165, Din. 1.34, with Gunderson 1981.
40. Tarn 1948 and Lane Fox 1973, both of whom idealistically set up Alexander as a Homeric hero type who could do next to no wrong. On the issue of Alexander’s greatness, see the ancient sources and modern works in Worthington 2003a: 296–325.

Chapter 16

5. Haegemans and Stoppie 2004: 147–48 neatly summarize the different purposes that scholarship has attributed to Valerius’ project. Rightly, I think, they find ethics at its heart (though cf. 2004: 167) and contra Wardle 1998: 14, I don’t see that any distinction between ethical and rhetorical is practicable or desirable.
7. There are, of course, significant connections between what Valerius is doing with his “home” and “abroad” examples, and Plutarch’s comparative “lives” of Greeks and Romans; see Freyburger and Jacquemin 1998, and (on Valerius and Velleius) Jacquemin 1998.


10. “Deeds and sayings worthy of memory” (1, Praef.). The text used is Shackleton Bailey 2000; translations are my own.

11. See Spencer 2002: 2–5. Valerius’ self-rootedness in paruitas is most straightforwardly a balance to the Optimus Maximus (Best and Greatest) that characterizes Jupiter, two subclauses back. But before dismissing Alexander from this magnus/paruus (great/slight) equation, consider Valerius’ extremely rare self-insertion into the text at 4.7 ext. 2b: here he plays Hephaestion to his patron Pompeius’ Alexander (discussed below, section 5). The in-text joke is that we’ve just been told (by Alexander) of Hephaestion nam et hic Alexander est (this man is also Alexander, 4.7 ext. 2a).

12. We do get a magnus in the epitome of Januarius Nepotianus (1.1. ext. 5), plus a maximus animus (greatest of spirit; highly magnanimous) for Alexander (4.7 ext. 2a). After rex, Macedonia is the next most popular associative term.

13. The imago was the death mask of an ancestor who has held public office; I suggest, here, that Alexander’s translation into a part of Rome’s backstory turns him into a legendary ancestor for Rome (see Gowing 2005 for this kind of process). On imagines: Flower 1996.


15. One might push the boundaries here and speculate that in Alexander as “self-made man,” born in a Podunk town in a Mediterranean backwater and coming to prominence specifically because of a notionally just war, exemplary history was a category waiting to happen. And Rome was the place to develop it.

16. Livy 9.18.8–19; Valerius Maximus 1, Praef.

17. Chaplin 2000 provides an excellent study of this aspect of Livy.


19. The chapter headings are from Shackleton Bailey 2000, but probably give a good sense of what the likely sections would have been. For a clear summary of the text’s form see Skidmore 1996: 31–34. Skidmore introduces three useful parallels for Valerius’ prefatory statement on the rationale for his project: Vitruvius 5, Praef. 5; Diodorus Siculus 1.3.2–5; Plutarch Apophthegmata, Praef. 172E.
20. Faranda 1971: 16. Some number crunching: as I count it, Alexander crops up (including in the epitomized sections) twenty-four times, outdoing all other challengers except Scipio Africanus Maior (forty-nine entrances), Hannibal (forty), Pompey (thirty-seven), Marius (and his legacy, twenty-nine plus five), Caesar (including Diuus Iulius, twenty-four plus eight), Sulla (thirty), Scipio Africanus Minor (twenty-seven). See Bloomer 1992: 150 and Wardle 2005: 145–46 and n. 26 for slightly different figures.


23. *Quamquam quid attinet mores natione perpendi? <is> in media barbaria ortus sacrilegium alienum rescidit . . . (1.1 ext. 3).

24. Thirty-one instances of Carthage; twenty-eight references to Carthaginians; twenty-three instances of *Poenus*, and forty-eight of *Punicus* (alternate terms for Carthage and Carthaginians).

25. Livy’s Hannibal at the Colline Gate was particularly influential (26.10.5–6). See also Juvenal *Satires* 6.290; 7.161. Cf. Faranda: 1971: 23 on Valerius’ Hannibal: “Basti pensare al giudizio che spesso ricorre su Annibale, considerato semplicemente e semplicisticamente un furbastro generale, e non quel grande implacabile stratega e tattico che fu.” (All too often, judgment of Hannibal resorts to stereotyping him simply and simplistically as a sneaky commander rather than as the great, relentless strategist and tactician that he was).


27. See, e.g., Spencer 2002: 94–97 on the aftermath (Curtius 6.2.1–5).

28. Only Hannibal (of Valerius’ *alieni*) appears more often than Alexander.


30. This proposal dovetails with the speculations of Schultz 2007 on Philip and Zeus: belief systems are complex and subject to nuance and context.

31. Mueller 2002: 95–96. Mueller draws in a different but equally telling comparison, proposing that we compare 9.5 ext. 1 with Valerius’ comments on Scipio’s conversational relationship with Capitoline Jupiter, whom he was accustomed to visit (4.1.6). See Spencer 2002: 178–79 on Scipio, Jupiter, and Alexander.


35. 5.1.10. Valerius’ use of *diuinus princeps* to refer to Julius Caesar is an intriguing anachronism—divinity and supreme power are being applied retrospectively.

36. Cf. 7.2 ext. 10, where poor judgment characterizes Alexander’s rule, and Philip’s conquests are mercenary rather than military achievements.


38. My thanks go first to this volume’s editors, but also to the anonymous readers, and Gideon Nisbet, for intellectual support and advice throughout.

Chapter 17

I am grateful to Elizabeth Carney for her gracious invitation to speak at the “Philip II and Alexander III: Father, Son, and Dunasteia” conference at Clemson University. I also thank Brian Bosworth for the reference and comments on Arrian during my paper discussion.

1. Starting with the work of Ernst Badian (e.g., 1958; 1964). Gene Borza’s introduction to Wilcken 1967 (pages ix–xxviii) is a still valuable survey for the history of Alexander studies through the late 1960s.

2. For the Alexander-myth in Greece, Rome, and beyond, starting points are Badian 1976 and Goukowsky 1978–81; see also Carlsen, Due, Steen-Due, and Poulsen, eds. 1993; Baynham 1998; Bosworth and Baynham 2000; Spencer 2002; Koulakiotis 2006; Stoneman 2008.

3. David Hogarth’s admiring work on Philip (1897) was ahead of its time; see also Hammond 1994. Philip’s reputation began to increase hugely with Manolis Andronicos’ discovery of a luxurious tomb in Macedonia that has been attributed to him (see, e.g., Andronicos 1977; 1978; 1981), although to the dissent of some (e.g., Lehmann 1980; 1981; 1982; Prestianni Giallombardo and Tripodi 1980; Adams 1980).


5. As is well known, Alexander “the Great,” was a Roman invention. The epithet *magnus* was attributed to the Macedonian king first by Plautus in the third or second century B.C. (*Most.* 775), and then adopted in his honor by Pompey, on whom see Stewart 2003: 57.

6. The most influential being Droysen (1833), who saw Philip as unifier but Alexander as world-mover, and, in the anglophone world, Tarn (1948), who saw Alexander as world-unifier.
7. These writers were not merely following traditions: Hellenistic writers like Polybius and Diodorus seem to have preferred Philip to his son. For Diodorus, for example, see Ian Worthington’s essay in this volume.


9. Whereas in the Archaic period of Greece, for example, a person might prove his Greekness by stating his lineage (like Alexander I of Macedon did when he wanted to qualify for the Olympics: Herodotus 5.22, 9.45; see Borza 1982; Badian 1982b; Borza 1999: 27–50), in the empire he would be more inclined to do so by giving an excellent declamatory speech in the style of Demosthenes, for which he would receive kleos, or glory.

10. Graham Anderson’s suggestion that Greeks could make “their” subjugation by Alexander and Philip “a very great virtue by necessity” rightly hints at the analogy between these two powers (1993: 119), as do others (see Asirvatham 2005: 109 n. 8). But Anderson’s view that the Macedonian hegemony is something they could only hedgingly accept assumes that Second Sophistic writers were compelled to tackle particular subjects by the classicizing impulse. By contrast, I believe that Alexander and/or Philip are useful as idealized figures only inasmuch as they help a writer claim “Greek” authority on the Roman province of power.

11. Aristides wrote two anti-Philip orations carefully wrought from a series of Demosthenean slurs (itself an unusual sign of interest in Philip, and a sign of extreme Atticism); elsewhere in Aristides’ speeches, Alexander gets credit for founding Alexandria, but little else. For Aristides, Macedonian history is a foil to the superior might of Rome (Asirvatham 2008).


13. Philip is not the only one whose shortcomings are criticized: Second Sophistic writers who do not idealize Alexander are likely to take the Rome-centric view that, while Alexander was impressive, he was unable to keep his empire; see Arist. Rom. Or. 24; App. Rom., praef. 10 (where Alexander and Philip of are largely spoken of as a unit).


15. Not all contemporaneous genres partook in this “masking.” Sons’ strong desire to subvert the potential oppression of patria potestas is reflected by the large number of Latin declamations from 50–200 A.D. that deal with father-son conflict, especially over matters of inheritance (according to Vesley 2003 [180], over one-third of the speeches found in Seneca the Elder, Pseudo-Quintilian, Calpurnius Flaccus, and Quintilian).

17. The dates are not secure, but there is no good reason not to think that Dio’s *Kingship Orations* postdates Trajan’s interest in Alexander, whether the latter interest was weak or strong (see Moles 1990: 299–300). In arguing for the Romanizing nature of Plutarch’s texts, I tend to assume a similar postdating.

18. The anti-Alexander/Nero strain is most powerful among philosophizing Romans like Lucan and Seneca, who saw him as a Caesarean (for bibliography see Fears 1974: 122 n. 55) and a Stoic anti-type (Stoneman 2003: 336). On Trajan’s Alexander imitation, see e.g., Cass. Dio 68.29f, Julian *Caes*. 333a, 335d and the *Hist. Aug.*, Hadrian 4.9.


23. Reading the *Kingship Orations*, one can strongly sense Dio peeking through the mask from time to time: in *Oration* 1, appearing as Hermes, who mediates between Zeus and Heracles (presumably another Nerva/Trajan pair); morphing into an idealized Alexander halfway through *Oration* 2; disguised as the wandering Cynic philosopher Diogenes in *Oration* 4. (In *Oration* 3 he is most evidently himself, wearing the mantle not of a flatterer to Trajan, as he insists, but as an authority on good kingship versus tyranny).


25. Rachel Kousser (2008: 85–87) has recently shown, for example, how Trajan’s famous monument to his Dacian conquests, “Trajan’s Column,” legitimized the emperor through visual symbols that mixed *virtus* with *humanitas*. Kousser points specifically to the depiction of the goddess Victoria, which balances symbols of military victory (e.g., she is inscribing a shield with foot resting on a helmet, and is flanked by two trophies) with allusions to classical Greek representations of Aphrodite in clothing and hairstyle (the high-belted chiton and hair in topknot and bun). For imperial *humanitas* (for which some use the neologism *humanitas Romana*), see Bauman 2000: 20–27.

26. *Or*. 4.8 is a typical Dionian statement on Alexander’s “war problem”: “Alexander himself needed his Macedonian phalanx and his Thessalian cavalry and Thracians and Paeonians and many others, if he was to go wherever he wished and get what he wanted. Diogenes, on the other hand, went forth all alone and was perfectly safe, both day and night, to go wherever he wanted.” See also *Or*. 1.6.

27. Assuming correspondences between Greek and Roman terms is a tricky business, but to my mind specifically Rome-conscious contexts
like that of Dio’s speeches justify imagining what words Greeks used for Roman concepts, if not specific words. For the way in which philanthróπia first inspired Republican humanitas—and then was later reinspired by imperial humanitas—see Asirvatham 2005: 117 and n. 46 for bibliography and Bauman 2000: 10–19.

28. In Or. 74.14 Philip appears in his classic role as Demosthenean barbarian.

29. Or. 1.59–84. Fears 1974 argues that the existence of positive Stoic portraits of Alexander in writers like Dio and Arrian proves that not all Hellenistic Stoic views of him were negative, but I would argue that Dio’s views in particular have less to do with old images of Alexander than Trajan’s self-presentation as a Stoic.

30. In Oration 1, it is suggested that Heracles, whom Dio notes was unclothed and unarmed other than with a club and lion’s skin (61), had harder things to do than to fight lions: for lions were nothing compared to “the savage and wicked men” (tous anémerous kai ponérous anthrópous) he had to chastise and the “arrogant tyrants” (huperéphanon turannôn) he had to destroy in order to deliver the earth and the human race. Note that for Plutarch, the unruly, authority-subverting Alcibiades was also a “lion” (Alc. 2.2–3), and Alexander may be a sated lion after his destruction of Thebes in the Alex. 13.2. See also Stewart 1993 (74–78) on lion features in Alexander’s official portraiture.

31. For a comprehensive account of Alexander’s relationship to divinity, see Fredricksmeyer 2003.

32. Moles 1990: 312 collects the examples from the Kingship Orations: 1.37–41, 45, 59, 64–67, 73, 83–84; 2.72, 3.50–54; 4.21–23, 27, 31, 38–43.

33. Aristotle is a figure who has loomed large in Alexander mythography. The popularity in the Middle Ages of a fictional “letter” from Alexander to Aristotle about India is a case in point (Stoneman 2008: 238).

34. A conclusion based on its sympathies with Trajanic archaeological material: see Roche 2002. The question of which work, Dio’s or Pliny’s, came first, and what their common source might be has borne little fruit over the course of much discussion (see Moles 1990: 301–02). I am satisfied with the idea that the common source for these ideas is Trajan’s own ideology, which by definition would have simply been “out there” for thinking men to grasp and mold into the form they preferred. On the pervasive influence of imperial ideology on Rome’s subjects, see Ando 2000.


38. It is not necessary to draw a direct line here from Trajan-Nerva to Philip-Alexander in order to see Romanizing (as opposed to strictly classicizing) elements in De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute.
39. On Alexander’s religion in the Life of Alexander, see Asirvatham 2001 and below.

40. Carney (2006: 132–35) points out how Olympias’ harsh treatment in the Life of Alexander has over-influenced generations of scholars who have ignored the more positive image of her found in the Moralia.

41. According to Pelling 2002: 303–05, Plutarch’s level of interest in Alexander’s childhood is unusual in ancient biography. We often see an emphasis on the education of a statesman, but less often the behavior that will prefigure adult behavior. The Life of Alexander has both. The influence may be from Plutarch’s sources: there seems to have been at least one work contemporary with Alexander on his childhood, modeled on Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. But I would argue that Plutarch’s use of these stories of Alexander that foreshadow his imperial accomplishments owes as much to the present as to the past.

42. While Alexander is not called a “philosopher” in the Life as in De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute, he is presented throughout the biography as having a philosophical attitude toward not only the day-to-day temptations of alcohol and sleep, but also the trappings of conquest.

43. This idea is supported by Plutarch more or less until Alexander’s murder of Clitus and the proskynēsis episode with Callisthenes, when the more “tragic” elements of Alexander’s outsized personality begin to take permanent hold. See Asirvatham 2001: 108–24.

44. See Asirvatham 2001, 112–16.

45. Philip is not always denigrated by Plutarch, who seems to take a page from Polybius when he emphasizes the king’s own philanthrōpia in Dem. 23.4.

46. The language of Alexander’s humanitas, incidentally, provides an interesting contrast with that of Polybius—who had labeled Philip, and not Alexander, as a model of praoτēs, megalopsuchia, epieikēia, and philanthrōpia (“mildness,” “generosity,” “gentleness,” and “humaneness”) (5.10.1). In stark contrast to Second Sophistic authors, however, Polybius doubted the ability of paideia to affect philanthrōpia (Bauman 2000: 5, 11)—the root, as it were, of Second Sophistic authors’ wishful thinking about Rome.

47. His hybridity is suggested by Lucian (Alex. 2), who calls him “the disciple of Epictetus, a Roman of the highest distinction, and a life-long devotee of letters.”


49. Apparent in the long list of the military dispositions he gives in Anab. 3.11.8–12.5, the most detailed description of the Macedonian army in Arrian’s corpus, and “rightly taken as one of the principal bases for modern reconstruction” for the Macedonian forces (Bosworth 1980–95: i, 300).
52. Critical reactions to Alexander’s *pothos* (or Latin *cupido*) are not rare: the king’s acceptance of his human limits is a major theme of the *Alexander Romance*; Quintus Curtius describes Alexander as “forgetful of his mortal state” (*humanae sortis oblitus*) when he questions the priest at Siwah (4.7.25; cf. Baynham 1998: 161). I do find it striking, however, in a generally encomiastic and war-themed work like the *Anabasis*.

Chapter 18

1. A strong case could also be made for Alexander’s encounter with the dead pharaoh Sesonchosis in the “cave of the gods” at *AR* 3.24 as a variety of *katabasis*.
2. This is made explicit twice: *AR* 2.39 and 2.41(β).
3. The relevant portion of the Armenian translation is §209, at Wolo-hojian 1969: 115–16. The tendency to regard the water-of-life motif as a late insertion *tout court* into the *Romance* tradition, as found at Friedländer 1910, Jouanno 2002: 268–71, accordingly seems precarious. For the general dating of the recensions see Stoneman 1996: 601–09, 2007: lxxiii–lxxxiii, 2008: 230–32 and Jouanno 2002: 247–465. For the personal names and their significances see Stoneman 2008: 146–47 and Jouanno 2002: 271–80: *Ounna* means “Hun”; the name *Neraida*, as it stands, is built on what we know as the modern Greek term for water, *nero*. Note also, more broadly, Stoneman 2008: 154–69 for the important reception of this episode of the *Romance* in the Arabic tradition (super-seding Dawkins 1937). I thank Richard Stoneman for his direct advice on these matters and for giving me access to his work in advance of publication on these points and much else in this paper, but the views it expresses are not his.
4. Hes. *Op*. 169–72, Pind. *Ol*. 2.68–72 (more—and different?—on reincarnation from Pindar at *Threnodies* F133 Snell-Maehler = Pl. *Meno* 81b–c), Pl. *Grg*. 523ab (the last simultaneously sending the unjust to Tartarus). Indeed in the eighth century A.D. recension *ε* of the *AR*, the birdlike creatures tell Alexander that it is forbidden for him to tread not upon the *Land* but actually upon the *Isles* of the Blessed (*makarōn nēsoi*).
5. For a recent reassertion of the fundamentally Orphic nature of the tablets, see Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 179–205.
6. Graf and Johnston 2007 no. 39 (properly excluded from Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008) hails from Manisa in Asia Minor, but cannot be securely identified as belonging to the Orphic set.
7. For the eventual blessed state awaiting the tablet-bearers, see Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 169–78.


10. Hom. *Od*. 4.568 (the context is Proetus’ prophecy that Menelaus will be sent to Elysium when he dies), Pind. *Ol*. 2.70–72.


12. Dustuchias—a lack of blessedness?

13. Of course it must also be noted here that the spring of eternal life (or eternal youth) is itself a widely recurring folk legend with its own independent tradition: see Thompson 1955–58 E80, H1321, Uther 2004 nos. 551, 707; cf. Romaios 1973 and Stoneman (forthcoming) on 2.39, with further references. Hdt. 3.23 knew of an Ethiopian spring in which nothing could float, but which conferred longevity.

14. Dowden 1989: 712 n.77 makes a vestigial comparison between Alexander’s right turn and the right turns on tablets in tombs of “ancient mystics.” The right turn is not explicit either in the Armenian translation or in Bergson’s reconstruction of the basic β recension, but it is presupposed by the former. For the Armenian translation’s account of the episode ends with Alexander sealing the gates to the land and writing “on the stone all that we had seen” (in Wolohojian’s translation): this etiolated and undermotivated denouement must be a simplification of an already-existing account in which Alexander more specifically inscribed the advice to turn right, as he does in L.


16. Note here too the early third-century B.C. epigram of Leonidas of Tarentum at *Anth. Pal*. 16.230, evidently laden with underworld imagery: the poem tells travellers not to drink from the adjacent pool, but to pass on in the same direction over a hill, where they will come to a spring colder (*psuchroteron*) than the snow of the north; cf. Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 35.


21. *Suppl. Hell.* no. 980: “Go then as a blessed traveller, go as one destined to see the fair places of the pious, Philicus, rolling out well-sung words from an ivy-clad head and revel to the Isles of the Blessed . . .” (ἐρχεο δὴ μακάριστος ὁδοιπόρος, ἔρχεο καλοὺς / χώρους εὐσεβέων ὤφόμενος, Φίλικε / ἐκ κισσηρεφέος κεφαλῆς εὐύμνα κυλίων / ῥήματα, καὶ νήσους κόμασον εἰς μακάρων. . .). Cf. Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 127. For shining trees in association with an Isle of the Blessed, see Pindar *Olympian* 2.70–73.


23. The term is mistranslated at Graf and Johnston 2007: 5, 17, 35, and curiously excluded from discussion at 111–12.

24. τί χώραν πατεῖς, Ἀλέξανδρε, τὴν θεοῦ μόνου;


26. This subordinate episode is only partly represented in the Armenian translation and in Bergson’s reconstruction of the β recension, neither of which make mention of the old man or his sons, but even so it may be presumed to lie behind them in full form. Both of these accounts contain the device of the mares and the foals (savagely overedited in the case of the Armenian translation), but attribute the initiative to take the mares while leaving the foals behind to Alexander himself. However Bergson’s β also includes the sequence in which Callisthenes advises Alexander to take with him into the Land of the Blessed an army consisting only of his “friends, a hundred boys and 200,000 [!] picked men.” In L this sequence serves, quite appropriately, to account for the exclusion of the old men from the army, but here it is redundant. Its inclusion therefore presupposes that the full version of the subordinate episode, including the old man and his sons, already exists.

27. It is a town’s custom to kill all the old men. But one young man cannot bring himself to kill his father, and so he hides him in the cellar. The town is then called to arms to fight a monster that lives deep in a cavern with hundreds of labyrinthine passages. The father warns his son that even if the monster is killed, death will await him and the other men afterward, because they will not be able to find their way out of the tunnels. So, calling upon the wisdom of his years, he advises him to take their black mare and her foal with him into the cave, to kill and bury the foal at the cave-mouth and then take the mare with him into the cave, so that she will then guide him back to the foal. The young man does as bidden and after the monster has been killed does indeed use the mare to
guide himself and the other men safely out the cave. When pressed by his fellows to reveal how he has come by such wisdom, he will only consent to tell them after they have sworn that they will do him no harm. The others are so impressed by what he tells them about his father’s advice that they realize the advantage in preserving their old men and abolish their cruel custom. Cf. Gaster 1919 and Stoneman (forthcoming) on 2.39.


29. This episode in turn exhibits a certain thematic affinity with the narratives of Alexander’s victory at the Persian Gates. In particular, Diodorus tells that he was guided over the mountain path here by a man who had lived in the mountains as a shepherd “for quite a few years” (ἐτη πλείω) and so come to know the topography well, with the king offering him great rewards. Note also the parallel loci, Curt. 5.4.1–20, Plut. *Alex*. 37 and Arr. *Anab*. 3.18.4–5. I thank Prof. Bosworth for drawing my attention to this.


33. Lucian *Dial. mort*. 12. At *Hermotimus* 4–5 Lucian alludes without irony to Alexander’s conquest of (the rock) Aornos in a fashion that presents it as a great and paradigmatic feat.

34. And cf. the cave setting of the Romanian folktale recounted above.

35. πορεύσομαι μεθ’ ὑμῶν ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ στρατοῦ.

Chapter 19


2. On the rival projects and their prepublicity see Nisbet 2008: 112–19.

3. On non-Western receptions see Pomeroy 2007: 103–11 and for background Wood 1997; on the Shatner *Alexander* as background to the


5. Lane Fox 2004: 7 colludes in downplaying the resemblance of Stone’s film to Rossen’s, drastically misreporting the content of the latter: “On screen, the main precursor is Robert Rossen’s unsatisfactory *Alexander the Great* . . . It ends early in Alexander’s career, because the attempt to tell the whole story in a sequence proved impossible in two hours.”

6. The classic treatments are Hark 1993 and Hunt 1993.


8. Wyke 1997, is, in my view, the landmark work in the study of the ancient world in film. Reception of Rome in evangelical melodrama and other nineteenth-century popular entertainments is explored by numerous contributors to Edwards (ed.) 1999; see now also Malamud 2008, specifically on American material.

9. Conversely, at the level of mise-en-scène, the *peplum* is invariably compromised by its secondary relation to the established costuming and set design of Roman epic: Nisbet 2008: 8–9, 16–18, 24–30.


12. The classic formulation of semiotic literary theory’s “Death of the Author”—the dethroning of the author’s person as a source for, or authority on, the meaning of a literary text—is Barthes 1977, incorporating an essay first written ten years earlier. Auteur Theory was a school of criticism within film studies, predicated on the idea of the director as a creative artist who alone determined a film’s meaning—in other words, an Author in the old-fashioned sense. Modish in the 1950s, it is largely redundant in contemporary film theory but enjoys a demotic afterlife in home-format media merchandising, where director’s cuts and commentaries add to the perceived value of the product for fans.

13. For a parallel from Philip’s ancient reception, see the chapter in this volume by Pownall on the reframing of Philip as a “bad” symposiast in the Second Sophistic.

14. Pomeroy 2007: 101–02: “The narrative is . . . confused by a desire to combine the mythological and the psychological. To Stone, Alexander is both the [legend]. . . and a man whose inner conflicts can be traced back to the family feuds between his father and mother. Myths, such as those of Oedipus killing his father and marrying his mother and of Medea murdering her children, are depicted as representing the hero’s psychological scars from his upbringing. . . . Bringing in modern psychology . . . undermines heroic codes.”
15. The effectiveness of this technique for a contemporary American audience is astutely analyzed, with specific reference to the New Age spirituality of *Gladiator*, by Cyrino 2005: 252–54.


18. On subtext in *Ben-Hur* see the very entertaining account by Vidal 1993, perhaps self-mythologizing just a little.

19. On how heterosexual panic conditions popular reception of the *peplum*, see Nisbet 2008: 35–38, 60–64; on *300* playing to subtext, 140–41.


21. Lane Fox 2004: 5.


Dell, H. J. 1964. The Illyrian Frontier to 229 B.C. Diss. Wisconsin.


Jacoby, F. 1923–. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Multiple volumes and parts. Leiden.


——— 1969. Untersuchungen zur Ptolemaios’ I. Munich
——— 1983. Das Zeitalter der Diadochen. Darmstadt


Welles, C. B. 1934. Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period. New Haven, Conn.


Index

Note: Only endnotes incorporating substantive discussion are referenced here.

Achilles 17–18, 29, 31–2, 55, 63, 77–8, 120, 194, 198, 200, 203, 223, 227–8, 238n32, 255n76
Ada 6–8, 233n4
Adaeus 93–4
Adaeus/Eurydice, daughter of Philip II, wife of Philip Arrhidæus 35–6, 44, 49–50, 52, 113–17, 120, 254n69
Adulis inscription 128
Aeacids 20, 252n39, 255n76
Aegae (Aigai, Vergina) 15–16, 22, 29, 34, 39, 44–51, 55, 114–16, 118–19, 127, 169, 248n23, 250n14, 251n36, 252n44, n45, n54, 253n59, n64, 254n68, n74, 276n15
Aeschines 38, 51
Agathos Daimon 126
Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas the regent 115, 147, 266n37, 276n22
Alcibiades 14, 17, 62, 195, 238n33, 297n30
Alexander (2004 movie) 43, 46, 217–31
Alexander I 30, 72, 74, 78, 99, 288, 295
Alexander II 36, 99–101, 154, 156, 271
Alexander III the Great passim
Alexander IV 113–21, 124, 131, 153, 278–9, 288n29
Alexander of Epirus 34
Alexander the Great (1956 movie) 217–31
Alexander Romance 126, 205–15, 282n21
Alexandria 15, 20, 124, 126–33, 228, 282n21, 295n11
Ammon 25, 95, 184–5, 200, 215, 220, 247n64
Amyntas I 48
Amyntas III 14, 17, 35–40, 99–100, 129, 281n8
Amyntas IV 37–8, 290n33
anastole 13, 18, 256n6
Anaximenes of Lampsacus 71, 97–9
Antigenses 137, 142
Antigonus I Monophthalmus 20–2, 86, 102, 113, 116–17, 119, 132, 136–47, 241n58, 266n50, 277n29, 279n46, 285n1, n8, n11
Antigonus II Gonatas 23, 138, 241n63, 258n21, 285n8
Antigonus III Doson 23
Antiochus I of Commagene 24
Antiochus III of Syria 85–6
Antipater 21–2, 36, 52, 74, 113–14, 118, 131, 138–9, 161, 171
Aornus 93, 214–16
Apelles 16, 19
Apollo 17, 20, 24, 46, 70–5, 79
Archelaus 129, 153–4, 158, 160, 200, 288
Argaeus 281n8
Argaeus passim; and dunasteia, 151–63; and the Ptolemies, 123–33
Argyraspids see Silver Shields
Aristobulus 26, 61, 69, 94, 203, 269n17
Aristocrates 1, 6–9, 234n14
Aristotle 14, 22, 64, 71, 151–63, 168, 191, 194, 198–201, 213
Arrhidaeus see Philip III
Arrhidaeus
Arrian passim, esp. 26–9, 38–9, 52, 77–8, 81–4, 89, 92–6, 103, 106–9, 193–6, 202–4, 271n36, 274n13
Arsinoe I 131
Arsinoe II 49, 132
Arsinoe, mother of Ptolemy I 128–9
Arsites 5, 233n6
Asthetairoi 81–90, 98
Athena 77–8
Athenaeus 13, 46, 194
Athens, Athenians passim, esp. 4–7, 13–14, 17, 44–7, 49, 52, 56–9, 72–4, 77, 80, 100, 155, 159–60, 193, 195
Attalus 8–9, 16, 33, 38, 56, 84–5, 161, 202
Audata/Eurydice, wife of Philip II 35
Augustus 179, 184, 196
Avernus 215, 302n32
beards 13–24
Bessus 29, 109, 203
birds 205–6, 212–13, 215
Blessed, Land of, Isles of 205–16
Bucephalas (-us) 201, 226
Calanus 60, 64
Callisthenes 26, 60–1, 64, 69, 71, 78, 80, 108, 155, 158, 168, 191, 205, 213, 247n64, 263nn68–9, 264n80, 301n26; see also Alexander Romance
Caria see Pixodarus
Carthage 96, 189, 227; see also Hannibal
Cassander 19, 22, 41, 52, 113–21, 128
Ceteus 146–7
Chaeronea 14–15, 33, 35, 37, 57–9, 64, 72, 180, 225
Chares of Mytilene 60–1, 64
chiliarchs, chilarchies 91–4
Chrysippus 13, 20
clemency 186–7
Cleopatra, daughter of Philip II, sister of Alexander III 34, 44, 47, 52, 132, 247n65, 249n4, 250n20
Cleopatra/Eurydice, wife of Philip II 7–8, 10, 33–4, 37–41, 45–6, 115, 202, 235n28, 254n69, 290n29
Clitarchus 107, 136, 216
Clitus the Black 21, 30, 56, 168, 213, 217, 220–2, 225–6
Clitus the White 82
Coenus 83–8, 88, 168
Companions see hetairoi
Craterus, 21, 85, 87, 137–9
Cunaxa 104, 108–9, 273n10
Curtius passim, esp. 26–7, 92–3, 105–9, 216
Cynna(ne) 51–2, 115–16, 255n76, 276n22
Daochus II 15
Darius III 15–16, 19, 77, 79, 103, 105, 188, 239n43
dekades 96–7
Delphi 15, 40, 46, 70–1, 73, 79, 81
Demades 57, 257n11
Demaratus of Corinth 8–11, 34, 202, 235n24
Demetrius I Poliorcetes 23, 48, 119–21, 138, 140–1
Demetrius II of Syria 24
Demetrius of Phalerum 118
Demosthenes 18, 57–9, 63, 65, 59–70, 75, 78, 97, 170, 173, 193, 225, 235n24, 257n11, n14, 260n56, 261n5, 288n17
Dio Chrysostom 196–9
Diodorus 113–21, 165–74
Diogenes 146, 197, 213
Dion 4–7, 75
Dionysus 17, 20, 46, 128, 200, 203, 215
drunkenness 8, 26, 55–65, 141, 167, 170, 175, 191, 218, 220, 224–5
dunasteia 151–63
Duris of Samos 46, 49, 60, 63, 135, 258n21, 285n1, 286n15

eagles 127, 129, 133
Egypt, Egyptians 5–6, 117, 125–32, 139, 227; see also Alexandria
Elysium 209–11
Ephemerides 61, 92
Ephippus of Olynthus 60–1, 64
Ephorus 69, 71–3, 80, 166
Eucleia 39–40, 45–6, 250n14, 253n64
euergesiai 124, 136
Eumenes of Cardia 52, 86–7, 102, 113, 135–8
Euphraeus 155
Europe, daughter of Philip II 44
Eurydice/Adea, daughter of Philip II see Adea/Eurydice
Eurydice/Audata, wife of Philip II 35
Eurydice/Cleopatra, wife of Philip II see Cleopatra/Eurydice
Eurydice, daughter of Antipater 36, 131
Eurydice, daughter of Sirrhas, wife of Amyntas III, mother of Philip II 35–40, 45–7, 49, 51
exempla 175–91
friendship 187–9
Gabene 144–7
Gaugamela 16, 29, 84–5, 87, 89, 100, 103–9, 272n1, 274n16
Hadrian 24, 203–4, 241n60
Hannibal 181–3
Hecatomnids see Pixodarus
hekatostys 94–6
Helios 17
Hephaestion 21, 60, 77, 82, 94, 188–9, 221, 227–31
Heracles, hero 16, 24, 32, 64, 74, 77–8, 127–9, 194, 198, 200, 205, 215, 223–4, 228
Heracles, son of Alexander III 117–18, 278n37, nn41–2
Hermolaus 25–32, 243n9, 244n22, 246n51
hetairoi 3, 11, 19, 21, 55–6, 63, 83, 85, 88, 98, 104–6, 160–2, 202, 235n28, 268n8, 274n13; see also asthetairoi, pezhetairoi
Hieronymus of Cardia 135–48, 285n1, n8, 286n12
Homer 17–18, 52–3, 55, 63–5, 77–8, 100, 120, 152, 156–7, 169, 194, 197–9, 203, 210, 238n32, 253n62, 256n88, 291n40; see also Achilles
homosexuality 17–18, 227–30, 238n36
horses 15, 22, 27–8, 30, 33, 95, 98, 104–9, 206, 216, 226, 271n43, 273n10, 274n13
hubris 25, 27, 30, 57–8
hunting 22, 26–9, 114
Hygieia 45–6, 251n39
hypaspists 82–9, 93, 104, 108
ilai 95, 98
Illyrians 8–10, 18, 34–5, 37, 52, 85, 87, 96, 100–2, 161, 172, 203
Ipsus 131
Isocrates 4, 6–7, 69, 73–4, 76, 78, 80
Issus 16, 25, 29, 32, 77, 85, 87, 96
Julius Caesar 177, 184, 186
Justin 47, 58, 69–74, 77–8, 118–19, 135–6, 165–74, 252n44, 278n42; see also Pompeius Trogus
kingship, theories of 151–63
kómos 55–7; see also drunkenness
Lagus 129
Lamia 258n21
Leochares 14, 35
Livy 51, 179
lochoi 94–5, 97
Ptolemy II Philadelphus 20, 128, 130–2, 258n21
Ptolemy III 128
Ptolemy IV 128
Ptolemy of Alorus 99–100, 288n29
Pyrgoteles 16
Pyrrhus 20, 81, 240n48

revenge 69–80
Rossen, Robert 217–31
Roxane 51, 113, 116–18, 171, 225, 229, 239n44, 252n50, 255n79
Royal Pages 25–32, 63, 104, 168, 243n7
Sacred War, First 74; Third 69–79; Fourth 75, 79–80
saris(s)a 81–90, 96, 100–1, 103–9, 265n22
Satyrus 7, 33, 128, 131, 283n40
Second Sophistic 193–204
Seleucus I Nicator 113, 119, 131, 140, 278n41, 279n46
Seleucus II 24, 240
Silver Shields 86–9, 102, 137, 142
Sopolis 26, 246n51
Speusippus 58, 69, 74, 78, 80, 155
Stoicism 13, 196, 198–9, 203–4
Stone, Oliver 43, 46, 217–31

suttee 145–6
symposia 55–65

tables, Orphic 205–16
Thebes 18, 69–70, 73, 99, 156
Theopompus 17, 56–60, 63, 65, 69, 71–4, 76, 80, 98, 170, 174, 238n36, 257n6, 257n8, nn13–14, 260n58, 261n5
Thessalonica (Thessaloniki) 114
Thessalonice 44, 113–14, 116, 121
Thessalus 3, 6, 9–11
Thrace, Thracians 82, 89, 97, 117, 131, 138, 147, 172
Tiberius 176–9, 184–5
Trajan 94, 196–200, 204
Trogus see Pompeius Trogus
Tychaion 129

underworld 205–16

Valerius Maximus 175–91
Velleius Paterculus 177
Vergina see Aegae

water of life 209–12
women, royal 33–41, 43–53; see also Olympias

Zeus 16–17, 39, 46, 75, 77–8, 129–30, 133, 199–200, 219–20, 224, 237n18, 247n64, 296n23